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The marine environment is under stress from marine pollution, over-exploitation of
marine living resources and over-exploitation of the coastal zones caused by the ever
intensifying human activities in the sea. Perceiving the problem of the degradation of the
marine environment, international society has established a variety of international legal
regimes with a view to resolving this problem. Since the United Nations Convention on
the Law ofthe Sea (the 1982 UNCLOS) is internationally recognized as the international
basis for the protection and sustainable development of the marine and coastal
environment and its resources, the regime for the protection of the marine environment
established thereunder constitutes a frameworkfor different international regimes for the
protection of the marine environment. In analyzing international regimes, regime theory
can be used as a theoretical tool. A regime is a norm-based institution composed ofa set
of substantives norms, procedural rules and behavioural aspects (convergent
expectations and compliance) in a given issue area. Since any legal regime evolves with
the passage of time, a theory ofevolution of legal regimes can be built up by identifying
different mechanisms of evolution, such as amendments, additional agreements,
evolutionary interpretation, rules of reference, sub-regimes. With these two sets of
theoretical tools, the regime for the protection of the marine environment under the 1982
UNCLOS is analyzed in this thesis, by reviewing its components and their relations with
those in other regimes.
Chapter 1 presents the nature of the issue-area of the protection of the marine
environment. Chapter 2 presents regime theory with a view to applying it to the analysis
of the regime for the protection of the marine environment under the 1982 UNCLOS. In
Chapter 3, evolutionary mechanisms of the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS are
examined. In Chapters 4 and 5, substantive norms of the regime (principles and rules)
are examined in the light of the theory of evolution of legal regimes. In Chapter 6,
procedural and behavioural aspects, i.e., decision-making procedures, convergent
expectations, and compliance system under the regime are examined also in the light of
the theory ofevolution oflegal regimes.
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Introduction
In the literature of international law, the term 'international regime' is widely used. But
more vigorous studies on international regimes are undertaken by a school of
international relations theorists. Since regimes are norm-based institutions, regime theory
can be used as a theoretical tool for the analysis of international legal institutions.
Without finding any systematic application of regime theory to the analysis of
international regimes for the protection of the marine environment, 1 have used regime
theory as an analytical tool for the analysis of the international regime for the protection
of the marine environment under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(hereinafter referred to as the 1982 UNCLOS). Since the regime evolves with the passage
of time adapting to the changing environment, a set of evolutionary mechanisms of the
regime is examined and used as another theoretical scheme for the analysis of the regime.
Chapter 1 presents the issue-area of the regime. The problem of the degradation of
the marine environment is caused by marine pollution, the over-exploitation of marine
living resources and the over-development of the coastal areas. After the analysis of the
nature of these problems, different streams of environmental ethics underlying human
attitudes vis-a-vis nature are reviewed. In order to resolve the problem of the degradation
of the marine environment, international society has established a series of international
regimes and a comprehensive international agenda. Before the conclusion of the 1982
UNCLOS, all international regimes had developed piecemeal, dealing with specific
issues, such as the protection of a particular type of marine pollution, the conservation of
particular fish stocks, or having limited geographical scopes. The 1982 UNCLOS has
established a comprehensive international regime for the law of the sea, within which the
regime for the protection of the marine environment is embedded. At the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development held at Rio at Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June
1992 (hereinafter referred to as the 1992 UNCED), international society has adopted
Agenda 21, in which Chapter 17 has established a comprehensive programme of action
for the protection of the marine environment. The content of Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
and its relationship with the 1982 UNCLOS is examined.
1
Chapter 2 presents regime theory with a view to applying it to the analysis of the
regime for the protection of the marine environment under the 1982 UNCLOS. The
concept of international regimes, theories of regime creation and regime consequences
are examined. Regime theorists employ the terms 'principles', 'norms', and 'rules' as
normative elements of regimes. The concepts of these terms as defined by regime
theorists are somewhat different from those used in legal literature. In applying regime
theory to the analysis of a legal regime, some adjustment is necessary in order to avoid
any confusion which may arise from the difference in the use of terms. These terms are
redefined and rearranged according to how these concepts are usually understood in legal
theory. In behavioural aspects, regime theorists focus on convergent expectations as a
necessary condition for cooperation among sovereign States in anarchical international
society. In a legal regime, the problem of compliance with legal norms is as important as
the convergence of expectations. Therefore, compliance is introduced as an additional
variable in analysing the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS.
Chapter 3 examines the evolutionary mechanisms, such as amendments,
additional agreements, evolutionary interpretations, rules of reference and the creation of
sub-regimes with which the regime for the protection of the marine environment under
the 1982 UNCLOS is endowed. This chapter shows how these mechanisms work so as to
allow the regime to adapt to the changing environment, while maintaining its integrity.
In Chapter 4, the principles embodied in the 1982 UNCLOS are examined in the
framework of regime theory and the evolutionary mechanisms of legal regimes. The
regime for the protection of the marine environment under the 1982 UNCLOS embraces
the integrated approach by providing a set of substantive norms covering all issues
concerning marine pollution, applicable to all States and to the entire sea area of the
globe. Although it does not explicitly articulate relatively new principles, such as the
ecosystem approach, sustainable development, precautionary principle, it contains many
precursory ideas of these principles, or it can readily embrace these principles.
Chapter 5 examines the operational rules provided by the 1982 UNCLOS to
ensure the rational behaviour of States in their dealing with the marine environment.
Most of the rules are the result of the codification of the rules of customary international
2
law, but some new elements are introduced in the 1982 UNCLOS. These rules are
examined in the light of the theory of rationality.
Chapter 6 deals with the procedural and behavioural aspects of the regime. In this
chapter, the decision-making procedures set down in the regime and the expectations
converging around the regime are examined in the light of regime theory. Since the 1982
UNCLOS provides a variety of compliance mechanisms, this chapter also examines the
compliance system, which is absent from regime theory or embedded in the concept of
convergence of expectations, but essential in analysing the effectiveness of a legal regime.
It is in the analysis of these procedural and behavioural aspects of the regime that regime
theory shows its particular merits.
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Chapter 1
The Issue-area of the Protection of the Marine Environment
In regime theory, an issue refers to a problem perceived by policy-makers and adopted as
an agenda, and an issue-area is a set of closely interconnected issues in a particular field.1
Conceived as such, an issue-area has a dual aspect; a set of perceived problems, and an
agenda aimed at solving the problems.
The protection of the marine environment is an issue-area, since international society
has perceived a set of problems of the degradation of the marine environment, and has
established a set of agendas to deal with the problems.
1. Problems of degradation of the marine environment
The degradation of the marine environment is a problem caused and perceived by
humanity. The development of science and technology coupled with the increase in
human population has led to an intensification of human activities in the sea. Traditional
uses of the sea such as fishing and navigation have notably intensified. After having
found new uses of the sea, such as the exploitation of seabed resources, the production of
energy from seawater, currents and winds, the construction of artificial islands, the
development of marine leisure industry, etc., humans are continuing in their endeavour to
find still other uses of the sea. Human activities causing the degradation of the marine
environment may be classified into three main categories: 1) marine pollution; 2) over-
exploitation of marine living resources; 3) over-development of coastal areas.
1.1 Marine pollution
1.1.1 The concept of marine pollution
1 Formal definitions of the terms issue and issue-area will be given in Chapter 2
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The most widely accepted legal definition of marine pollution is that adopted in the 1982
UNCLOS, which is based on the definition formulated by the Joint Group of Experts on
the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP).
GESAMP had made efforts to draft a definition of marine pollution since 1969
and, after several amendments, proposed the following definition in 1982;
"Marine pollution is defined as the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of
substances or energy into the marine environment (including estuaries) resulting
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources, hazard to human health,
hindrance to marine activities including fishing, impairment of quality for use of
seawater and reduction of amenities."2
The definition proposed by GESAMP served as the basis of the definition of the
marine environment in the 1982 UNCLOS. The GESAMP definition was slightly
modified in the 1982 UNCLOS as follows (the italic letters inserted in the following
definition);
"Pollution of the marine environment means the introduction by man, directly or
indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including
estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to
living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine
activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of
quality for use of seawater and reduction of amenities."3
Many regional or global conventions adopt either the GESAMP definition or the
UNCLOS definition, with slight modification according to their respective objective and
policy orientation.4
2 GESAMP Report, 1982
3 1982 UNCLOS, Article I, para. 1 (4)
4 The following regional or international instruments, i.a. adopt a definition of (marine) pollution on the
basis of the GESAMP definition or the UNCLOS definition:
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<Anthropogenic phenomenon>
In the UNCLOS definition ofmarine pollution, the act ofman only is taken into account;
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly is considered as the cause of marine
pollution. The degradation of the marine environment by natural disaster or by animals is
not considered as pollution.5 This distinction between act of man and act of nature is
natural in a policy-oriented definition, since legal norms are aimed at regulating human
activities. This element is common to all the definitions of marine pollution adopted in
the instruments, listed in the footnote 4.
<Scope of the marine environment
The physical scope of the concept of marine pollution is all of the seas in the world. But
it covers also estuaries. In the GESAMP definition, the words "including estuaries" are
The 1974 Convention on the protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Art.2);
The 1974 Convention for the Prevention of marine Pollution from Land-based Sources (Art. 1);
The 1976 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution (Art.2);
The 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution
(Art. 1);
The 1981 Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of
the West and Central African Region (Art.2);
The 1981 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Sea of the South-East
Pacific (Art.2);
The 1982 Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment (Art.
i);
The 1985 Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal
Environment of the Eastern African Region (Art.2);
The 1985 Montreal Guidelines for the protection of the marine environment against pollution from land-
based sources; (para. 1)
The 1986 Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific
Region (Art.2);
The 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (replacing the
1974 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area) (Art.2);
The 1992 Convention for the Protection of the marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR)
(Art. 1)
The 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against pollution (Art. II)
The 1995 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the
Mediterranean (Art.2)
The 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping ofWastes and
Other matter, 1972 (Art. 1)
5 See M. Despax, La pollution des eaux et ses problemes juridiques, Librairies Techniques, 1968, p. 3 « La
presence de l'element perturbateur doit d'abord resulter d'une intervention humaine. L'action des
phenomenes naturels, cyclone, eruptions petroliere sous-marine, rechauffement ou eloignement soudain
d'un courant sous-marin, tous faits de Dieu, n'entrent pas ici en ligne de compte. »
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in the parenthesis, reflecting the hesitation of GESAMP whether to include estuaries into
the marine realm. In scientific terms, it is questionable whether estuaries, mixing points
of the marine ecosystem and the terrestrial ecosystem, belong to the marine environment.
But in a policy-oriented definition, it is reasonable that the estuaries be included in the
marine environment, since they are ecologically inseparable from the marine realm.6 The
1982 UNCLOS clearly includes the estuaries into the concept of marine environment,
eliminating the parentheses around the words including estuaries. After the adoption of
the 1982 UNCLOS, most, not all, instruments include 'estuaries' in their definition of
marine pollution, following the example of the UNCLOS definition.7
<Substances or energy>
Marine pollution is caused by certain categories of substances or energy, which may be
called pollutants or contaminants. What kinds of substances and energy cause pollution?
First, there are some substances intrinsically harmful or hazardous to living things.
According to the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (hereinafter
referred to as MARPOL 1973/78), 'harmful substance' means "any substance which, if
introduced into the sea, is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living
6 See Daniel D. Chiras, Environmental Science, Wadsworth Publishing Co. Fifth Edition, 1998, p. 89
"Estuaries are places where freshwater mixes with salt water. Estuaries are very rich life zones because
streams and rivers transport many nutrients from the land and because incoming tides carry nutrients into
estuaries from the ocean. These nutrients support abundant plant and algal growth and sizeable populations
of fish and molluscs."
See also Carol M. Lalli & Timothy R. Parsons, Biological Oceanography, Butterworth Heinemann, Second
Edition 1997, p. 209
7 Regarding 'estuaries', there are, among the instruments listed in footnote 4, four types of definition, as
follows:
A) GESAMP type definitions, which put the term 'estuaries' in the parenthesis (estuaries): the 1974
Convention for the prevention of marine pollution from land-based sources, the 1981 South-East
Pacific Convention, the 1986 South Pacific Region Convention,
B) UNCLOS type definitions, which include clearly the term 'estuaries': the 1974 Baltic Sea Area
Convention, the 1985 Eastern African Region Convention, the 1992 Baltic Sea Area Convention,
the 1992 Black Sea Area Convention, the 1995 Mediterranean Convention
C) Definitions which do not mention 'estuaries': the 1976 Mediterranean sea Convention, the 1978
Kuwait Regional Convention, the 1982 Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Convention, the 1985 Montreal
Guidelines, the 1992 North East Atlantic Convention (Ospar), the 1996 Protocol to the London
Dumping Convention
D) The definition which employs the term 'coastal zones' instead of'estuaries': the 1981 The West
and Central African Region Convention
The 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses also includes
'estuaries' in the concept of marine environment. "States shall... take all measures with respect to an
international watercourse that are necessary to protect and preserve the marine environment, including
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resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses
of the sea..."8In some instruments, harmful substances are classified according to their
degree of intrinsic harmfulness. For instance, the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (hereinafter referred to as the
1972 London Dumping Convention) established a black list, a grey list and a white list.9
estuaries, taking into account generally accepted international rules and standards." Art. 23
8 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships (MARPOL 1973/78), Article 2 (2)
Besides the MARPOL 1973/78 and many other instruments provide for similar definitions of harmful
substance.
A) Some instruments provide similar, but not identical, definitions of'harmful substances': for example,
The 1974 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea defines "harmful
substances" any hazardous, noxious or other substances, which, if introduced into the sea, is liable to cause
pollution (Art.2);
The 1982 Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Arden Environment
defines "harmful substance" as any substance whose introduction or presence in the marine environment
causes a danger threatening or impairing that environment (Art. I);
The 1985 Protocol concerning co-operation in combating marine pollution in cases of emergency in the
Eastern African Region defines "harmful substance" as any substance other than oil which, if introduced
into the sea, creates hazards to human health, harms living resources and marine life, damages amenities or
interferes with other legitimate uses of the sea (Art. 1);
The 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, "harmful substance" means any
hazardous, noxious or other substance, the introduction of which into the marine environment would result
in pollution or adversely affect the biological processes due to its toxicity and/or persistent and/or
bioaccumulation characteristics (Art. II);
B) Some instruments employ the term "hazardous substance" instead of'harmful substance":
The 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes
defines "hazardous substances" substances which are toxic, carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic or bio-
accumulative, especially when they are persistent (Art. 1)
C) The 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area distinguishes
'harmful substance' and 'hazardous substance'. "Harmful substance" means any substance which, if
introduced into the sea, is liable to cause pollution. "Hazardous substance" means any harmful substance
which due to its intrinsic properties is persistent, toxic or liable to bio-accumulate. (Art.2)
D) The 1993 Convention on Civil Liability for Damages Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment employs the term "dangerous substance", which means a) substances or preparations which
have properties which constitute a significant risk for man, the environment or property. A substance or
preparation which is explosive, oxidizing, extremely flammable, highly flammable, flammable, very toxic,
toxic, harmful, corrosive, irritant, sensitising, carcinogenic, mutagenic, toxic for reproduction or dangerous
for the environment within the meaning of Annex I, Part A. b) substances specified in Annex I, Part B to
the Convention.
9 In the 1972 Convention for the Prevention ofMarine Pollution by Dumping ofWastes and Other Matter
(the 1972 London Dumping Convention), wastes or other matter are classified into three categories, listed
in Annex I, Annex II, and Annex III, according to the degree of toxicity.
In the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Dumping Convention, this structure is completely changed by the
introduction of the 'reverse list', which means any dumping and incineration at sea is prohibited unless
allowed exceptionally in cases listed in the Protocol. See the 1996 Protocol, Articles 4, 5, 8
The 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their
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Second, there are some substances that are not intrinsically harmful, but can be
harmful, if highly concentrated in a given space and time. For instance, phosphorus and
nitrogen are indispensable nutrients for many primary producers in the water, but when
intensely concentrated in seawater or fresh water they may provoke the eutrophication,
which is harmful to aerobic living resources. Contamination is a more correct term to
refer to this kind of phenomena. Contamination is defined by GESAMP as "the presence
of elevated concentrations of substances in water, sediments or organisms".10 The 1972
London Dumping Convention uses the concept of pollution based on the concept of
concentration of substances, by listing in Annex II "materials which, though of a non¬
toxic nature, may become harmful due to the quantities in which they are dumped, or
which are liable to seriously reduce amenities".11 Thus, pollution is a matter of density of
pollutants since the environment has a capacity to absorb wastes. Thanks to this
environmental capacity, 12 even the substances that are classified into the category of
"intrinsically harmful substances" are not harmful when dispersed in a sufficiently large
space or over a sufficiently long period of time.13 On the contrary, any substance can be
harmful, when excessively concentrated in a limited space and time.14
Disposal classifies wastes into three categories: Annex I Categories of Wastes to be controlled. Annex II
Categories of Wastes Requiring Special Consideration. Annex 111 provides the list of hazardous
characteristics: such as explosive; flammable liquids; flammable solids; substances and wastes liable to
spontaneous combustion; substances or wastes which, in contact with water emit flammable gases;
oxidizing; organic peroxides; poisonous (acute); infectious substances; corrosives; Liberation of toxic gases
in contact with air or water; toxic; ecotoxic; capable by any means, after disposal, of yielding another
material. In addition to the lists of Annex I and Annex II, the Basel Convention allows also national
definitions of hazardous wastes (Art.3).
The 1991 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa takes a similar approach: it provides the
list of hazardous wastes (Annex I Categories of Wastes which are Hazardous Wastes), and the list of
hazardous characteristics (Annex II), which is identical to that of Annex III of the 1989 Basel Convention.
10 UN Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP)(1982)
11 1972 London Dumping Convention, Annex II, D
12 GESAMP defines environmental capacity of the marine environment as its ability to accommodate a
particular activity, or rate of activity, without an unacceptable impact. See V. Pravdic, Environmental
Capacity- Is a New Scientific Concept Acceptable as a Strategy to Combat Marine Pollution? 16 Marine
Pollution Bulletin (1985), pp. 295-296
13 Even radioactive materials are not harmful below the de minimis levels. For example, IAEA has issued in
1996 the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety
of Radiation Sources (BSS). The BSS establishes requirements for controlling radiation exposure. On the
other hand, BSS defines radioactivity levels below which material may be considered "non-radioactive"
(known as de minimis or exempt levels), on the basis of the concepts of exclusion and exemption. Any
exposure whose magnitude or likelihood is essentially unamenable to control through the requirements of
the BSS is deemed to be excluded from the BSS. Sources that are essentially uncontrollable, such as cosmic
radiation at ground level and potassium-40 in the body, can be dealt with by the process of exclusion from
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Third, energy also can cause harmful effects on the marine environment through
thermal pollution. An enhancement of the temperature of the coastal seawater by the
thermal discharges from cooling systems of industrial installations may cause changes in
the environment with subsequent biological effects on the coastal ecosystems.15 Thermal
pollution lowers the dissolved oxygen content of water and increases the metabolic rate
of aquatic organisms.16
<Deleterious effects>
If marine pollution is regarded as a problem, it is because it entails "deleterious effects'".
It is difficult to define deleterious effects in conceptual terms, because it is virtually
impossible to devise an abstract criterion for the classification of the innumerable effects
produced by all substances.17 The 1982 UNCLOS, without giving a conceptual definition
to deleterious effects, presents some examples thereof, such as "harm to living resources
and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing
and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of seawater and
reduction of amenities." Similarly, the definition of harmful substance in the MARPOL
1973/78 enumerates the effects created by a harmful substance: "hazards to human health,
the scope of regulatory instruments. Exemption determines what waste may - and what may not - be freed
a priori from some or all regulatory controls. Sources which give rise to small individual doses and small
collective doses in both normal and accidental conditions are subject to the exemption process.
See IAEA Bulletin 42/3/2000 What waste is "radioactive"? Defining the scope of regulatory system, by
John Cooper, Abel J. Gonzalez, Gordon Linsley, and Tony Wrixon.
See also Ivo Rens & Joel Jakubec (ed.), Radioprotection et droit nucleaire, Georg Editeur, 1998
14 For example, oil is not inherently harmful, as the 1985 Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating
Marine Pollution in cases of Emergency in the Eastern African Region excludes oil from the category of
harmful substance, by defining 'harmful substance' as any substance other than oil which, if introduced
into the sea, creates hazards to human health, harms living resources and marine life, damages amenities or
interferes with other legitimate uses of the sea. But, oil spilled densely in a limited sea area causes marine
pollution due to its concentration.
15 For example, in a nuclear power plant, water from the river is used to cool the reactor. Heat picked up
from this process by the river water is then dumped, along with the water, back into the stream, causing a
rapid increase in water temperature that is harmful to aquatic ecosystems. Heated river water runs into the
sea and elevate the temperature of coastal seawater.
16 See Daniel D. Chiras, Environmental Science, op. cit. p. 416
17 In many instruments, the concept of deleterious effects is embedded in the definition of "harmful
substance", "hazardous substance", or "dangerous substance". Deleterious effects are presented as the
characteristics of "harmful substances" or "hazardous substances". See supra. Note 8
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harm to living resources and marine life, damage to amenities and interference with other
legitimate uses of the sea."18
"Harm" is the core element of the concept of deleterious effects. "Hazard",
"hindrance", "impairment", and "interference" can be used interchangeably with "harm"
in most cases.19 But all are highly subjective and relative concepts. "Harm" is a subjective
concept in that it is subject to the value judgement of humans. Suppose that a particular
ecosystem is succeeded by another ecosystem as a result of the eutrophication. If this
change of ecosystem is perceived as a harmful effect, it is implied that the original
ecosystem was better than the new one, in the eyes of humans. The notion of harmfulness
is based on just such a subjective anthropocentric value judgement.
"Harm" is a relative concept in the sense that the same change caused by a given
substance may be beneficial to some things, but detrimental to some other things. For
example, mariculture is the creation of conditions favourable to the fish living in the pond,
which may be harmful to the fish living around the pond.20
Because of the difficulty of defining 'harm' conceptually, it is sometimes defined
in a circular expression, for example, "Harm means harm caused to persons, property or
the environment."21
As to the question of "harmful to whom", the GESAMP definition of marine
pollution focuses on consequences on human interests; harm to living resources, hazards
to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing, impairment of quality
for use of seawater and reduction of amenities. Living resources are things that are
regarded as resources for human consumption. In the GESAMP definition, the term
18 Article 2
The instruments enumerated in Note 8 provide similar concepts of harmful effects,
19 The 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area distinguishes
'harmful substance" and "hazardous substance': "Harmful substance" means any substance which, if
introduced into the sea, is liable to cause pollution; "Hazardous substance" means any harmful substance
which due to its intrinsic properties is persistent, toxic or liable to bio-accumulate. In the light of these
definitions, hazardous substance can be considered to be more damaging than harmful substance.
20 The main technical problems associated with aquaculture are fish disease and excess food, and antibiotics
affecting local ecosystems in the vicinity of the sea cages. See Peter D. Moore, Bill Chaloner, Philip Scott,
Global Environmental Change, Blackwell Science Ltd, 1996, p. 191, and M. Barinaga, Fish money and
science in Puget Sound, Science 247, 1990, p.631
See also Carl J. Sindermann, Ocean Pollution: Effects on Living Resources and Humans, CRC Press, 1996
pp.195 -197 Biological interactions of aquaculture stocks and native populations.
21 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, adopted by ILC at
its 53rd session (2001), Article 2
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'marine activities' means implicitly human marine activities, 'quality of seawater' and
'amenities' are considered in relation to human use. The 1982 UNCLOS introduces
"harm to marine life" into the concept of marine pollution. The term marine life is devoid
of any notion of the utility of living things for humans. By considering harm to marine
life as pollution, the UNCLOS definition widens the perspective beyond the
anthropocentric vision. The fact that harm to marine living resources and marine life is
considered as marine pollution signifies that the concept of marine pollution is linked by
definition to the marine living resources. This means that the concept of the marine
environment should comprise the issues of marine pollution and those of marine living
resources. Marine pollution may harm humans directly, but in most cases harms humans
through its harm to marine living resources.22
Besides the 1982 UNCLOS, several instruments include 'harm to marine life' in
the concept of marine pollution.23 Some instruments introduce 'harm to marine
ecosystems', instead of harm to marine life', into the concept ofmarine pollution.24
<Real and potential effects>
It is also noteworthy that not only the actual harm but also the potential harm is taken into
account in the UNCLOS definition ofmarine pollution, by introducing the expression "or
is likely to result" in deleterious effects. The UNCLOS definition is more policy-oriented
than the scientific definition proposed by GESAMP.25 Scientifically speaking, what is
likely to result in deleterious effects may not be pollution, without being proved to be
deleterious. But in legal norms aimed at preventing marine pollution, it is more
appropriate to take into account potential harm to the environment. In 1982, the
22 See Carl J. Sindermann, op. cit., Chapter 5 Ocean Pollution and Human Diseases
23 The 1974 Baltic Sea Convention, the 1981 South-East Pacific Convention, the 1986 South Pacific Region
Convention, the 1992 Black Sea Convention, the 1995 Mediterranean Convention.
24 The 1974 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources, the 1985
Montreal guidelines for the protection of the marine environment against pollution from land-based sources,
the 1992 Baltic Sea Convention, the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the marine Environment of the
North East Atlantic (OSPAR), the 1996 Protocol to the London Dumping Convention. It is noteworthy that
the 1992 Baltic Sea Convention, which has replaced the 1974 Baltic Sea Convention, has replaced the term
'marine life' with the term 'marine ecosystems'.
25 The formulation 'results or likely to result' was judged non-scientific by GESAMP, because the need for
scientific exactness requires strict proof, and probability of an event should not be used as the scientific
basis for mitigation of anticipated damage. See, M. Tomczak, Jr. Defining marine pollution, Marine Policy,
October 1984, pp. 311-322
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precautionary principle had not yet been formulated. But the notion of potential harm
introduced in the concept of marine pollution can be regarded as a forerunner of the
precautionary principle.26
Many other instruments introduce potential harm into the concept of marine
pollution, by using the term "or is likely to result" in their definition of marine pollution.27
In some instruments dealing with the issues of liability for environmental damage,
the concept of "environmental damage" or "pollution damage" is used instead of that of
pollution.28 In a regime of civil liability, damage is an indispensable condition of civil
26 For precautionary principle, see Chapter IV, I Principles
27 The 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention (Art. I), the 1981 South East Pacific Convention (Art. 2), the
1982 Regional Convention of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (Art. I), the 1985 Montreal Guidelines (para. 1),
the 1986 South Pacific Region Convention (Art. 2), the 1992 North East Atlantic Convention (Ospar)
(Art. 1), the 1992 Black Sea Convention (Art. II), the 1995 Mediterranean Convention (Art. 2), the 1996
Protocol to the London Dumping Convention (Art. 1)
The 1992 Baltic Sea Convention employs the term "which are liable to create", different from "is likely to"
in wording, but the same in meaning.
28 In the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, "pollution damage"
means loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or
discharge of oil from the ship, where such escape or discharge may occur, and includes costs of preventive
measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures. (Art. I (6))
The IMO Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage modifies slightly this definition: "Pollution damage" means: (a) loss or damage caused
outside the ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship,
where such escape or discharge may occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the environment
other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of
reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken; (b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss
or damage caused by preventive measures. (Art. 2 (6))
The 1989 International Convention on Salvage defines "damage to the environment" as substantial
physical damage to human health or to marine life or resources in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent
thereto, caused by pollution, contamination, fire, explosion or similar major incidents. (Art. 1 (d))
In the 1993 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment (Lugano Convention), "Damage" means: a) loss of life or personal injury; b) loss of or
damage to property other than to the installation itself or property held under the control of the operator, at
the site of the dangerous activity; c) loss or damage by impairment of the environment in so far as this is
not considered to be damage within the meaning of sub-paragraphs a) or b) above provided that
compensation for impairment of the environment, other than for loss of profit from such impairment, shall
be limited to the costs of measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken; d) the costs of
preventive measures and any loss or damage caused by preventive measures, to the extent that the loss or
damage referred to in sub-paragraphs a) to c) of this paragraph arises out of or results from the hazardous
properties of the dangerous substances, genetically modified organisms or micro-organisms or arises or
results from waste. (Art. 2 (7))
In the 1996 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, "Damage" means: (a) loss of life or
personal injury on board or outside the ship carrying the hazardous and noxious substances caused by those
substances; (b) loss of or damage to property outside the ship carrying the hazardous and noxious
substances caused by those substances; (c) loss or damage by contamination of the environment caused by
the hazardous and noxious substances, provided that compensation for impairment of the environment
other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of
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liability.29 He who is responsible for damage is liable for reparation or compensation. On
the contrary, the concept of pollution is not directly related to the concept of reparation or
compensation. For this reason, the concept of damage is preferred to that of pollution in
the instruments dealing with the issues of civil liability.
1.1.2 Classification of the sources of marine pollution
With a volume of some 1.3 billion cubic kilometres and covering 71% of the earth's
surface, the global ocean has an enormous absorptive capacity. In spite of the excellent
homeostatic power of the global ocean, the marine environment is threatened by man-
made pollutants reaching the marine realm from a variety of sources.
The pollutants arriving in the marine realm are so various that it is necessary to
classify them into some categories to deal with them efficiently. In fact, it is common
practice for international environmental regimes, in dealing with these pollutants, to
classify them into categories appropriate to the purposes of the regimes. For the purpose
of scientific analysis, pollutants are commonly classified according to their components,
or their biochemical activities. But for the purpose of devising pollution control systems,
pollutants are usually classified according to their sources or pathways so that appropriate
norms can be applied to control pollutants by their sources or pathways. For example, the
1982 UNCLOS classifies marine pollution into six categories: 1) pollution from land-
based sources, 2) pollution from sea-bed activities subject to national jurisdiction, 3)
pollution from activities in the Area, 4) pollution from dumping, 5) pollution from
vessels, 6) pollution from or through the atmosphere.30
This classification contains an ambiguity because of an inconsistency of the
application of criteria. The first five categories are classified on the basis of the single
criterion, i.e. the source of pollutants, but in the case of 'pollution from or through the
reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken; and (d) the costs of preventive measures and further
loss or damage caused by preventive measures. Where it is not reasonably possible to separate damage
caused by the hazardous and noxious substances from that caused by other factors, all such damage shall be
deemed to be caused by the hazardous and noxious substances except if, and to the extent that, the damage
caused by other factors is damage of a type referred to in article 4, paragraph 3. In this paragraph, "caused
by those substances" means caused by the hazardous or noxious nature of the substances.
29 See Patrice Jourdain, Les Principes de la Responsabilite Civile, Dalloz, 5e edition, 2000, p. 137
30 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Articles 207-212
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atmosphere', two criteria are applied, i.e. the source and pathway of pollutants. Pollution
"from" the atmosphere is a category classified according to the source of pollutants. It
may include pollutants generated by airborne craft such as gases emitted by aircraft or
other flying objects. But pollution "through" the atmosphere is a category based on the
pathway of pollutants. It may include all kinds of airborne pollutants, whether generated
on land, in the sea, or in the air, if only they are infused into the sea, after residing some
time in the air. This may be a source of confusion. For example, heavy metal particles
which are emitted on land, taken up in the air and finally fall into the sea may belong to
the category of pollution from land-based sources and also to the category of pollution
from or "through" the atmosphere. Likewise, carbon dioxide particles emitted in the sea
by a vessel, taken up in the air and finally infused into the sea belong simultaneously to
"pollution from vessels" and "pollution through the atmosphere".
It is more logical that pollutants emitted from land-based activities belong to land-
based pollutants even though they are infused into the sea through the atmosphere. In fact,
the 1974 Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based
Sources, the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention) and other instruments which deal with pollution from
land-based sources, apply the source of pollutants as the unique criterion of the
classification of pollution. In the definitions laid down in these instruments, emissions
into the atmosphere from land are logically included in the category of "land-based
sources", even though they reach the maritime area through the air.31
For the sake of simplicity and consistency, marine pollution may be classified into
three main categories, on the basis of a single criterion of the source of pollutants;
pollution from land-based sources, pollution from sea-based activities, and pollution from
atmosphere. According to the purpose of the analysis, each category may be divided into
sub-categories. For example, pollution form sea-based activities may be divided into sub¬
categories such as pollution from sea-bed activities, pollution from dumping, pollution
from vessels, etc.
31 See infra. <Pollution from land-based sources>
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<Pollution from land-based sources>
The 1974 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources
defines "pollution from land-based sources" as the pollution of the maritime area
(i) through watercourses,
(ii) from the coast, including introduction through underwater or other pipelines,
(iii) from man-made structures placed under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party
within the limits of the area to which the present convention applies.
(iv) by emissions into the atmosphere from land or from man-made structures as
defined in subparagraph (iii) above.12
Because pollutants produced from land-based activities are so various, most definitions of
pollution from land-based sources focus on describing their pathways to the sea.33
Agenda 21, Chapter 17 states, "human settlement, land use, construction of
coastal infrastructure, agriculture, forestry, urban development, tourism and industry can
affect the marine environment. Coastal erosion and siltation are of particular concern."34
The land itself is an efficient sink for many pollutants. Most pollutants produced on land
are treated or absorbed there. A significant portion of the rest is destined to end up in the
sea. Water is the most important transportation means that carries pollutants to the sea.
All rivers run to the sea, carrying dissolved and suspended materials, including pollutants.
Pollutants from land-based activities can also be introduced into the sea through other
32 Article 3 (c)
33 The 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR)
defines "land-based sources" as point and diffuse sources on land from which substances or energy reach
the maritime area by water, through the air, or directly from the coast. It includes sources associated with
any deliberate disposal under the sea-bed made accessible from land by tunnel, pipeline or other means and
sources associated with man-made structures placed, in the maritime area under the jurisdiction of a
Contracting Party, other than for the purpose of offshore activities.
The 1985 Montreal guidelines for the protection of the marine environment against pollution from
land-based sources defines "land-based sources" as (i) municipal, industrial or agricultural sources, both
fixed and mobile, on land, discharges from which reach the marine environment, in particular: from the
coast, including from outfalls discharging directly into the marine environment and through run-off;
through rivers, canals or other watercourses, including underground watercourses; and via the atmosphere;
(ii) sources ofmarine pollution from activities conducted on offshore fixed or mobile facilities within the
limits of national jurisdiction, save to the extent that these sources are governed by appropriate
international agreements. (Para. 1 (b))
In the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area,
"land-based pollution" means pollution of the sea by point or diffuse inputs from all sources on land
reaching the sea waterborne, airborne or directly from the coast. It includes pollution from any deliberate
disposal under the seabed with access from land by tunnel, pipeline or other means. (Art. 2, para.2)
16
pathways such as runoff from land, groundwater systems, pipelines, outfall structures, etc.
The remaining minor portion of the pollutants produced on land is taken up into the
atmosphere. But most pollutants which arrive in the atmosphere fall ultimately into the
ocean, after certain residence time in the air. The ocean is therefore the final repository of
an important portion of pollutants emitted on land. Pollutants produced on land are by far
the most important in quantity as well as in variety. Among pollutants introduced into the
ocean, these land-based sources are estimated to represent 70% of the total of marine
pollution.35
From a legal point of view, there are some particular difficulties in dealing with
pollution from land-based sources in the context of international regimes. First, these
pollutants are generated within the territory of sovereign States. Second, an important
portion of these pollutants comes from non-point-sources. Furthermore, before arriving in
the ocean, these pollutants pass through zones under national jurisdiction, from internal
waters, territorial sea to the exclusive economic zone, or continental shelf, where the
primary responsibility of protecting the environment is entrusted to the governments of
the coastal States. For these reasons, "there is currently no global scheme to address the
special issue-area of marine pollution from land-based sources", as stated in Agenda 21.36
At the global level, the 1982 UNCLOS provides only a general framework." The 1985
Montreal Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment Against Pollution from Land-
based Sources was the first attempt to address the problem of pollution from land-based
sources on a global basis and through a single instrument. The Global Programme of
Action (GPA) launched under the 1995 Washington Declaration on Protection of the
Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, adopted in the intergovernmental
conference convened in response to Agenda 21,38 is a further step toward the
development of global regime for the protection of the marine environment from land-
34 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para 17.18, 19
35 UNCED, Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para. 17.18
36 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para. 17.18
37 In Article 207, the 1982 UNCLOS requires States to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, including rivers, estuaries, pipelines
and outfall structures, in accordance with internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures. Under Articles 213, States are required to enforce the laws and regulations
adopted in accordance with article 207. As such, the 1982 UNCLOS does not provide any particular rules
on the matter. See infra. Chapter 3, Section 2.4 Evolution by incorporation of rules of reference.
38 See Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para. 17.26
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based sources.39 At the regional level, some instruments, such as the 1974 Paris
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, the 1980
Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, the 1983 Protocol for the protection of the South-East Pacific Against Pollution
from Land-Based Sources, the 1990 Protocol to the Kuwait Regional Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, deal
with the specific issue-area of marine pollution from land-based sources. Some multi¬
purpose regional instruments, such as the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic and the 1992 Convention on the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, include the issue ofmarine
pollution from land-based sources in their issue-areas. Since the impact of land-based
pollution is concentrated in coastal zones and most land-based pollutants are produced on
land under national sovereignty and traverse coastal waters under national jurisdiction,
national and regional approaches can be more efficient means of dealing with this issue.
This does not however preclude the necessity of appropriate global regimes for the
control of this source of marine pollution.
<Pollution from sea-based activities>
Since main sea-based activities that cause marine pollution are maritime transport,
dumping-at-sea and sea-bed activities, marine pollution from these activities can be
divided into sub-categories of pollution from maritime transport, pollution from
dumping-at-sea and pollution from sea-bed activities.
The terms "pollution from maritime transport" and "pollution from vessels" are
often used synonymously. But the term "pollution from vessels" may cause confusion,
because vessels can be used not only for maritime transport but also for dumping-at-sea.
Deliberate disposal ofwastes from vessels belongs to the category of dumping-at-sea, but
it can belong to the category of pollution from vessels as well. To avoid this confusion,
the term pollution from maritime transport is clearer than pollution from vessels. In
practice, however, the term 'pollution from vessels' is more widely used. When the term
39 See Thomas Mensah, The International Legal Regime for the Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment from Land-based Sources of Pollution, in Alan Boyle and David Freestone (ed.) International
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pollution from vessels is used, dumping from vessels should be understood to be
excluded therefrom.
Pollution from maritime transport is mainly a problem of oil pollution. According
to Agenda 21, approximately 600,000 tons of oil enter the oceans each year as a result of
normal shipping operations, accidents and illegal discharges. When spilled on the sea, oil
forms oil slicks, which cause damage to the marine ecosystem, by creating harmful
effects on plankton, marine vegetation, fish stocks, seabirds, marine mammals, and
sediments.
Pollution from maritime transport may result from operational discharges and
accidental discharges. Ballast cleaning of tankers and the disposal of bilge water and fuel
oil are the main causes of pollution from operational discharges. The development of
deballasting methods, such as load-on-top system and segregated ballast, contributes to
the reduction of discharges of oil into the sea.40 Accidental discharges of oil can be caused
by collision, grounding, or explosion of oil tankers.41
The total quantity of discharges from maritime casualties is less important than
that from operational discharges. But the impact on marine environment from maritime
casualties may be more serious than that from operational discharges, because pollution
is a matter of concentration. First, oil spilled by accidental discharge is densely
concentrated in a limited space and over a short period of time, while oil discharged in
the course of operation of vessels is normally dispersed in a large space over a long
period of time. Even the density of oil in heavily congested shipping routes is not
comparable with the density of oil at the scene of a grounding tanker.42 Second, most
collisions or groundings of oil tankers happen in coastal seas, such as narrow straights or
shallow coastal seas. Compared with open oceans, coastal seas are ecologically more
Law and Sustainable Development, Oxford University Press, 2000.
40 With the introduction of these improved methods of deballasting, the amount of oil entering the sea as a
result of tanker operations has steadily reduced from an estimated I million t per year or more in the mid-
1970s, to 700,000 t in 1981, and to 158,000 t in 1989. See R.B. Clark, Marine Pollution, p. 39
41 Some of data on the large oil tanker spills may indicate the gravity of this problem; Atlantic
Empress{\919, off Tobago, 287,000 t), A'IB Summer{ 1991, off Angola, 260,000 t), Castillo de Be/lver
(1983, off Cape Town, 257,000 t), Amoco Cadiz( 1978, Brittany, 223,000 t), lorry Canyon(\961, Scilly
Isles, 119,000 t), Braer (Shetland Isles, 85,000 t), Exxon Valdez( 1989, Prince William Sound, Alaska,
37,000 t). See R. B. Clark, Marine Pollution, p.42
42 If the 119,000 tons of oil spilled by the Torry Canyon had been evenly dispersed on the whole Atlantic,
the oil would be thinly dispersed and there would have been no harm to the marine environment.
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vulnerable to oil pollution, because costal seas are more densely populated by marine
living resources. Besides oil pollution, the effects of harmful anti-fouling paints on
marine life can be classified into the category of marine pollution from vessels.43
Quantitatively, pollution from maritime transport is estimated to contribute 10 % of the
total marine pollution.44
Compared with pollution from land-based sources, pollution from maritime
transport is relatively easy to deal with in the context of international regimes. Except
vessels used for coastal navigation, most vessels are not entirely sheltered within the
rampart of sovereignty. But complicated legal problems arise in regulating vessels having
long-range activities. Ocean-going vessels, in particular oil tankers, move from a port to
another, navigating through internal waters, territorial seas, exclusive economic zones of
different States and the high seas. The problem of jurisdiction over moving vessels
according to their location complicates the regulation of pollution from vessels. The 1982
UNCLOS and the MARPOL1973/78 deal with pollution from ships.
Dumping-at-sea is another main cause of marine pollution. According to the
definition provided by the 1972 London Dumping Convention and the 1982 UNCLOS,
"dumping is any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft,
platforms or other man-made structures at sea, and any deliberate disposal of vessels,
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea."45 Following this definition, not
all dumping is from vessels or sea-borne structures; there is also dumping from aircraft.
But dumping is commonly thought of as pollution from sea-based activities, since the
major portion of dumping is done from vessels. In essence, dumping is a problem of
choice of place for disposal of wastes. If not dumped at sea, wastes should be treated or
dumped somewhere on land. Dumping at sea is a deliberate disposal relying on the
absorptive capacity of the ocean.46 Various substances dumped at sea, from biodegradable
43 In order to protect the marine environment from anti-fouling systems. International Convention on the
Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems has been adopted in 2001 under the auspices of I MO.
Anti-fouling systems, i.e. a coating, paint, surface treatment, surface or device that is used on a ship to
control or prevent of unwanted organisms, proved to kill barnacles and other marine life, persist in the
seawater and harm the marine environment. See www.imo.org/Conventions/
44 UNCED, Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para. 17.18
45 The 1982 UNCLOS, Article 1, para. 1 (5) (a) the 1972 London Dumping Convention, Article 3, para. 1.a
46 Martine Remoond-Gouilloud. Du Droit de detruire. Presses Universitaires de France, 1989, pp. 61-72
«technique d'eloignement».
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material to radioactive material account for approximately 10 % of total marine
pollution.47
Considering the fact that the impact of dumping on the marine environment
differs according to the characteristics of the substances dumped at sea, materials are
commonly classified according to their degree of harmfulness. The 1972 London
Dumping Convention classifies materials into three categories: the black list (Annex I)
contains the most harmful wastes and other matter whose dumping is prohibited; the grey
list (Annex II) contains wastes and other matter which can be dumped with a special
permit; and the white list (Annex III) contains wastes and other matter which can be
dumped with a general permit. The 1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Dumping
Convention introduces the 'reverse list' approach, which means that all dumping is
prohibited unless explicitly permitted in accordance with the Protocol.48 Sea-bed
activities include human activities in the sea such as exploration, exploitation of oil or
other sea-bed mineral resources. The pollution from these activities is concentrated in
some limited areas according to deposits of mineral resources. Quantitatively, pollution
from sea-bed activities are limited so far. Most sea-bed activities are conducted in areas
under national jurisdiction. For these activities, the task of regulation is entrusted to
coastal States under the regime of territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf. The sea-bed
activities undertaken in the Area, beyond national jurisdiction, can be regulated by the
special international regime, with the International Seabed Authority as its central organ.
<Pollution from atmosphere>
The global ocean has a large sea/air interface through which it exchanges energy and
matter with the atmosphere. By means of evaporation of aerosol and gas evolution, the
sea sends different materials to the atmosphere. In return, the sea receives materials from
the atmosphere through precipitation and dry deposition. Since the global ocean covers
71% of the earth surface, an important portion of the pollutants contained in the
atmosphere end up falling into the sea.
47 UNCED, Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para. 17.18
48 Articles 4, 8, Annex I, II For the content of the 1996 Protocol, see infra. Chapter 4
The 1996 protocol is not effective at the end of 2002.
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Most pollutants residing in the atmosphere are generated on land. For example,
atmospheric inputs account for from 80 to 99 per cent of PCBs, DDT, HCB and HCH
found in open ocean seawater,49 but these are materials emitted on land. For these
pollutants, the atmosphere provides only a pathway to the sea.
If all the pollutants arriving at sea "from and through" the atmosphere are
included into a single category, they represent 33% of total marine pollution.50 But if the
pollution through the atmosphere is excluded, the pollution from the atmosphere is very
limited in quantity.
One of the difficulties which arises in dealing with the pollution from air-based
pollution is due to the mixing and spreading capacity of the atmosphere, which makes it
difficult to trace the movement of pollutants. Once pollutants are dispersed in the
atmosphere, they are almost beyond human control, physically and legally. Therefore
atmospheric pollution can be more effectively controlled at its source than in the
atmosphere. Pollution from atmosphere is relatively less serious, but even more difficult
to deal with. Few international norms have been developed on the matter. Article 212 of
the 1982 UNCLOS provides a general framework, by exhorting States to adopt laws and
regulations, and take other measures as may be necessary, to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from or through the atmosphere. To date, there is no
special convention aimed at controlling pollution of the marine environment from aircraft.
Even Agenda 21 is relatively indifferent to this problem.
1.2 Over-exploitation of marine living resources
Marine living resources constitute essential components of the marine environment. They
are under double threat from the human species: direct threat from human predation and
indirect threat through marine pollution. The most serious human impact on the marine
ecosystem is caused by the catch of fish stocks to the point of threatening their
49 GESAMP, The state of the marine environment, 1990, p. 36 See also R. B. Clark, Marine Pollution,
Fourth Edition, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1997, pp. 83-84
50 GESAMP, ibid.
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reproductive capacity.5' The problem of over-fishing has been accentuated by the increase
in demand for fish. This increase in demand is associated with the increase in human
population, combined with the change in nutritional patterns.52 The increase in demand
has induced the increase in supply. On the other hand, the increase in the supply of fish
has been accelerated by the development of technology applied to fishing and fish
processing.
But what level of catch can be said to be over-exploitation? The concept of over-
exploitation of renewable resources should be understood in relation to the capacity of
reproduction of the fish stocks in question. So, the concept of over-exploitation is
associated with the concept of sustainability, which means the maintenance of some kind
of ecological equilibrium. All ecosystems are cybernetic systems returning to a steady
state after oscillation within a certain limit by the capacity of self-regulation and self-
restoration. Once an ecosystem surpasses this threshold, by internal or external factors, it
cannot return to the steady state. In the idea of sustainability, natural resources are
assimilated with capital, that is, a stock of real goods with the power of producing further
goods in the future. Natural capital has most of the characteristics of the traditional
concept of capital. If humans consume renewable resources within the limit of
reproduction, the stock of natural capital may remain intact, and be bequeathed to future
generations.53
The ecological complexity inherent in marine living resources entails complex legal
issues. First of all, marine living resources are typical commons and apt to suffer the
tragedy of the commons. After the advent of the EEZ regime, under which coastal States
have sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing
the natural resources within the limit of 200 nautical miles from the baselines, the great
51 The total world annual fish catch has remained around 91 million tons since 1994, but per capita catch
has slightly declined from 17.2kg in 1988 to 15.9kg in 1995. Farmed fish is rapidly increasing up to 19
million tons in 1995. See FAO, Yearbook ofFishery Statistics: Catches and Landings, 1988 to 1995
52 The total world fish consumption is a function of the human population and the per capita fish
consumption. Per capita annual fish consumption is 7.5 kg in 1950, 9.5 kg in 1955, and 12.0 kg in 1960.
Since 1965 per capita fish consumption has been stabilised within the band between 15.0 and 17.0 kg. This
trend indicates that until 1965 the increase in demand for fish was accelerated by the nutrient pattern of
humans in addition to the increase in human population, and since 1965 the increase in demand for fish is
roughly proportional to the growth of human population.
See Lester R. Brown, Michael Renner, Christopher Flavin, Vital Signs 1997-1988, The environmental
trends that are shaping our future. Earthscan Publications Ltd. London, 1997, p. 33
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majority of fish stocks are now placed under national jurisdiction. Only a minor portion
of fish stocks still remains as res communis in the high seas. But even the fish stocks
under national jurisdiction maintain the characteristics of the commons among competing
fishermen of the coastal State, if not properly regulated. Furthermore, there are many
species whose life span is not confined within the boundaries of national jurisdiction,
such as straddling species, highly migratory species, anadromous stocks, and
catadromous species. Another fundamental cause of legal complication concerning
marine living resources is their ecological interdependence. Because of a high degree of
ecological interdependence among marine living resources, an isolated regime for the
protection of a particular species cannot be efficient, or of little value for the whole
marine ecosystem. This problem requires an ecosystem approach.54
1. 3 Over-development of coastal areas
Humans have shown a tendency to prefer to dwell along coastlines. This preference
fosters human migration toward the margin of the sea. According to Agenda 21, "more
than half of the world's population lives within 60 km of the shoreline, and this could rise
to three quarters by the year 2020."55 The Food and Agricultural Organization states; "the
population of the world's coastal zones is expected to double within the next 20 to 30
years. This rapid increase in construction and outflows of urban and industrial wastes will
further endanger fragile coastline environments."56 In the United States, "each year
approximately 300,000 additional acres of U.S. coastal areas are developed, which has
resulted in the continued disruption of complex ecosystem composed of estuaries,
lagoons, beaches, bays, harbors and islands that shelter a vast array of flora and fauna..."57
The large-scale movements of populations to coastal areas have been coupled
with a significant increase in economic activity and industrialization along the coastline -
53 See infra. Chapter 4
54 See infra. Chapter 4
55 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para. 17.3
56 FAO, Factfile: coastal environments under threat. FAO, 1998, http:/www.fao.org/news/factfile/FF9804-
E.HTM
"John Warren Kindt, Marine pollution and the Law ofthe Sea, William S. Hein & Co. Inc., Buffalo,
N.Y.I986, pp.6-7
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such as oil and gas exploration, mining, fish farming, tourism, development of ports,
marinas and coastal defences- putting enormous pressure on coastal areas.58 The principal
problem of marine pollution caused by urbanization and industrialization of the coastal
areas is the increase in land-based sources of marine pollution. Besides the problem of
marine pollution, human concentration in shoreline areas causes a problem of destruction
of coastal ecosystems.59
Conscious of the complexity of the impact of coastal development on the marine
environment, Agenda 21 has chosen the integrated management of coastal and marine
areas as the first item among its seven programme areas. The impact of coastal
development is basically a national issue, since the activities of coastal development are
undertaken on the territory, in internal waters or territorial seas. It is difficult for
international regimes to intervene in these activities undertaken within the boundaries of
areas under national jurisdiction. But the effects of the coastal development may extend
beyond the limit of national jurisdiction, through the ecological interdependence and the
movement of ocean currents. Therefore regional approach can be effective in dealing
with the issue of integrated management of coastal zones.60
The problems relating to marine pollution, the over-exploitation of marine living
resources and the impact of coastal development are closely interconnected. Marine
pollution entails deleterious effects on marine living resources. Coastal development also
causes harm to marine living resources. Marine living resources play important roles in
regulating the quality of the marine environment, by bio-degrading wastes and
contributing to the biochemical cycles of many materials. Solutions for each problem
should be searched for on the basis of each particular problem, since each problem has its
own particular characteristics, but such solutions should be evaluated in a holistic and
integrated perspective, taking account of the complexity of the relations among the
problems.61
58 UN Documents, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 20lh Anniversary (1982-2002), p. 3
59 See The Noordwijk Guidelines for Integrated Coastal Zone Management, Distributed at the World Coast
Conference 1993, 1-5 November 1993, Noordwijk, the Netherlands, "Concern is growing in particular
about the destruction of natural coastal ecosystems by the demands placed upon them by population and
economic growth." P. 3
60 See The Noordwijk Guidelines for Integrated Coastal Zone Management, op.cit.
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2. Ethical foundations for the protection of the marine environment
Once problems are perceived, the objectives should be established to resolve the
problems. An agenda is composed of the established objectives. Before examining the
agenda established by international society with a view to ameliorating the marine
environment, it is desirable to review different streams of environmental ethics
underlying international regimes for the protection of the marine environment. As Stuart
Bell & Donald McGillivray assert, "Environmental values affect the way in which law is
made and the way it operates on a practical level. Although there is no direct connection
between the two, there are many ways in which values play a part in the operation of an
environmental regulatory system."62
2.1 Anthropocentrism and biocentrism
If the marine environment is to be protected and preserved, is it for the human species or
for the marine environment itself? The answer to this question should stem from more
fundamental philosophical foundations with regard to the man-nature relationship: should
nature be preserved for the sake of humans or for the sake of nature itself? Now that the
human species is endowed with the power to destroy nature, the environmental ethics on
this question should orient the norms of environmental regimes designed to regulate
human activities causing environmental impact. Two lines of thought contrast with each
other; anthropocentrism and biocentrism, each having a wide spectrum.
Anthropocentrism is based on the traditional western culture. According to the
Judeo-Christian views, human beings are created in the image of God and authorised by
God to rule over all the other creatures.63 This human-centred belief was reinforced by
Cartesian man-nature dualism, which proclaims; «L 'homme doit se rendre maitre et
possesseur de la nature», because man thinks (res cogitans), but nature does not (res
61 For integrated approach, see infra. Chapter 4.
62 Stuart Bell & Donald McGillivray, Environmental Law, 5th Edition, Blackstone Press, 2001, P-29
63 After the Deluge, God said to Noah and his sons "Everything that lives and moves will be food for you.
Just as I gave the green plants, I now give you everything." The Old Testament, Genesis 9:3
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externa)™ The conviction of human dominance over nature was further consolidated by
the belief in permanent progress of science and technology. This anthropocentric
worldview has become rooted in modern legal and economic systems. In the capitalist
market system, value is determined in terms of utility, quantifiable in exchange value
measured on the market. From this anthropocentric viewpoint, everything is valued in the
light of human preferences and human interests. Humans, distinct from nature, are
valuers of nature. Non-human things have only instrumental value, measured in terms of
their utility as resources for humans.65
In contrast to the anthropocentric man-nature dualism, biocentric (ecocentric)
ethics are based on the basic assumptions that humans are part of nature and inseparable
therefrom, and humans are not valuers of nature. The concept of intrinsic value66
constitutes the main theoretical pillar supporting biocentric ecologism. The essence of the
intrinsic value argument is that nature has autotelic value, independent of any awareness,
interest or appreciation by a conscious being. John O'Neill underlines three basic senses
of intrinsic value;67 (1) Intrinsic value is used as a synonym for non-instrumental value.
An object has instrumental value in so far as it is a means to some other end. An object
has intrinsic value if it is an end in itself. (2) Intrinsic value is used to refer to the value an
object has solely in virtue of its 'intrinsic properties'. Intrinsic properties of an object are
its 'non-relational properties'.68 (3) Intrinsic value is used as a synonym for 'objective
64 Rene Descartes, Discours de la Methode, III, IV
65 Modern anthropocentric ecological ethics advances the subjective theory of value, which can be
summarized as follows;
Values are determined through the preference rankings of valuers (the no detachable values assumption).
Valuers' preference rankings are determined through valuers' interests (the preference reduction thesis).
Valuers are humans (persons) (the species assumption).
Therefore, values are determined through human interests (through the interests of persons).
* Richard Routley and Val Routley present this summary to criticise the subjective theory of value, in their
article 'Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism', in Robert Elliot (ed.), Environmental Ethics,
Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 111
66 It was G.E. Moore who first defined the term 'intrinsic value', long before the emergence of the concept
of ecocentrism. According to him, «To say a kind of value is 'intrinsic' means merely that the question
whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the
thing in question. G.E. Moore, 'The conception of intrinsic value', in Philosophical Studies, Routledge &
Regan Paul, 1922. P. 260
67 John O'Neill, Ecology, Policy and Politics, Routledge, 1993, pp. 8-10 Arne Naess, 'Identification as a
Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes', in Michael Tobias (ed.). Deep Ecology, Avant Books, second edition,
1988, p. 268
68 There are two interpretations for non-relational properties. First, the non-relational properties of an object
are those that persist regardless of the existence or non-existence of other objects (weak interpretation).
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value', i.e. value that an object possesses independently of the valuations of valuers. It is
to deny the subjectivist view that the source of all value lies in valuers - in their attitudes,
preferences and so on.
The theory of 'deep ecology' advocated by Arne Naess and some other radical
ecologists since 1973,69 constitutes one of the philosophical foundations of the intrinsic
value arguments. Naess formulates the intrinsic value as follows; «Something A is said to
have a value independent of whether A has a value for something else, B. The value ofA
must therefore be said to have a value inherent in A. A has intrinsic value.»70
Biological egalitarianism, which calls for the respect of all other living and non¬
living things,71 is a corollary of the concept of intrinsic value. If all living and non-living
things have their intrinsic values, these values must be equal. If there is no valuer, there is
no way of establishing a hierarchy of values among objects. Biological egalitarianism is
indispensable for the defence of the concept of intrinsic value. Any retreat from the cause
of biological equality would undermine the very foundation of intrinsic value, because
inequality means differentiation of the values of all things, which in turn presupposes
human value judgement. The concept of biological egalitarianism is therefore inseparable
from the concept of intrinsic value.
The merits and demerits of anthropocentrism and biocentrism may be evaluated in
the light of their moral value on the one hand, and their capacity of generating practical
norms conducive to environmentally sound behaviour on the other hand.
It is widely believed that the sense of human superiority and the belief in
instrumental values of non-human things based on anthropocentrism contributed to
human aggressiveness toward nature. Human-centred vision, coupled with property rights
Second, the non-relational properties of an object are those that can be characterized without reference to
other objects (strong interpretation). See John O'Neill, op.cit.
69 The term 'deep ecology' was coined by Arne Naess in 1973, in an effort to 'transcend the limit of any
particular science of today, including systems theory and scientific ecology', in his article 'The Shallow
and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements', Inquiry, 16(1973)
70 Arne Naess, 'Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes', in Michael Tobias (ed.), Deep
Ecology, Avant Books, second edition, 1988, p. 268
71 For R. Nash, «Rocks, just like people, do have rights in and of themselves. It follows that it is in the
rock's interests, not the human interested in the rock, that it is being protected.» R. Nash, 'Do rocks have
rights?», The Center Magazine, November/December 1977, cited in David Pepper, Modern
environmentalism, Routledge, 1996, p. 49 George Sessions draws attention to the theology of Saint
Francis(l 181-1226), who «tried to depose man from his monarchy over creation and set up of a democracy
of all God's creatures». George Sessions, 'Ecological Consciousness and Paradigm Change', in Michael
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granting the right of usus, fructus, abusus to the proprietor and propelled by human
egoism, has created even a sense of the right to destroy (droit de detruire).12 Now that
mankind is aware of the risk of self-destruction through the destruction of the
environment, anthropocentrism itself begins to serve as a driving force of human efforts
for the protection of the environment. Humans are now conscious of the necessity of
conserving natural resources for the welfare and survival of humans themselves.
Biocentrism is a radical environmentalist vision. But paradoxically, it can be used
or abused to justify an anti-environmental attitude, as Elliott Sober points out this risk; "If
we are part of nature, then everything we do is part of nature, and is natural in that
primary sense."73 In fact, the following arguments can be derived from the intrinsic value
combined with biological egalitarianism: If everything has its own intrinsic value, and
everything is equal, then every pollutant has also the same intrinsic value as any other
materials, and every ecosystem has the same value as any other. If a given ecosystem is
destroyed, it will be succeeded by another. Then where is the reason to worry about the
change of ecosystems, while the succeeding ecosystem has the same intrinsic value as the
replaced one?
As for the capacity of generating practical norms for the protection of the
environment, anthropocentrism is a very fecund ideology. When any norm is properly
based on human egoism, it can be a strong device for the protection of the environment.
For example, the pollution tax, if properly applied, can motivate humans toward
environment-friendly conduct. By complying with such a rule, humans are expected to
behave in an environmentally sound manner first of all for their own sake.
The arguments of intrinsic value and biological equality have much difficulty in
providing concrete criteria for the choice of human actions in relation to nature.74 The
question posed by Martine Remond-Gouilloud reflects this problem; «Au nom de quel
critere privilegier un element naturel plutot qu'un autre1)>ls Arne Naess presents two
Tobias, ed., Deep Ecology, Avant Books, second edition, 1988, pp.36-7
72 See Martine Remond-Gouilloud, Du droit de detruire, Presses Universitaires de France, 1989
Remond-Gouilloud derives the concept of the right to destroy from the concepts of abusus.
73 Elliott Sober, 'Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism\ in Robert Elliot, Environmental Ethics,
Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 234
74 See Tim Hayward, Ecological Thought, Polity Press, 1995, p. 69 "It (deep ecology) fails to generate the
criteria needed to serve as a guideline."
75 Martine Remond-Gouilloud; Du droit de detruire; Presse Universitaire de France, 1989; p:45
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criteria to be applied in defining priority in the conflict of interests: « vitalness and
nearness »: "The more vital interest has priority over the less vital. The nearer has priority
over the more remote - in space, in time, culture, species...It may be of vital interest to a
family of poisonous snakes to remain in a small area where children play, but it is also of
vital interest to children and parents that there are no accidents. The priority rule of
nearness makes it justifiable for the parents to remove the snakes. But the priority of vital
interest of snakes is important when deciding where to establish the playgrounds."76
Paradoxically, we can find a firm subjectivism and a profound anthropocentrism
embedded in these criteria, contrary to the doctrine of deep ecology. Is not the
determination of vitalness a valuing act? In the example given by Naess, it is human
beings who determine the degree of vitalness. It means that human beings emerge as
valuers. Thus the criterion of vitalness undermines the very foundation of intrinsic value.
The criterion of nearness is also a self-defeating argument. In the concept of nearness, the
critical element is the base point from which the distance is measured. In the example
given by Naess himself, the base point is ego. Distance - in space, time, culture, species -
is measured from ego. This is ego-centrism in its purest sense.77
Biological egalitarianism has also much difficulty to explain the relationship
between prey and predator.78 It is even more difficult to explain how humans can
consume living resources.79
Applied to the issue-area of the marine environment, the two ideologies, i.e.
anthropocentrism and biocentrism, will give different answers to the question "if the
marine environment should be preserved, is it for the human species or for the marine
environment itself?" From the anthropocentric standpoint, the marine environment should
be protected for the sake of the maintenance of its utility for mankind, i.e. values of the
76 Ame Naess, 'Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes', in Michael Tobias, ed.. Deep
Ecology, Avant Books, second edition, 1988, pp.266-7
77 T, 'you', 'here', 'there', 'this', 'that', 'now', 'past', 'present', and 'future', all these concepts, implying
the distance from ego, are typical egocentric particulars. See The Cambridge Dictionary ofPhilosophy.
1995, p. 217
78 For Tim Hayward, "it is not wholly clear in what sense it would be meaningful to say of prey and
predator that they have an equal right to flourish. See Tim Hayward, Ecological Thought, Polity Press,
1995, p. 69
79 Robin Attfield argues: "if the death of a human would result in a greater number of flourishing lives (e.g.
maggots) than the number of lives which the same human being sustains when alive (e.g. intestinal flora).
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marine environment as a component of the life-support system, a provider of nutrients, a
regulator of the climate, routes of transportation, places for leisure, and so on. From the
biocentric viewpoint, the marine environment should be preserved for its own intrinsic
value, irrespective of these utilities for human beings.
In international environmental law, anthropocentrism is the dominant underlying
ideology. In the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, the anthropocentric ideology is reflected, in
paragraphs such as; "The protection and improvement of the human environment is a
major issue which affects the well-being of peoples and economic development
throughout the world."80 In the Rio Declaration of 1992, it is more explicitly declared that
"Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development."81
But the cause of intrinsic value has begun to find some echo in international
instruments since the end of the 1970s. The 1979 Convention on the Conservation of
European Wildlife and Natural Habitats recognizes; "wild flora and fauna constitute a
natural heritage of aesthetic, scientific, cultural, recreational, economic and intrinsic
value that needs to be preserved and handed on to future generations."82 In the 1982
World Charter for Nature, the idea of intrinsic value is reflected in phrases such as,
"Mankind is a part of nature...", and "Every form of life is unique, warranting respect
regardless of its worth to man." In the Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992, it is
declared that "the Contracting Parties are conscious of the intrinsic value of biological
diversity and of the ecological, genetic, social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural,
recreational and aesthetic values of biological diversity and its components."83
2. 2 Conservationism and Preservationism
Conserve or preserve? Should a species be conserved to the extent that it is useful for
human well-being? Or should it be preserved independently of its utility for humans?
These are issues concerning policy orientation stemming from the basic standpoints with
then it would be better for the human being to die." Robin Attfield, Silvan, Fox and Deep Ecology: A View
from the Continental shelf, Environmental Values, 2, 1 (1993), pp. 21-32
80 Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972,
Preamble, para.2.
81 Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Principle 1
82 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, 1979, Preamble
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regard to the man-nature relationship. An anthropocentric vision logically leads to
conservationist policies, while a biocentric vision advocates preservationist policies.
Conservation means the saving of resources for future use. According to John
Passmore, "To conserve is to save...the saving of species from extinction or of
wilderness from land-developers as much as the saving of fossil fuels or metals for future
use...The conservationist accepts the general principle that it is man's task to make of the
world a better place for men to live in."84 The typical paradigm of environmental policy
derived from this concept is 'wise use', or 'rational and efficient management' of natural
resources. In contrast, preservation means "the attempt to maintain their present condition
such areas of the earth's surface as do not yet bear the obvious marks ofman's handiwork
and to protect from the risk of extinction those species of living beings which man has
not yet destroyed."85 The rationale of this standpoint is that wilderness and species should
be preserved because they have a 'right to exist' and intrinsic value. Typical policy
paradigm derived from the preservationism is 'set-aside' or 'wilderness-for-wilderness-
sake'.
In international law, the conservationist approach is the dominant policy paradigm.
Most of international instruments, soft or hard, are aimed at conserving living or non¬
living things as 'resources' having effective or potential value for humans. Even
international instruments adopted for the protection of wildlife emphasise the value of
wildlife for humans. For instance, the 1973 Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) recognizes "that wild fauna and
flora in their many beautiful and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural
systems of the earth which must be protected for this and the generations to come, and
the ever-growing value of wild fauna and flora from aesthetic, scientific, cultural,
recreational and economic points of view."86 The 1979 Convention on the Conservation
83 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, Preamble
84 John Passmore, Man's responsibility for nature, Duckworth, Second edition, 1980, p. 73-4
In the same line, William M. Sutherland considers the meaning of the term 'conserve' to be established by
the specific and immediately recognizable purpose which the term denotes, which is to treat the object of
the activity in such a way that it will be available for later use. William M. Sutherland, Management,
Conservation, and Cooperation in EEZ Fishing: The Law of the Sea Convention and the South Pacific
Forum Fisheries Agency, Ocean Development and International Law, Volume 18, Number 6, 1987, p. 617
85 John Passmore, op.cit., p. 101
86 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species ofWild Fauna and Flora, 1973, Preamble
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ofMigratory Species of Wild Animals recognizes "that wild animals in their innumerable
forms are an irreplaceable part of the earth's natural system which must be conserved for
the good of mankind."87 Polar bears are to be conserved as "significant resources",88
whales as "the great natural resources for future generations."89 North Pacific fur seals are
to be conserved in a manner to achieve "the maximum sustainable productivity."90
Even in the cases where the concept of intrinsic value is introduced in
international instruments, it fails to generate concrete preservationist injunctions. For
example, the concept of intrinsic value introduced in the 1979 Convention on the
Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats,91 the term "mankind is a part of
nature" included in the 1982 World Charter for Nature92 and the concept of the intrinsic
value of biological diversity embraced in the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity93
are mere expressions of the prise de conscience of the intrinsic value, rather than concrete
injunctions aimed at regulating human behaviour in respect of the intrinsic value of all
objects.
When applied to the issue-area of the marine environment, preservationism would
mean an absolute ban on the disturbance in the marine life, such as the prohibition of all
fishing activities, whereas conservationism would command the optimal use of marine
resources for the maximum well-being of mankind in the long term. Conservationism
calls for the balance between utilization and conservation of natural resources, and
generates thereby such policy paradigms as sustainable utilization, maximum sustainable
yield, total allowable catch, etc.94
2.3 Individuals, species, communities or ecosystems
87 The 1979 Convention on the Conservation ofMigratory Species of Wild Animals, Preamble
88 The 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Preamble
89 The 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Preamble
90 The 1957 Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, Preamble
91 The 1979 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Preamble.
See above p.31
92 World Charter for Nature, 1982, Preamble.
93 The 1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Preamble.
94 See infra. Chapter 4
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Preservation and conservation are still quite abstract concepts. For humans to act in
conformity with the cause of preservation or conservation, they need more action-
oriented specific injunctions as to the question of the real object of preservation or
conservation. Preserve or conserve every individual, every species, every community,
every ecosystem, or the entire biosphere? On this point, different spectrums of atomism
and holism contrast with each other.
2.3.1 Preservation at individual level
Advocates of animal rights are generally preoccupied with the fate of individual beings,
from the atomist viewpoint. The core of their animal welfarism is that it is each
individual that should be protected, because it is individual which is sentient, while
species or other collective entities are abstract things.95 Joel Feinberg argues, for example,
that "a whole collection, as such, cannot have beliefs, expectations, wants, or
desires...Individual elephants can have interests, but the species elephant cannot".''6 For
Peter Singer, "species as such are not conscious entities and so do not have interests
above and beyond the interests of the individual animals that are members of the
species."97
If it is individuals that should be preserved, does it mean the preservation of every
individual or some selected individuals? In order to be consistent with the philosophical
foundation of the preservationism, i.e. the intrinsic value and biological egalitarianism,
every individual should be preserved. But preservation of every individual is an unnatural
and self-contradictory objective. It is unnatural in that it goes against the mechanisms of
food chain. Between predator and prey, who should survive? It is self-contradictory in
that the preservation of every individual results in self-destruction of all individuals; if a
human being is determined to preserve every individual around him, he cannot preserve
himself. Preservation of individuals on selective basis is practicable, but inconsistent with
95 For animal welfarism, see Gareth Edwards-Jones, Ben Davies and Salmon Hussain, Ecological
Economics, Blackwell Science, 2000, pp. 79-80
96 Joel Feinberg, 'The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations', in W. T. Blackstone, (ed.), Philosophy
and Environmental Crisis, University ofGeorgia Press, 1974, pp.55-6
97 Peter Singer, 'Not for Humans only', in K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre, (ed.), Ethics and Problems of
the 21st Century, University ofNotre Dame Press, Indiana, 1979, p.203
34
the biological egalitarianism, on which animal rights are founded. Whatever the criterion
of selection, humans intervene as absolute arbiters.
2.3.2 Preservation at species level
Many international instruments and national laws and regulations for the protection of the
biological diversity are aimed at preserving natural resources at the species level.
Biological diversity means the diversity of species. In international conventions, such as
the 1973 CITES, the 1979 Convention on the Conservation ofMigratory Species of Wild
Animals, the 1992 United Convention on Biological Diversity, the focus is placed on the
preservation of species. The term 'endangered' means that a particular species is in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.98
Preservation of each species is valuable in maintaining biological diversity. But
preservation of each species without taking account of its ecological relations with other
species might be meaningless, or even dangerous, in the context of the ecosystem.
Suppose that in the Antarctic ocean, only 1 % of krills are preserved. This preservation
satisfies completely the criterion of preservation at species level, but many Antarctic
species of upper trophic levels, such as penguins, Antarctic seals and whales, would
become finally extinct.
2.3.3 Preservation at community level
For Aldo Leopold, the object of preservation should be each community. He argues: "A
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise".99
The idea of preservation of the integrity of every community cannot generate
practicable guidelines for human activities. A biotic community is simply an aggregation
of species, which occurs in the same place at the same time.100 For Aldo Leopold's
98 See Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Article 1 Interpretation.
99 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, New York, Oxford University Press, 1949. pp.224-5
100 See T.J. King, Ecology, Second edition, Nelson, 1989, p. 2
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proposition to be meaningful, it should be combined with a notion of ecological
relationship among the species existing in the same place at the same time.
2.3.4 Preservation at ecosystem level
For Holmes Rolston III, "The species defends its kind against the world, but at the same
time interacts with its environment, functions in the ecosystem, and is supposed and
shaped by it...Neither the individual nor the species stands alone; both are embedded in a
system. It is not preservation of species but of species in the system that we desire."101
The smallest unit of holistic concepts of systemic integrity is ecosystem.
Ecosystem means "a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities
and their non-living environment interacting as a functional unit."102 The preservation of
an ecosystem requires not only the preservation of component species but also the
maintenance of certain equilibrium among living and non-living things. As the
preservation of species or communities, the preservation of ecosystem is a kind of holistic
approach. A moral question may arise from these holistic approaches. The standpoint that
the ecological value of all individuals is to be found in their contribution to the
functioning of their larger ecosystem can be criticized as 'environmental fascism'.103
Applied to humans, a holistic criterion may entail human rights problems. In particular, if
combined with biological egalitarianism, this holism could justify the sacrifice of
individual human beings in the interests of the human species.
If developed as a purely metaphysical concept, neither atomism nor holism can
provide an appropriate paradigm of human behaviour, because they should, to be
consistent, rely on extremist logic. An atom or a whole means an endpoint of the
continuum of the universe. In reality, however, individuals, species, ecosystems can be
perceived as atoms and wholes according to one's point of view. An ecosystem is a
101 Holmes Rolston III, 'Duties to Endangered Species', in Robert Elliot, ed., Environmental Ethics, Oxford
University Press, 1995, p.72
102 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 2 Use of Terms
103 See Bryan Norton, 'Ecological Health and Sustainable Resource Management', in Robert Costanza (ed.),
Ecological Economics, Columbia University Press, pp.102-117 It is T. Regan who criticizes the
((environmental fascism».
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super-organism for its components, but an atom in the context of the biosphere, as
pointed out by Bernard Fischesser and Marie-France Dupuis-Tate, "Z, 'ecosystems est
super-organisme et cellule elementaire de la biosphere."I04 So is each individual animal
or plant. Agenda 21 also takes a similar viewpoint, stating that "the marine environment
forms an integrated whole that is an essential component of the global life-support
system."105 In generating norms aimed at regulating human behaviour toward an
environmentally sound attitude, a pragmatic holism, based on the concept of open system,
could be more realistic.
In international instruments relating to the conservation of living resources, the
preservation of species is the dominant idea. The 1992 Convention on Biological
Diversity is a crystallization of the logic of preservation at species level. The concept of
biological diversity focuses on the number of species. But this Convention recognizes the
inseparability of species from their ecosystem, as the definition of biological diversity
states; "Biological diversity means the variability among living organisms from all
sources including, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species
and of ecosystems."106
In the field of the marine environment also, it is at species level that most fishing
regimes are designed to protect the environment. For example, maximum sustainable
yield is a concept based on the optimal use of a specific species.
But the idea of the conservation of ecosystem began to find its way in
international instruments since the 1980s. The notion of ecosystem approach is embedded
in the regime for the protection of Antarctic environment,107 the 1982 UNCLOS, Agenda
21 and many other subsequent instruments.108
104 Bernard Fischesser and Marie-France Dupuis-Tate, Le Guide illustre de I'Ecologie'' Editions de la
Martiniere'1996; p:227
105 UNCED, Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para. 17.1
106 Article 2
107 In 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, the protection of the
integrity of the ecosystem of the seas surrounding Antarctica is emphasised in the preamble, and the
geographical scope of the Convention is defined on the basis of the Antarctic Convergence, which forms a
boundary of Antarctic marine ecosystem. In the 1991 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental
Protection, the object to protect is "the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems".
108 See infra. Chapter 4
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3. International agenda for the protection of the marine environment
3.1 Agenda 21
The most comprehensive agenda ever made by international society in the issue-
area of the protection of the marine environment is Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 adopted by
universal consensus in the 1992 UNCED, with the participation of 176 States and more
than fifty intergovernmental organizations.109 The supreme guiding principle of Agenda
21 and other UNCED instruments is sustainable development."0
3.1.1 Structure of Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
Chapter 17, entitled "protection of the oceans, all kinds of seas, including enclosed and
semi-enclosed seas, and coastal areas and the protection, rational use and development of
their living resources", identifies seven programme areas: (a) Integrated management and
sustainable development of coastal areas, including exclusive economic zones; (b)
Marine environmental protection; (c) Sustainable use and conservation of marine living
resources of the high seas; (d) Sustainable use and conservation of marine living
resources under national jurisdiction; (e) Addressing critical uncertainties for the
management of the marine environment and climate change; (f) Strengthening
international, including regional, cooperation and coordination; (g) Sustainable
development of small islands.111
109 The Conference has produced three non-binding instruments and two treaties; the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, the Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forest,
Agenda 21, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.
110 See infra. Chapter 4
11' Agenda 21, Chapter 17. para. 17.1
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Each programme area is composed of four elements: 1) Basis for action, 2)
Objectives, 3) Activities, 4) Means of implementation. The item 'basis for action'
contains an evaluation of the present situation of the programme area. The item
'objectives' enumerates the targets that States will pursue under the guidance of the
principle of sustainable development. The item 'activities' formulates concrete actions
for the States to take in order to realize the objectives, such as management-related
activities, data and information, international and regional cooperation and coordination.
The item 'means of implementation' is composed of financing and cost evaluation,
scientific and technological means, human resource development, and capacity-building.
This structure is designed in such a way as to guide to rational behaviour, by enhancing
cognitive rationality (Basis for action), axiological rationality (Objectives), and
instrumental rationality (Activities and means of implementation)."2
3.1.2 Main issues of programme areas
A. The programme area of the integrated management and sustainable development of
coastal areas, including exclusive economic zones
In the programme area of the integrated management and sustainable development of
coastal areas, Agenda 21 expresses concern over the trend of concentration of world
population in the coastal areas. The concentration of human settlements in the coastal
areas causes an increase in impact of the land-based pollution on sea areas. The
integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas contains some legal
implications.
First, the integrated management of marine and coastal areas, based on the human
awareness of the close ecological interdependence between marine and coastal
ecosystems, tends to extend the geographical scope of international law on the marine
environment. In the definition of marine pollution formulated in the 1982 UNCLOS,
estuaries are considered to constitute a component of the marine environment."3 Agenda
112 For the different concepts of rationality, see infra. Chapter 5
113 See supra. 1.1.1 The concept of marine pollution
39
21 goes farther, having wider geographical scope covering not only marine realm but also
coastal land areas. This is a new development going beyond the boundaries of traditional
international law on the marine environment, whose scope is usually confined to the
marine realm, and exceptionally extended to estuaries. Although the term ecosystem
approach is not used in this programme area, the emphasis on the ecological
interdependence and integrated management of the wide coastal areas implies naturally
the necessity of the ecosystem approach. Considering man's imperfect knowledge of the
ecological causality among phenomena in the complex networks of marine and coastal
ecosystems, it is natural that Agenda 21 lays emphasis on the necessity of preventive and
precautionary approaches based on well-informed prior assessment and the systematic
observation of the impacts of development projects."4
Second, the call for the integrated management of the coastal areas may cause
complications in existing international legal systems on the protection of the marine
environment. The introduction of the concept of the integrated management of marine
and coastal areas may orient the development of international law in two opposite
directions. The first possible direction is the infiltration of international norms into the
areas under national jurisdiction. It is possible that international society, relying on the
concept of the integrated management of marine and coastal areas, reinforces
international norms applicable to the areas under the jurisdiction of coastal States, in
particular in the issue-area of the prevention of marine pollution from land-based sources.
Considering the nature of land-based sources, most of which are dissolved or dispersed in
the freshwater before being introduced into the seas, they can be more effectively
controlled by regulating human activities on land."5 Therefore, for a regime for the
prevention of marine pollution from land-based sources to be effective, it should be
endowed with appropriate means to control pollutants emitted on land. This landward
114 See infra. Chapter 4
115 The title of the 1995 Washington Declaration on Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-
based Activities signifies that the marine pollution from land-based sources should be controlled through
the control of land-based activities. Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-based Activities (GPA) adopted in the 1995 Washington Conference states also;
"Marine pollution is caused by human activities on land
About 80 per cent of all marine pollution is caused by human activities on land. Activities such as sewage
disposal in rivers and the coastal ecosystem; inadequately treated waters from industries; discharges of
nutrients of phosphorus and nitrogen used in agriculture, and finally, heavy metals and persistent organic
pollutants." GPA, preamble
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extension of the geographical applicability of the regimes for the protection of the marine
environment is already manifested in some regional agreements, such as the 1996
Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-based
Sources and Activities,"6 and the 1995 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas
and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean."7 The second possible direction of the
development of international law on the marine environment is the seaward extension of
the jurisdiction of coastal States. Coastal States might invoke the concept of integrated
management of marine and coastal areas to reinforce their jurisdiction seawards. The
concept of integrated management combined with that of ecological interdependence may
encourage coastal States to try to strengthen their jurisdiction in the sea areas under their
jurisdiction and/or extend their seaward jurisdiction even beyond their exclusive
economic zones, as already manifested in the practices of some States."8
B. The programme area of marine environmental protection
116 The 1996 Mediterranean LBS Protocol is applicable to the hydrologic basin, defined as the entire
watershed area within the territories of the parties, draining into the Mediterranean. See Protocol for the
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities, amended in
Syracuse, on 7 March 1996.
117 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean, opened to
signature in Barcelona in 1995, is applicable to all the marine waters of the Mediterranean, as well as to the
seabed, its subsoil and to the terrestrial coastal areas designated by each party, including wetlands.
118 For example, Canada's Amendment of 1994 to the Coastal Protection Act has extended Canada's
jurisdiction beyond 200 nautical miles for the conservation of fishing resources and caused a dispute
between Canada and Spain, (the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, ICJ, General ListN° 96). See M.S. Sullivan,
The Case in International Law for Canada's Extension of Fisheries Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles, 28
Ocean Development and International Law 203 (1997). See also infra. Chapter 3.
Some coastal States of the Southeast Pacific have concluded the 2000 Galapagos Agreement, in
which the States Parties extends their jurisdiction to the high seas in relation to the conservation of
straddling and highly migratory species (See infra. Chapter 3). The exercise ofjurisdiction by the Chilean
authority beyond 200 nautical miles on the basis of the Galapagos Agreement has caused the Swordfish
case between Chile and EC. See ITLOS, Case concerning the conservation and sustainable exploitation of
swordfish stocks in the South-eastern Pacific Ocean, Order 2000/3. See also infra. Chapter 6.
Chile's proclamation of Presencial Sea, by its Law No. 19.080 enacted in 1999, is also an attempt
to the extension of the national jurisdiction beyond 200 miles. See F.O. Vicuna, The Presencial Sea:
Defining Under International Law Coastal States' Specific Interest in High Seas Fisheries and Other
Activities, German Yearbook ofInternational Law, 35 (1993) pp. 264-92. See also Paul Stanton Kibel,
Alone at sea: Chile's Presencial Ocean Policy, Journal ofEnvironmental Law, vol. 12 (2000), No.l
Following the example of Chile, the Argentine government enacted the Law No 12.968 on
Maritime Areas of the Argentine Republic, by which Argentine's national regulations on the conservation
of resources shall apply beyond 200 miles in relation to migratory species. See J.A. de Yturriaga, The
International Regime of Fisheries: From UNCLOS 1982 to the Presencial Sea, Kluwer Law International,
1997, pp. 229-37
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In the programme area of marine environmental protection, Agenda 21 draws special
attention to the problem of degradation of the marine environment from land-based
sources, which are believed to represent 70% of marine pollution. Since there is no
binding global instrument to address marine pollution from land-based sources, Agenda
21 invites States to reinforce the Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-Based Sources, to enhance existing regional agreements and
action plans and to develop new regional agreements. In response to Agenda 21, the 1995
Washington Conference on protection of the marine environment from land-based
activities was convened of which the outcome is the Global Programme of Action
established under the 1995 Washington Declaration on the protection of the marine
environment from land-based activities."9
In the field of the prevention, reduction and control of degradation of the marine
environment from sea-based activities, there exist already some well-elaborated regimes,
such as the regime for the protection of the marine environment from pollution from
ships under the MARPOL 1973/78, the regime for the protection of the marine
environment from pollution by dumping under the 1972 London Dumping Convention.
In these issue-areas, Agenda 21 lays emphasis on the reinforcement of the existing
regimes, by calling for the wider ratification and implementation of these conventions,
and encouraging IMO activities in this field. With a view to complementing these
existing regimes, Agenda 21 invites States to ratify the 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, which addresses, inter alia, the development of
contingency plans at the national and international level.
Agenda 21 expresses no particular concern over the pollution from seabed
activities.
The status of these maritime areas remains ambiguous and arguable. However, the practices of
these States manifest their zeal for the extension of their jurisdiction beyond 200 nautical miles.
119 See above p. 17
See also Thomas Mensah, The International Legal Regime for the Protection and Preservation of the
Marine Environment from Land-based Sources of Pollution and Alexander Yankov, The Law of the Sea
Convention and Agenda 21: Marine Environmental Implications in Alan Boyle and David Freestone (ed.)
International Law and Sustainable Development, Oxford University Press, 2000.
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In this programme area also. Agenda 21 emphasises the necessity of preventive,
precautionary and anticipatory approaches in preventing the degradation of the marine
environment. Agenda 21 recommends also economic devices based on the internalisation
of environmental costs, such as the polluter pays principle.
C. Programme area of sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources of the
high seas
As the main causes of overfishing in the high seas, Agenda 21 identifies unregulated
fishing, overcapitalisation, excessive fleet size, vessel reflagging, insufficiently selective
gear, unreliable databases and lack of sufficient cooperation between States. The essence
of the objectives set out in this programme area is the sustainable utilisation of marine
living resources. For this, Agenda 21 underlines the necessity of multi-species
management and other approaches that take into account the relationship among species,
and the necessity of preserving habitats and other ecologically sensitive areas, the
development of underutilised or unutilised populations as potential substitutes for
traditional fishing resources. In this way Agenda 21 embraces the idea of ecosystem
approach.
Agenda 21 requests States to convene an intergovernmental conference under the
auspices of the United Nations, taking into account relevant activities at the subregional,
regional and global levels, with a view to establishing a regime on straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory fish stocks.120
States are also requested to fully implement existing international norms, such as
General Assembly Resolution 46/215 on large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing, the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Convention and the Agreement on Small Cetaceans in the Baltic and North Sea
under the Bonn Convention.
D. The programme area of the sustainable use and conservation ofmarine living
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resources under national jurisdiction
The problems relating to the conservation of marine living resources under national
jurisdiction are far more important and complicated than those relating to the
conservation of marine living resources of the high seas. The importance of marine living
resources under national jurisdiction can be seen in the fact that 95 % of the total world
catch is taken from waters under national jurisdiction.121 Complicated legal problems may
arise from the fact that marine living resources are in the areas where national legal
systems overlap with international legal rules. The 1982 UNCLOS has vested to coastal
States the primary responsibility of conserving marine living resources in the areas under
national jurisdiction.
As in the previous programme area, the essence of the objectives in this
programme area is the sustainable use of marine living resources, based on the
anthropocentric conservationist ideology.
E. The programme area of addressing critical uncertainties for the management of the
marine environment and climate change
Agenda 21 draws attention to the interaction between the atmosphere and the
hydrosphere in the global ecosystem. The main problems identified so far with regard to
the atmospheric system are the depletion of the ozone layer and climate change. An
international regime addressing the problem of ozone depletion has been established on
the basis of the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The problem of the climate change
was one of the main topics of the 1992 UNCED, which resulted in the adoption of the
United Nations Convention on Climate Change.
In this programme area. Agenda 21 expresses its concern about the possible
effects of climate change and ozone depletion on the marine environment. Humanity is
120 The result of this international conference is the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks adopted in 1995.
121 Agenda 21, para. 17.70
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convinced that climate change and ozone depletion have some serious effects on the
marine environment, such as the melting of polar glaciers and sea-level changes, but in
today's human knowledge, the causal relationship is not clearly established. This is a
situation which requires a precautionary approach, and Agenda 21 calls for precautionary
measures.122
F. The programme area of strengthening international, including regional, cooperation
and coordination
To enhance the effectiveness of existing international regimes in the issue-area of the
marine environment, Agenda 21 underlines the necessity of an integrated and
multisectoral approach at national, regional, subregional and global levels.
The first orientation advocated by Agenda 21 is to improve the institutional
efficiency of existing national and international regimes. Many national, regional and
global regimes have already been established. Their efficiency can be enhanced by
strengthening the coherence among them. For this, Agenda 21 emphasises the role of the
United Nations system in general, and the General Assembly in particular in coordinating
activities of global institutional networks relating to the marine environment, by pursuing
regular intergovernmental review and promoting effective information exchange.
The second orientation advocated by Agenda 21 is the multisectoral approach in
addressing environment and development in marine and coastal areas. It is true that most
of the exiting national, regional and international regimes deal with specific issues, such
as the prevention of certain category of marine pollution, the conservation of certain
category of marine living resources, etc. Considering the ecological interdependence and
links among issue-areas of marine environment, Agenda 21 underlines the importance of
coherence among sectoral regimes.
The programme area of strengthening international, including regional,
cooperation and coordination is quite different in character from other programme areas.
Instead of having a specific subject matter, this programme area recommends
methodologies to realize objectives set out in other programme areas. In each programme
122 For the precautionary principle, see infra. Chapter 4
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area, the necessity of strengthening international and regional cooperation and
coordination is already underlined as one of the activities to be pursued by international
society. At the cost of redundancy, Agenda 21 re-emphasises the importance of the issues
of international and regional cooperation and coordination by adopting them as a new
programme area.
G. The programme area of the sustainable development of small islands
Small island States are particularly dependent on marine and coastal resources. The
depletion of marine living resources and the degradation of marine ecosystems on which
small island States are heavily dependent have already been perceived as serious threats
to their populations. Recently, an alarming new phenomenon has been identified; a sea-
level rise caused by global warming, which may threaten the very existence of some
small islands.
Considering this particular vulnerability of small island developing States to the
change of marine environment, as well as their geographic disadvantage, Agenda 21 pays
special attention to the situation of these States. Agenda 21 invites international society to
adopt and implement plans and programmes to support the sustainable development of
small island developing States, and to adopt measures which will enable them to cope
effectively, creatively and sustainably with environmental change and to mitigate impacts
and reduce the threats posed to their marine and coastal resources.
3.2 Agenda 21 and the 1982 UNCLOS
Agenda 21 is an international action programme for sustainable development, of which
Chapter 17 provides a comprehensive international action programme for the protection
of the marine environment. The 1982 UNCLOS is an international treaty establishing
international legal norms applicable to the whole issue-area of the law of the sea, of
which Part XII and other provisions provide the international legal framework for the
protection of the marine environment. Therefore, Agenda 21 and the 1982 UNCLOS
have an overlapping issue-area, i.e. the protection of the marine environment. Both of
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them deal with all sources of pollution in all oceans and seas of the world. There must be
some close relationship between them. As Alexander Yankov asserts, the two instruments
are "quite distinct in their legal nature and scope, and yet are complementary to one
another...The interface between UNCLOS and the marine part of Agenda 21 has been an
evolving process of complementarity between a legal framework and a programme of
action, with important environmental implications".123
Agenda 21 and the 1982 UNCLOS are distinct in their legal nature. The former is
a hortatory instrument, while the latter is legally binding convention. They are distinct in
their scope. The former is an international agenda covering the entire issue-area of
sustainable development, while the latter provides a legal framework covering the entire
issue-area of the law of the sea.
Yet the two instruments are complementary in may aspects in their overlapping
issue-area. To be complementary to each other, they should share the same philosophical
foundation and guiding principles. The prevailing ethical foundation embraced by
Agenda 21 and the 1982 UNCLOS is the anthropocentric conservationism. The idea of
the balance between environment and development already implies the human-centred
conservationist ideology.124 In Agenda 21, the marine environment is perceived as a
'positive asset that presents opportunities for sustainable development',125 and the value
of the coastal area is considered as an object, which 'contains diverse and positive
habitats important for human settlement, development and local subsistence'.126 And
States are invited to 'develop and increase the potential of marine living resources to
meet human nutritional needs, as well as social, economic and development goals',127 to
'increase the availability of marine living resources as human food',128 etc. Marine and
coastal resources have instrumental value in terms of their utility for human beings. This
philosophical foundation is in line with that embedded in the 1982 UNCLOS.'29
123 Alexander Yankov, The Law of the Sea Convention and Agenda 21: Marine Environmental Implications,
in Alan Boyle and David Freestone (ed.) International Law and Sustainable Development, Oxford
University Press, 2000, p.271
124 See infra. Chapter 4
125 Agenda 21, para. 17.1
126 Agenda 21, para. 17.3
127 Agenda 21, para. 17.46
128 Agenda 21, para. 17.56
129 See above the concept of marine pollution and infra. Chapter 4
47
Agenda 21 and the 1982 UNCLOS are also common in their guiding principles.
Both of them are guided by, or in harmony with, the concept of sustainable development,
the integrated principle, the ecosystem approach and the precautionary principle.130
On the basis of these common philosophical foundations and guiding principles,
Agenda 21 and the 1982 UNCLOS exercise mutual influence. Agenda 21 provides a
comprehensive set of objectives and action plans for the protection of the marine
environment that international society is determined to pursue. As declared in Agenda 21
itself, the 1982 UNCLOS provides an international legal framework for the protection of
the marine environment on the basis ofwhich international society should pursue these
objectives and action plans.131
Although Agenda 21 has limits in orienting State behaviour as a kind of 'soft law'
instrument, it has a certain degree of normative value as a crystallization of the
consensual political will of international society. It may orient the future development of
international law by providing good evidence of opinio juris, or constituting authoritative
guidance on the interpretation or application of a treaty, or serving as agreed standards
for the implementation of more general treaty provisions or rules of customary
law.l32Some principles embraced in Agenda 21, such as sustainable development,
ecosystem approach, and precautionary principle may evolve into binding legal norms.
At present, the legal status of these principles remains ambiguous, but it is certain that
they are in the process of evolution toward the status of legal rules.133
Even in this stage where these principles remain devoid of binding force, they
may serve as guidelines for subsequent regulatory treaties. For example, after the 1992
UNCED, it is difficult to imagine that any international legal instruments in the issue-area
of the prevention of marine pollution and the conservation of marine living resources be
adopted in conflict with the concept of sustainable development. It is not rare that non-
binding hortatory international instruments have guided the formation of subsequent
130 See infra. Chapter 4
131 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para. 17.1 "...International law, as reflected in the provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea..., sets forth rights and obligations of States and provides the
international basis upon which to pursue the protection and sustainable development of the marine and
coastal environment and its resources.
132 See Alan Boyle, 48 ICLQ (1999), 901. See also Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle, International Law & the
Environment, Second edition, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp.24-27
133 See infra. Chapter 4
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binding instruments. For example, the Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, adopted at Basel in 1989, was
guided by the principles embedded in the Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment (UNCHE) of 1972, the Cairo Guidelines and Principles for
the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes adopted by the Governing
Council of UNEP in 1987, the Recommendations of the United Nations Committee of
Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods formulated in 1957 and updated biennially
and the World Charter for Nature.134 Similarly, the Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer was guided by the principles of the 1972 UNCHE.135
In such a way, Agenda 21 may exercise a certain influence upon the formation of
binding or non-binding instruments for the protection of the marine environment. For
example, the main principles embodied in Agenda 21 have been embraced by some
global agreements such as the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks (hereinafter referred to as "the 1995 Agreement") and the 2001 Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs).136 Agenda 21 has also given an
impetus to the development of the regime for the protection of the marine environment
from land-based sources. The 1982 UNCLOS is rather poor in providing concrete norms
for preventing the sea from pollution caused by land-based sources.137 In contrast.
Agenda 21 lays much emphasis on the problem of marine pollution from land-based
sources. As a result, the Washington Declaration on Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-based Activities has been adopted in 1995.138 Although the 1995
134 See the Preamble of the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal.
See also Katharina Kummer, International Management of Hazardous Wastes: The Basel Convention and
Related Legal Rules, Oxford University Press, 1999
135 See the preamble of the Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.
See also Thomas Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, Peter Lang GmbH, 1994
136 The 1995 Agreement embraces the principle of sustainable development, the precautionary approach,
the ecosystem approach. See infra. Chapter 3. The POPs, referring to the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21,
embraces the precautionary approach and the polluter pays principle.
137 Without providing any concrete norms, the 1982 UNCLOS calls for States to adopt and enforce national
laws and regulations and international rules and practices. See Articles 207, 213
138 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para. 17.26 called for the UNEP Governing Council to convene an
intergovernmental meeting on protection of the marine environment from land-based activities.
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Washington Declaration itself is not a legally binding instrument, it may evolve into a
basis for an international regime for the protection of the marine environment.139 The
Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-
based Activities established under the 1995 Washington Declaration may function as a
regime.
Agenda 21 is reflected also in regional regimes. The Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean, as
amended in 1995, reflects and applies to a regional scale the main ideas arising from the
1992 UNCED: the precautionary principle; the integrated management of the coastal
zones; the resort to best available techniques and best environmental practices and the
promotion of environmentally sound technology, including clean production
technologies. l40The Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution
from Land-Based Sources and Activities, as amended in 1996, reflects the principle of
integrated management embodied in Agenda by extending its area of application to the
hydrologic basin, which is defined as the entire watershed area within the territories of
the parties, draining into the Mediterranean.141 The 1995 Protocol concerning Specially
Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean is applicable to all the
marine waters of the Mediterranean, irrespective of their condition, as well as to the
seabed, its subsoil and to the terrestrial coastal areas designated by each party, including
wetlands. l42This approach reflects the principle of integrated management advocated by
Agenda 21.
Agenda 21 is also echoed in the Caribbean LBS Protocol, which applies the
principle of integrated management.143
139 As the definition of the regime indicates a regime can be built on non-binding instruments or even on a
set of implicit norms. See infra. Chapter 2
140 See The Mediterranean and the Law of the Sea at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Actes du colloque de
I'Association Internationale du Droit de la Mer (Naples, 22 et 23 Mars 2001), Sous la Direction de
Giuseppe Cataldi, Bruyant Bruxelles 2002, p. 269 The Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable
Development established within the framework of the Mediterranean Action Plan is also a reflection of the
spirit of the 1992 UNCED.
141 Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources and
Activities, amended in Syracuse, on 7 March 1996.
142 See The Mediterranean and the Law of the Sea at the Dawn of the 21st Century, op. cit.
143 See Protocol concerning Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities to the Convention for the
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region adopted at Aruba
on 6 October 1999, adopted by the Parties to the Convention for the Protection and Development of the
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In addition, Agenda 21 may contribute to the evolution of the regime under the
1982 UNCLOS by influencing the interpretation of the latter. The 1992 UNCED has
created a new context to be taken into account in the interpretation of the 1982 UNCLOS
and other related instruments.144 For example, the concept of sustainable development, as
embodied in Agenda 21 and other UNCED instruments, is so widely embraced that
instruments relating to the protection of the marine environment should be interpreted in
the light of this concept.145 Agenda 21 purports also to enlarge the applicability of the
1982 UNCLOS toward the coastal areas, by declaring it "international basis upon which
to pursue the protection and sustainable development of the marine and coastal
environment and its resources."146
If the 1982 UNCLOS provides the legal framework upon which the objectives set
out in Agenda 21 should be pursued, a question may arise; is the regime under the 1982
UNCLOS adequate for the achievement of the objectives of Agenda 21? To answer this
question, it may be worthwhile to examine the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS and
related regimes in the light of regime theory.
marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region done at Cartagena de Indias on 24 March 1983. The
Protocol, referring to the principles of the Rio Declaration and Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 as its guiding
principles, is intended to regulate the emission of land-based pollutants on the coastal areas by limiting the
source categories, activities and associated pollutants of concern listed in Annexes.
144 The new context created by the 1992 UNCED is a situation which may influence the interpretation of
treaties, as foreseen by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law ofTreaties, which stipulates in Article 31,
para.3; "There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties."
For the concept of evolutionary interpretation, see infra. Chapter 3
145 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the law ofTreaties Article 31, para.3 stipulates;
"There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
146 See infra. Chapter 3
Chapter 2
Regime Theory
1. Theoretical background of regime theories
Why and how do self-interested sovereign States cooperate in their interactions in the
anarchical international society? This is one of the fundamental questions to which most
of international relations theories purport to offer an answer. Among these, regime
theories focus their attention on the fact that sovereign States do cooperate among
themselves in many fields by instituting self-governing mechanisms based on normative
rules. The key concepts that constitute the basic assumptions underlying regime theories
with regard to the nature of main actors and their environment in modern international
society are sovereignty, interdependence and international anarchy.
1.1 Sovereignty
Sovereignty is one of the basic concepts that characterize State actors in modern
international society. It has its internal and external aspects, as Hedley Bull distinguishes
"internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other authorities within that
territory and population", and "external sovereignty, by which is meant not supremacy
but independence of outside authorities".' In its internal aspect, sovereignty means that "a
State's domestic policy falls within its exclusive jurisdiction, provided of course that it
does not violate any obligation of international law."2 In other words, it implies nearly
absolute control as Henkin states; "In the modern inter-State system, too, the State has
complete authority in its territory and over persons, activities and things within it (except
as it consents to waive some of that authority)."3 External manifestation of a State's
sovereignty in its relation with other States is its independence. For Grotius, a State is
1 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, Second edition, MacMillan, 1995, p. 8
2 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, pp.131
3 Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, General Course on Public International
Law, Recueil des Cours, The Hague Academy of International Law, 1989, IV Tome 216, p. 28
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sovereign when its acts are not subject to the control of others.4 Similarly, Max Huber
states; "independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to
the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State."5 Hans Morgenthau perceives
the concept of sovereignty as "a consequence of the transformation of the feudal system
into the territorial State which had been consummated in the sixteenth century".6
The concept of equality of States is a corollary of the concept of sovereignty.7 If
States are truly independent, no one of them will be subject to any other.8 Vattel deduces
the principle of equality of States from the concept of natural equality, relying on the
analogy between natural persons and States.9 Equality of States means legal equality. In
his doctrine of absolute equality of States, Vattel emphasises legal equality in spite of
inequality of States in their power or size; "Strength or weakness, in this case, counts for
nothing. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small Republic is no less a sovereign
State than the most powerful Kingdom."10 This incongruity between legal equality and
political inequality is one of the characteristics of today's State system. The principle of
legal equality of States is consolidated in modern international law, by being enshrined in
international legal texts, in particular in the Charter of the United Nations, and manifested
in international practices. Regarding the content of equality of States, however, many
questions arise. 'Equality before the law' is firmly anchored in international society.
However, 'equality of rights' as the material content of international law encounters not
4 Hugo Grotius, Dejure belli ac pacis, 1645, translated into French by P. Pradier-Fodere, Pressses
Universitaires de France, 1999, p. 98 « Voila done en quoi consiste la puissance civile...On la dit
souveraine, lorsque ses actes ne sont pas dependants de la disposition etrangere... »
5 Max Huber, Arbitral Award rendered in conformity with the Special Agreement concluded on January
23rd, 1925 between the United States of America and the Netherlands relating to the Arbitration of
differences respecting Sovereignty over the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) April 4th, 1928, Part II.
6 See Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, Brief edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson,
McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1993, p.253
7 See P. H. Kooijmans, The Doctrine of the Equality of States, A.W. Sythoff-Leyden, 1964, p.p. 126-151
"the equality of States as a consequence of their sovereignty".
See also Paul Reuter, Le developpement de I'ordre juridique internationale, Economica, 1995, p. 381
Pau Reuter states ; « la theorie de la souverainete entraine un corollaire : 1'egalite des Etats. »
8 For John Westlike, "the equality of sovereign states is merely their independence under a different name".
John Westlike, International Law, Cambridge, 1904, p. 308
9 Emeric de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, Translation of the edition of 1758
by Charles G. Fenwick, The Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916, p. 7
"Since men are by nature equal, and their individual rights and obligations the same, as coming equally
from nature, Nations, which are composed ofmen and may be regarded as so many free persons living
together in a state of nature, are by nature equal and hold from nature the same obligations and the same
rights."
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only counterexamples in reality but also many questions in theory. Even in the United
Nations system, political inequality is translated into legal inequality in some aspects. For
example, while embracing the principle of sovereign equality, the Charter of the United
Nations institutes a predominant position of the permanent members of the Security
Council." Some, e.g. P. J. Baker, maintain that equality before the law is the only
definition that will bear examination.12 For Suganami also, equality of States means only
equality before the law.13 In spite of divergent interpretations of its concept, the principle
of sovereign equality is consolidated as a fundamental pillar supporting the contemporary
international legal order.
1.2 Interdependence
Interdependence characterizes the society in which States act and interact.
Conceptually the concept of sovereignty generates that of independence. However, reality
entangles independent States. Grotius deduces the freedom of the seas form the natural
interdependence of States, by arguing that the freedom of the seas stems from the
axiomatic first principle of the freedom of every nation to travel to every other nation,
and to trade with it, which in turn is founded on the concept of economic interdependence
among nations.14 Vattel, while fervently defending the cause of the independence of
10 Ibid p. 7
" Considering the predominance of the Security Council in the United Nations and the predominance of the
great powers in the Security Council, Hans Morgenthau regards the United Nations as a "Government by
Superpowers". See Hans J. Morgenthau, op.cit. p. 319
12 P. J. Baker, The Doctrine of Legal Equality of States, BYIL, vol. 4 (1923-1924), pp.1-20
13 For Hidemi Suganami, equality before the law means that states are equally subjected to, bound by, or
obligated to act in accordance with international law, but does not mean that states ought to possess
identical rights and duties in international law. When states are said to have an equal right what is meant is
that there is nothing in international arrangements of international society precluding any class of sovereign
states from acquiring legal rights, or from maintaining legal freedoms, which another class of sovereign
states are permitted. See Hidemi Suganami, Grotius and International Equality, in Hedley Bull, Benedict
Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (ed.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations, Clarendon Press, 1990, pp.
221-240
14 In Mare Liberum, Grotius argues; "God Himself says this speaking through the voice of nature; and
inasmuch as it is not His will to have Nature supply every place with all the necessaries of life, He ordains
that some nations excel in one art and others in another. Why is this His will, except it be that He wished
human friendships to be engendered by mutual needs and resources, lest individuals deeming themselves
entirely sufficient unto themselves should for that very reason be rendered unsociable". Hugo Grotius, The
Freedom of the Seas, translated by Ralph Van Deman Magoffin, Oxford University Press, American
Branch, 1916, p. 7
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sovereign States, recognizes the reality of interdependence among nations and derives
therefrom the duty of aiding others as the first general law.15 For John Austin, it is from
the natural interrelatedness of sovereigns that international law originates, when he
asserts; "society formed by the intercourse of independent political societies, is the
province of international law...Speaking with greater precision, international law, or the
law obtaining between nations, regards the conduct of sovereigns considered as related to
one another."16
In general, "interdependence arises when the actions of individual members of a
social system impact (whether materially or perceptually) the welfare of other members
of the system".17 Interdependence in world politics refers to "situations characterized by
reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries."18 In game
theoretical terms, "the parties are interdependent in the sense that the outcome depends
on the opponent's choice of strategy as well as on one's own."19 As such, today's
complex international relations are woven into an 'interdependence structure'.20
Interdependence among States is a common feature in every field. In particular,
environment is a field where interdependence is the root of all issues. Environmental
interdependence results from ecological interdependence as well as from the nature of the
environment as an international public good.21 The global environment is composed of
global commons, such as the global climate, ozone layer, high seas, and mixed goods,
15 Emeric de Vattel contends that "the first general law, which is to be found in the very end of the society
ofNations, is that each Nation should contribute as far as it can to the happiness and advancement of other
Nations." Emeric de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, translated by Charles G.
Fenwick, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916, p. 6
16 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Lecture VI, Edited by Wilfrid E. Rumble,
Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 171
According to Austin's command theory of law, international law is not a law properly called, but only a
law by analogy, because no one can command sovereigns.
17 Oran R. Young, The effectiveness of international institutions: Hard cases and critical variables, in James
N. Rosenau and Ernest-Otto Czempiel (ed.) Governance without Government, Cambridge University Press,
1992, p. 188
18 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Second edition, Harper Collins
Publishers, 1989, p. 8
19 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 37
20 Interdependence structure means situations in which personal outcomes are partially or completely
determined by the actions of one or more others. See Paul A. M. Van Lange and Carsten K. W. De Dreu,
Social Interaction: Cooperation and Competition, in Miles Hewstone and Wolfgang Stroebe (ed.), Social
Psychology, Blackwell Publishers, Third edition, 2001, p. 343
21 Public good is characterized by non-rivalry and non-excludability. See Michael Parkin, Economics,
second edition, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1994, p. 520.
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which have the characteristics of private good as well as public good, like international
watercourses.22 Actions of States in relation to such public goods and mixed goods entail
problems of externalities and free-riding, which are common to all environmental issues.
1.3 Anarchy
Anarchy is a characteristic of the nature of contemporary international society.
The concept of anarchy is closely related to that of sovereignty. In its simplest meaning,
anarchy refers to the absence of central authority."Among independent and equal States,
no one can exercise authority over others. Anarchy in this sense does not automatically
mean chaos. Today's international anarchy is different from the Hobbesian state of nature.
In contemporary anarchical society, order does exist in some way. Different
institutionalists show different modalities of cooperation under anarchy through
institutional mechanisms, on the assumption that "in anarchy individuals pursue their
own self-interest without the aid of a central authority to force them to cooperate with
each other".24 Even realists, who are convinced that international anarchy fosters
competition and conflict among States, perceive the world in "anarchic order",25 not in
chaos. However, it is undeniable that anarchy does not favour the creation of order and
cooperation among States. For realists, in particular, anarchy engenders many negative
consequences; "states recognize that, in anarchy, there is no overarching authority to
prevent others from using violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave
them",26 and "wars can occur because there is nothing to prevent them".27 In international
22 For the navigational purpose, a transboundary river may be regarded as a public good until it is congested.
For the purpose of irrigation or drinking water supply, it may be treated as a private good, being rival and
excludable.
23 Institutionalists, such as Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, define anarchy as "a lack of common
government in world politics". See Axelrod and Keohane, Achieving cooperation under anarchy, in David
A. Baldwin, (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism, Columbia University Press 1993, p. 85
For realists also, international anarchy means the absence of a common interstate government. See Joseph
M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits ofCooperation, International Organization, 42, 1988, p.485
24 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution ofCo-operation, Penguin Books, 1984, p. 6
25 See Kenneth N. Waltz, Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism
and its Critics, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp.98-130
26 Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation, lO, 1988, p. 497
27 Kenneth N. Waltz, op.cit. p. 232
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relations theories the term anarchy is used to mean the decentralized character of
international society.
1.4 Conflict and cooperation under anarchy
In an anarchical society where sovereign States are independent in law but interdependent
in fact, conflicts are inevitable, but cooperation is not impossible.
The most fundamental cause of conflicts among States is the State egoism. It is
almost axiomatically assumed that States pursue the maximization of their interest.
However, with regard to the concept of interest, there is a sharp divergence between
institutionalists and realists. Institutionalists assume that States focus primarily on their
individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains of others.28 Therefore,
cooperation is possible insofar as there is some possibility of joint gains. On the contrary,
realists assert that the fundamental goal of States in any relationship is to prevent others
from achieving advances in their relative capabilities, and they are compelled to ask
"Who will gain more?" rather than "Will both of us gain?"29 If national interest is defined
in terms of power, as held by Hans Morgenthau, States are motivated by relative gains
since power is a relative gain by nature.30 If all States are preoccupied with relative gains,
cooperation among them becomes difficult, because each State, in pursuit of relative
gains, desires to gain more than other States. This can be more clearly illustrated in game
theoretical terms; between player A and player B, the objective ofA is Ga > Gb, and that
of B is Ga < Gb (Ga: gain for A, Gb: gain for B). But it is mathematically impossible to
realize Ga > Gb and Ga < Gb simultaneously. If the players are cooperative enough, A
may be satisfied with Ga > Gb, and B with Ga < Gb. Then the only possible solution is
Ga = Gb. This is the point where balance of interest or balance of power can be achieved.
The independence of States complicates problems of conflict and cooperation.
As Dante argues; "There is always the possibility of conflict between two rulers where
28 Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative gains in International Relations Theory, in David A. Baldwin, (ed.)
Neorealism and Neoliberalism, op.cit, p. 209
29 Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and Limits ofCooperation, in David A. Baldwin, (ed.) Neorealism and
Neoliberalism, op.cit. p. 127
30 Schwarzenberger defines power as "capacity to impose one's will on others by reliance on effective
sanctions in case of non-compliance." Georg Schwarzenberger, Power Politics, 3rd edition, 1964, Stevens, p.
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one is not subject to the other's control",31 if States behave independently, it is difficult to
expect an automatic harmony in their actions. Harmony can be achieved through
coordination or cooperation, which require a certain degree of self-restraint, which is
rarely compatible with the concept of independence. Different models of game theory
demonstrate how it is difficult for egoists to arrive at the optimal outcome, when making
decisions independently, however rational they might be.32 The tragedy of the commons
is a typical parable that shows how rational actors are destined to tragic outcomes
resulting from independent decisions.
Equality of States is no longer a favourable condition for the creation of order
and cooperation. In a realist perspective in particular, equality is a source of struggle
among men as well as among States. For Hobbes, "Nature hath made men so equal, in the
faculties of body, and mind...From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the
attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which
nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies".33 In the same line, Kenneth
Waltz regards equality of States as a cause of strife, when he asserts; "In anarchic realms,
like units coact. In hierarchic realms, unlike units interact. In an anarchic realm, the units
are functionally similar and tend to remain so. Like units work to maintain a measure of
independence and may even strive for autarchy. In a hierarchic realm, the units are
differentiated, and they tend to increase the extent of their specialization".34 Among
equals, cooperation can be realized only through agreement or mutual consent.
As a means of realizing order and cooperation among States, realists rely on the
concept of power. In line with Dante's idea of Monarchic and Hobbes's Leviathan,
some propose the theory of hegemonic stability, which claims that a benevolent despot in
14
31 Dante Alighieri, Monorchia, 1313, translated into English, Monarchy, by Prue Shaw, Cambridge
University Press, 1996, p. 14
32 See Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchical world, in Stephen D.
Krasner, (ed.) International Regimes, Cornell University Press, 1995, pp. 115-140
33 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 86-87
The concept of equality presented by Hobbes is the equality in terms of real power. For Vattel, however,
men and nations are equal in their rights and obligations, and strength or weakness, in this case, counts for
nothing. Vattel, The Law ofNations, op.cit., p. 7
34 Kenneth N. Waltz, Anarchic Orders and Balance of Power, op.cit, pp. 100-101
35 Dante, Monorchia, op. cit. p. 15-17 "Therefore, the world is ordered in the best possible way when
justice is at its strongest in it...justice is at its strongest in the world when it resides in a subject who has in
the highest degree possible the will and the power to act; only the monarch is such a subject."
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international politics leads to desirable outcomes for all states.36 Other realists, starting
from the concept of interest defined in terms of power, envision international peace and
cooperation by means of limitations of national power, such as balance of power,
international morality and public world opinion, international law.37 Still other realists
advance more radical and pessimistic views of power politics, in which order can be
established only by the interplay of forces; "Because each state is the final judge of its
own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies. Because any
state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force
with force or to pay the cost of weakness."38
In contrast, institutionalists pay more attention to the possibility of international
order maintained by decentralized cooperation among equal States fostered by self-
governing institutions. Theorists of Grotian tradition envisage an international society in
which all States should be bound by rules and institutions as well as by morality and law.
They believe in the possibility that States cooperate by calculation of their self-interests,
or by patterned behaviour guided by rules they form for themselves. Recently, since the
1970s, a school of international relations theorists has been developing theories focused
on a particular type of institutions, i.e. regimes, which function on the basis of self-
governing normative injunctions. Since these regime theories purport to explain
international cooperation achieved by patterned behaviour based on normative rules, they
are particularly appropriate for application to international environmental issues, in
dealing with which States are motivated to achieve joint gains through cooperation,
instead of pursuing relative gains through power struggle.
2. Concept of Regimes
Different definitions of regimes are proposed by different regime theorists. It is John
Ruggie who is the first to propose a definition of regime as "a set ofmutual expectations,
rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which
36 For Robert Gilpin, "the Pax Britanica and Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an international
system of relative peace and security". Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University
Press, 1981, p. 144.
37 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, op.cit.
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have been accepted by a group of states".39 Oran R. Young defines regimes as "social
institutions governing the actions of those interested in specifiable activities (or
meaningful sets of activities). As such, they are recognized patterns of practice around
which expectations converge".40 For Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye regimes are "sets of
governing arrangements that include networks of rules, norms, and procedures that
regularize behaviour and control its effects.41 For Ernst Haas regimes are "norms, rules,
and procedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue-area".42 Friedrich Kratochwil and
John Gerard Ruggie perceive regimes as "governing arrangements constructed by states
to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of international behaviour in various
issue-areas".43 The most widely accepted definition is proposed by Stephen D. Krasner;
"Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a
given area of international relations".44
Krasner explains the meaning of four components of his definition: "Principles are beliefs
of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of
rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action.
Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing
collective choice".45
If we analyse Krasner's definition, we find six elements: (1) principles, (2) norms,
(3) rules, (4) decision-making procedures, (5) convergent expectations of actors, and (6)
given area of international relations.
38 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man the State and War, Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 160
39 John Ruggie, International responses to technology: concepts and trends, IO, vol.29, summer 1975, p.
570
40 Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems ofConcept Formation", World Politics, April 1980, p.
332. Young gives similar definition in Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes, in
Krasner (ed.), International regimes, Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 93
41 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, op.cit., p. 19
42 Ernst B. Haas, Why collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes, World Politics, April 1980,
p.358
43 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, International organization: a state of the art on the art of
the state, IO, 1986, p. 759
44 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in
Krasner (ed.) op.cit. p.2 This definition is recognized as the collective definition among several regime
theorists.
45 Stephen D. Krasner, op.cit, p.2
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2.1 Principles
'Beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude', shared by the members of a given group, mean
the perception of reality and the value orientation which prevail in that group. These are
underlying belief and value systems espoused by the members of a group. A belief
system combined with a value system lays the foundation of rational behaviour of the
members of a given group in their interaction; the former provides cognitive rationality,
the latter axiological rationality.46
A set of specific beliefs about facts and causal relations shared by members, i.e.
common assumptions about "what is" in a given issue-area, constitutes a belief system.
As Talcott Parsons emphasizes the integrative function of common beliefs in systems of
interaction,47 since without shared beliefs, expectations of actors cannot converge. For
example, by recognizing that "human activities have been substantially increasing the
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural
greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average in an additional warming of the
Earth's surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and
humankind",48 the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change express an
element of their common belief system. Shared beliefs may be scientifically valid or not.
To the extent that such beliefs are widely accepted with little or no questioning, they can
influence many aspects of social life. Shared beliefs are thus a matter of common
perception rather than a question of truth. For example, by "noting that there are many
uncertainties in predictions of climate change, particularly with regard to the timing,
magnitude and regional patterns thereof',49 the Parties to the Climate Change Convention
admit that their common beliefs are based on the common perception rather than on the
scientific truth.
46 For the concept of rationality, see infra. Chapter 5.
47 According to Parsons, belief systems involve an independent orientation to a "reality" which has
properties independent of the actor who attempts to understand it cognitively. Patterns of value-orientation,
on the other hand, formulate the directions of choice in the dilemmas of action. See Talcott Parsons, The
Social System, Collier MacMillan Publishers, Paperback Edition, 1964, pp.326-383
48 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, Preamble
49 Idem.
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A set of values shared by the members of a group, i.e. judgments about "what is
desirable or undesirable" or about "what is right or wrong", constitutes a value system
which provides the axiological framework for a regime. Without a common value
orientation, actors cannot pursue a common goal. For example, by "acknowledging that
the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all
countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities and their social and economic conditions",50 the Parties to the Climate
Change Convention define a common value orientation. The principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities thus embodied is formed by the combination of a particular
belief system and a particular value system embraced by the contemporary international
society: the former is based on the common conviction on the historic background
concerning the different responsibilities for the global environmental degradation and the
present circumstances characterized by marked inequality between developed and
developing States; the latter is orientated toward more just and equitable international
order. In some cases, principles, though abstract in their expression, are explicitly
articulated, commonly in the preamble of international instruments. In other cases,
principles are implicitly embedded throughout a regime. For example, "in the nineteenth
century, principles concerning the rectitude of the balance of power among major actors
were reflected in norms legitimizing and regulating colonial expansion, and in those
regulating major-power warfare".51 This implicit diffuseness of principles may be the
reason why many regime theorists omit this element in their definition of regimes.
Because of their abstract character, principles may not be suitable to serve as directly
operational guidelines. They form a general orientation of actions, commonly under the
heading of such and such 'principle' or 'approach'. For a principle to provide concrete
guidelines for the behaviour of the regime members, more concrete injunctions should be
deduced therefrom, in the form of norms or rules.
2.2 Norms
50 Idem.
51 Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, International Regimes: lessons from inductive analysis, in
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Norms, which refer to 'standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations',
are shared standards regarding "legitimate or illegitimate" social actions. Compared with
principles, norms are more concrete injunctions. In some cases, norms are directly
derived from principles. For example, in the Climate Change Convention, two categories
of norms are derived from the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; 1)
norms for all Parties from the principle of common responsibility, 2) norms for developed
country Parties from the principle of differentiated responsibilities. The commitment of
all Parties to "take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in
their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions..."52 is one of the
norms derived from the concept of common responsibilities. The commitment of the
developed country Parties to "take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance,
as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and
know-how to other Parties, particularly to developing country Parties, to enable them to
implement the provisions of the Convention"53 is one of the norms derived from the
concept of the differentiated responsibilities. However, in many other cases, it is difficult
to trace how such and such norm is deduced from such and such principle. Some norms
are formulated from principles which are implicitly embedded in the regime. For example,
the principle of the common but differentiated responsibilities is not explicitly articulated
in the 1982 UNCLOS, but the concept of the differentiated responsibilities is reflected in
the norm of preferential treatment for developing States embodied in some articles, such
as Article 203, stipulating "Developing States shall, for the purpose of prevention,
reduction, and control of pollution of the marine environment or minimization of its
effects, be granted preference by international organization in : (a) the allocation of
appropriate funds and technical assistance; and (b) the utilization of their specialized
services".54
When explained as standards of behaviour defined in terms of "rights and
obligations", norms may give some legal connotation. But they are not necessarily of
Krasner (ed.), op.cit., p.64
52 Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 4, paragraph 1(f)
53 Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 4, paragraph 5.
54 See infra. Chapter 4.
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legal character. They may be moral and ethical injunctions. For example, the above-
mentioned commitments of all Parties, and those of developed country Parties are moral
or political commitments, without giving rise to a legal obligation. Sometimes, the term
"norms" represents all of the regime injunctions, and many regime theorists perceive
regimes as normative institutions designed to promote the norm-guided behaviour of
states. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, for example, emphasize that what
distinguishes international regimes from other international phenomena is a specifically
normative element.55
2.3 Rules
Rules, as "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action", constitute action-oriented
technical injunctions designed to induce the actors to behave in line with principles and
norms of a given regime. Whereas principles and norms, as defined in regime theory, are
basically value-oriented injunctions, rules are not necessarily so. Though derived from, or
based on, principles or norms, rules themselves may or may not based on a value
judgment. Many operational rules established as means of coordination and regulation of
collective actions prescribe or proscribe the behaviour of actors without implying value
judgment. Such operational rules are followed for expedient rather than moral reasons.
For example, the obligations of the States in respect of 'Monitoring and Environmental
Assessment' for the protection and preservation of the marine environment set forth in
Articles 204-206 of the 1982 UNCLOS are operational rules, which have no moral
character. Whether based on a value judgment or not, regime rules entail concrete social
constraints on the behaviour of actors, in the form of prescription or proscription. Such
prescriptions and proscriptions are instrumental injunctions in that they purport to realize
the objectives set out in higher injunctions such as principles or norms. Most rules and
standards established for the environmental protection are free of a value judgment. Their
raison d'etre is to improve the quality of a particular element of environment. For
example, the 1972 London Dumping Convention prohibits the dumping of wastes or
55 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: a state of the art on an art of
the state, IO,, 1986, p. 767
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other matter listed in Annex I, but allows the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in
Annex II by a prior special permit, and allows the dumping of all other wastes or matter
by a prior general permit.56 There is no value judgment in the standards applied to the
classification ofwastes and matter.
The concept of rules is so close to that of norms that it is often difficult to
distinguish rules from norms. It is a matter of difference of specificity. In fact, regime
theorists often employ the two terms interchangeably or in combined terms, such as 'rules
and norms', 'norm and rule-guided action', etc. For Robert O. Keohane, "the rules of a
regime are difficult to distinguish from its norms; at the margin, they merge into one
another. Rules are, however, more specific: they indicate in more detail the specific rights
and obligations of members".57
2.4 Decision-making procedures
As a durable and evolutionary institution, a regime needs to make continuous decisions to
deal with internal matters or adapt to the changing external environment. The decision¬
making in a regime is an expression of the will of its members moulded through a process
of collective choices. In today's decentralized international society composed of
sovereign States, it is difficult to formulate an expression of the common will of a group
of States, respecting the principle of sovereign equality but taking into account the factual
inequality and conflicting interests among States. Appropriate procedures are necessary
for an orderly process of collective choices. In the case of a regime founded on the basis
of a formal constituent instrument, the basic rules of decision-making are normally
included in the instrument, and more detailed procedures are established in terms of the
rules of procedures for different levels ofmeetings.
In general, decisions in international regimes are made through the submission,
discussion, and adoption of a proposal in the meetings of the regime members. Decision¬
making procedures include normally the rules governing the modalities of submission,
discussion and adoption of proposals, as well as the distribution of voting power. For the
56 The 1972Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
57 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 58
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adoption of proposals, which is the final phase of the decision-making process, various
methods are employed according to the characteristics of each meeting and each decision
to make. Since the 1960's, because of its dual merits, the consensus rule has been widely
applied, in particular in global organizations. On the one hand, decision-making by
consensus conforms to the principle of sovereign equality. On the other hand, a decision
made by consensus is more conducive to compliance by the minority because it is not a
decision imposed on the minority.58 A variety of voting methods such as decision by
unanimity or by different types of majority voting are being utilized according to the
situation. The main subjects of decision-making in a regime are those relating to the
establishment of the regime itself, its functioning, and its transformation through the
amendment of constituent instruments.
Another category of decision-making procedures is the provisions relating to
dispute settlement. Because disputes within a regime arise from the conflict concerning
the interpretation and application of regime injunctions, they should be settled in the
context of the relevant regime, in accordance with predetermined procedures. Decision¬
makings for the settlement of disputes are quite different in nature from other decision¬
makings; the former is made by an independent body empowered by regime members,
while the latter is made by the regime members themselves.
Sometimes, decision-making procedures are consolidated through practice
without formal provisions, as in the case of the Antarctic Treaty System, in which every
substantive decision is made by consensus among Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties
according to a consolidated practice.
2.5 Convergence of expectations
58 Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker explain merits and disadvantages of decision by consensus as
follows: "...this (consensus) reconciles the apparently irreconcilable. Like unanimity, it fully respects
sovereignty, and in common with majority voting, it fully takes into account the interests of the majority of
states... Among the disadvantages of this manner of proceeding, frequent mention is made of the private
character of negotiations, leaving no room for extensive public records which might facilitate the solution
of future questions of interpretation; furthermore, negotiations are usually time-consuming and the content
of decisions may be excessively watered down through almost endless compromises. See Henry G.
Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p.785
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The mere setting of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures is not
enough for a regime to function. The core problem of regime functioning is how
sovereign States comply with international norms and rules in the absence of any central
authority entitled or empowered to enforce them. The principal, if not sole, determinant
of the willingness of egoistic States to comply with regime injunctions is their self-
interest. As illustrated in many models of game theory, States will cooperate insofar as
they expect that others will cooperate also. Without such shared expectations, actors are
prone to be driven to mutual defection by the dictates of egoism. In the rational
calculation of interest, convergent expectations for mutual cooperation may facilitate
cooperation and avoidance of defection. In a norm-guided behaviour, shared expectations
facilitate compliance of each actor by strengthening the assurance that other actors too
will comply with the norms. As such, convergent expectations constitute a behavioural
foundation for cooperation among States, by guiding their decision-making toward
cooperation and compliance. This behavioural aspect is the essential attribute that
differentiates international regimes from international organizations or international
institutions. Emphasizing this behavioural component of a regime, Martin Tist and
Volker Rittberger assert that a regime can only be said to exist if a certain density of rules
and durability of norm- and rule-guided behaviour can be ascertained.59 In the same line,
Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie regard regimes as governing arrangements
constructed by states to coordinate their expectations,60 and Robert O. Keohane argues
that regimes only exist if actors' expectations actually converge.61 Oran R. Young draws
attention to the conjunction of convergent expectations and patterns of behaviour or
practice (the occurrence of behavioural regularities sometimes gives rise to a
convergence of expectations, and vice versa), which produces conventionalised
behaviour or behaviour based on recognizable social conventions.62 Stephen Haggard and
Beth A. Simmons consider that the strength of a regime is measured by the degree of
59 Martin List and Volker Rittberger, Regime Theory and International Environmental Management, in
Andrew Hurrel an Benedict Kingsbury (ed.), International Politics of the Environment, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1992, p. 89-90
60 Kratochwil & Ruggie, International Organization: a state of art or an art of the state, IO, 1986, p.759
61 Robert O. Keohane, The Analysis of International Regimes, in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory
and International Relations, Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 27
62 Oran R. Young, Regime Dynamics: the Rise and Fall of International Regimes, in Krasner (ed.), op.cit., p.
94
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compliance with regime injunctions, particularly in instances where short-term or
"myopic" self-interests collide with regime rules.63 John Rawls asserts, "an institution
exists at a certain time and place when the actions specified by it are regularly carried out
in accordance with a public understanding that the system of rules defining the institution
is to be followed."64 For Andrew Hurrel, "perhaps the most important difference that
marks regime theory from international law and older notions of international society
concerns the reasons why states obey rules that are usually unenforced and mostly
unenforceable... regime theory's most distinctive contribution is to have developed the
idea of self-interest and reciprocal benefits and, in general, to have downplayed the
traditional emphasis placed on the role of community and sense of justice. The central
challenge was to explain the emergence of cooperation on the basis of realist assumptions
- that states are self-interested actors competing in a world of anarchy, that cooperation
need not depend on altruism, that it can develop from the calculations of instrumentally
rational actors."65
What do regime members expect? When States are said to be self-interested, it is
meant that they pursue their individual interests. In reality, each State is motivated not
only by individual interest but also by common interest shared by a group of States or the
international society as a whole. Conflicts between individual interest and collective
interest pervade international society. However, the most common in reality is the mixed-
motive situation,66 in which individual interest partially corresponds and partially
conflicts with collective interest.
Although interest is the key variable in accounting for State behaviour, it is not
the sole determinant of State behaviour. As Martti Koskenniemi asserts; "reliance on
interest-rationality may also be unfounded, since states act through complicated networks
of rationalities...", there must be, besides interest, some other factors which contribute to
moulding State behaviour. In fact, it is not rare that States forgo their national interest in
the cause of justice, international peace, human rights, or the intrinsic value of natural
63 Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, Theories of international regimes, lO ,1987, p.497
64 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 55
65 Andrew Hurrel, International Society and the Study of Regimes, A Reflective Approach, in Volker
Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 54-56
66 For the concept of mixed-motive situations, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of conflict, Harvard
University Press, Fifteenth printing, 1995, Part II Reorientation ofGame theory, pp. 81-118
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resources. Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, Raymond Boudon, Louis Henkin, John Rawls,
Joseph Raz, and many other authors point out that utilitarian or functionalist analyses
based on the pursuit of interest are not sufficient to explain human behaviour. They
believe in the existence of normative orientation of action, without denying the
importance of utility-based action. For Max Weber, legitimacy is one of the key factors
orienting social action, when he asserts; "Action, especially social action which involves
social relationships, may be oriented by the actors to a belief (Vorstellung) in the
existence of a 'legitimate order.'"67 Talcott Parsons regards the system of normative-
orientation as a subsystem (together with a personality system and social system) of the
system of action.68 Raymond Boudon insists that axiological judgements cannot be
reduced to the consideration of interest.69 Louis Henkin underlines the binding force of
moral commitments, by asserting; "often States (and their officials) have moral
commitments, reflecting the ideology, the values, the "style" of their society, as well as
some awareness of, and respect for, world opinion."70 For John Rawls, "Justice is the first
virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought...the primary subject of
social justice is the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental
rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation."71 For
Joseph Raz, normativity is the core element of rationality. He maintains; "the core idea is
that rationality is the ability to realize the normative significance of the normative
features of the world, and the ability to respond accordingly."72
Whether it is interests or normative values that determine the behaviour of States,
there is no guarantee that they coincide in harmony. Expectations converge through
intersubjective understanding. In the interdependence structure, cooperation or conflict is
a problem of interaction, in which each member of a group behaves on the basis of
intersubjective understanding. John Rawls describes the intersubjective expectations; "A
person taking part in an institution knows what the rules demand of him and of the others.
67 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A. M. Henderson and
Talcott Parsons, The Free Press, 1964, p. 124
68 Talcott Parsons & Edward Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action, Transaction Publishers, 2001,
Originally published in 1951 by Harvard University Press. Chapter 3. Systems of value-orientation.
69 See Raymond Boudon, Le juste et le vrai, Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1995, pp. 251-292
70 Louis Henkin, op.cit., p. 72
71 John Rawls, A theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 3-7
72 Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason, On the Theory of Value and Action, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 68
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He also knows that the others know this and that they know that he knows this, and so on.
To be sure, this condition is not always fulfilled in the case of actual institutions, but it is
a reasonable simplifying assumption."" For Parsons, "the expectations of an ego always
imply the expectations of one or more alters."74 Game theory illustrates more clearly that,
in interdependent interactions, the expectation based on the decision of other actors
constitutes one of the critical factors of each actor's decision. The goal-expectation
theory argues that cooperation is likely to be effectively promoted when two conditions
are met: (1) the individual must pursue cooperative goals, and (2) the individual must
expect cooperation from the interdependent other.75 D. M. Kuhlman and A. Marshello
describe such interdependent cooperation; "Other's behaviour - or beliefs regarding
other's behaviour - is a strong determinant of transformations and subsequent own
behaviour. A pervasive effect is that the observation or expectation of non-cooperative
behaviour evokes non-cooperative behaviour in the interdependent other. An observation
or expectation that the interdependent other makes a cooperative choice tends to elicit (or
maintain) cooperative behaviour among some (but not all) of us.76 The lack of this
intersubjective understanding is the critical cause of the behaviour of rational fools, as
exemplified in the prisoners' dilemma, the tragedy of the commons, and stag hunters, etc.
Regimes facilitate the convergence of expectations among regime members by
providing them with substantive and procedural rules and by instituting mechanisms
aimed at forging convergent interpretations of regime injunctions by different means,
such as a dispute settlement system or a meeting of members.
2.6 Issue-area
For Ernest B. Haas, an issue refers to "a single goal that found its way onto a decision¬
making agenda".77 Similarly, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye define issues as
73 John Rawls, A theory ofjustice, Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 56
74 Talcott Parsons, op.cit. p. 191
75 Miles Hewstone and Wolfgang Stroebe, Introduction to Social Psychology, Blackwell Publishers, Third
edition, 2001, p. 356
76 D. M. Kuhlman, & A. Marshello, Individual differences in game motivation as moderators of
preprogrammed strategies effects in prisoner's dilemma. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 32
(1975), 922-31
77 Ernest B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power, University of California Press, 1990. P. 76
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"problems about which policymakers are concerned, and which they believe are relevant
to public policy" 78 These definitions indicate that the perception of a situation by
decision-makers is crucial for a problem to become an issue. A potential problem, or even
an imaginary problem may become an issue, whereas a real problem may not become an
issue if it fails to be properly perceived. A 'malade imaginaire' can be an issue, whereas
an unnoticed cancer cannot be an issue. If the depletion of the ozone layer was not an
international issue before 1980s, it was not because the depletion of the ozone layer
began in the 1980s, but because the problem of ozone layer depletion has only been
perceived since the 1980s. The reason why human perception is essential in forming an
issue is that humans behave on the basis of internalised reality,79 i.e. each individual's
mental representation of the external situation.80
An issue-area is a cluster of issues, which are closely interconnected, as defined
by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye as "a set of issues that the governments see as
closely interdependent and deal with collectively".81 As a social institution, a particular
regime should have its own realm delineated by boundaries. These boundaries may be
designed by a regime creator or defined a posteriori by observers. In the former case, the
boundaries of a given regime may be relatively clear, whereas in the latter case the
regime boundaries may be vague or arbitrary according to the criteria applied by each
observer. The delineation of issue-areas depends on the structure of networks of issues. If
States are rational actors behaving on the basis of a stable order of preferences, as
generally assumed by the realists, the world will be dominated by an overall power
structure according to a fixed hierarchy of issues. For example, patterns of cooperation in
economic and cultural issue-areas may be shaped by the political power structure. This is
possible only in special situations in which power is sufficiently fungible.82 In today's real
78 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, op.cit., p.64
79 For the concept of internalised reality, see Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction
of Reality, Doubleday & Company Inc., 1966
80 See Paul Guillaume, La psychologie de la Forme, Flammarion, 1979, p. 136 « La psychologie
contemporaine a pris, avec raison, l'habitude de ne pas separer la perception et Faction. La perception
prepare et regie Faction ; elle est destinee a rendre possible I'adaptation de Fetre vivant a son milieu. »
81 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, op.cit. p. 65
82 David A. Baldwin defines fungibility as the ease with which capabilities in one issue-area can be used in
other issue-area. He stresses that the longer the time frame of one's analysis, the more useful a high-
fungibility assumption is likely to be. See David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism,
Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 20
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world, conflicts of interest are so complex that it is difficult to establish a neatly defined
hierarchy of issues. For Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, the absence of a hierarchy
among issues constitutes one of main characteristics of complex interdependence.83 In
different issue-areas different actors interact with different motivations and abilities.
Ernest B. Haas emphasizes that regimes are arrangements peculiar to substantive issue-
areas in international relations that are characterized by the condition of complex
interdependence.84 As Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins assert; a "regime
exists in every substantive issue-area in international relations where there is discernibly
patterned behaviour",85 in each issue-area, particular principles, norms, rules and
decision-making procedures are set out according to the nature of issues. However, each
regime is not always entirely insulated. Multiple regimes may form a network or nesting
structure.
2.7 Regimes and similar concepts
2.7.1 Regimes and Institutions
Institution in general means a convention of behaviour that is created by society to help it
solve recurrent problems. Economists define institutions as "sets of rules that constrain
the behaviour of social agents in particular situations".86 In this definition, 'sets of rules
that constrain the behaviour of agents' may correspond to 'principles, norms, rules, and
procedures', and 'particular situations' to 'issue area'. The concept of institutions
encompasses thus that of regimes. What differentiates regimes from institutions is the
83 See Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, op.cit, pp.24-29
For Keohane and Nye, three characteristics of complex interdependence in today's international society are
multiple channels, absence of hierarchy of issues, and a minor role of Military Force. Multiple channels
mean interstate, intergovernmental, and transnational relations. Absence of hierarchy among issues means
that military security does not consistently dominate the agenda because the agenda of interstate
relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. While
admitting that military force is always a central component of national power because the survival is the
primary goal of all states, Keohane and Nye believe that in most situations the effects of military force are
both costly and uncertain.
84 Ernest B. Haas, Words can hurt you; or, who said what to whom about regimes, in Krasner (ed.), op.cit, p.
27
85 Donald J. Puchala & Raymond F. Hopkins, International Regimes: lessons from inductive analysis, in,
Krasner (ed.), op.cit., p. 63
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fact that in the concept of institutions injunctions are tied together in a single category of
"sets of rules", whereas in the concept of regimes they are broken down into four levels
of injunctions forming a conceptual hierarchy. The concept of regimes contains another
qualifying attribute, 'the convergence of expectations' which is not contained in the
concept of institutions. Because of converging expectations, regimes are more
behavioural than institutions. In view of these similarities and differences, it can be said
that regimes are institutions of a special type, a subset of institutions. For Oran R. Young,
"institutions are sets of rules of the games or codes of conduct that serve to define social
practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and guide the interactions
among occupants of these roles".87 Comparing this definition of institutions with his
definition of regimes as "social institutions governing the actions of those interested in
specifiable activities", it is clear that Young perceives regimes as a special type of
institutions.
2.7.2 Regimes and Organizations
Michel Virally defines an international organization as an association of States,
established by agreement among its members and endowed with a permanent apparatus
of organs, whose task is to pursue the realization of the objectives of common interests by
means of cooperation among its members.88 Similarly, Henry G. Schermers and Niels M.
Blokker define international organizations as "forms of cooperation founded on an
international agreement creating at least one organ with a will of its own, established
under international law".89 Oran R. Young distinguishes international institutions from
international organizations; "Whereas institutions are sets of rules of the game or codes
of conduct defining social practices, organizations are material entities possessing offices.
86 Andrew Schotter, Microeconomics, HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994, pp.5-6
87 Oran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a stateless society, Cornell
University Press, 1994, p. 3
88 Michel Virally, Le Droit International en Devenir, Presses Universitaires de France, 1990, p. 228
« Une organisation peut etre definie comme une association d'Etats, etablie par accord entre ses membres
et dotee d'un appareil permanent d'organes, charge de poursuivre la realisation d'objectifs d'interet
commun par une cooperation entre eux. »
89
Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1995, p. 33
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personnel, budgets, equipment, and, more often than not, legal personality...
organizations are actors in social practices, whereas institutions affect the behaviour of
these actors by defining social practices and spelling out codes of conduct appropriate to
them, but they are not actors in their own right".90 What differentiates organizations from
institutions also differentiates organizations from regimes: the former should have
material elements such as offices, personnel, budgets, etc., whereas the latter may or may
not have such material elements; the former can have legal personality,91 the latter cannot.
Another element which differentiates international regimes from international
organizations is the normative character which is essential in regimes, but not necessary
in organizations. As such, international organizations and international regimes are
distinct concepts. But in many regimes, organizations are established to facilitate the
regime functions.92
2.8 Modification of the definition of regimes
The definition of regimes examined above (recognized as the consensual definition by
many regime theorists) has an advantage over other definitions in that it is the most
comprehensive one, including most of the component elements of regimes contained in
other definitions. It has some shortcomings as well. It is an enumerative form of
definition. It merely enumerates the components, without properly assembling them into
a synthetic concept. If we say that "a car is a set of a motor, wheels, handle, brakes,
windows...", this is not a definition but an enumeration of elements. An enumeration of
the parts of a car, however exhaustive it might be, does not mean a car. For them to
constitute a car, they should be appropriately assembled into a whole entity. This whole
entity is the core of the concept of a car, as follows; "a car is a road vehicle with usually
90 Oran R. Young, International Governance, Cornell University Press, 1994, pp. 3-4
91 In some cases, there is an explicit statement on legal personality of international organizations. For
example, the statue establishing the World Tourism organization stipulates; "the Organization shall have
legal personality". In many cases, such a statement is not articulated but implicitly recognized in
international organizations. N.D. White considers that "there appears no need for an express provision in
the constituent treaty of an organization for it to be deemed to posses personality. N.D. White, The Law of
International Organizations, Manchester University Press, p. 1996, p. 27
92 For example, the International Whaling Commission is the organization established in the regime under
the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation ofWhaling
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four wheels which is driven by a motor and used as a means of travel for a small number
of people".93 Krasner's definition lacks this core concept. By introducing the concept of
institution as the core of the concept of regime, Krasner's definition might be slightly
modified as follows;
"An international regime is an international institution founded on a set of
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors'
expectations converge in a given area of international relations."
3. Creation of regimes
A variety of inquiries into the creation of international regimes may be classified into the
following categories of questions; Who creates international regimes? Why are they
created? How are they created?
3.1 Who creates international regimes?
Since the principal actors in international society are States, international regimes are in
most cases created by States. Which State? Divergent answers from different lines of
thoughts have been proposed to this question. Those who are inclined toward the realist
standpoint believe in the decisive role of dominant powers in forming international
regimes. For those who are confident of the possibility of cooperation among equals,
international regimes can be formed through negotiations among equal States.
The realist standpoint concerning regime formation is commonly translated into
the theory of hegemonic stability, which maintains that concentration of power in one
dominant State facilitates development of strong regimes, and fragmentation of power is
associated with regime collapse.9"' Realists believe that order in world politics is typically
created by a single dominant power. This implies that the formation of international
regimes normally depends on hegemony.95 Hegemony refers to "that situation in which
the ongoing rivalry between the so-called 'great powers' is so unbalanced that one power
93 Longman Dictionary of English Language and Culture, 1992, p. 176
94 Robert O. Keohane, The demand for international regimes, in Krasner (ed.), p. 142
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is truly primus inter pares; that is, one power can largely impose its rules and its wishes
(at the least by effective veto power) [on the others].'"'6 Since international regimes reflect
the configuration of power in international society, they are created by the dominant
powers. Other States have no choice but to comply or to be punished. The hegemon is
regarded here as a provider of public goods, who ensures the enforcement of norms and
rules, by giving rewards for cooperation and punishments for defection. The hegemon has
dual images. A benign hegemon exercises its power in the service of common goods,
bearing more than proportionate share of costs of maintaining the system. Such a
hegemon may be exploited by small States, because of unequal burden-sharing in favour
of small States, as in most military alliances, or because of the responsibility of the
hegemon to absorb the costs of regime functioning,1'7 as in the case of the responsibility of
the United States in maintaining gold standard regime in the postwar period. In contrast, a
hegemon propelled by narrow egoism may be viewed as a coercive bully, creating
regimes only to facilitate the exercise of its power for the exploitation of small States, by
articulating a set of normative principles conducive to its interests.98 Whatever the image
of a hegemon, "hegemonic powers must have control over raw materials, control over
sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of
highly valued goods".99 On the other hand, G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan
emphasize the importance of nonmaterial resources in the exercise of hegemonic power,
in particular the socialization of secondary States by the hegemonic power.100
The theory of hegemonic stability is based on a domestic analogy in that the role
of the hegemon in international society is assimilated to the role of the central
government in domestic society. The basic idea underlying hegemonic stability can be
found in Dante's Monarchia and Hobbes's Leviathan. History provides ample examples
95 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 31
96 Immanuel Wallerstein, The politics of the World Economy, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp.38-39
97 For hegemonic cooperation, see Duncan Snidal, Relative Gains, in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism
and Neoliberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 198
98 Brezhnev Doctrine declared in 1968 can be regarded as one of the examples of this kind of hegemonic
regime. This doctrine asserted the right of Soviet intervention in cases where "the essential common
interests of other socialist countries are threatened by one of their number." This doctrine was used to
justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies in 1968. See Britannica,
CD-ROM
99 Robert Keohane, After hegemony, op.cit., p. 32
100 G. John Ikenberry & Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and hegemonic power, IO, 44, 3, Summer 1990,
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of hegemonic regimes; Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, Pax Americana, two blocs during
the cold war, different types of feudal systems, ancient East Asian imperial systems
formed around the Chinese empire, etc. However, the validity of this theory is challenged
by recent experiences of creation of international regimes, in which hegemonic power did
not play any decisive role, e.g. the creation of the Global Climate Regime. These
counterexamples undermining the validity of the hegemonic stability theory may be
explained in the light of the limited fungibility of power and the wide application of
consensus rule. If the fungibility of power across issues is limited, structural power
cannot be transformed automatically into bargaining power in the process of issue-
specific regime building. For example, we can hardly believe that military power can be
used as bargaining leverage in the formation of an environmental regime. Oran R. Young
argues in this line; "Power in the sense of control over material resources or tangible
assets - what the neorealists call structural power - is often difficult to translate into
power in the sense of the ability to determine collective outcomes...Because great powers
always strive to participate actively in a number of policy arenas simultaneously,
moreover, the prospect of high opportunity costs is sufficient to induce such powers to
negotiate rather than impose the terms of international regimes relating to most specific
activities."101
While recognizing the limit of the role of hegemonic power in regime formation,
we cannot deny the existence of a disparity between the bargaining leverage of great
powers and that of small States. The very concept of structural power in its broadest
sense contains the essential elements of bargaining power. For example, for Susan
Strange, the sources of structural power include "control over security; control over
production; control over credit; and control over knowledge, beliefs and ideas."102 It is
reasonable to believe that States richly endowed with these resources occupy normally a
better strategic position than States poorly endowed therewith. Since there is a certain
degree of fungibility, though limited, great powers may exercise more influence by
means of issue-linkage; in the negotiation on a particular issue, great powers may
pp. 283-315
101 Oran R. Young, International Governance, Cornell University Press, 1994, p.89
102 Susan Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, Basil Blackwell,
1988, p.26
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strengthen their bargaining position by linking the issue under negotiation with other ones
in which small States are dependent on the great powers. By doing so, as Arthur A. Stein
argues, great powers can often structure the choices and preferences of minor powers.103
Even in a given specific issue-area, a hegemon is likely to possess a dominant bargaining
power, because it has more resources at its disposal in that issue-area, to the point that it
dominates the negotiation without resorting to other sources of power. Considering
divergent views on the role of a hegemon in international relations, it should be
recognized that a hegemon is generally capable of playing a dominant role in regime
formation in many cases.
In the institutionalist perspective, international regimes are basically decentralized
institutions. They maintain that regimes can be created by hegemonic powers, but they
can also be formed among equal States, through their concerted rational choice. Since
States are rational egoists seeking maximization of their interests, they can arrive at
agreements to establish norms and rules in such a way as to maximize their joint gains.
To say that regimes are created either by hegemons or non-hegemons is a mere
truism. In order to give a meaning to this proposition, this line of interest-based theories
should explain how self-interested and independent States manage to create a mechanism
in which they can reap joint gains, acceptable, if not satisfactory, to all members of a
regime. In this respect, the point of argument shifts from the question of who creates
regimes to the question ofwhy and how regimes are created.
3.2 Why are regimes created?
Whereas the question of who creates regimes relates to the supply side of regime creation,
the question ofwhy regimes are created concerns the demand side.
The first motivation for the creation of a regime is the necessity of coping with
conflicts of interest among States in a given issue-area. In a harmony of interests, each
State can achieve the optimal solution without resorting to institutionalised intervention.
103 Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and collaboration : regimes in an anarchic world, in Stephen Krasner (ed.),
op. cit. p. 135
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In a reality characterized by interdependence, such harmonious situations are rare,
conflicting situations are common.
The second motivation for the creation of a regime is the necessity of dealing with
the gap between individual rationality and collective rationality. If each State can achieve
its desired optimal solution in the conflict of interests, only by relying on its own
rationality, there will be no motivation for it to participate in the creation of regimes. In
reality, the incongruence between individual rationality and collective rationality is a
common feature in interstate relations. Regimes may serve as devices for solving the
conflict of interests and bridging the gap between individual rationality and collective
rationality. Without any regime, rational egoists might arrive at a Pareto-suboptimal
solution. With the aid of a regime, the same rational egoists may achieve the Pareto-
optimal solution, by overcoming the gap between individual rationality and collective
rationality.
3.2.1 Theory of demand for international regimes
Many problems which arise in many issue-areas of international relations, in particular in
issues dealing with global commons, are often analysed with the help of the concept of
market failure. The concept of market failure is the foundation of interventionist logic;
whenever the market fails, government action can be designed to eliminate the
consequences of market failure and to achieve allocative efficiency. In international
society, there is no central authority that can play such a role in dealing with the problems
of free riding and externalities occurring in international commons. Such situations
require some kind of devices, as substitutes for central authority.
Some regime theorists derive, by domestic analogy, much inspiration from the
theory of market failure. For example, Robert O. Keohane advances the theory of demand
for international regimes; "like imperfect market, world politics is characterized by
institutional deficiencies that inhibit mutually advantageous coordination...international
regimes may be interpreted as helping to correct similar institutional defects in world
politics." 104 Keohane interprets regimes as devices for overcoming the barriers to more
104 Robert O. Keohane, The demand for international regimes, in Stephen Krasner, (ed.), op.cit, p. 151
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efficient coordination. As the principal barriers to a mutually beneficial agreement, he
identifies, in particular, transaction costs and information costs. He perceives regimes as
intermediate arrangements which facilitate the making of ad hoc substantive agreements
by providing a framework of rules, norms, principles, and procedures for negotiation.
This theory is inspired by the Coase theorem, which states that in market with
externalities, if property rights are assigned unambiguously and if the parties involved
can negotiate costlessly, then the parties will arrive at a Pareto-optimal outcome
regardless of which one owns the property rights.105 The core of this argument is that even
if externalities exist, the agents involved will be able to correct the effects of the
externalities by means of private agreements if they can costlessly negotiate among
themselves. Coase identifies the key conditions for the Pareto-optimal solutions in the
presence of externalities identified, as follows:
(a) a legal framework establishing liability for actions, presumably supported by
governmental authority;
(b) perfect information; and
(c) zero transaction costs (including organization costs and costs of making side-
payments).
By inverting these conditions, Keohane establishes a list of conditions, at least one of
which must apply if regimes are to be of value in facilitating agreements among
governments:
(a) lack of a clear legal framework establishing liability for actions;
(b) information imperfections (information is costly);
(c) positive transactions costs.106
Whereas the Coase theorem is formulated on the basis of the ideal situation of an
imaginary world, Keohane's theory is based on the concrete situation of the real world. In
world politics all of Keohane's conditions are met: world government does not exist and
liability system is imperfect; information is extremely costly and often impossible to
obtain; transaction costs, including the costs of organization and side-payments, are often
very high. Insofar as international regimes can correct institutional defects in world
105 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, Journal ofLaw and Economics, Vol. 3, 1960, pp. 1 -44
106 Keohane (ed.), op.cit., p. 154
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politics along any of these three dimensions (liability, information, transactions costs),
they may become efficient devices for the achievement of States' purposes. Believing
that regimes do not necessarily establish enforceable legal liabilities in a strict sense,
Keohane pays more attention to the second and third conditions. He is convinced that
regimes are much more important in establishing negotiation frameworks (reducing
transactions costs) and in helping to coordinate actors' expectations (improving the
quality and quantity of information available to states). In the belief that political
entrepreneurship is necessary in the creation of international arrangements, Keohane
argues that we only expect regimes to develop where the costs of making ad hoc
agreements on particular substantive matters are higher than the sum of the costs of
making such agreements within a regime framework and the costs of establishing that
framework. Since high quality information reduces uncertainty, there will be a demand
for international regimes that provide such information. Most typical information
problems that firms and consumers encounter in the market are asymmetric information,
moral hazard, deception and irresponsibility. In international society, States may
encounter these information problems. The necessity of resolving these problems of
information costs can motivate States to create regimes designed to deal more efficiently
with problems of uncertainty and risk.
In brief, the theory of demand for regimes implies that regimes are created if the
benefits of creating regimes exceed the costs of their creation. The benefits of regimes
reside in reducing the information costs and transaction costs. This idea goes in line with
that of Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes who assert that in areas of activity
covered by treaty obligations, the alternative to recalculation is to follow the established
rule, because decisions are not a free good.107
3.2.2 Game theory and regime creation
Many regime theorists rely on the concepts of game theory in explaining regime creation.
Game theory is concerned with the actions of decision makers who are conscious that
107 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, On compliance, IO, 47, 2, Spring 1993, pp. 178-179
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their actions affect each other.108 Game theory is useful in developing regime theory in
two aspects. Regime theory and game theory share the basic assumptions: actors are self-
interested and rational, they are independent, but their actions are interdependent. Starting
from these shared assumptions, the two types of theories arrive at similar conclusions:
independent actions result in sub-optimal outcomes at best, or disastrous outcomes at
worst; such actors may achieve the optimal outcome through coordination and
cooperation.
In game theory applied to international relations, States are assimilated to players.
Strategies are usually simplified into a choice between cooperation (or comply, denoted
by C) and defection (denoted by D). Payoffs are determined according to the nature of the
game, which is characterized by possible combinations of strategies chosen by players. In
a simplified basic two-person game with two strategies (2x2 game), there are four types
of possible combinations; mutual cooperation (CC), unrequited unilateral cooperation
(CD), unilateral defection (DC), mutual defection (DD). According to the structure of
payoffs (a set of relative payoffs each player expects to receive in each event), games
may be categorized into several types. The games most widely applied to international
relations are Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Chicken, and Deadlock, which are
classified according to the preference orderings of each player, as follows:109
Prisoner's Dilemma : DC>CC>DD>CD
Stag Hunt : CC>DODD>CD
Chicken : DC>CC>CD>DD
Deadlock : DC>DD>CC>CD
In environmental issues, Prisoner's Dilemma is frequently cited. But Stag Hunt is the
most common situation in environmental issues. Chicken game and Deadlock situations
occur frequently in security problems.110
108 Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information, Blackwell, 1989, p. 9
109 See George W. Downs, David M. Roke, and Randolph M. Siverson, Arms Races and Cooperation, in
Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation under Anarchy, Princeton University Press, 1986, pp.118-146
See also Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and
institutions, in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993,
pp. 85-115, Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy, World Politics, Oct. 1985
110 The Munich crisis in 1938, the crisis of Berlin Blockade in 1948 and the Cuban crisis in 1962 are typical
examples of Chicken Game. See Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations, Princeton
University Press, 1977, 108-113
The confrontation of the United States and Japan in 1941which lead to the Pacific War is an example of
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In Prisoner's Dilemma, each player's preference ordering is DC>CC>DD>CD,
which can be illustrated in quantitative figures as follows;"1
Row player C: cooperate
D: defect
In this payoff matrix, for each player, unilateral defection is preferable to mutual
cooperation (DC>CC; 4>3), which is preferable to mutual defection (CC>DD; 3>2),
which is preferable to unilateral cooperation (DD>CD; 2>1). In this preference ordering,
defection is the dominant strategy for each player.112 Whatever strategy I might expect my
partner to choose, my choice is defection: If I expect my partner to cooperate, my choice
will be defection because DC>CC; If I expect my partner to defect, my choice will still
be defection, because DD>CD. I expect that my partner will reason in the same way. In
such a situation, both players are induced, by their own strategic rationality, to mutual
defection, which provides optimal result to neither of them.
In Stag Hunt, each player's preference ordering is: CODC>DD>CD, which can
be illustrated in quantitative figures as follows;
C: cooperate D: defect
C: cooperate
D: defect
In this payoff structure, the logic of the game is quite different from that of Prisoner's
Dilemma: If I expect my partner to cooperate, I'll also cooperate (CC>DC; 4>3); If I
expect my partner to defect, I'll also defect (DD>CD; 2>1). In this game, my strategy
depends on the strategy that I expect of my partner. Therefore, there is no dominant
strategy. Mutual cooperation is the best outcome for both players, but this can be done
Deadlock. See Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Ibid., p. 124
111 In the payoff matrix, the first number (left side) in each cell represents the payoff allocated to row player,
and the second number (right side) in each cell represents the payoff of column player.
112 The strategy Si is a dominant strategy if it is a player's strictly best response to any strategies the other
players might pick, in the sense that whatever strategies they pick, his payoff is highest with Si. His inferior
strategies are dominated strategies. See Eric Rasmusen, op. cit, p. 16
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only if each player has the assurance that the other player will cooperate also. The logic
of this game can be applied to issues dealing with the commons, such as environmental
issues, or other common pool resource issues, in which most actors are conscious of the
advantage of mutual cooperation and ready to cooperate if only they have the assurance
that the other actors cooperate also. In this sense, this game can be regarded as an
assurance game."3
The merit of game theory in explaining regime creation resides in the fact that it
shows in quantitative formulae the following logics, which constitute the basic rationale
of regime creation:
1) In the absence ofmutual communication and coordination, each player is tempted
to defect in the hope of reaping the fruit of unilateral defection and/or for fear of
encountering the worst payoff caused by unilateral cooperation;
2) By instituting mechanisms of mutual communication and coordination, the
players can achieve mutual cooperation.
In Prisoner's Dilemma, the players are conscious that mutual cooperation is
preferable to mutual defection for both players (CODD). If they are tempted to mutual
defection, it's for fear of unilateral cooperation. If only mutual trust can be attained
through exchange of information, can the dilemma be transformed into a cooperative
game.114 A regime may provide the mechanism for such confidence building.
In Stag Hunt, each player is ready to cooperate if only he can has enough reason
to expect that the other player will also cooperate. If each player is tempted to defect
nevertheless, this is because of a lack of assurance that the other player will cooperate. In
such a situation, trust building by mutual communication is essential in transforming the
Stag Hunt into a cooperative game."5 A regime may provide a mechanism for such a
confidence building.
113 Lisa L. Martin, Interests, power, and multilateralism, /O, 46, 4, Autumn 1992, pp.765-792
114 A cooperative game is a game in which the players can make binding commitments, as opposed to a
noncooperative game, in which they cannot. See Eric Rasmusen, op. cit.. p. 18
115 The difference between Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt in this logic resides in the following: In
Prisoner's Dilemma, there remains the temptation to defect even if mutual cooperation is possible, because
unilateral defection is preferable to mutual cooperation (DOCC). In Stag Hunt, once mutual cooperation is
attainable by mutual communication and coordination, each player feel no temptation to defect, because
mutual cooperation is preferable to unilateral defection (CODC).
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The rationale of regime creation can be illustrated more clearly by introducing
concepts of incentive and disincentive into the game theory, as Robert Jervis maintains;
"The chances of achieving this outcome will be increased by: (1) anything that increases
incentives to cooperate by increasing the gains of mutual cooperation (CC) and/or
decreasing the costs the actor will pay if he cooperates and the other does not (CD); (2)
anything that decreases the incentives for defecting by decreasing the gains of taking
advantage of the other (DC) and/or increasing the costs of mutual noncooperation(DD);
(3) anything that increases each side's expectation that the other will cooperate.""6
Jervis indicates that players can be induced to mutual cooperation when the
payoff matrix can be appropriately transformed. Such an argument can be more clearly
illustrated in game theoretical terms. By imposing penalties on defection and/or by
granting reward for cooperation, preference ordering can be changed so as to induce
players to cooperate. Taking the above payoff matrix of Prisoner's Dilemma, suppose
that one point of penalty is imposed on defection, and one point of reward is granted for
cooperation. Then the payoff matrix is modified as follows;
C D C D C D
c 3,3 1,4 C 3+1,3+1 1+1,4-1
C 4,4 2,3
D 4,1 2,2 ► D 4-1, 1 + 1 2-1, 2-1 = D 3,2 1, 1
Original payoff matrix Modified payoff matrix
In the original payoff matrix, the preference ordering was DC>CC>DD>CD. In the
modified payoff matrix, this ordering is changed to CC>DC>CD>DD. Contrary to the
original payoffmatrix, the modified matrix is structured so as to induce players to mutual
cooperation. For row player and column player alike, there are incentives for cooperation
and disincentives for defection. For each player, cooperation is preferable to defection,
whatever the other player's strategy might be. In such a way, cooperation, instead of
defection, becomes the dominant strategy.
116 Robert Jervis, Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, World Politics, January 1978, No.2, p. 171
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Similarly, in the Stag Hunt game, suppose that one point of penalty is imposed on
defection, and one point of reward is granted for cooperation. Then the payoff matrix is
modified as follows;
C D C D C D
c 4,4 1,3 C 4+1,4+1 1+1,3-1 C 5, 5 2,2
D 3,1 2,2
w
D 3-1, 1+1 2-1, 2-1 = D 2,2 1,1
Original payoff matrix Modified payoff matrix
In the original payoff matrix, the preference ordering was CODODOCC. In the
modified payoff matrix, the preference ordering is CC>CD=DC>DD. In this new
situation, each player has a strong incentive to cooperate and no temptation to defect. In
such a way, the two players will be induced to cooperation by their common interests,
and deterred from defecting for fear of their common aversions."7
In spite of the merits of clear argument, game theories have limits in explaining
the rationale of regime creation. Like mathematical formulae, they say nothing about
concrete reality. As purely abstract methods of reasoning developed on the basis of
allegorically imagined situations, they can serve only as engines of analogical inference.
3.3 How are regimes created?
Regimes can be created spontaneously among States through an accumulation of
practices, or through social engineering geared by a hegemonic power or by a group of
equal States. Non-State actors can exercise influence on the creation of international
regimes.
3.3.1 Spontaneous regime creation
117 For the mechanism of common interests and common aversions, see Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and
collaboration: regimes in an anarchical world, in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), op.cit., pp.115-140
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In explaining regime formation, Oran R. Young presents three types of international
orders; spontaneous orders, negotiated orders, and imposed orders, which correspond to
spontaneous regimes, negotiated regimes, and imposed regimes respectively.
Spontaneous orders are the product of the action of many men but...not the result of
human design."8 Such institutions do not involve conscious coordination among
participants, do not require explicit consent on the part of subjects or prospective subjects,
and are highly resistant to efforts at social engineering.119 Natural market, balance of
power system, language system or mores are examples of this category of orders.120 On
the contrary, Robert O. Keohane does not believe in the spontaneous formation of
international regimes, by arguing; "Neither international agreements nor international
regimes are created spontaneously, and political entrepreneurs must exist who see a
potential profit in organizing collaboration."121
3.3.2 Regime creation by social engineering
A majority of existing international regimes were created by the conscious efforts of the
individual participants. This social engineering may be done by a dominant power or by
equal States through negotiation. Regimes created by social engineering geared by a
dominant power are called imposed regimes. For Oran R. Young, imposed regimes are
deliberately established by dominant actors who succeed in getting others to conform to
the requirements of these orders through some combination of coercion, cooperation, and
the manipulation of incentives.122 Young presents two types of imposed orders; overt
hegemony and de facto imposition. Overt hegemony occurs when the dominant actor
openly and explicitly articulates institutional arrangements and compels subordinate
actors to conform to them, as in the case of classical feudal arrangements as well as many
of the great imperial systems. De facto imposition refers to situations in which the
118 Oran R. Young cites the concept of spontaneous orders defined by Friedrich A. Hayek, in Rules and
Order, vol.1 of Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Chicago University Press, 1973, p. 27
119 Oran R. Young, Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes, in Krasner, (ed.), op.cit, p.
98
120 Idem.
121 Robert O. Keohane, The demand for international regimes, in Krasner (ed.), op.cit, p. 155
122 Oran R. Young, Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes, in Krasner (ed.) op.cit.,
p. 100-101
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dominant actor is able to promote institutional arrangements favourable to itself through
various forms of leadership and the manipulation of incentives, like the role of Britain in
the nineteenth-century regime for the oceans or the role of the United States in the regime
for the continental shelves.123 The concept of imposed regimes is nothing but a reflection
of the theory of hegemonic stability.
In contemporary international society composed of sovereign States, the most
common way of regime creation is negotiation. Most regimes are created on the basis of
an agreement made by conscious efforts and more or less explicit consent by independent
States. In order to create a device leading to cooperation by overcoming the conflicts of
interest, States are motivated to negotiate, at a bilateral, regional or global level. Through
negotiation, interested States formulate the principles, norms, rules and procedures which
are expected to permit them to arrive at an equilibrium point on which their interests
converge.
3.3.3 Regime creation under the influence of non-State actors
Cognitivist regime theorists draw much attention to the role of non-State actors, in
particular epistemic communities, which play their role in the making of international
regimes by providing the bases of consensual knowledge. Ernest B. Haas defines
consensual knowledge as "generally accepted understandings about cause-and-effect
linkages about any set of phenomena considered important by society, provided only that
the finality of the accepted chain of causation is subject to continuous testing and
examination through adversary procedures."124 For Haas, consensual knowledge is
socially constructed and therefore inseparable from the vagaries of human
communication. Consensual knowledge may not be true or complete. By epistemic
communities are meant networks of knowledge-based communities with an authoritative
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within their domain of expertise. Their members
share knowledge about the causation of social or physical phenomena in an area for
which they have a reputation for competence, and a common set of normative beliefs
123 Idem.
124 Ernest B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power, University of California Press, 1990, p. 21
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about what actions will benefit human welfare in such a domain.125 According to
knowledge-based theories, epistemic communities may contribute to the emergence of
norms and principles of behaviour, and they can even perform the surveillance,
information gathering, and enforcement functions of an already established regime.126
They can do so by providing a cognitive basis for policy makers or by creating public
opinion in favour of their shared beliefs.
There is no denying the importance of the impact of converging social cognition
and epistemic communities on the behaviour of State actors in the course of regime
negotiation, especially in the fields which require highly specialized expertise, as in many
environmental issues. They affect government decision-making by generating paradigms
in perception, belief systems or value systems of decision makers. But however strong
their influence might be, epistemic communities are influencers, not actors in the
formation of international regimes. In the present States system, they can contribute to
the creation of regimes only by influencing State actors. For Stephen Krasner also,
"Knowledge alone is never enough to explain either the creation or the functioning of a
regime. Interests and power cannot be banished. But knowledge and understanding can
affect regime."127 In the same vein, Oran R. Young points out the limits in the role of
epistemic communities; "In the case of climate change, it seems clear that the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has been influential in bringing ideas to bear
as a means of defining the scope and nature of the problem. But it is equally clear that the
IPCC has not been a major force in the bargaining process unfolding under the auspices
of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee from February 1991 onward."128
Moreover, State behaviour is influenced not only by epistemic communities, but also by
other non-State actors, such as the business sector, trade unions, etc.
4. Consequences of regimes
125 Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Environmental Cooperation,
in Volker Rittberger, (ed.). Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 179
126 Virginia Haufler, Crossing the Boundary between Public and Private: International Regimes and Non-
State Actors, in Volker Rittberger (ed.), op.cit. p. 107
127 Stephen D. Krasner, Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous variables, /O, 36, 2,
Spring 1982
128 Oran R. Young, International Governance, Cornell University Press, 1994, p. 98
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4.1 Causality of regime consequences
In the relationship between a regime and its consequences, it is clear that the latter are
dependent variables; i.e. they are dependent on the former. As for the former, it is
considered to be either an intervening variable129 or an independent variable.
Stephen D. Krasner assumes that regimes can be conceived of as intervening
variables standing between basic causal variables (most prominently, power and
interests) and outcomes and behaviour.130 If regimes matter, the causality can be depicted
as follows;
BASIC CAUSAL VARIABLES —► REGIMES —► RELATED BEHAVIOR
AND OUTCOMES
In this assumption, regimes do not arise of their own accord. They are not regarded as
ends in themselves.
Krasner recognizes also the autonomous role of regimes; "Once regimes are
established they assume a life of their own, and while the influence of basic causal
variables does not evaporate, principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
come to have their own exogenous impact on outcomes and behaviour."131 This causality
can be depicted as follows;
BASIC CAUSAL VARIABLES ► RELATED BEHAVIOR
AND OUTCOMES
REGIMES
129 Intervening variable is a psychological concept which means a state of an organism or person postulated
to explain behaviour and defined in terms of its causes and effects rather than its intrinsic properties, such
as food drive. See The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1995, p.382
130 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables, in
Krasner (ed.), op.cit., pp. 5-10
131 Stephen D. Krasner, op.cit.,, p. 359
90
Whether independent variables or intervening variables, they are explanatory
variables, which account for the outcomes produced by or through regimes. A
fundamental methodological problem arising here is the question of how to identify the
causal relationship between a given regime and the outcomes supposed to be produced by
that regime. Even a single behaviour of a State is the result of a complex interplay of
various factors. From the infinity of causal factors, it is difficult to single out the one to
which an observed outcome is attributable. Moreover, in international regimes, where
sovereign States are actors, experimentation is practically unfeasible. For these reasons,
some theorists recognize that it is inevitable to resort to counterfactual analysis,132 which
is widely employed in fields where experimental researches or statistical analyses are not
appropriate, such as analyses of historical causality. Thomas J. Biersteker recognizes that
"in the analysis of international regimes, it is difficult for the analysts interested in their
causal consequences to avoid relying on the construction of historical counterfactual
alternatives at some point, either explicitly or implicitly."133 More specifically, Thomas
Volker Rittberger and Michael Ziirn assert; "Investigating the consequences of
international regimes requires a counterfactual argument. In case the conflicts in the
issue-area are not managed by a regime, then one has to speculate about what a regime
could do. And if a regime does exist, one has to cope with the question of what would be
without it."134 Conscious of the inevitability of resorting to counterfactual analysis in
dealing with regime consequences on the one hand, and the limitations inherent in this
method on the other hand. Biersteker suggests that historical counterfactual alternatives
must be articulated explicitly, in conjunction with a clearly identified theoretical
framework.135 Applied to the causal relations between regimes and their consequences, a
132 According to Max Weber, historical causation involves "the production of "imaginative constructs" by
the disregarding of one or more of those elements of "reality" which are actually present, and by the mental
construction of a course of events which is altered through modification in one or more "conditions."
Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated and edited by E.A. Shils and H.A.Finch,
Free Press, 1949, p. 173
133 Thomas J. Biersteker, Constructing Historical Counterfactuals to Assess the Consequences of
International Regimes, in Voiker Rittberger (ed.). Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford
University Press, 1995, p.327
134 Volker Rittberger and Michael Ziirn, Towards Regulated Anarchy in East-West Relations: Causes and
Consequences of East-West Regimes, in Rittberger (ed.), International Regimes in East-West Politics, 1990,
p. 47
135 Thomas J. Biersteker, op.cit., p.337
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counterfactual argument would mean; "If regime A had not been created, outcome B
would not have been produced; is regime A therefore a cause of outcome B?"
4,2 What consequences do regimes generate?
Realists are sceptical about the consequences of regimes in international relations,
because they perceive regimes as surface phenomena reflecting power distribution, empty
facades that rationalize the rule of the powerful by elevating their preferences to the
status of norms. Susan Strange, in particular, argues; "All those international
arrangements dignified by the label regime are only too easily upset when either the
balance of bargaining power or the perception of national interest (or both together)
change among those states who negotiate them...Not only does using this word regime
distort reality by implying an exaggerated measure of predictability and order in the
system as it is, it is also value-loaded in that it takes for granted that what everyone wants
is more and better regimes, that greater order and managed interdependence should be the
collective goal...Moreover, many of the so-called regimes over which the international
organizations preside turn out under closer examination to be agreements to disagree."136
Regime theorists believe, of course, that certain outcomes are generated by or
through regimes under certain conditions. According to Oran R. Young, an institution is
effective to the extent that its operation impels actors to behave differently than they
would if the institution did not exist or if some other institutional arrangement were put in
its place. For Young, regimes induce States to 'patterned behaviour,' or
'conventionalized behaviour,' which means behaviour guided by regime injunctions
which serve as behavioural standards on which actors rely without making detailed
calculations on a case-by-case basis.137 He believes that the rise of conventionalized
behaviour is apt to engender a widespread feeling of legitimacy or propriety in
conjunction with specific institutional arrangements. Some interest-based theorists, for
example Arthur A. Stein,138 resort to the logic of game theory to show that regimes may
engender coordinated behaviour or collaborative behaviour in situations of conflicting
136 Susan Strange, Cave! hie dragones, in Krasner (ed.), International regimes, op.cit., pp.337-354
137 Oran R. Young, Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes, IO, 36, 2 Spring 1982
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interests. According to the analyses inspired by microeconomic theories, regimes may
lead States to Pareto-optimal outcomes, which cannot be achieved by individual
rationality in situations in which markets fail. For example, Robert Keohane asserts; in
situations of market failure, "specific attributes of the system impose transaction costs
(including information costs) that create barriers to effective cooperation among the
actors. Thus institutional defects are responsible for failures of coordination. To correct
these defects, conscious institutional innovation may be necessary."139 Helmut Breitmeier
and Klaus Dieter Wolf analyse regime consequences by classifying them into two
categories; problem solving effects in issue-area, and context changing effects in
domestic structure and international system. In the dimension of issue-area, regimes
generate problem solving consequences, by means of 'just' and 'sustainable' conflict
regulation. By 'justice', Breitmeier and Wolf mean the amount to which the procedures
of conflict regulation and the value distribution within the issue-area are regarded as fair
by participating actors. By 'sustainability' they mean the distribution of values which is
neither to the detriment of future generations nor insufficient with respect to the limits of
the natural environment.140
In sum, international regimes modify State behaviour, by inducing States to
behave in conformity with a pre-established set of principles, norms, rules and decision¬
making procedures. By fostering norm-guided and rule-compliant behaviour, regimes
mitigate the exercise of naked power and interest politics.
4.3 How do regimes generate their consequences?
To the question of how and under what conditions a regime produces its consequences,
power-based theorists seek their answers in the structural factors of international society,
interest-based theorists in the rational calculations, and knowledge-based theorists in the
influence of knowledge.
138 Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and collaboration, in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), op.cit., pp.115-140
139 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, 1984, p.83
140 Helmut Bretimeier and Klaus Dieter Wolf, Analysing Regime Consequences : Conceptual Outlines and
Environmental Explorations, in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations,
Clarendon Press, 1993, pp.339-388
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Within a modified neo-realist framework, Robert O. Keohane asserts;
"international regimes can affect capabilities by serving as a source of influence for
States whose policies are consistent with regime rules, or which are advantaged by the
regime's decision-making procedures."141
According to the interest-based functionalist theories, international regimes may
alter calculations of interest by assigning property rights, providing information, and
altering patterns of transaction costs, as suggested in the theory of demand for regimes. In
game-theoretical perspective, regimes may produce their consequences by facilitating the
realization of joint maximization based on the rational calculations made by actors in
their pursuit of utility maximization. Arthur A. Stein, for example, maintains that the
institutionalization of coordination and collaboration can become a restraint on
individualism and lead actors to recognize the importance of joint maximization; those
who previously agreed to bind themselves out of self-interest may come to accept joint
interests as an imperative.142
In the cognitivist perspective, regimes may orient State behaviour by changing the
perceptions of decision-makers. Peter M. Haas underlines that regimes may serve as
important vehicles for international learning that produce convergent State policies, and
believes that regimes may be transformative, leading to the empowerment of new groups
of actors who can change State interests and practices.143
In some issue-areas where States themselves are real actors, such as armament,
regimes regulate directly State behaviour. But in most issue-areas, States themselves are
not real actors but regulators. The real actors are individuals, companies, organizations or
other entities under their jurisdiction or control. Yet, most regime injunctions are
formulated in the form of norms and rules to be complied with by States. In order to
regulate the activities of real actors, such as fishers, polluting ships, industrials producing
the substances that deplete the ozone layer, regime injunctions should be internalised by
national policies. These policies are generally crystallized into domestic laws and
regulations. Regimes founded on formal international instruments often require States to
141 Robert O. Keohane, The Analysis of International Regimes, in Rittberger, (ed.), op.cit., 1993, p.29
142 Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world, in Krasner, (ed.), op.cit.,
p. 139
143 Peter M. Haas, Do regimes matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control, IO,
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legislate and enforce domestic laws and regulations for the implementation of regime
injunctions.144
In sum, international regimes may be regarded as a kind of conflict management
scheme. Conflict of interests among States may be more smoothly and more fairly
resolved and cooperation may be more easily fostered through regimes by changing the
pattern of interplay of power, the mode of rational calculation of self-interest, or the
cognitive framework of States.
5. Application of regime theory to the analysis of the regime for the
protection of the marine environment
5,1 Adjustment of the terminology to the nature of subject-matter
Although regime theory is developed in the context of international relations theory, it
can be applied to political, legal, economic, or any other issue-areas provided that there
exist a self-governing mechanism on the basis of a set of substantive and procedural
norms. Regime theory borrows some key terms, such as 'principle', 'norm' and 'rule'
from other social sciences. In order to build up a theory, regime theorists have given new
definitions to them. As a result, there can be some discrepancies between the meanings
given to these terms in regime theory and their meaning generally recognized in other
sciences.
The concepts of principles, norms, rules used in the definition of regimes are
basically similar, but not identical, to the concepts of these terms used in legal science. In
order to avoid confusions in analysing a legal regime in the light of the theoretical tools
provided by regime theory, attention should be paid to this difference in the meanings of
the terms. There are two alternatives: 1) to use the terms as redefined in regime theory; 2)
to use the terms in their ordinary meaning in legal science. The former will be more
1989, pp.377-403
144 For example, Article 207, para. I of the 1982 UNCLOS stipulates; "States shall adopt laws and
regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources,
including rivers, estuaries, pipelines and outfall structures, taking into account internationally agreed rules,
standards and recommended practices and procedures". See infra. Chapter 6
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faithful to regime theory, but may cause some conceptual confusion in the analysis of
legal regimes. The latter will make no confusion in the analysis of a legal regime, but will
cause a certain degree of departure from regime theory. Comparing the weight of these
merits and demerits of each choice, it can be more desirable to take the former. Since
tools are instrumental in nature, it is more reasonable to adjust them to the nature of
subject matter. Without remodelling regime theory, we may return to the original
meanings of the terms 'principles', 'norms' and 'rule', as they are generally understood
in legal science, as follows.
<Norms>
In the variety of definitions of norms, the most common element is that norms are
standards of value judgment and standards of behaviour shared by a society. In this sense,
Karl-Dieter Opp classifies the definitions of norms into two categories; the oughtness
definition and the behavioural definition.14^
In the oughtness definitions, norms are what a person ought to be or ought to do
in a certain circumstance. In such a definition, the concept of norm is based on the
concept of value. Hans Kelsen's concept of norm is that of oughtness definition. For
Kelsen, a norm refers to a prescription or an order and means something that ought to be
or ought to happen (Sollen).]4b George C. Homans also proposes an oughtness definition,
"A norm is a statement specifying how a person is, or persons of a particular sort are,
expected to behave in given circumstances - expected, in the first instance, by the person
that utters the norm. What I expect of you is what you ought to do."147
In behavioural definitions, a norm is perceived as a standard of social
behaviour.148 A norm is formed under the social influence, and shared and accepted by a
group of individuals. And thereby it oils social interactions. For Niklas Luhmann, a norm
is a modality of social communication, which allows actors to reduce complexity and
145 Karl-Dieter Opp, How do Norms Emerge? In Raymond Boudon, Pierre Demeulenaere, Riccardo Viale
(ed.), L'explication des normes sociales, Presses Universitaires de France, 2001, pp.11-43
14,1 Hans Kensen, Theorie Generale des Normes, traduit de Allgemeine Theorie der Normen par Olivier
Beaud & Fabrice Malkani, Presses Universitaires de France, 1996, p. 2
« Dans la mesure oil le mot de 'norme' designe une prescription ou un ordre, la 'norme' signifie que
quelque chose doit etre ou avoir lieu. »
147
George C. Homans, Social Behavior, Its Elementary Forms, Hartcourt, 1974, p. 96
14x See Denys de Bechillon, Qu'est-ce qu'une regie de Droit? Editions Odile Jacob, 1997, p. 171
96
contingence of social life.149 Alain Cercle and Alain Somat defines a norm as a rule of
behaviour or value judgment shared and accepted by specific group of individuals in
interaction, which is acquired through the process of social influence.150
The difference between the oughtness definitions and the behavioural definitions
resides only in their emphasis. Any norm has both aspects. A norm is a scheme of
behaviour generally, if not necessarily, based on a certain moral value.151
<Principles>
Principles are abstract legal rules, providing the basis of a legal regime applicable to
multiple concrete situations, either to regulate them in a permanent way or to resolve
difficulties arising from the situations.152 Most principles have some common
characteristics: i.e. ideological, abstract and general.
Principles contain ideological feature declaring an axiomatic value, for example
the declaration of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. For Ronald
Dworkin, a principle is a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or
secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a
requirement ofjustice or fairness or some other dimension ofmorality.151
Principles are abstract norms. Being abstract, principles serve as guidelines, rather
than imposing concrete obligations.154 Many of them remain as political principles. Even
though they are formulated as legal principles laying down the rights and obligations,
l49Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, Translated by E. King & M. Albrow, Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1985, p. 19. For Luhmann, "The complexity of social action arises from the fact that actors, in
their efforts of coordination, face always a multitude of possibilities. Contingence means the fact that action
can always take place differently from the plan. Actors can reduce the uncertainty of social life by
communicating."
150 Alain Cercle &Alain Somat, Manuel de psychologie sociale, DUNOD, 1999, p . 134
« Une norme est une regie de comportements ou de jugements evaluatifs, partagee et acceptee par un
collectif specifique ou specifiable d'individus en interaction, dont l'acquisition est soumise a un processus
d'influence sociale. L'existence d'une norme implique I'attribution d'une valeur reconnue par le collectif. »
151 See Louis Quere, Le schematisme de la norme d'un point de vue sociologique, in La Querelle des
normes, Cahiers de philosophie politique et juridiques, N° 27, 1995, Presses Universitaires de Caen, 1995
See also Christophe Grzegorczyk, La theorie generale des valeurs et le droit, Bibliotheque de philosophie
du droit, volume XXV, Libraire Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1982
152 See Michel Virally, Le Droit International en Devenir, Presses Universitaires de France, 1990, p. 197
153 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, seventeenth printing 1999, p. 22
154 Andre Nollkaemper, "What You Risk Reveals What You Value " and Other Dilemmas Encountered in
the Legal Assault on Risk, in Freestone and Hey (ed.) The Precautionary Principle and International Law,
Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 80
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most of them remain in the province of lege ferenda.l55
By being abstract, principles are characterized by the generality of application, as
Freestone states: "the very notion of a principle requires that it be formulated at a
sufficient level of generality that it can be of broad application."156
<Rules>
Rules are concrete norms which dictate a certain type of actions or inactions. In this sense,
Grotius construes a rule as equivalent to law.157 Hart distinguishes the primary rules and
the secondary rules. Under the primary rules, human beings are required to do or abstain
from certain actions, whether they wish to or not. These are the rules of obligation. The
secondary rules specify the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively
ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively
determined.158
<Relationship between principles, norms and rules>
As examined above, in legal theory, the concept of norms is wider one than that of
principles or rules. Norms comprise principles and rules. It can be said that principles are
abstract norms, while rules are concrete norms. This conceptual structure is different
from that of regime theorists who classify substantive regime injunctions into three-tiered
concepts: [principles - norms - rules], rated according to the degree of abstractness.
If principles and rules can be considered to be included in the category of norms,
a question arises as to the distinction of principles from rules. The criteria generally used
for this distinction are the degree of abstractness and the degree of generality. But the two
155 Michel Virally, op. cit., pp. 198-205
For Virally, some principles, such as the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources,
declared in the Resolution 1803 (XVII) of the General Assembly, can be regarded as lege lata.
156 David Freestone, Caution or Precaution: "A Rose By Any Other Name...?" Yearbook ofInternational
Environmental Law, Volume 10 (1999), p. 26
157 Hugo Grotius, Le Droit de la Guerre et de la Paix, (De jure Belli ac Pads) Traduit par P. Pradier-Fodere,
PUF, 1999, Livre I, Chapitre I, IX, p. 37 « II y a une troisieme signification du mot droit, suivant laquelle
ce terme est synonyme du mot loi, pris dans le sens le plus etendu, et qui veut dire une regie des actions
morales obligeant a ce qui est honnete. »
158 H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law, Second edition, Oxford University Press, 1997, Chapter V Law as the
Union of primary and secondary rules, pp. 79-99
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criteria go together, because the more abstract a norm is, the wider is its applicability.'59
Applying the criterion of generality, it is clear that principles are more general norms
than rules, as David Freestone asserts; "We might usefully recall that in jurisprudential
terms the difference between a rule and a principle is the very level of generality in which
it is phrased - indeed, it is the nature of principles to be vague. A rule is formulated with
a degree of precision that will allow for its equal application in similar cases, whereas the
very notion of a principle requires that it be formulated at a sufficient level of generality
that it can be of broad application."160 ICJ also takes a similar position.161 Ronald
Dworkin proposes similar criteria in different expressions, such as the character of the
direction they give and the dimension ofweight or importance.162
The relations between the three terms as defined by regime theorists can be
schematised as follows, in the order of their degree of abstractness:
P>N>R
In their meaning in legal theory, these relations can be schematised as follows:
N3P, NDR, P>R
This means: Principles are a sort of norms; Rules also are a sort of norms;
Principles are more abstract than rules.
In analysing the injunctions of the regime for the protection of the marine
159 See Michel Virally, op.cit., p. 203 "Plus la regie devient vague et imprecise et, par consequent, fournit
un guide moins complet et moins sur pour Paction...elle devient aussi susceptible de s'appliquer a des cas
de plus en plus nombreux et de plus en plus differents. »
160 David Freestone, Caution or Precaution: "A Rose By Any Other Name..."? YIEL, volume 10, 1999, p.
26
161 Gulf of Maine Case (1984) ICJ reports 246, 288-90, para.79 "The association of the terms 'rules' and
'principles' is no more than the use of a dual expression to convey one and the same idea, since in this
context 'principles' clearly means principles of law, that is, it also includes rules of international law in
whose case the use of the term 'principles' may be justified because of their more general and more
fundamental character."
162 Ronald Dworkin, op. cit. pp. 22-28. For Dworkin, "The difference between legal principles and legal
rules is a logical distinction. Both sets of standards point to particular decisions about legal obligation in
particular circumstances, but they differ in the character of the direction they give. Rules are applicable in
an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case
the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision...A
principle like 'No man may profit from his own wrong' does not even purport to set out conditions that
make its application necessary. Rather it states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not
necessitate a particular decision." "Principles have a dimension that rules do not - the dimension of weight
or importance. When principles intersect...one who must resolve the conflict has to take into account the
relative weight of each... If two rules conflict, one of them cannot be a valid rule. The decision as to which
is valid, and which must be abandoned or recast, must be made by appealing to considerations beyond the
rules themselves."
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environment under the 1982 UNCLOS, in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, all of them will be
considered as norms, and classified into two categories: principles and rules. This is a
slight deviation from the conceptual structure of regime injunctions generally employed
in the regime theory. This deviation can be justified in the light of the meanings of norms,
principles and rules, which are similar but not identical to those defined in the regime
theory, as examined above.
5.2 Introduction of a new variable
Regime theorists put much emphasis on behavioural aspects in analysing regime
functioning. In their efforts to explain how independent actors cooperate under anarchy,
they rely on the concept of the convergence of expectations. However important this
variable might be in analysing human behaviour, it remains in a psychological
dimension.163 Expectation is a mental state which conditions human decisions and actions,
but it is not a real action. In a legal regime, the most important element in behavioural
aspects is the question of compliance. The variable 'compliance' is omitted in the
definition of regimes, but not in the theories of regime functioning. Instead, it constitutes
the core of the theories regime functioning. Therefore, in Chapter 6 dealing with
procedural and behavioural aspects of regimes, compliance system is included as an
additional variable.
163 See infra. Chapter 5, 1. Theory of rationality
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Chapter 3
Evolutionary mechanisms of the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS
1. Concept of evolutionary regime
1.1 Evolution of regime
As living institutions, regimes undergo continuous evolution to resolve internal problems
and to adapt to the changing external situation. For Oran Young, "international regimes
do not become static constructs even after they are fully articulated. Rather, they undergo
continuous transformations in response to their own inner dynamics as well as to changes
in their political, economic, and social environment."' As inner dynamics, Oran Young
presents two types of internal contradictions; irreconcilable contradictions among the
constituent elements, contradictions exhibiting a developmental character, deepening
over time as a consequence of the normal operation of a regime. He presents also
exogenous factors which may undermine the essential elements of a regime. These
exogenous factors arise from societal developments external to a specific regime, such as
changes in the nature and distribution of technology.2
Robert Keohane lays more emphasis on the exogenous factors as causes of regime
evolution when he states; "regimes can be viewed as intermediate factors, or 'intervening
variables,' between fundamental characteristics ofworld politics such as the international
distribution of power on the one hand and the behaviour of states and nonstate actors
such as multinational corporations on the other."3
External factors causing evolution of regimes are political, economic, and socio-
cultural variables. For Talcott Parsons, "Changes in the external situation of a social
system, either in its environmental conditions (as in the case of the depletion or discovery
of some natural resource), changes in its technology which are not autonomous, changes
' Oran R, Young, International Cooperation: building regimes for natural resources and the environment,
Cornell University Press, Third printing, 1993, pp.95-96
2 Oran R. Young, Ibid, pp.96-103
1 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,
Princeton University Press, 1984, p.64
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in the social situation of the system (as in its foreign relations), may be cited as the chief
exogenous factors in change."4
A new exogenous factor of the evolution of international regimes in contemporary
society is the rapidly increasing influence of epistemic communities and non¬
governmental organizations. For Ernest Haas, "institutionalised collaboration can be
explored in terms of the interaction between changing knowledge and changing social
goals."5 Epistemic communities may orient cognitive evolutions in international regimes
by providing them with changing knowledge,6 while NGOs may exercise influence on the
evolution of international regimes by providing them with changing social ideals and
goals.7 But the ideas, ideals and goals provided by epistemic communities or NGOs can
contribute to the evolution of regimes only when they are embraced by political decision¬
makers and thereby translated into regime injunctions in the form of national laws,
regulations or administrative measures, or international rules, standards, practices and
procedures. In this line, Stephen Krasner points out; "For knowledge to have an
independent impact in the international system, it must be widely accepted by policy
makers."8 Similarly, Emmanuel Adler argues; "At any point in time and place of a
historical process, institutional actors...may be affected by politically relevant collective
sets of understanding of the physical and social world that are subject to political
selection processes and thus to evolutionary change."9
Evolution means change. In the process of continuous change, a regime may lose
its integrity. To what extent can a regime change without losing its integrity? Regarding
this question, Stephen D. Krasner distinguishes 'change within regime' from 'change of a
regime'. For Krasner, principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a
regime, while there may be many rules and decision-making procedures that are
4 Talcott Parsons & Edward A. Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action, Transaction Publishers, abridged
version, 2001, p. 232
5 Ernest Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International regimes, World Politics, 32, 1980, p.360
6 See Emmanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the
creation of a reflective research program, IO, Vol. 46, N°2, Spring 1992, pp.367-390
7 See Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental
Organizations Under International Law, Global Legal Studies Journal, Indiana University, 1999, Vol. 6
8 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables, in
Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 19
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consistent with the same principles and norms. Therefore, changes in rules and decision¬
making procedures are changes within regime, whereas changes in principles and norms
are changes of the regime itself.10 This idea is not shared by all regime theorists. Robert
Keohane, for example, maintains that it is a "false dichotomy between principles on the
one hand and rules and procedures on the other"."
Krasner's distinction of 'change of regime' from 'change within regime' is
conceptually meaningful in that there must be, somewhere in the course of evolution, a
threshold beyond which the original integrity of the regime ceases to exist. An evolution
within the threshold may be considered to be a change within regime, while evolution
beyond the threshold creates a new regime. But the criterion proposed by Krasner for this
distinction might be artificial, if not 'false dichotomy'. Krasner's criterion implies that
the threshold resides automatically between principles/norms on the one hand and
rules/decision-making procedures on the other. This criterion may easily encounter
counterexamples. Some principles can be changed without causing a change in the
identity of the regime. For example, the introduction of the precautionary approach in the
high seas fishing regime is a change in principle but it does not result in a change in the
general high seas regime. Being new, but not contrary to the existing principles, it can be
a factor of development of the regime in the same line with the existing set of principles.
In some cases, a change in decision-making procedures may result in a change of regime.
For instance, if the decision-making procedures in the Security Council were changed
into the decision by consensus, or the simple majority rule without distinction between
permanent and non-permanent members, such a change in decision-making procedures
would result in a change of regime.
Each regime has defining attributes, which determine its identity. Each regime
may also have occasional attributes which are not essential for the formation or
maintenance of regime's identity. It seems an oversimplification to say that principles
and norms are defining attributes, and rules and decision-making procedures are
occasional attributes. The identity of a given regime should be recognized in the light of
9 Emmanuel Adler, Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and
Their Progress, in Emmanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, (ed.), Progress in Postwar International
Relations, Columbia University Press, 1991, p. 47
10 Stephen D. Krasner, op. cit, pp.3-5
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overall characteristics generated by the combination of the whole set of principles, norms,
rules and decision-making procedures.
Most regime theorists concentrate their attention on changes in regime injunctions.
However, changes in other elements of regimes such as issue^area, regime members and
convergence of expectations may entail 'change of regime'.
If there is a change in the issue-area, regime may change as Friedrich Kratochwil
points out; "regime change may also result from extension or restriction of the scope of
*
• • 12 • •rules applicable in the issue-area." The evolution of the European Union is an example
1 ^
of the change of regime through the extension of the issue-area.
A regime may change when its members change. For example, the regime under
the Charter of the United Nations started as a regime among victorious powers and their
allies in the Second World War, but has become a universal regime by the extension of
its members. The regime under the 1982 UNCLOS is undergoing an evolution with the
increase in its Parties. When it entered into force in 1994, there were 60 States Parties. At
that moment it was difficult to regard it as the basis of a universal regime. Now that an
absolute majority of the States of the world have become parties, it constitutes
undoubtedly the legal basis of a universal regime.
A regime may change when there is a fundamental change in the convergence of
expectations among regime members. When the convergence of expectations weakens,
the regime may weaken or degenerate into desuetude. The rise and fall of the regime
under the Warsaw Pact is an example of such changes of regime. In 1955, Eastern
European States established the regime under the Warsaw Pact with converging
expectations of mutual assistance based on the communist solidarity under the leadership
of the Soviet Union in the cold war context. By the collapse of the Soviet Union and
11 Robert O. Keohane, After hegemony, op.cit, p. 59
12 Friedrich Kratochwil, The Force of prescriptions, IO, 38, 4, Autumn 1984, p. 687
Kratochwil presents an example: "taxing information and treating it as if it were a "good" - changing the
scope of applicable revenue laws or tariff statutes - might fundamentally alter not only the nature of
transborder data flows but also the governing regime."
13
Starting from the limited issue of cooperation in the field of coal and steel, the issue-area of the
European Union has been enlarged to the whole area of economic issues and the security and defence
issues and is further extending to the highly political issues, such as the European Constitution. Through
the extension of the issue-area, the nature of the original European Coal and Steel Community has
completely changed.
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The expectations of mutual assistance, which were once converging, have lost the
ideological foundation, and thereby the regime has degenerated into non-existence.14
1.2 Evolution of law and legal regimes
As ICJ has stated, international law undergoes continuous evolution.15 In a sociological
perspective, law is a social phenomenon and evolves when its social context changes.
Judge Rosalyn Higgins, perceiving international law as a process, maintains; "if
international law was just 'rules', then international law would indeed be unable to
contribute to, and cope with, a changing political world. To rely merely on accumulated
past decisions (rules) when the context in which they were articulated has changed - and
indeed when their content is often unclear - is to ensure that international law will not be
able to contribute to today's problems and, further, that it will be disobeyed for that
reason."16 In the same line, Myres McDougal underlines the evolutionary aspect of the
law of the sea, asserting that the international law of the sea is not a mere static body of
rules but is a whole decision-making process.17 But is it correct to say that rules are
always static?18
In a regime founded on a treaty, substantive and procedural rules are crystallized
into the treaty text. It is natural that the evolution of the treaty entails the evolution of the
regime founded thereupon.
14 Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was concluded in May 14, 1955
among the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and
Romania. After the democratic revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact became moribund
and was formally declared "nonexistent" on July I, 1991, at the final summit meeting ofWarsaw Pact
leaders in Prague. See Britannica 2001
15 Barcelona Traction Case, (Second phase), ICJ Reports 3, p. 33
16 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems & Process, International Law and How We Use it, Oxford University Press,
1994, p. 3
17
Myres McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, AJIL, 1955, 49,
p.356 McDougal continues; "As such a process, it is a living, growing law, grounded in the practices and
sanctioning expectations of nation-state officials, and changing as their demands and expectations are
changed by the exigencies of new interests and technology and by other continually evolving conditions in
the world arena."
18 Hart recognizes the static character of the rules as a defect in a simple social structure. But Hart proposes
the introduction of 'rules of change' as a remedy for the static quality of the regime of primary rules.
See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Second edition, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.92-96
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The regime of the law of the sea under the 1982 UNCLOS has undergone such
evolution under the influence of exogenous factors and internal contradictions. The entry
into effect of the Convention was a decisive phase in the process of the evolution of the
regime of the law of the sea. This evolution was realized under the impact of major
exogenous factors, such as the development in fishing and sea-bed mining capacity, the
increased number and ever stronger voices of developing States armed with new
ideologies, in particular that of the New International Economic Order, and the rush for a
wider mare nostrum by many coastal States. After the entry into force of the Convention,
new exogenous factors have continuously emerged, such as the growing concern about
the deterioration of the marine environment, the increasing human consciousness of the
interdependence between the atmospheric phenomena and the global ocean, the further
development of marine science and technology, the increasing influence of non¬
governmental entities, etc.
From the moment of its adoption, the Convention bore many internal
contradictions, which might become causes for the evolution of the regime. The most
critical internal contradiction was the conflict of interests between developing States and
major industrial States in respect of sea-bed activities in the Area. This contradiction
could be removed, if not completely, only by adopting the 1994 Agreement relating to the
implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1994 Agreement). Apart from this issue, a
number of other internal contradictions are latent in the provisions formulated in
ambiguous terms as a result of compromise and package deal. For example, the imprecise
criteria for the drawing of straight baselines,19 the equivocal rules for the delimitation of
19 In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (1951), the ICJ admitted that the Norwegian straight baselinesystem was in conformity with international law and gave some rules formulated in abstract terms. Therules enunciated by the Court for the drawing of straight baselines, after long discussions in the ILC, wereincorporated in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, and adopted also in Article 7 of the 1982 UNCLOS.The rules originally formulated by the Court and introduced into the Convention are not unclearconceptually, but because of the absence of any numerical or cartographic criteria, these rules can be veryflexibly interpreted. State practices are so disparate. For example, the United States lays down guidelinesfor evaluating straight baselines providing strict criteria for deeply indented coastlines and fringing islands.On the contrary, some States apply very elastic criteria in drawing their straight baselines, by drawing, forinstance, straight baselines exceeding one hundred nautical miles, while others have drawn straightbaselines which may be seen as deviated from the general direction of the coastline. See United StatesDepartment of State, Bureau ofOceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits inthe Seas No. 106.
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EEZ and continental shelf,20 and the ambiguous provisions relating to the right of the
coastal State in respect of straddling fish stocks beyond and adjacent to the EEZ21 are
some examples, among others, of such contradiction-bearing provisions. In text,
conflicting interests could be buried in intentionally equivocal provisions. In concrete
reality, internal contradictions dormant in equivocal provisions may arise as acute causes
of dispute. If such internal contradictions can be resolved in an appropriate way through
negotiation or adjudication, they can entail a smooth evolution of the regime. If such
contradictions create a deadlock situation, they may cause instability or disruption of the
regime.
Under the pressure coming from latent internal contradictions and newly arising
external factors, the regime for the protection of the marine environment under the 1982
UNCLOS is in the process of continuous evolution. How can such a regime based on the
treaty text evolve while the text remains unchanged? Such a regime can be considered,
prima facie, to be more rigid than a regime formed on the basis of customary rules. For
Baxter, "customary law is flexible and adaptable law, responsive to changes in
international politics, to the advancement of technology, and to changes in the economic
and social structure of the world. Treaties are static and must be changed deliberately by
a formal procedure calling for a large amount of international co-operation."22 According
to this statement, customary international law seems inherently more evolutionary than
conventional international law.23 Considering that the text of a given treaty remains
unchanged unless amended or terminated, Baxter's argument might be generally valid,
but not always so. There are some types of treaties which are well prepared to evolve,
readily adapting to the changing international environment. The 1982 UNCLOS is such a
treaty containing a variety of mechanisms suitable for the evolution of the regime, as
follows.
20 As a result of the compromise between arguments for the equidistance principle and arguments for the
equitable principle, the wording of Articles 74 and 83 on the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental
shelf is so imprecise that these provisions provide only a guiding principle rather than operational criteria.
21 Article 63, para 2
22 R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, The Hague Academy, Recueil des Cows 1970-1, p. 97
23 Michael Byers maintains that treaty rules are sometimes more difficult to change. Michael Byers, Custom,
Power and the Power of Rules, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 125
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2. Mechanisms of evolution
2.1 Evolution by amendment
In a regime based on a formal treaty, amendment is a typical built-in mechanism of
evolution, since amendment is a means of self-transformation. In the 1982 UNCLOS, the
provisions for amendment are formulated with a view to maintaining the balance between
its integrity and its adaptability to the changing environment. It can be amended on rather
hard conditions. First, it is frozen for ten years from the date of its entry into force.24
Second, "the amendment conference should make every effort to reach agreement on any
amendment by way of consensus and there should be no voting on them until all efforts at
consensus have been exhausted."25 It does not stipulate the procedures to be applied when
a voting is inevitable. However, there are two indications; On the one hand, the decision¬
making procedure applicable at the amendment conference shall be the same as that
applicable at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. On the other
hand, according to the rules of procedures of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Law
of the Sea Convention (SPLOS) stipulates, a decision on a question of substance shall be
made, after the exhaustion of all efforts at consensus, by a two-third majority of the
States Parties present and voting, provided that such majority includes a majority of the
States Parties participating in the Meeting.26Since an amendment is a 'question of
substance', this rule can be applied to the decision on amendment. But SPLOS is not an
amendment conference as defined in the amendment clauses of the Convention. Although
it is not clear therefore whether the rules of procedures of SPLOS shall be applicable at
the amendment conference, it can be reasonably anticipated that an amendment
conference will make decision by consensus in principle, and by a two-third majority
after the exhaustion of all efforts to reach a consensus.27
24 Article 312, para 1
25 Article 312, para 1, para2
26 Rules of Procedures of SPLOS/2/Rev.3, Rule 53. Rules of Procedures of SPLOS (States Parties to the
Law of the Sea Convention) do not lay down the procedure for amendment. But, considering that an
amendment is a question of substance par excellence, Rule 53 stipulating two-thirds majority rule can be
applied to the procedure of amendment.
27 According to Article 314, amendments to the provisions which are exclusively related to activities in the
Area will be decided in ISBA. In Article 159 on the composition, procedure and voting of the Assembly of
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The 1982 UNCLOS provides also the simplified procedure for amendment, in
which the proposed amendment can be adopted if there is no written objection from any
State Party within a period of 12 months from the date of circulation of the
communication of amendment proposal.28
Considering these procedures for amendment, the 1982 UNCLOS seems to lay
more weight on the side of integrity than on the side of evolution. To date, no amendment
has been adopted through the procedures set forth in the Convention.
2.2 Evolution by additional agreements
When a treaty contains a serious internal conflict of interests or ambiguity, ensuing
problems may be resolved either through amendments or subsequent agreements. In the
case of the 1982 UNCLOS, the procedures for formal amendments are relatively rigid.
International society has resolved two kinds of controversial issues by adopting
successive agreements relating to the implementation of the Convention; one on the issue
of sea-bed mining in the Area, the other on the issue of the conservation of straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory species.
< The Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982>
The 1994 Agreement was adopted on 28 July 1994 and entered into force on 28 July
1996 with the objective of settling internal contradictions of the regime in respect of sea¬
bed activities in the Area. In spite of the efforts of the international community to
harmonize the interests of all States through package deal in the course of negotiation of
the 1982 UNCLOS, the conflict of interests between developing States and major
industrial States in respect of the sea-bed activities jeopardized the establishment of the
general regime of the law of the sea. In the negotiation and adoption of the text, major
ISBA, decisions on questions of substances shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the members present
and voting, provided that such majority includes a majority of the members participating in the session. In
the Assembly of ISBA, consensus or general agreement is not required.
28 Article 313
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industrial States were outnumbered by developing States. But regime could not start up
without the participation of the industrial States, fewer in number but greater in real
power. This conflict of interests has been reconciled by adopting the 1994 Agreement, in
which some adjustments are made to the sea-bed regime in such a way as to reflect the
position of the industrial States.
There are some peculiar aspects in the relationship between the 1982 UNCLOS
and the 1994 Agreement due to the fact that the latter brought some substantive
modifications to the former before the former entered into force.29 Article 2 of the 1994
Agreement stipulates; "The provisions of the Agreement and Part XI of the Convention
shall be interpreted and applied as a single instrument, and in the event of any
inconsistency the provisions of the Agreement shall prevail."30 In form, the 1994
Agreement is not an amendment to the 1982 UNCLOS, because it was not adopted in
accordance with the amendment procedures. The procedure of adoption of the 1994
Agreement does not conform to the general rule regarding the amendment of treaties laid
down in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 39: "A treaty may
be amended by agreement between the parties." Clearly, the 1994 Agreement was not
adopted by agreement between the parties to the 1982 UNCLOS, because there were no
parties to the Convention at the moment of the adoption of the Agreement.31 The 1994
Agreement is not a protocol to the 1982 UNCLOS, because some of the provisions of the
former supersede those of the latter. Being neither amendment nor protocol, the 1994
Agreement can be regarded as a "successive treaty relating to the same subject-matter" in
the meaning ofArticle 30 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
In relation to the application of the 1994 Agreement, some legal questions may
arise from the fact that the Parties to the Agreement are not the same as the Parties to the
1982 UNCLOS. As of 9 December 2002, the 1994 Agreement has 111 Parties, while the
29 See Renate Platzoder, Substantive Changes in a Multilateral Treaty before its Entry into Force: The Case
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, EJ1L, vol.4, 1993, N°3
30 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982, Article 2
31 There were many States which had ratified the 1982 UNCLOS before the date of adoption of the 1994
Agreement. But these States were not still parties to the 1982 UNCLOS, because it did not yet enter into
effect at that moment.
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1982 UNCLOS has 142 Parties.32 So, there are 31 States which are Parties to the 1982
UNCLOS but not Parties to the 1994 Agreement. Article 30 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties lays down general rules on the application of
successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter.33 The relationship between the
1982 UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement is more complicated than that envisaged in
Article 30 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, due to the fact that the 1994 Agreement was
adopted before the 1982 UNCLOS entered into force. The Parties to the 1982 UNCLOS
can be classified into two categories; 1) Parties to both the 1982 UNCLOS and the 1994
Agreement, 2) Parties to the 1982 UNCLOS, but non-Parties to the 1994 Agreement.
For the States which become Parties to the Convention after the adoption of the
1994 Agreement, the situation is clear. The text of the 1982 UNCLOS and that of the
1994 Agreement are presented as a single instrument. Furthermore, according to Article 4,
paragraph 1 and 2 of the 1994 Agreement, "After the adoption of this Agreement, any
instrument of ratification or formal confirmation of or accession to the Convention shall
also represent consent to be bound by this Agreement" and "No State or entity may
establish its consent to be bound by this Agreement unless it has previously established or
establishes at the same time its consent to be bound by the Convention." In fact, 77 States
and the EU became Parties to the Convention and to the 1994 Agreement at the same date
(during the period running from the date of adoption of the Agreement to the end of
2002), having full knowledge of the relationship between the two instruments.34
For the States which had already ratified the 1982 UNCLOS before the adoption
of the 1994 Agreement, the situation is complicated. These States saw the 1982
UNCLOS being modified after they had ratified it. The content of the modification made
by the 1994 Agreement can be acceptable for some States but unacceptable for others.
Among the 63 States which had ratified the 1982 UNCLOS before the adoption of the
32 Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and related Agreements as at 9 December
2002, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, www.un.org/Depts/los/los94st.htm
"Article 30, para.4 stipulates as follows:
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to
which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations.
34 The Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and related Agreements as at 9
December 2002. Division ofOcean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations.
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1994 Agreement, 33 became Parties to the Agreement, while 30 remain non-Parties as of
9 December 2002.35
Regarding the attitude of these 30 States which ratified the 1982 UNCLOS but
still remain non-Parties to the Agreement (they are all developing States), it is not clear
whether they remain non-Parties to the Agreement as persistent objectors or simply they
are delaying the procedure of ratification.36 For them, the original text of the 1982
UNCLOS remains unchanged37 and the 1994 Agreement is a pacta tertiis, which is not
binding upon them.38 In theory, the relationship between these States and the States which
are Parties to both the 1982 UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement may be governed in
accordance with Article 30, paragraph 4 (b) of the Vienna Convention, which stipulates
"as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the
treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations." In the
case of a treaty dealing with individual interests, such as commercial activities or
treatment of nationals, this provision of the Vienna Convention can regulate problems
arising from the difference of its Parties from those to another treaty. Such a treaty, even
though it is multilateral, governs a series of bilateral relations. It can function like a
bundle of bilateral treaties. But in the case of a treaty dealing with global commons,
Article 30, paragraph 4 (b) of the Vienna Convention is not sufficient to regulate the
problems arising between parties and non-parties to a treaty. In dealing with the common
heritage of mankind, there can be only one regime because the relations cannot be
divided into a series of bilateral relations. For example, it is not possible to apply the
production policy defined in Article 151 of the 1982 UNCLOS for the States which are
35 The Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and related Agreements as at 9
December 2002. Division ofOcean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations.
36 There is a trend that the number of these States is decreasing. Among the States which had ratified the
1982 UNCLOS before the adoption of the 1994 Agreement, five States (Costa Rica, Tunisia, Kuwait,
Cameroon, Cuba) have ratified the Agreement during the year 2002.
37 Tullio Treves has pointed out: "...il n'en reste pas moins possible qu'apres l'entree en vigueur de
l'Accord certains Etats restent lies a la Convention dans son texte originaire, puisqu'il n'est pas prevu, et il
serait imprudent de prevoir, que I'entree en vigueur de I'Accord exige I'expression du consentement a etre
lie par tous les Etats ayant deja ratifie la Convention. II est ainsi en principe possible, meme probable, que
se verifie une coexistence entre deux Conventions, celle dans le texte de 1982 et celle dans le texte de
1994. » Tullio Treves, I'Entree en vigueur de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le Droit de la Mer et les
Conditions de son universalisme, Annuaire Franc;a is de Droit International, XXXIX - 1993, Editions du
CNRS, Paris, pp.871-2
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Parties thereto but non-Parties to the 1994 Agreement on the one hand, and the
production policy redefined in Section 6 of the 1994 Agreement for the States which are
Parties to both instruments on the other. The International Sea-Bed Authority (ISBA) will
apply the policy as defined in the 1994 Agreement, in case of the inconsistency between
the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS and those of the 1994 Agreement. In theory, the
States which are Parties to the 1982 UNCLOS but non-Parties to the 1994 Agreement
have a legal basis for the argument that all the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS remain
unchanged and valid in relation to them. Thus, the uniform application of the 1982
UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement remains questionable, notwithstanding the provision
of Article 2 of the 1994 Agreement stipulating that both instruments shall be interpreted
and applied as a single instrument. This means that the conflicting interests around the
deep sea-bed mining are not still completely reconciled. Before the adoption of the 1994
Agreement, some major industrial States were not satisfied with the 1982 UNCLOS.
Now, a group of developing States seem to remain unsatisfied with the 1994 Agreement.
In reality, it is difficult to imagine a situation where these States could block the
functioning of the sea-bed regime under ISBA.
In content, the 1994 Agreement can be regarded as an amendment to the 1982
UNCLOS in that some of the provisions of the former have superseded the relevant
provisions of the latter.19 The 1994 Agreement contains few provisions relating to the
protection of the marine environment. But the real contribution of the 1994 Agreement to
the regime for the protection of the marine environment resides in the fact that it has
cleared the way for the creation of the new general regime of the law of the sea, in which
is embedded the regime for the protection of the marine environment.
<The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks >
38 Jonathan Charney argues that, besides jus cogens, a doctrine governing the common heritage of mankind
might be an exception to the persistent objector rule. See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law,
AJ/L, 1993, Vol. 8, p. 541
39 1994 Implementing Agreement, Section 6 Production Policy, paragraph 7: "The provisions of article 151,
paragraph 1 to 7 and 9, article 192, paragraph 2(q), article 165, paragraph 2 (n), and Annex III, article 6,
paragraph 5, and article 7, of the Convention shall not apply."
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The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (hereinafter
referred to as "the 1995 Agreement") was adopted on 4 December 1995 and entered into
force on 11 November 2001,40 as a subsequent instrument aimed at settling the problems
arising from the ambiguity and controversy around the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS
relating to the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species.
Articles 63 and 64 of the 1982 UNCLOS lay down general guidelines for the
conservation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species. These articles call on
coastal States and States fishing such species to cooperate directly or through appropriate
subregional, regional or international organizations for the conservation of such species.
Conscious of the problem latent in the incongruence between the boundary of EEZ and
the life space of these species, Articles 63 an 64 indicate some conservation measures
applicable to the area "beyond and adjacent" to the EEZ, or "within and beyond" EEZ.
For these species, a regime which covers their life space, transcending the jurisdictional
demarcation between EEZ and the high seas will be more effective than a pure EEZ
fishing regime and/or a high seas fishing regime. Articles 63 and 64 of the 1982 envisage
a move in this direction, but these provisions lay down only a general framework, without
providing any concrete rules and standards. The 1992 UNCED, drawing attention to the
issue of the conservation of these species, called on States to convene, as soon as possible,
an intergovernmental conference under United Nations auspices, taking into account
relevant activities at the subregional, regional and global levels, with a view to promoting
effective implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.4' In response of this
call, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided in 1992 to convene an
intergovernmental conference on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.42
The 1995 Agreement is the outcome of the conference thus convened.
40 See the Status of the Convention and the related Agreements, as at 9 December 2002, Division of the
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations.
41 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, section 17.45, 17.49, 17.78
42 UNGA Resolution A/RES/47/192 adopted on 22 December 1993
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This 1994 Agreement is not entitled 'protocol' to the 1982 UNCLOS, but,
considering the relationship between the two instruments, in form and in substance, the
former is similar to a protocol to the latter.
In form, the 1995 Agreement is subject to the 1982 UNCLOS. Article 4 of the
Agreement defines its relationship with the 1982 UNCLOS; "Nothing in this Agreement
shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the Convention. This
Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner consistent
with the Convention." This is one of the relations foreseen in Article 30, paragraph 2 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: "When a treaty specifies that it is
subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty,
the provisions of that other treaty prevail." This relationship differs from the relationship
between the 1994 Agreement and the 1982 UNCLOS. While the 1994 Agreement
prevails over the 1982 UNCLOS, the 1995 Agreement is subject to the Convention.
Another difference between the 1995 Agreement and the 1994 Agreement in their
respective relationship with the 1982 UNCLOS is that a State may become a party to the
1995 Agreement without being a party to the 1982 UNCLOS,43 whereas no State or entity
may establish its consent to be bound by the 1994 Agreement unless it has previously
established or establishes at the same time its consent to be bound by the 1982
UNCLOS.44 In this sense, the 1995 Agreement can be qualified as a stand alone
agreement, as some authors so state.45
In substance, the 1995 Agreement introduces some important evolutionary
elements into the high seas fishing regime. The 1995 Agreement is entitled
"Implementing Agreement", but there are some provisions which go beyond the objective
of implementing the corresponding provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS. Erik Franckx
classifies the provisions of the 1995 Agreement into three categories; the provisions
43 Actually there are some States, such as Canada, Iran, USA, which have ratified the 1995 Agreement
without becoming parties to the Convention. See the Status of the Convention and the related Agreements,
as at 31 July 2001, Division of the Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United
Nations.
44 The 1994 Agreement, Article 4, para.2
45 For Judge D.H. Anderson, the 1995 Agreement is a 'stand alone' agreement in that a state may become a
party to the Agreement without becoming a party to the Convention and vice versa. D.H. Anderson, 'The
Straddling Stocks Agreement of I995-An Initial Assessment', 1996, ICLQ 463. In fact, some States, such
as Canada, Iran, USA have ratified the 1995 Agreement without becoming party to the Convention, as of
22 June 2001.
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which are fully consistent with the letter and the spirit of the 1982 UNCLOS {propter or
secundum legem), the provisions which go beyond the 1982 UNCLOS but are
nevertheless in line with the spirit of the 1982 UNCLOS since they represent a natural
development of the latter document (praeter legem), the provisions which are plainly
inconsistent with the 1982 UNCLOS {contra legem).46 There are many others who
believe that the 1995 Agreement does not merely implement the 1982 UNCLOS, but
goes beyond its framework.47
The strong enforcement system set forth in Part VI of the 1995 Agreement is one
of the progressive elements which go beyond the ambit of the 1982 UNCLOS. In
particular, Article 21 introduces some problematic rules in relation to the principle of the
flag state jurisdiction, by empowering any State Party participating in a subregional or
regional fisheries management organization or arrangement to board and inspect fishing
vessels flying the flag of another State Party to this Agreement, whether or not such State
Party is also a member of the organization or a participant in the arrangement.48 The right
to board and inspect vessels on the high seas by authorities of States other than the flag
State is an important new element which goes beyond the principle of the flag State
jurisdiction in the high seas confirmed in the 1982 UNCLOS. If such a right is exercised
among members of subregional or regional members inter se, it can be explained in the
light of the freedom of States to make agreement to modify multilateral treaties between
certain of the parties only, as recognized in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties and the Convention.49 However, Article 21, paragraph 1 of the 1995 Agreement
goes even further. It authorizes a member of a regional regime to board and inspect
fishing vessels flying the flag of another State Party to the Agreement, whether or not
46 Erik Franckx, Pacta Tertiis and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation &
Management of Straddling fish stocks & Highly migratory fish stocks, FAO Legal papers Online no. 8,
June 2000
47 Laurent Lucchini/ Michel Voelckel, Droit de la mer, Tome 2, Volume 2, p. 690 : « L'Accord feint sans
doute de se soumettre a la CMB (Convention de Montego Bay), mais it va au-dela. Son autonomic par
rapport a elle est reelle. Sous le pretexte, en effet, de donner plus de substances au devoir de cooperation, il
transforme, a differents egards...le droit des peches en haute mer. II est hautement significatif, au
demeurant, qu'aucune reference ne soit faite au principe de liberte de la peche en haute mer pourtant
rappele aux Articles 87 et 116 de la CMB.
48 Article 21, para. 1
49 The 1969 Vienna Convention, Article 41, The 1982 UNCLOS, Article 311, para.3. See below section
3.2.2.6
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such State party is also a member of the organization or a participant in the arrangement.
At first glance, this provision seems to be contrary to the pacta tertiis rule. But it is not
necessarily so, since this provision is binding only upon the States Parties to the 1995
Agreement. If a member State of a given subregional or regional regime exercises the
right of boarding and inspecting fishing vessels flying the flag of another State which is
not a member of that regime, it is not contradictory to the pacta tertiis rule, insofar as
both States are Parties to the 1995 Agreement. In such a case, the right of boarding and
inspection by a member of a subregional or regional regime can be exercised on the basis
of the 1995 Agreement. Even though the right of the flag State in the high seas is a
longstanding principle of customary international law codified into the Convention, a
State is free to accept some restriction to the jurisdiction over the vessels flying its flag by
giving consent to be bound by the 1995 Agreement. This means that such right cannot be
exercised vis-a-vis the States which are non-Parties to the 1995 Agreement. When non-
Parties to the 1995 Agreement may stay beyond this stringent enforcement rule, the real
issue around this point is a practical problem of how to deal with free riders, rather than a
legal problem.
The reinforcement of port State jurisdiction in respect of fisheries is another
evolutionary element in the high seas fishing regime. The 1995 Agreement lays down the
right and duty of port State to take measures to promote the effectiveness of subregional,
regional and global conservation and management measures. In particular, it empowers a
port State to inspect documents, fishing gear and catch on board fishing vessels, when
such vessels are voluntarily in its ports or at its offshore terminals.50 This is a bold
departure from the traditional international rules and standards and the relevant
provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS, which provide the port State jurisdiction only in respect
of the port entry requirements.51 The 1995 Agreement enlarges the ratione materiae of
port State jurisdiction by providing the right and duty to exercise port State jurisdiction
"to promote the effectiveness of subregional, regional and global conservation and
management measures." This is an important innovative step that may entail some legal
problems. The provisions of the 1995 Agreement on port State jurisdiction go beyond the
50 Article 23
51 See infra. Chapter 5
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relevant rules laid down in the 1982 UNCLOS. Do they so in line with the spirit of the
1982 UNCLOS (praeter legem) or in contradiction therewith (contra legem)? In this
sense, the provisions of the 1995 Agreement enlarging the scope of port State jurisdiction
can be regarded as contra legem vis-a-vis the 1982 UNCLOS. But this deviation from the
Convention can be justified in two ways. First, the 1995 Agreement is an inter se
agreement vis-a-vis the Convention. The port State jurisdiction as provided in the 1995
Agreement is applicable to the fisheries issues between its Parties, in conformity with
Article 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In case a vessel flying
the flag of a State which is Party to the 1982 UNCLOS but non-Party to the 1995
Agreement enters, after having violated fishing regulations under the 1995 Agreement on
the high seas, into a port of a State which is Party to both instruments, the vessel should
be treated in accordance with the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS. Second, as between
the Parties to both the 1982 UNCLOS and the 1995 Agreement, there can be an argument
that the latter is lex specialis to the former.
Another progressive element in the 1995 Agreement is the introduction of new
principles of international environmental law which have emerged after the adoption of
the 1982 UNCLOS, in particular the precautionary principle.
The 1982 UNCLOS, adopted before the advent of the precautionary principle in
international law, does not explicitly articulate it.52 The basic philosophy embodied in the
Convention in respect of the protection of the marine environment is the preventive
principle, as States are required to take measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution
of the marine environment, in many provisions.53 The 1995 Agreement explicitly
embraces the precautionary approach. It requires States to apply the precautionary
approach widely to conservation, management and exploitation of straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory fish stocks in order to protect the living marine resources and
preserve the marine environment,54 and calls on States to be cautious when information is
uncertain, unreliable or inadequate, and not to use the absence of adequate scientific
information as a reason to postponing or failing to take conservation and management
52 For the precautionary principle, see infra. Chapter 4.
53 In Articles 194, 195, 196, 201, 202, 203, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211. 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 220, 222,
it is stipulated that prescriptive or enforcement measures should be aimed at the prevention, reduction and
control of marine pollution.
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measures.55 In addition, the 1995 Agreement lays down some detailed guidelines for the
implementation of the precautionary approach.56
The precautionary approach introduced in the 1995 Agreement goes beyond the
preventive principle set forth in 1982 UNCLOS. The preventive principle and the
precautionary principle are both along the same lines. But the preventive principle and
the precautionary principle are different paradigms of behaviour in dealing with risk and
uncertainty.57 Vis-a-vis the 1982 UNCLOS, the provisions of the 1995 Agreement
requiring the precautionary approach can be regarded as praeter legem, extending the
attitude required by the principle of prevention to a certain category of risks, which are
uncertain but may result in serious or irreversible damage, if they occur.
Thus, the 1995 Agreement contains some provisions which go beyond the 1982
UNCLOS, some of them are an extension in line with the principles of the 1982
UNCLOS, while others deviate therefrom. It is by so doing that the 1995 Agreement
contributes to the evolution of the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS. If all rules and
standards were always strictly contained within the established legal frame, there would
be little room for evolution.
< Other additional agreements>
The International Conference on Responsible Fishing held at Cancun in 1992 resulted in
the adoption, at the FAO Conference in 1994, of the Agreement to Promote Compliance
with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the
High Seas (hereinafter referred to as 'Compliance Agreement'). The Compliance
Agreement is designed to specify flag States' responsibility in respect of fishing vessels
entitled to fly their flag and operating on the high seas. This Agreement is followed by
the adoption of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (hereinafter referred to as
'Code of Conduct') at the FAO Conference in 1995. The Code of Conduct places
emphasis on the conservation of the aquatic ecosystem, the maintenance of biodiversity
and precautionary approach. The Compliance Agreement and the Code of Conduct refer
54 Article 6, para 1
55 Article 6, para 2
56 Article 6, para 3 to 7
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to the 1982 UNCLOS as the legal basis and underline their conformity therewith. They
contribute to the evolution of the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS by supplementing the
rules and standards as regards the exercise of flag State jurisdiction and by introducing
some new elements into the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS.
2.3 Evolution by interpretation and re-interpretation
2.3.1 Concept of evolutionary interpretation
Whereas the text of a treaty remains unchanged unless amended or terminated, its
meaning may vary according to interpreters and with the passage of time. The vitality of
a treaty as a "living instrument"58 arises from its dynamic adaptability to the environment.
The meaning of a treaty text is not free from the influence of subjectivity and temporality.
The 1969 Vienna Convention provides a general rule of interpretation: "A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."59
This rule leaves room for flexibility in interpreting a treaty. Neither "the ordinary
meaning" of the terms nor "the context" of the treaty can be identically perceived by all
interpreters. The function of legal interpretation is the choice among the plurality of
conceivable meanings of a given text.60 A certain degree of subjectivity is inevitable in
interpreting a text, however strong the fidelity to the written text might be.61 Subjectivity
57 See infra. Chapter 4.
58 In the Tyrer case, the European Court of Human Rights asserts that the Convention is a living instrument
which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. The European Court of Human Rights,
Judgment of the Court, 25 April 1978, Court A, Vol. 26, para.31
59 Article 31, para I
60 Hans Kelsen states; "The linguistic sense of the norm is not unequivocal, and whoever is to apply the
norm is faced with several possible readings... In terms of positive law, there is simply no method
according to which only one of the several readings of a norm could be distinguished as 'correct -
assuming, of course, that several readings of the meaning of the norm are possible in the context of all other
norms of the statute or of the legal system... Every method of interpretation developed thus far invariably
leads merely to a possible result, never to a single correct result.", Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the
problems of legal theory, translated by Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson, Oxford
University Press, 1992, p. 79 and 81
61 H.L.A. Hart asserts; "In most important cases there is always a choice. The judge has to choose between
alternative meanings to be given to the words of a statute or between rival interpretations of what a
precedent 'amounts to'." H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, Second edition, 1997,
p. 12
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of interpretation has its axiological as well as cognitive aspects. When the Vienna
Convention stipulates: "A treaty shall be interpreted...in the light of its object and
purpose", it requires an axiological rationality in interpreting a treaty. Teleological
interpretation is apt to be oriented by the value system of each interpreter. The task of
identifying the real meaning of the text, i.e. the true intention of the parties, requires
cognitive rationality which can be achieved through logical reasoning on the basis of
relevant knowledge. But however rational human cognition might be, it is not entirely
free from subjectivity inherent in human perception, as modern theories of perception lay
emphasis on the fact that all human perception is a sort of mental construction on the
basis of sensory stimuli.62 In particular, perception of highly abstract objects such as legal
norms is a fortiori a mental construction.
Not only the ordinary meaning of the terms, but also the assessment of the
"context" of a given treaty is subject to the intervention of subjectivity to a certain degree.
In particular, in the myriad of rapidly increasing international legal instruments with
varying degrees of binding force, the boundary of the set of legal instruments relating to a
given treaty is to be determined by the perspective of each interpreter.
Furthermore, the interpreter has a wide margin of freedom in ascertaining the
object and purpose of the treaty, which are generally formulated in abstract and sublime
terms.
Considering the inevitable subjectivity in interpreting a treaty, it is not totally
absurd to say that interpretation of law is a kind of creation of law.63In particular, Hans
Kelsen underlines "the relativity of the contrast between creating and applying the law"
in the sense that "...legislation (the creation of general norms) represents the application
of the constitution; judicial decisions and administrative acts (setting individual norms)
represent the application of statutes; and the realization of coercive acts represents the
application ofjudicial decisions and administrative directives."64
62 Maurice Reuchlin, Psychologie, Presses Universitaires de France, 13e edition, 1998, p. 91 « Le percept
est une construction, un ensemble d'informations selectionnees et structurees en fonction de l'experience
anterieure, des besoins, des intentions de l'organisme implique activement dans une certaine situation. »
63 Jean Carbonnier, Sociologie juridique. Presses Universitaires de France, Edition Quadrige, 1994, p. 267
64 Hans Kelsen, op.cit., 1992, p. 70
In the case of international law, Kelsen regards the legal norms created by way of international courts as a
third level international norm, after general international customary law (first level), and particular
international treaty law (second level). Ibid, pp. 107-108
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But subjectivity of interpretation has its own limits, without which the stability
and consistency of a treaty are undermined.65 The "ordinary meaning"66 of a given term is
confined within a certain limit, beyond which the meaning is no longer ordinary. 67
Furthermore, the ordinary meaning of a treaty text should be interpreted in such a way as
to maintain its coherence with the context, as ICJ noted: "If the relevant words in their
natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter. If,
on the other hand, the words in their natural and ordinary meaning are ambiguous or lead
to an unreasonable result, then, and then only, must the Court, by resort to other methods
of interpretation, seek to ascertain what the parties really did mean when they used these
words."68 Subjectivity in interpretation is also limited by the rule that any treaty should be
interpreted in accordance with fundamental principles of international law.69 Court
practices also contribute to the maintenance of consistency and stability in the
interpretation of treaty. Even though the decision of the Court on any case has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case,70 an interpretation
of a treaty given by an international court has the authority of jurisprudence.
Besides subjectivity, temporality intervenes in the interpretation of treaties. With
the passage of time, the interpreter and the meaning of a treaty text change.
An individual interpreter is an evolving subject. Each interpreter's knowledge,
reasoning capacity and experience change with time. In the eyes of this evolving
65 See Philippe Coppens, Normes et fonction de juger, Bruyant LGDJ, 1998, pp.175 "L'interpretation est
une reconstruction qui ne peut etre une innovation a la fois pour des raisons qui tiennent aux contraintes
langagieres et pour des raisons qui tiennent au fait que toute regie est une reference autoritaire dans un
systeme juridique."
66 The Court used the term "natural and ordinary meaning " instead of "ordinary meaning ". In the
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations Case, ICJ
declared that "the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a
treaty is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which
they occur." ICJ Reports, 1950, pp.4-8
67 Charles de Visscher asserts: « Dans le traite, la securite garantie par la fidelite a la parole donnee est
I'objectif des contractants. La fonction de 1'interpretation est de donner pleine efficacite a cette exigence
fondamentale. » Charles de Visscher, Problemes d'interpretation juridiques, 1963, p. 10
68 The Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 8
69 See Charles de Visscher, op. cit. p. 16
Similarly, within the frame of the hierarchical structure of the legal system, Hans Kelsen would say that the
meaning of a lower-level norm is bounded within the frame of the higher-level norm, as he asserts; "the
higher-level norms governs the act whereby the lower-level norm is created...In governing the creation of
the lower-level norm, the higher-level norm determines not only the process whereby the lower-level norms
is created, but possibly the content of the norm to be created as well." Hans Kelsen, op.cit, p. 78
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individual, the meaning of the same text may be perceived differently from year to year.
Even though each individual remains completely consistent in interpreting a text, a group
interpreter, such as the governments of the States parties or international courts, cannot
remain totally consistent, because its composition changes over time through the
continuous inflow and outflow of its members. If the members of an international court
are changed partially,71 isn't it to minimize the inevitable loss of the continuity of the
court from the change of its members?
The ordinary meaning of the terms itself is dynamic, as Mark E. Villiger asserts:
"in view of the fact that a term may possess many 'ordinary meanings', the parties may
adapt to changing circumstances and conditions, by attributing in their interpretation of a
rule one of many plausible meanings to the terms...parties may, in their interpretation,
gradually wander from the original text towards a different content and thereby modify
the rule."72 Interpretation of a treaty in a long time span raises the question of
intertemporal law. According to the general rule of interpretation provided for in the
Vienna Convention, a treaty should be interpreted with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms in their context. The "context" here means the legal context at the time of the
conclusion of the treaty. The doctrine of intertemporal law proposes that "a juridical fact
must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it..."" In the Grisbadarna
Arbitration, the Permanent Court of Arbitration held that "in order to ascertain which
may have been the automatic dividing line of 1658 we must have recourse to the
principles of law in force at that time."74 ICJ also declared: "the first duty of a tribunal
which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty is to endeavour to
70 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 59
71 In case of ICJ, the term of office of the judges is nine years. In order to ensure a certain measure of
continuity, one-third of the Court, i.e., five judges, is elected every three years. See Statute of the
International Court of Justice, Article 13
Similarly, one-third of the members of ITLOS, seven judges, is elected every three years. See Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 5
72 Mark E. Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties, Second edition, Kluwer Law International,
1997, p. 213
73 The Island of Palmas case, UNRIAA Vol. II
74 UNRIAA (1909), vol. XI, p. 159
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give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they
occur."75
However, if the meaning of a treaty remains fixed in defiance of the changing
environment with the passage of time, that treaty may degenerate into desuetude. ICJ
recognizes the necessity of evolutionary interpretation, which means that an international
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal
system prevailing at the time of the interpretation. In the South West Africa case, ICJ
declared: "The concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant (of the League of
Nations) were not static, but were by definition evolutionary...That is why, viewing the
institutions of 1919, the Court must take into consideration the changes which have
occurred in the supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected
by the subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations and by
way of customary law."76 In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case also, ICJ took the
same position, by declaring that "the Court is of the opinion that the expression (under
consideration) in reservation (b)...must be interpreted in accordance with the rules of
international law as they exist today, and not as they existed in 1931 (when Greece
acceded to the General Act)."77 More recently, in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case (1997), ICJ
took the position of evolutionary interpretation, by declaring: "Owing to new scientific
insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind - for present and future
generations - of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new
norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments
during the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and
such new standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities
but also when continuing with activities begun in the past."78 The Vienna Convention
also incorporates the mechanism of dynamic interpretation by stipulating: "There shall be
taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b)
75 The Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations Case,
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Report 1950, p.8
76 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Report 1971, pp.
31-32
77
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, pp.29/34
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any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties."79 The attitude of the evolutionary
interpretation can be found also in civil law.80
As such, the jurisprudence dictates to interpret a treaty in the context at the time
when the treaty is concluded on the one hand, but by taking into account the development
of law that has occurred in the supervening period on the other. These two rules of
interpretation are seemingly inconsistent with each other. The first rule requiring the
contemporaneity with the judicial fact may be understood to say about the applicable law.
This rule can be derived from the principle of non-retroactivity of law, as R. Y. Jennings
asserts: "The rule that the effect of an act is to be determined by the law of the time when
it was done, not of the law of the time when the claim is made, is elementary and
important. It is merely an aspect of the rule against retroactive laws, and to that extent
may be regarded as a general principle of law."8' The second rule requiring the
contemporaneity with the interpretation may be understood to say about the necessity of
giving a new meaning to the text in the light of the new prevailing legal system. The first
rule requires that the applicable law should be found at the time when the judicial fact
occurred. The second rule signifies that the meaning of the treaty may evolve with the
passage of time. When ICJ, in the Namibia case, held that "Mindful as it is of the primary
necessity of interpreting an instrument in accordance with the intentions of the parties at
the time of its conclusion, the Court is bound to take into account the fact that the
concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant: 'the strenuous conditions of the
modern world' and 'the well-being and development' of the peoples concerned were not
static, but were by definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the
'sacred trust'", the Court applies the two rules simultaneously by giving new meaning to
the unchanged text taking into account the subsequent development of law. Similarly,
78 The Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ, Judgment, para. 140
79 Article 31, para.3
80
« L'interprete a le droit d'adapter librement le texte aux necessites sociales de son epoque. II doit
rechercher ce que serait la pensee des auteurs de la loi s'ils avaient a legiferer aujourd'hui. Ce qui importe
pour I'interpretation du Code Civil, ce n'est pas I'intention du legislateur de 1804, mais celle d'un
legislateur suppose de 1984. » Jean Carbonnier, Droit Civil, Presses Universitaires de France, 1995, p. 198
81 R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, Manchester University Press, 1963,
p.28
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when ICJ, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, has found that the 1977 Treaty is still in
force and consequently governs the relationship between the Parties, but requires the
Parties to look afresh at the effects on the environment of the operation of the Gabcikovo
power plant taking into account the new norms and standards,82 the Court maintains the
position that the treaty remains unchanged, but is not suitable for the fulfilment of its own
objectives in the new situation. Therefore, the Court finds "that Hungary and Slovakia
must negotiate in good faith in the light of the prevailing situation, and must take all
necessary measures to ensure the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty of 16
September 1977."83
Since it is a delicate task to give a new meaning to the fixed text, ICJ, while
admitting the necessity of evolutionary interpretation, underlines the primordial necessity
of interpreting a given instrument in conformity with the intentions that the parties had at
the time of its conclusion.84 Judge M. Bedjaoui, though admitting that evolutionary
interpretation is useful and even necessary in very limited situations, gives a warning that
evolutionary interpretation should be applied only in the respect of the general rule of
interpretation as provided in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.85
The evolution of interpretation of a given treaty takes place among the persons
who are in a position to interpret and apply it; they are the parties to the treaty and
international courts, and in some cases international organizations. The parties to the
treaty interpret it as a preliminary step to its application. Interpretation and application are
distinct concepts, but they are inseparably linked. Interpretation precedes application.
Interpretation is the process of passing from an abstract norm to a concrete one.
Application is the process of individualization of norm, since it means matching an
interpreted norm to a particular fact. In other words, interpretation remains in the realm of
concept, while application goes into reality. In practice, treaties are often applied without
82 The Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ Judgment, para. 140
83 The Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ Judgment, para. 155
84 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, pp.
31-32
85 M. Bedjaoui, Opinion Individuelle, The Case Concerning the GabCikovo-Nagymaros Project,
« L'interpretation evolutive ne peut s'appliquer que dans le respect de la regie generate d'interpretation de
Particle 31 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traites. » Judge Bedjaoui admits that evolutionary
interpretation can be applied to Articles 15, 19, and 20 of the 1977 Treaty between Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, because these articles are formulated in extremely vague terms.
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a formal interpretation. Even in such a case, an implicit interpretation is made in the mind
of the person who applies it. In the contemporary world, the interpretation of treaties is
one of the daily tasks of each government. When a treaty is concluded, the government of
a signatory State interprets it to complete the internal procedures for ratification or
publicity. After the entry into force of a treaty, the government interprets it in order to
apply it.86
The role of international courts in the interpretation of treaties is different from
that of governments. First, international courts play a passive role in interpreting treaty
texts. They interpret a treaty only when they are requested to settle a particular dispute, or
when they are requested by international organizations to give an advisory
opinion.87Second, a judicial interpretation and a governmental interpretation are different
in the degree of their subjectivity and impartiality. Since governments interpret treaties in
the light of their national interest to the possible extent, their interpretation tends to be
subjective and partial. But international courts are always third parties, required to be
impartial. Third, a judicial interpretation given by an international court is final,88 while
an interpretation and application made by a State may be contested by other States.
86 See Detlev F. Vagts, Treaty Interpretation and the New American Ways of Law Reading, EJ1L, Vol.4,
1993, N°4
87 Article 96 of the UN Charter: "1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the
International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. 2. Other organs of the
United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly,
may also request advisory opinion of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their
activities." Reflecting this provision, Article 65 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
stipulates: "1. The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever
body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a
request."
By virtue of Article 159 of the 1982 UNCLOS, the General Assembly of ISBA may request an advisory
opinion to the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS.
The effects of the interpretations given by an international court are different from organization to
organization. In the case of the United Nations, the Charter does not specify the effects of the advisory
opinions of ICJ, but it is interpreted that the advisory opinions are advisory, therefore not binding. In some
organizations, such as ILO (Article 37), UNESCO (Article XIV), FAO (Article XVII), ICAO (Article 84),
ICJ or arbitral tribunal may give final determination which is binding on the parties and the organization.
In other organizations such as UNIDO (Article 22) and ISBA (Article 191 of the 1982 UNCLOS), ICJ or
ITLOS may give non-binding opinions.
On the subject of the effects of the constitutional interpretation given by international courts, see C.F.
Amerasinghe, Principles of the institutional law of international organizations, Cambridge University Press,
1996, Chapter 2 Interpretation of texts, Roberto Ago, "Binding" advisory opinions of the International
Court of Justice, AJIL, Vol. 85 (1991), N°3, Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International
Court of Justice, 1965, Guillaume Bacot, Reflexions sur les clauses qui rendent obligatoires les avis
consultatifs de la C.P.J.I et de la C.I.J., Revue Generate de Droit International Public, vol. 84 (1980)
88 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 60; "The judgment if final and without appeal."
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The possibility of different interpretations is even higher in case of provisions
formulated with intentional or constructive ambiguity as a result of compromise. The
Convention contains a number of such equivocal provisions.
2.3.2 Re-interpretation in the context of new international norms
The 1992 UNCED has brought an important external impact on the regime of the
law of the sea under the 1982 UNCLOS, by adopting two binding conventions89 and three
non-binding instruments.90 These Rio instruments have created a new context by
introducing some new international norms, such as the principle of sustainable
development, the precautionary principle, the ecosystem approach, the integrated
approach, etc.91
Among the Rio instruments, it is Agenda 21 that exercises the most direct
influence on the 1982 UNCLOS.92 In relation to the marine environment, Chapter 17 of
Agenda 21 provides international action plan based on the concept of sustainable
development. It confirms the status of the 1982 UNCLOS as "the legal basis for the
protection and sustainable development of the marine and coastal environment and its
resources."93 This statement brings a new significance to the 1982 UNCLOS in two ways.
First, Agenda 21 links the 1982 UNCLOS with the concept of sustainable development.
Sustainable development, conceived after the conclusion of the 1982 UNCLOS, is a new
concept, although many elements of sustainable development are already embedded
therein.94 Therefore, Agenda 21 declares the 1982 UNCLOS "the legal basis
for...sustainable development of the marine and coastal environment." Second, Agenda
21 enlarges the geographical scope of the 1982 UNCLOS. Although the Convention
adopts an integrated approach based on the awareness that "the problems of ocean space
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 33; "The decision of the Tribunal is
final..."
89 The Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity
90 The Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, the Non-Binding Forest Principles
91 See infra. Chapter 4
92 See supra. Chapter 1
93 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, Introduction.
94 See infra. Chapter 4
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are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole",95 its geographical scope is
limited to the sea and oceans. But Agenda 21 brings coastal areas into the ambit of the
1982 UNCLOS, by declaring it the legal basis for...sustainable development of the
marine and coastal environment, and by adopting the integrated management and
sustainable development of the coastal and marine areas as its first programme area.96
This integrated approach is based on the belief in the ecological interrelationship between
sea areas and coastal areas, as stated; "the marine environment - including the oceans and
all seas and adjacent coastal areas - forms an integrated whole."97
Being a non-binding instrument, can Agenda 21 constitute part of the
contemporary legal system in respect of the marine environment? From a formalistic
viewpoint, it would be difficult to answer affirmatively. Flowever, it constitutes a part of
the fabric of the corpus of contemporary international environmental law, of which a
large part is composed of instruments qualified as "soft law". When ICJ declared in its
judgment on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case that "...new norms and standards have been
developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during last two decades. Such new
norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new standards given proper weight,
not only when States contemplate new activities but also when continuing with activities
begun in the past", the court seems to recognize, to a certain degree, the legal meaning of
"soft law". Whatever the legal nature of Agenda 21 might be, it has substantial weight in
the international regime for the protection of the marine environment. Although its
provisions are not directly binding upon States, it might an element of a new context
which is to be taken into account when interpreting legally binding instruments and
creating new legally binding instruments.
2.3.3 Re-interpretation of ambiguous provisions
It may be an exaggeration, but without foundation, to say that there is an inversely
proportional relation between the clarity of law and the power of interpretation provided
95 Preamble
96 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para. 17.3-17.17
97 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para. 17.1
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to those who have to apply it.98 Ambiguous provisions leave room for divergent
interpretations which may lead to disputes. In the course of negotiation of a treaty text,
equivocal terms might facilitate a compromise. When such provisions have to be applied
to a particular fact, latent contradiction erupts and ambiguity loses its contradiction-
veiling capacity.
On the other side of this negative aspect, ambiguous provisions may have a
positive aspect, by facilitating evolutionary interpretation. Such provisions may invite or
even necessitate a re-interpretation at the moment of their application. Ambiguous
provisions, thanks to their high degree of flexibility, are more adaptable to changing
situations and receptive to new ideas. Article 63, paragraph 2 and Article 64 of the
Convention are examples of such provisions bearing unsettled ambiguous ideas.99 With
regard to stocks and associated species which occur both within EEZ and in an area
beyond and adjacent to EEZ, Article 63, paragraph 2 leaves room for diverging
interpretations, by requiring the coastal State and the States fishing such stocks in the
adjacent area to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in
the adjacent area. Similarly, Article 64 requires the coastal State and other States whose
nationals fish in the region for the highly migratory species to co-operate directly or
through appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and
promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the region.
These two provisions should be interpreted in relation to Article 87 stipulating the
general principle of the freedom of the high seas and Article 116 which provides: "All
States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to:
(a)...(b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States provided for, inter
alia, in article 63, paragraph 2, and articles 64 to 67; and..."
Some coastal States interpret these provisions as recognition of preferential status
of the coastal States in taking measures for the conservation of straddling stocks and
highly migratory species. Already during the negotiation of the Convention, there were
98 For Chai'm Perelmann, "II existe un rapport inversement proportionnel entre la clarte de la loi et le
pouvoir d'interpretation accorde a ceux qui doivent 1'appliquer." Chai'm Perelmann, Ethique et Droit,
Editions de L'Universite de Bruxelles, 1990, p. 456
99 Paul Stanton Kibel, Alone at Sea: Chile's Presencial Ocean Policy, Journal ofEnvironmental Law, Vol.
12 (2000), N°l, p. 50 "The modifications and proposals put forth in Articles 116, 63 (2) and 87, however,
merely framed the questions. They did not provide the answer."
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proposals presented by coastal States trying to formulate the provision of Article 63,
paragraph 2 in such a way as to allow coastal State authority to extend conservation
measures to the high seas.100 After their unsuccessful efforts in UNCLOS III, the volition
of these coastal States to extend their jurisdiction beyond 200 nautical miles has been
strengthened as a reaction to the intensification of fishing activities in the high seas by
distant water fishing vessels.101 Some of these coastal States try to extend their
jurisdiction beyond 200 miles by way of national legislation.102 Some regional regimes
have been created on the basis of the preferential status of the coastal States.
From the viewpoint of teleological interpretation, it is possible to advance an
argument that these provisions are made in such a way as to take into account the
ecological particularities of the fish stocks straddling the boundary between EEZ and the
high seas.102 For such stocks, conservation measures applied in the EEZ should be
extended, beyond EEZ, to the whole Lebensraum of the stocks. Such a position is well
100 Australia, Canada, Cape Verde, Iceland, Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, and Sierra Leone
submitted the proposal of the "Amendment to Article 63, paragraph 2". Official Records of the UNCLOS,
xvi, Doc. A/CONF.162/L.114
101 After the establishment of the EEZ regime, many distant-water fishing vessels intensified their fishing
efforts in the areas just outside of EEZs. G.L. Lutgen, Fisheries for the Halibut, 25 Environmental Policy
and Law 223 (1996) p. 227 "Back in the mid-1970s, it was generally thought there would be fewer distant-
water fishing fleets operating in the high seas as a result of the extension of national fisheries jurisdiction to
200 nautical miles. This did not happen. As their catches have begun to fall, the fleets of some countries
have become increasingly desperate, fishing whatever they can, wherever they can."
102 In September 1991, the Chilean government enacted the Law N° 19.080 in which a special zone called
presential sea (mar presencial) is created in the high seas and the jurisdiction of the Chilean government is
extended to that zone. See Paul Stanton Kibel, Alone at Sea: Chile's Presencial Ocean Policy, op. cit.
C.C. Joyner & P.N. De Cola, Chile's Presencial Sea proposal: Implications for the Straddling Stocks
Convention, 24 Ocean Development and International Law 99 (1993)
On 5 December 1991, the Argentine government enacted, the Law N° 12.968 on Maritime Areas of the
Argentine Republic. According to this law, Argentine's national regulations on the conservation of
resources shall apply beyond 200 miles to migratory species and to those associated with the trophic chain
of species found in the Argentine EEZ. See J.A. de Yturriaga, The International Regime of Fisheries: From
UNCLOS 1982 to the Presential Sea, Kluwer Law International, 1997, pp. 229-37
The Canadian government promulgated the Amendment of 1994 to the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act,
by which the Canadian government extended its jurisdiction over the conservation of straddling stocks
beyond 200 miles. See M. S. Sullivan, The Case in International Law for Canada's Extension of Fisheries
Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles, 28 ODIL, 203 (1997)
The Russian Federation also extended its control over the Alaska pollock in the Sea ofOkhotsk Peanut
Hole by a series of unilateral actions and bilateral agreements. See Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Sea of
Okhotsk Peanut Hole De Facto Extension of Coastal State Control, in Olav Schram Stokke (ed.) Governing
High Seas Fisheries, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 179-205
103 See F. O. Vicuna, The Presencial Sea: Defining Under International Law Coastal States' Specific
Interest in High Seas Fisheries and Other Activities, German Yearbook ofInternational Law, 35 (1993) pp.
264-92
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summarized in the Framework Agreement for the Conservation of Living Marine
Resources on the High Seas of the South Pacific (Galapagos Agreement).104
On the other side, distant water fishing States stick to the division between EEZ
and the high seas, and rely on the freedom of fishing on the high seas.105 There is also the
argument that the establishment of EEZ regime itself is the result of the compromise
between the claims of the coastal States and the position of the distant water fishing
States, and therefore the jurisdiction of the coastal States cannot be further extended
beyond the 200 nautical miles.106
Amidst these diverging viewpoints on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
species, some regional agreements have been concluded. The Convention on the
Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources of the Central Bering Sea was
concluded in 1994 between two coastal States (US, Russia) and four distant water fishing
States (China, Korea, Japan, Poland) for the conservation of pollock on the high seas of
the Bering Doughnut Hole. This Doughnut Hole Convention, without precisely defining
its relationship with the 1982 UNCLOS, refers to the latter in vague terms.107 The
Doughnut Hole Convention lays down a very strong enforcement system, in particular
the obligation of each fishing vessel to accept one observer of a Party other than its flag
State108 and the obligation of fishing vessels to use real-time satellite position-fixing
104 See the Framework Agreement for the conservations of living marine resources on the high seas of the
South Pacific "the Galapagos Agreement". Preamble: "these provisions imply the recognition of a
preferential status for the coastal States..."
105 Such a view is clearly expressed in the Application instituting proceedings by Spain in the Spain v.
Canada Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. ICJ, General List N° 96
106 Laurent Lucchini/Michel Voelckel, Droit de la Mer, Tome 2, Volume 2 Navigation et Peche, Editions A.
Pedone, 1996, p. 691 « On ne peut, nous I'avons vu, lire dans la CMB (Convention de Montego Bay) un
droit preferentiel de I'Etat cotier en haute mer venant y restreindre la peche par les autres Etats. Que ce
droit preferentiel soit souhaite de lege refenda par certains Etats est, certes, une realite...Pour autant, il est
necessaire de souligner que l'adoption d'un tel Accord mettrait en jeu Fun des compromis fondamentaux
sur lequel est construit la CMB : celui qui a permis de creer la zone economique exclusive. »
Similarly, Paul Stanton Kibel argues; « With UNCLOS III, the EEZ question has been resolved. With the
1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement, there is now an international framework for dealing with coastal state
concerns about high seas overfishing of straddling stocks, and this framework is clearly rooted in the
principle of regional cooperation. » Paul Stanton Kibel, op. cit., p. 63
107 The sole reference to the Convention is an expression included in the preamble: "Noting the adoption of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982"
108 Article XI, para. 5 (a) "Each fishing vessel of the Parties that fishes for pollock in the Convention Area
shall accept one observer of a Party other than its flag-State Party, upon request of such Party, under
conditions established bilaterally sufficiently in advance by the Parties concerned. If such an observer is not
available, the fishing vessel shall have on board one observer from its flag-State Party."
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transmitters while in the Bering Sea.109 These enforcement measures go beyond the rules
of the 1982 UNCLOS regarding the jurisdiction over the vessels on the high seas. As in
the case of the 1995 Agreement, these measures are arguably inconsistent with the 1982
UNCLOS in relation to the flag State jurisdiction on the high seas.
The Agreement between the Government of Iceland, the Government of Norway
and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Certain Aspects of
Cooperation in the Area of Fisheries, concluded in 1999 for the conservation of the
straddling fish stocks (cod, haddock, capelin) in the Barents Sea Loophole, contains some
provisions which go beyond the 1982 UNCLOS but in line with it, such as the
precautionary approach and the ecosystem approach."0 This Agreement contains a
provision which is seemingly inconsistent with the 1982 UNCLOS in respect of the
jurisdiction over the vessels fishing straddling stocks on the high seas, by stipulating a
strong port State jurisdiction: the right of States Parties to prevent landing of catches in
their ports; and the right to deny access to ports to non-complying vessels."1
The Galapagos Agreement, concluded in 2000 between the Coastal States of the
Southeast Pacific, members of the South Pacific Permanent Commission and other
interested States for "the conservation of living marine resources in the high sea zones of
the Southeast Pacific, with special reference to straddling and highly migratory fish
populations","2 espouses the precautionary approach and ecosystem approach, in line
with the 1982 UNCLOS."1 This Agreement contains, however, controversial elements in
relation to the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS, by stipulating: "In conformity with the
relevant provisions of international law, all States have the right to allow their nationals
to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject inter alia to the rights, duties and interests
of the coastal States with regard to the capture of straddling stocks and highly migratory
species; These provisions imply the recognition of a preferential status for the coastal
109 Article XI, para.3 (a) "Each Party shall require its fishing vessels that fish for pollock in the Convention
Area: (a) to use real-time satellite position-fixing transmitters while in the Bering Sea"
110 Preamble
111 Article 7: "The Parties agree to take measures to prevent landing in their ports of catches if it has been
established that such catches have been taken in a manner which undermines the effectiveness of this
Agreement and the conservation and management measures referred to in Article 5, and, subject to
obligations according to established international law, to deny access to ports to vessels that engage in such
activities, except in cases of distress or force majeure."
112 Article 2
113 Article 5 Conservation Principles
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States, justified by the relationship that exists between fish stocks of such species and the
marine ecosystem of those States, as well as by the effects of fishing activities on certain
coastal fish populations, associated or dependent of the same;""4
The arguments advanced by the Parties to the Galapagos Agreement to defend the
theoretical foundation of the preferential status of the coastal States are based on the
ecosystem consideration, the effectiveness of conservation measures, and the special
interests of the coastal States corresponding to their contribution to the conservation of
the resources."5 This is a teleological interpretation of international treaties. These
objectives have been widely accepted by international society as expressed in a great
number of binding or non-binding instruments. But the preferential status of the coastal
States is not automatically derived from these objectives, and its recognition is still
arguable. It seems that the drafters of this Agreement were conscious of this ambiguity of
the relevant provisions of international instruments on the matter. Without referring to
any specific provision of a relevant treaty, this Agreement mentions only "the relevant
provisions of international law". It is clear that "the relevant provisions" include the
provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS, in particular Article 64, and the 1995 Agreement,
because these are provisions directly relevant to the highly migratory species. The
Galapagos Agreement is also cautious when it states: "These provisions imply the
recognition of a preferential status for the coastal State," without boldly stating that these
provisions recognize a preferential status. As such, the Galapagos Agreement relies on
the evolutionary interpretation of treaties. The Agreement itself expresses clearly this
attitude, by stating: "the provisions on these matters contained in recent instruments
114 Preamble
115 Preamble: "The preferential status for the coastal States is justified by the relationship that exists
between fish stocks of such species and the marine ecosystem of those States, as well as by the effects of
fishing activities on certain coastal fish populations, associated or dependent of the same";
"The uncontrolled exploitation of living marine resources in the high seas adjacent to zones under national
jurisdiction represents a threat to the conservation and sustainable use of said resources, as well as to fish
populations dependent on or associated with them, and it may undermine the effectiveness of measures
adopted by the coastal States with respect to the same species, within their 200-mile zones";
"The coastal States of the Southeast Pacific have the right and duty to ensure the conservation and
sustainable use of the living marine resources present in their subregion, including those which migrate
from the zones under their national jurisdiction to the high seas and vice versa",
"The countries have administered some of the world's biggest fishing grounds and have adopted effective
measures to promote the long-term sustainability of the living marine resources there, and thus they have a
special interest in ensuring that the measures applied on the adjacent high seas are no less strict than those
in the zones under their jurisdiction."
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adopted within the United Nations Organization must be evaluated and adapted to the
specific requirements of the South Pacific."116 These controversial elements caused a
dispute between a coastal State and distant fishing States.117
The coastal States and other interested States may conclude a regional agreement
containing elements which go beyond the framework of the 1982 UNCLOS, in harmony
or in contradiction therewith. Such a regional agreement may be justified as an inter se
agreement in the light of the provisions of Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on
"agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only", as well
as Article 311, paragraph 3 of the 1982 UNCLOS on the possibility of modifying or
suspending by two or more States Parties the operation of provisions of the Convention
applicable solely to the relations between them. Furthermore, the preferential status of the
coastal States in a regime for the conservation of the straddling or highly migratory
species is related to the provisions which allow very flexible interpretations.
These arguments can be strengthened if the distant water fishing States have
participated in the formation of the regime, but the Galapagos Agreement contains a
particular provision which might be problematic in the procedural aspect. It is open not
only to coastal States but also to other interested States. But, the four coastal States shall
first sign and ratify the Agreement, and thereby bring it into force. Only after that, other
interested States will be allowed to sign and ratify the Agreement, or accede thereto."8 So,
the four coastal States, after having brought the Agreement into force exclusively among
themselves, present it as a fait accompli to other interested States. This procedure seems
contrary to the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS. The Convention stipulates; "the coastal
116 Preamble
117 In the Case concerning the conservation and sustainable exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-
Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile/EC), the European Community raised the procedural and substantive
questions: Whether the 'Galapagos Agreement' was negotiated into in keeping with the provisions of the
Convention and whether its substantive provisions are in consonance with, inter alia, articles 64 and 116 to
119 of the Convention. The parties to the dispute reached a provisional arrangement concerning the dispute
and requested that the proceedings before the Chamber be suspended.
See ITLOS, Case concerning the Conservation and sustainable exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the
South-Eastern pacific Ocean (Chile/EC), Order 2000/3, 20 December 2000, and ITLOS/Press 45, 21 March
2001
118 Article 16 Signing, Ratification and Accession
"1. The present Agreement shall be opened for signature by the four coastal States of the Southeast Pacific
and ratified according to their respective constitutional procedures in force."
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State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly
or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures
necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area."119 In addition, it
provides: "In regions for which no appropriate international organization exists, the
coastal State and other States whose nationals harvest these species in the region shall co¬
operate to establish such an organization and participate in its work."120 By stipulating in
this way, the 1982 UNCLOS envisages that the coastal States together with the distant
water fishing States participate in the shaping and functioning of subregional or regional
regimes for the straddling stocks or highly migratory species. Considering that the
Galapagos Agreement applies exclusively to a certain part of the high seas, its provisions
treating the distant water fishing States as secondary participants seem to exaggerate the
preferential status of the coastal States, even if it is admitted that such a preferential status
is implied in the 1982 UNCLOS. These procedures laid down in the Galapagos
Agreement for its entry into force and the participation of other interested States are quite
different from those adopted in other subregional or regional agreements, such as the
Doughnut Hole Convention and the Barents Sea Loophole Agreement, in which the
coastal States and the distant water fishing States participated in the creation of the
regimes on equal footing.121
2.4 Evolution through the rules of reference
In the 1982 UNCLOS, there are many provisions which, instead of providing specific
rules and standards directly applicable to the parties, refer to international rules and
"2. Once it enters into force, in accordance with the provisions of Article 19, the Agreement shall become
open to the signature of other interested States for a twelve-month period. After this term has passed, any
interested State may accede to the Agreement."
119 Article 63 (2)
120 Article 64
121 In the Doughnut Hole Convention, two coastal States and four distant water fishing States participated
from the beginning of the negotiations. See David A. Balton, The Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention,
in Olav Schram Stokke, (eds.) Governing High Seas Fisheries, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 143-177
In the Barents Sea Loophole, the two coastal States, Russia and Norway, concluded a bilateral agreement
when there was virtually no distant water fishing State. After Icelandic fishing vessels began to operate on
the highs seas in the Barents Sea, the two coastal States and the one distant water fishing State have
concluded a trilateral agreement, which has replaced the bilateral agreement. See Olav Schram Stokke, The
Loophole of the Barents Sea Fisheries Regime, in Olav Schram Stokke (eds.) op.cit., pp. 273-301
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standards, already established or to be established, in other international instruments.
These provisions can be classified into two categories: provisions requiring States to
comply with existing international rules; provisions calling for States to establish or
elaborate further rules and standards.
2.4.1 Provisions requiring States to comply with the existing rules
Some provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS require States to implement and comply with the
existing international rules and standards. States are called on to do this by means of
national legislation and enforcement.
In respect of each source of marine pollution, the 1982 UNCLOS requires States
to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment in accordance with the relevant international rules and standards established
through (the) competent international organization(s) or general diplomatic conference.
On the other hand, States are required to enforce these laws and regulations to ensure
compliance with international rules and standards. For example, Article 207 calls for
States to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from land-based sources in accordance with internationally agreed
rules and standards, and Article 213 requires States to enforce such laws and regulations
to implement applicable international rules and standards. Similarly, in dealing with other
sources of marine pollution, the Convention lays down coupled provisions requiring
States to exercise their prescriptive and enforcement jurisdictions.122
122 To prevent, reduce and control marine pollution from sea-bed activities subject to national jurisdiction,
Article 208 coupled with Article 214 requires national legislation and enforcement.
For the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution by dumping. Article 210 and Article 216 lay
down the obligation of States to adopt their laws and regulations and the obligation to enforce them.
To prevent, reduce and control marine pollution from or through the atmosphere, Article 212 and Article
222 require States to adopt laws and regulations and to enforce them.
In dealing with pollution from vessels, Article 211 (2) requires States to adopt their national laws and
regulations. Since the rules of international law on the enforcement jurisdiction over vessels are quite
complicated, the Convention lays down several provisions: Art.217 on the enforcement by flag States, Art.
218 and Art.219 on the enforcement by port States, Art.220 on the enforcement by coastal States.
In respect of marine pollution from activities in the Area, Articles 209 States to adopt their laws and
regulations, but the enforcement of international rules, regulations and procedures is entrusted to ISBA by
virtue of Art.215.
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For safety of navigation, the 1982 UNCLOS lays down obligations on States in
similar ways. When the coastal State adopts laws and regulations relating to innocent
passage through its territorial sea, it is required that such laws and regulations be in
conformity with generally accepted international rules and standards.123 When the coastal
State establishes sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in its territorial sea,
international straits or archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea, such sea lanes
and traffic separation schemes should be established in conformity with the
recommendations of the competent international organization or generally accepted
international regulations.124 When States bordering international straits adopt laws and
regulations relating to transit passage, such laws and regulations should conform to the
relevant international regulations.125 When the coastal State removes installations and
structures in its EEZ or on its continental shelf, it is required to ensure safety of
navigation, taking into account generally accepted international standards.126 In
establishing safety zones around artificial islands, installations and structures, the coastal
State is obligated to take into account applicable international standards.127
The flag State is required to exercise its jurisdiction over ships flying its flag in
accordance with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices.128
Some provisions lay down obligations directly on operators in the sea, without
relying on the competence of States. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea are required to comply with all generally accepted
international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea.129 Nuclear-
powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious
substances are required to carry documents and observe special precautionary measures
established for such ships by international agreements.130 Ships in transit passage shall
comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for
123 Art.21 (1), (2)
124 Art.22 (2), Art. 41 (3), (4), Art.53 (8)
125 Art.42 (1)
126 Art.60 (3)
127 Art. 60 (4), (5,) (6,) (7), Art.80




safety at sea.131 Operators conducting marine scientific research are required to give
adequate internationally agreed warning signals to ensure safety at sea and the safety of
air navigation, taking into account the rules and standards established by competent
international organizations.132
2.4.2 Provisions requiring States to adopt new rules
The existing international rules, standards, practices and procedures established to
prevent, reduce and control marine environment are not sufficient, and they are subject to
modification to adapt to the changing environment. Therefore, the 1982 UNCLOS
requires States to cooperate in establishing or elaborating international rules and
standards, or recommended practices and procedures. The Convention lays down a
general obligation of States to cooperate to this end on a global or regional basis, directly
or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment.133
The Convention requires States to cooperate in establishing appropriate scientific
criteria for the formulation and elaboration of international rules and standards.134
In respect of each source of marine pollution, the Convention calls for States to
establish, through competent international organizations or diplomatic conferences,
global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to
prevent, reduce, and control marine pollution.135






135 Article 207 (4) on marine pollution from land-based sources, Article 208 (5) on pollution from sea-bed
activities subject to national jurisdiction. Article 209 (1) on pollution from activities in the Area, Article
210 (4) on pollution by dumping, Article 211 (1) on pollution from vessels, Article 212 (3) on pollution
from or through the atmosphere.
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The provisions by which the 1982 UNCLOS incorporates the rules from other
instruments specify neither the instruments providing such rules nor the competent
organizations establishing such rules.136 When the Convention relies on the rules
established in other instruments, the relationship between the Convention and the
instruments providing such rules seems to be a kind of framework convention/protocols
relationship. But there are ambiguous points.
On the nature of the framework convention, Jacob Werksman asserts: "the
process of law-making does not end with the adoption of the MEA (Multilateral
Environmental Agreement). The general 'framework' character of many MEAs leaves
much of the more difficult and detailed rule-making to the conference of the Parties
(COP) and the specialized institutions they establish as the treaty enters into force."137 In
the framework convention/protocol approach, "States first negotiate a framework
convention, establishing general obligations concerning such matters as scientific
research and exchange of information, as well as a skeletal legal and institutional
framework for future action. States later develop specific pollution control measures
(including emissions limitations targets) and more detailed implementation mechanisms
in protocols."'38
The 1982 UNCLOS is not entitled "framework convention". But in many aspects,
it can be regarded as a framework convention. Except for Part XI, the 1982 UNCLOS
provides general norms which are difficult to apply directly to real situations without
being supplemented by specific rules and standards. In particular, Part XII on protection
and preservation of the marine environment contains many general provisions, as Judge
Yankov asserts; "A major feature of this part of the 1982 Convention on the protection
and preservation of the marine environment was exactly the attempt to harmonize often
opposing interests such as the need to protect the marine environment on the one hand
and the preservation of the freedom of navigation, or any other national activities
136 See W. van Reenen, Rules of Reference in the New Convention on the Law of the Sea, in particular in
connection with the Pollution of the Sea by Oil from Tankers, 12 Netherlands Yearbook ofInternational
Law, 25 (1981), pp.3-25
137 Jacob Werksman, The Conference of Parties to Environmental Treaties, in Jacob Werksman (eds.)
Greening International Institutions, Earthscan Publications, 1996, p. 57
138 Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary,
Yale Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 18:439, 1993, p.494
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affecting the seas, on the other."139 For this reason, he regards the Convention as "an open
system of a framework treaty which may serve as a legal basis and incentive to other
agreements and international instruments compatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention".140 Documents of the United Nations also qualify Part XII of the 1982
UNCLOS as an 'umbrella',l4'or framework.142 In the context of the relationship between
the 1982 UNCLOS and IMO instruments, IMO acknowledged it as an "umbrella
convention" because most of its provisions, being of a general kind, can be implemented
only through specific operative regulations on other international agreements.143 For some
authors, the Convention in general, except Part XI, is a framework treaty.144 ILA also
considers the Convention as un umbrella.145 Considering the characteristics of the
provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS and the rules of reference incorporated or to be
incorporated from other instruments, as examined above, these observations seem to be
correct. However, if we regard the instruments from which the 1982 UNCLOS borrows
operative rules, it is not clear whether they are protocols to the 1982 UNCLOS. For
example, many of the rules established under the 1972 London Dumping Convention and
its protocols can be incorporated into the 1982 UNCLOS. But, the London Dumping
Convention is a treaty which is independent of the 1982 UNCLOS. So is the regime
under MARPOL 1973/78.
The framework convention/protocol approach is suitable to the evolution of
regimes. By relying on unspecified operational rules and standards which are established,
l3() A. Yankov, "The Law of the Sea Conference at Crossroads", 18 Virginia Journal of International Law,
1977, p. 31,36
140 Alexander Yankov, The Law of the Sea Convention and Agenda 21: Marine Environmental Implications,
in Alan Boyle and David Freestone (ed.), International Law and Sustainable Development, Oxford
University Press, 1999, p.273
141 See United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General: Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment (UN Doc. A/44/461), 18 September 1989, p. 5
142 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 20th Anniversary (1982-2002) p. 4 "A growing
number of detailed international agreements on the protection of the marine environment, as well as the
utilization, conservation and management of marine resources, have been adopted under the unifying
framework of the Convention."
143 IMO, LEG/MISC/2, Implications of the Entry into Force of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization, 10 February 1986, p.3
144 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe assert: "In part - the section dealing with the deep sea bed - it is an
exceptionally precise, detailed instrument closer in appearance to a commercial contract or concession than
an international treaty... The other parts are more in the nature of a framework treaty or loi-cadre." R.R.
Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, Second Edition, Manchester University Press, 1988, p. 15
145 International Law Association, Helsinki Conference, Committee on coastal state jurisdiction relating to
Marine pollution. First Report, May 1996, p. 12
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or to be established, in unspecified instruments, the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS is
endowed with highly flexible mechanisms of evolution.
Daniel Bodansky finds two merits of the framework convention/protocol model:
"First, it allows work to proceed in an incremental manner...Second, the framework
convention approach can produce positive feedback loops, making the adoption of
specific substantive commitments more likely."146 The 1982 UNCLOS contains such
mechanisms of incremental development and feedback. Under Articles 207, 208, 209,
210, 211, States are required to re-examine, from time to time as necessary, global and
regional rules, standards, recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment from land-based resources, from sea-bed
activities subject to national jurisdiction, from activities in the Area, by dumping, and
from vessels, respectively.
Through the rules of reference, the 1982 UNCLOS and the instruments which
provide technical rules and standards interact, exercising mutual influence in such a way
as to facilitate the evolution on both sides. By virtue of the provisions serving as
conveyer belts between the Convention and related instruments, a new rule or standard
developed in another regime can be transmitted to the regime under the Convention.
However, the Convention does not remain passive in this process of evolution. It may
bring evolutionary effects to the rules or standards established by competent international
organization in two ways. Firstly, the Convention may transmit its binding force to a rule
or standard adopted by an international organization. Suppose a rule is adopted by a
competent international organization, and the rule is not by itself legally binding. If this
rule is recognized to belong to the category of rules referred to in the relevant provision
of the Convention, the rule becomes legally binding by virtue of the binding force of the
provision of the Convention which obligates States to comply with such rules.147 In this
way, the Convention may strengthen the effectiveness of the rules and standards
established in other instruments. In addition, such process can be reinforced by means of
national legislation required by the Convention. As examined above, many provisions
146 Daniel Bodansky, op.cit., pp. 494-495
147 See ILA, Helsinki Conference, Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction relating to Marine Pollution.
First Report, May 1996, p.28 The ILA Report asserts; "certain rules and standards which would not
otherwise be legally binding, would become so by means of this rule of reference."
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require States to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control marine
pollution in accordance internationally agreed rules and standards. If a State adopts such
national laws and regulations, such rules and standards can be enforced by its national
authority upon its nationals or foreign nationals under its jurisdiction.
Secondly, the universal (or virtually universal) applicability of the Convention
can be extended to internationally agreed rules and standards. Suppose a State is party to
the Convention, but not party to the instrument which provides a technical rule. If the rule
is recognized to belong to the category of the rules referred to in the Convention, then the
rule becomes binding upon the State by virtue of the binding force of the Convention. In
this way, the Convention expands the applicability of the rule.148
However, these flexible mechanisms of evolution have been devised at the price
of ambiguity. Since the 1982 UNCLOS refers to unspecified international rules and
standards, it is not clear what rules and standards correspond to the provisions of the
Convention referring to "generally accepted''' or "internationally agreed" rules and
standards. On the one hand, these terms were formulated with intentional ambiguity.149
On the other hand, when referring to not only the existing rules but also the rules to be
created in the future it would be impossible to provide a clear-cut criterion to distinguish
"generally accepted" or "internationally agreed" rules or standards from others. In
addition, the Convention does not specify competent international organizations. The
Convention refers to (the) competent international organization(s), sometimes in the
singular, sometimes in the plural. When the term is used in the singular, it is understood
to designate IMO. When used in the plural, it means unspecified organizations which
may work in cooperation with IMO.150
2.4.4 Post-UNCLOS developments in the rules of reference
148 See ILA, ibid., p. 28 "The very idea was to oblige states to conform to these generally accepted rules
which were not necessarily accepted by all states. The 1982 Convention subsequently expanded its field of
application to the environmental sphere. ..The starting point therefore seems to be that the rule of reference
discussed imposes a legal obligation on a state to apply a particular rule or standard, which the latter would
otherwise not be legally bound to observe. The rule of reference therefore must be clearly intended to
establish such a global standard. "
149 See Bernard H. Oxman, The Duty to Respect Generally Accepted International Standards, 24 New York
University Journal ofInternational Law and Politics, 1991
150 IMO, LEG/MISC/2, Implications of the Entry into Force of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization, 10 February 1986, p.2
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<Post-UNCLOS evolution of the dumping regime>
The international regime for the protection of the marine environment from pollution by
dumping under the 1972 London Dumping Convention is under continuous evolution. In
1989 an amendment was made to Annex III to the Convention,151 to reinforce the
scientific basis in issuing a permit. The amendments adopted in 1993 brought about an
important change in the dumping regime by banning the dumping into the sea of low-
level radioactive wastes, phasing out the dumping of industrial wastes, and banning the
incineration at sea of industrial wastes.152 The Protocol adopted on 7 November 1996
introduces several important new principles, in particular the precautionary principle, the
polluter pays principle and the "reverse list" approach. It is the reverse list approach
which will bring about, when the Protocol becomes effective, a fundamental change in
the dumping regime. Under the 1996 Protocol, all dumping at sea is prohibited unless
explicitly permitted in accordance with the Protocol: The materials eligible for dumping
are listed in Annex I. Dumping of such materials is not automatically allowed. Such
materials may be dumped according to the result of the assessment conducted for each
case in accordance with the framework laid down in Annex II.153 Besides, dumping may
be exceptionally permitted in cases of force majeure caused by stress of weather, or in
any case which constitutes a danger to human life or a real threat to vessels, aircraft,
platforms or other man-made structures at sea.154 The 1996 Protocol also prohibits
151 1989 amendment requires Contracting Parties, when issuing a permit for dumping, to consider whether
an adequate scientific basis exists concerning the characteristics and composition of the matter to be
dumped to assess the impact of the matter on marine life and on human health.
152 As amended by the 1993 amendments, the London Dumping Convention prohibits the dumping of all
types of radioactive wastes at sea. But all substances hold some amount of radioactivity. They contain
either naturally occurring radioactive materials, or traces of radioactive substances produced from human
activities. After the adoption of the 1993 amendment to the London Dumping Convention, IAEA, charged
with the task of defining the radioactive wastes, has introduced the concept of de minimis levels, below
which materials can be considered "non-radioactive" for the purposes of the London Dumping Convention.
The concept of de minimis levels has been elaborated into the concepts of exclusion and exemption by the
International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of
Radiation Sources (BSS) issues by IAEA in 1996 as Safety Series N°115. See John Cooper, Abel J.
Gonzalez, Gordon Linsley, and Tony Wrixon, What waste is "radioactive"? IAEA Bulletin 42/3/2000,
and IAEA Newsbriefs http:/www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Newsbriefs/1994/newsv09nl.html
153 Article 4, Annex 1, Annex II
154 Article 8
144
incineration at sea and the export of wastes for the purpose of dumping or incineration at
sea unless permitted in some exceptional situations.155
The 1996 Protocol will supersede the 1972 London Dumping Convention as
between Contracting Parties to the Protocol which are also Parties to the Convention.156
When the Protocol enters into force, it will be an inter se agreement and a lex specialis
vis-a-vis the Convention, and will constitute a basis for a strong special dumping regime
among parties to the Protocol.157
By virtue of Article 210 and 216 of the 1982 UNCLOS, these evolutions which
have occurred, or are occurring, in the dumping regime have resulted, or will result, in
the evolution of the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS.
<Post-UNCLOS evolution of the MARPOL regime>
The regime for the prevention of marine pollution from vessels under MARPOL 73/78
has also evolved. Under MARPOL 73/78, technical rules and standards are set down in a
series of annexes to MARPOL 73/78: Annex I on prevention of pollution by oil. Annex II
on control of pollution by noxious liquid substances, Annex III on prevention of pollution
by harmful substances carried in packed form, or in freight containers or portable tanks or
road and rail tank wagons, Annex IV on prevention of pollution by sewage, Annex V on
garbage. As a result of the development of techniques applied to the construction and
equipment of ships and the findings of new problems, these annexes have been
continuously amended.'^In order to enhance the safety of the ships carrying dangerous
chemicals in bulk, the harmonized system of survey and certificates (HSSC) has been
introduced into the code for the construction and equipment of ships carrying dangerous
chemicals in bulk, which has been revised successively.159
155 Articles 5, 8
156 Article 23
157 The Protocol will enter into force 30 days after ratification by 26 countries, 15 ofwhich must be
Contracting Parties to the 1972 London Dumping Convention. As at 30 November 2002, 16 States have
ratified the Protocol. See Summary of Status ofConventions as at 30 November 2002,
http:/www. imo.org/Conventions/
158 Annex I has been amended in 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1997; Annex II in 1985, 1989, 1994;
Annex III in 1994; Annex IV in 1997, Annex V in 1990, 1994, 1995. The annexes have been amended by
revising the list of substances, or by designating new Special Areas.
159 The code for the construction and equipment of ships carrying dangerous chemicals in bulk (BCH Code
and IBC Code) has been amended in 1990, 1992, 1996, 1997.
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Besides these amendments to MARPOL 73/78, some new conventions, which are
independent ofMARPOL 73/78 but related to the pollution of marine environment from
ships have been adopted. In 1990, the International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Responses, and Co-operation (OPRC) was adopted. This Convention
provides, inter alia, rules for oil pollution emergency plans, oil pollution reporting
procedures. In 2001, International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling
Systems on Ships was adopted to prevent the harmful effects on marine life and the
marine environment by anti-fouling systems.160
By virtue of Articles 211, 217, 218, 220 of the 1982 UNCLOS, the evolution
realized in the regime for the protection of the marine environment against pollution from
vessels under MARPOL 73/78 has been incorporated into the regime under the 1982
UNCLOS.
2.5 Evolution by the creation of sub-regimes
Under a regime founded on the basis of a treaty, sub-regimes can be created: 1) by a
subgroup of the Parties to the treaty; 2) in a subset of the issue-area of the treaty; 3) in a
part of the geographical scope.
A subgroup of a treaty may build a sub-regime by concluding an inter se
agreement among them. The 1982 UNCLOS incorporates the rule on inter se agreements
laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, with some
modification.161 Whereas Article 41 of the Vienna Convention provides for the possibility
of 'modifying' a treaty among two or more parties applicable to them only, Article 311 of
the 1982 UNCLOS envisages not only a 'modification' but also a 'suspension' of some
provisions in the relationship among two or more parties. The 1995 Agreement provides
also the same mechanism of modification and suspension.162 Such a mechanism may
facilitate the formation of regional or bilateral regimes as well as issue-specific regimes
when a subgroup of parties to the 1982 UNCLOS feel the necessity to adjust some
160 The Convention defines "anti-fouling systems" as a coating, paint, surface treatment, surface or device
that is used on a ship to control or prevent attachment of unwanted organisms.
161 Article 41 Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only
162 The 1995 Agreement, Article 44, para.2
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provisions to particular circumstances. To date, there is no sub-regime established
through this mechanism, directly invoking the inter se agreement clause. But many
regional and bilateral regimes established on the basis of, or in conformity with, the 1982
UNCLOS may be regarded as sub-regimes of the general regime under the 1982
UNCLOS.
A sub-regime can be created in a particular subset of the issue-area of the general
regime under the 1982 UNCLOS. The instrument creating such a sub-regime can be
independent of the 1982 UNCLOS in form, but should be consistent therewith in
substance. Since the 1982 UNCLOS covers 'all issues relating to the law of the sea', the
issue-areas of other regimes dealing with law of the sea issues are subsets of the issue-
area of the Convention. For example, the regimes under the 1995 Agreement, the 1972
London Dumping Convention, and MARPOL 73/78 have specific issue-areas. All of
these are sub-issue-areas of the 1982 UNCLOS. These sub-regimes provide more
concrete action-oriented norms in consistency with the norms laid down in the 1982
UNCLOS.
The 1982 UNCLOS is applicable to all the seas and oceans of the globe. There
can be sub-regimes applicable to a limited sea area. Regional and bilateral regimes
belong to this category of sub-regimes.
In reality, many sub-regimes are created by combining the three criteria of sub-
regimes; regimes among subgroups of the Parties, those in a sub-issue-area, those
applicable to a limited sea area. Most of the regional regimes dealing with the law of the
sea issue belong to this category of sub-regimes. For example, the Bering Sea Doughnut
Hole Convention, the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, the
Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea, the Convention on the
Protection of the Marine Environment of Baltic Sea Area, etc., constitute legal bases for
regimes formed among subgroups of the States Parties to the Convention, in limited
issue-areas, with limited geographical scopes.
2.6 Mechanisms of controlling evolution
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As Talcott Parsons lays emphasis on the inseparability of the problems of stability and
change of social systems,163 change is inevitable in all social systems, but a radical
change may threaten their integrity. By adapting to the changing environment and
resolving internal conflicts, a regime should maintain its integrity. For a regime to evolve
in a dynamic equilibrium, it should be endowed with some controlling mechanisms,
together with evolutionary mechanisms.
Since a regime is made up of its members, the primary role of ensuring its
integrity is played by its members. They can perform this function by ensuring the
compliance with regime norms through self-control and reciprocal control.164 Self-control
can be done through the internalisation of regime norms in the mindset of each regime
member.165 The ritual of confirming and reconfirming the significance of the 1982
UNCLOS in the Meetings of States Parties and other international instances is an effort
toward consolidating the internalisation of the norms embodied in the Convention.
Reciprocal control can become effective through intersubjective expectations and
reciprocity, which are essential in the interaction of ego and alters, as Talcott Parsons
underlines; "This reciprocal aspect must always be borne in mind since the expectations
of an ego always imply the expectations of one or more alters. It is in this reciprocity or
complementarity that sanctions enter and acquire their place in systems of action."166
The 1982 UNCLOS contains mechanisms of controlling the evolution of the
regime in order to maintain its integrity. The prohibition of reservations or exceptions
stipulated in Article 309 is a mechanism for the maintenance of the integrity of the
regime through a uniform application of the Convention. In the same line, Article 310,
163 Talcott Parsons & Edward A. Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action, Transaction Publishers, 2001,
p. 231 Regarding the problems of stability and change of the social system, Talcott Parsons asserts; "It is
impossible to study one without the other." Parsons emphasizes also the inevitability of conflicts in social
systems and the necessary limits in the conflicts; "Although conflict can exist within a social system and, in
fact, always does, there are limits beyond which it cannot go and still permit a social system to exist." p. 198
164 See infra. Chapter 6, 3 Compliance System
165 See Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, translated by William Rehg from Faktizitat und
Geltung, Polity Press, 1997, p. 67 "The process of internalisation that secures a motivational foundation for
actors' value orientations is usually not repression-free; but its does result in an authority of conscience that
goes hand in hand with a consciousness of autonomy. Only in this consciousness does the peculiarly
obligating character of'existing' social orders find an addressee who 'binds' himself of his own free will."
166 Talcott Parsons, op.cit, p. 191
For parsons, "What an actor is expected to do in a given situation both by himself and by others constitutes
the expectations of that role. What the relevant alters are expected to do, contingent on ego's action,
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while allowing States Parties to make declarations or statements, makes clear that such
declarations and statements shall not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of
the provisions of the Convention.
Whereas Articles 309 and 310 lay down the mechanisms for maintaining the
integrity of the regime in the context of the regime itself, Article 311 sets down the
mechanisms for safeguarding its integrity in relation to other agreements. First, the
Convention prevails over the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea.167 Second,
the Convention respects the rights and obligations under other agreements on the
condition of the compatibility therewith.168 By interpretation a contrario, this provision
means that the Convention may change the rights and obligations under other agreements
if not compatible with it. Third, the Convention allows States Parties to conclude inter
see agreements modifying or suspending the operation of provisions of the Convention,
but on the condition that such agreements do not affect the application of the basic
principles embodied in the Convention and the enjoyment by other States Parties of their
rights or the performance of their obligations under the Convention.169 In this way, the
Convention ensures the maintenance of the integrity of the regime.
Self-regulation and reciprocal control may not be sufficient to ensure the stability
and integrity of the regime. In some cases, third party control is necessary. Dispute
settlement system is one of the third party control mechanisms. As discussed above, the
dispute settlement system may facilitate evolution of the regime by means of
evolutionary interpretation. On the other hand, the stabilization of behavioural
expectations is an intrinsic function of law.170 Therefore, the dispute settlement
mechanism may contribute to the maintenance of the integrity of the regime by
controlling evolution in several ways.
constitutes the sanctions. Role expectations and sanctions are, therefore, in terms of the content of action,
the reciprocal ofeach other."
167 Article 311, para. 1. The 1982 UNCLOS does not nullify the 1958 Geneva Conventions, since the 1982
UNCLOS prevails over the 1958 Geneva Conventions "between States Parties".
168 Article 311, para.2 stipulates: "This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties
which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment
by other States Parties of their rights and the performance of their obligations under this Convention."
169 Article 311, para.3
170 Jurgen Habermas, op. cit., p. 143
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First, the dispute settlement system may stabilize the regime by settling disputes
in accordance with its pre-established principles, rules and procedures. By this orderly
settlement of disputes, a regime may resolve the problems of conflicts among its
members and thereby avoid its disruption.
Second, the dispute settlement system may stabilize the regime by contributing to
the convergence of interpretations of the regime norms. When each individual State
interprets the regime norms independently, there can be no guarantee that such
interpretations are either identical or convergent. In contrast, judicial interpretations made
by international courts are conducive to the uniform or consistent interpretation of the
regime norms. As Hans Kelsen has maintained that the judicial decision is a continuation
of the law-creating process,171 the judicial decision supplements the general and abstract
norms by concretising and individualizing them. However, the contribution by the
dispute settlement system in this sense is inherently limited by the fact that the dispute
settlement system intervenes passively, case by case, ex post facto, at the request of the
parties to a dispute.
Third, by accumulating judicial interpretations, the dispute settlement system
controls itself. Although "the decision of the court has no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case",172 accumulated judicial interpretations
form the jurisprudence which controls more or less strictly the dispute settlement system
itself.
The regime under the 1982 UNCLOS is endowed with a dispute settlement
system. The variety and flexibility of the procedures set down in the dispute settlement
system may contribute to a controlled evolution of the regime.171
3. Conclusion
171 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, op.cit., p. 68
172 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 59
The same principle is incorporated into Article 33, para.2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea: "The decision shall have no binding force except between the parties in respect of that
particular dispute."
173 See infra. Chapter 6, 3. Compliance system
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A regime evolves under the influence of internal and external factors. Evolution of a
regime means any change in the components of the regime; substantive norms,
procedural rules, regime members, expectations, and issue-area.
There are various mechanisms for the evolution of legal regimes. Regimes may
evolve by modifying their substantive and procedural norms by adopting amendments,
additional agreements, protocols, or by resorting to evolutionary interpretation.
Besides these, there can be other mechanisms of evolution through external
developments. The regime under the 1982 UNCLOS is endowed with a mechanism of
evolution, by resorting to the rules established in other instruments. A regime may evolve
when different sub-regimes are created.
In some cases, new ideas, new knowledge, new techniques, new procedures can
be introduced into the regime in harmony with the existing regime norms. In other cases,
such new elements can be deviations from the existing regime norms. For such deviations
to contribute to an orderly evolution of the regime, they should be reconcilable with the
fundamental principles of the regime. If not, they cause instability or disruption of the




Substantive norms of the regime for the protection of the marine
environment under the 1982 UNCLOS: Principles
1. Integrated approach
The 1982 UNCLOS embraces the integrated approach in its ralione materiae, rationae
personae and radone loci. The Convention purports to cover all issues relating to the law
of the sea. It is intended to be applicable to all States of the world and to the entire sea
area of the globe, from internal waters to the high seas, and even to the entire sea-bed of
the world.
The issue-area of the protection of the marine environment is a subset of that of
the Convention. In this sub-issue-area also, the Convention takes an integrated approach:
it deals with all types of marine pollution classified into the categories of sources and
issues of conservation of marine resources; it provides norms applicable to all States of
the world and to all seas and oceans.
This integrated approach is an important step forward in the process of evolution
of the regime for the protection of the marine environment.
1.1 Concept of integrated approach
1.1.1 Integration of issue-areas
<Comprehensive vision>
The 1982 UNCLOS is the first international treaty to deal with virtually all issues relating
to the law of the sea in a single instrument. The Convention, in its preamble, declares;
"the States Parties are prompted by the desire to settle...all issues relating to the law of
the sea".
In Part XII, the Convention provides provisions covering virtually all types of
marine pollution classified by source; pollution from land-based sources, pollution from
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sea-bed activities, pollution by dumping, pollution from vessels, pollution from or
through the atmosphere. Article 194 stipulates; "States shall take, individually or jointly
as appropriate, all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source...", and "The
measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources ofpollution of the marine
environment..."
In addition, the Convention deals with the conservation ofmarine living resources,
which constitute an integral part of the marine ecosystem. The provisions on the
conservation of marine living resources should be regarded not only as measures of
resource management, but also in the context of the protection of the marine environment.
The Convention contains many provisions expressing concerns of international
society in socioeconomic dimension,' in dealing with the problems of marine pollution
and the conservation of marine resources. From the anthropocentric viewpoint, the
Convention treats marine resources and marine environment in the light of their interest
for humans.
<Systemic approach>
To deal with all issues in a single instrument is one thing, to consider them as a whole is
another. If all phenomena are interrelated so closely that they are considered to form a
whole, then the 'whole' is perceived as a system.2 The 1982 UNCLOS declares; "the
problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole".
This conviction signifies a systemic perspective. The systemic perspective in dealing with
natural resources means an ecosystem approach. Without employing the term 'ecosystem
approach', the Convention contains many provisions inspired by ecosystem
considerations.1
If socioeconomic dimensions are integrated with ecological dimensions in dealing
with "issues relating to the law of the sea" and "the problems of ocean space", such a
1 Navigation, fishing and exploitation of other marine resources and marine pollution are basically
problems of economic dimension.
2 In the context of fishery systems, Anthony Charles asserts; "Thus, a systems perspective involves
integrated approaches both to studying and to managing the fishery. The goal is to incorporate key
elements of fishery complexity into our thought processes and decision-making processes." Anthony
Charles, Sustainable Fishery Systems, Blackwell Science, 2001, p.225
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systemic perspective would be conducive to the concept of sustainable development.4 As
the 1992 Rio Declaration5 and ICJ6 have indicated, the concept of sustainable
development is the result of the integration of the goal of environmental protection and
that of economic development.
1.1.2 Integration of ratione personae
The provision stipulating the general obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment,7 and other provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS relating to the protection of the
marine environment are addressed to all States of the world, whether they are parties or
not.8 In addition, the provisions on the conservation and management of the living
resources of the high seas are addressed to all States.9
At first glance, the provisions stipulating the rights and obligations of the coastal
State or other States in relation to the problems of exploitation and conservation of the
marine resources in the area under national jurisdiction seem to be addressed to particular
categories of States. But the Convention divides all States of the world into two
categories; the coastal State and other States. In these provisions, "the coastal State"
means every coastal State without distinction, and the term "other States" includes all
States of the world except the coastal State in question.1(1 Any State is either "the coastal
State" or one of the "other States".
In this way, the Convention purports to create a universal regime, for the law of
the sea in general, for the protection of the marine environment in particular.
3 See infra. 2. Ecosystem approach and the 1982 UNCLOS
4 See infra. 3. Sustainable Development and the 1982 UNCLOS
5 The 1992 Rio Declaration, Principle 4 "In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental
protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation
from it."
6 In the Case Concerning Gabclkovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ noted; "This need to reconcile economic
development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable
development.", ICJ, Case Concerning Gabclkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997, Decision, para. 140.
7 Article 192
8 See Chapter 6, 2. Convergence of expectations.
9 Articles 116 to 120
10 For example, in Article 56 which stipulates; "Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the
exclusive economic zone", "the coastal State" means all coastal States which have proclaimed EEZ. When
the Convention provides; "the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States",
"other States" means all States of the world except the coastal State in question.
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1.1.3 Integration of geographic scope
The provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS on the protection of the marine environment cover
all the seas and oceans of the world. In contrast with many other treaties which define
"convention area" or "agreement area", the Convention does not provide any such
definition. By implication, in the context of the provisions of the Convention, the
"convention area" is the entire sea area of the globe. The Convention establishes separate
regimes for internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and the high seas.
But the sum of these zones constitutes the entire sea area of the world."
1.2 Evolution of the integrated approach
1.2.1 Pre-UNCLOS sectoral and regional approaches
Prior to the 1982 UNCLOS, the law of the sea had evolved piecemeal by sectoral and
regional approaches, either in customary international law or in treaty law.
A series of principles and rules of customary international law had been formed in
separate issue-areas, such as the freedom of the high seas, the regime of the territorial sea,
the system of straight baselines, the regime of fishery zones, the regime of continental
shelf, the delimitation ofmaritime zones, etc.
In the issue-area of the protection of the marine environment, most international
regimes had developed, before the 1958 Geneva Conventions, on the basis of a series of
treaties, each having a specific issue-area, such as the regulation of whaling,12 the
conservation of sea prawns,13 the conservation of fur seals,14 the conservation of tuna,15
" There are some inland sea areas where the applicability of the Convention remains problematic; the areas
such as the Dead Sea. Aral Sea, Caspian Sea. It is not clear whether the Convention can be applied to these
areas. The definition of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas given in Article 122 does not fit to these inland
seas. There are divergent theories on the question whether they are seas or lakes. See David Allonsius, Le
regime juridique de la mer Caspienne : Problemes actuels de droit international public, L.G.D.J, 1997
12 The 1946 International Convention for the Regulating of Whaling
13 The 1952 Agreement Concerning Measures for the Protection of the Stocks of Deep-Sea Prawns
(Pandalus borealis), European Lobsters (Homarus vulgaris), Norway Lobsters (Nephrops norvegicus) and
Crabs (Cancer pagurus)
14 The 1956 Interim Convention on Conservation ofNorth Pacific Fur Seals
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the prevention of marine pollution by oil,16 Mediterranean fisheries,17 etc. Some rules of
customary international law identified through the international arbitral or judicial
decisions in cases such as the Trail Smelter, the Corfu Channel were applicable to the
issue-area of the protection of the marine environment.
The 1958 Geneva Conventions, in codifying rules of customary international law
of the sea, have regrouped law of the sea issues into four issue-areas, i.e. the territorial
sea and contiguous zone, the high seas, the continental shelf, and the high seas
fishing. l8These conventions purported to be universal regime and to cover the entire
ocean space of the globe, but they embraced a sectoral approach in that each of them was
independent and had a specific issue-area, and the ocean space was divided into the
territorial sea and the high seas dealt with in separate regimes.
In the period between the 1958 Geneva Conventions and the 1982 UNCLOS,
some new rules of customary law of the sea developed, such as the regime of the
continental shelf, and the inchoate regime of the exclusive economic zone.19 In parallel,
international regimes on the marine environment developed through a series of
international treaties, in issue-areas such as the prevention of marine pollution by
dumping,20the prevention of pollution by oil or from ships,2land a variety of regional
conventions in issue-areas such as regional fishing,22 the protection of regional seas from
15 The 1949 Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
16 The 1954 International Convention for the Protection of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
17 The 1949 Agreement for the Establishment of a General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean
18 The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living resources of the High Seas.
19 D.J. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law, Oxford University Press, 1987
J. L. Jacobson & A. Reiser, The Evolution ofOcean Law, Scientific American, November 1998
20 The 1972 London Dumping Convention and subsequent annexes and protocol.
21 MARPOL 1973/78 and its subsequent annexes, the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage and its protocol, the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage and its protocol.
22 The 1959 Convention concerning fishing in the Black Sea, the 1959 North-East Atlantic Fisheries
Convention, the 1964 Fisheries Convention (among West European States), the 1969 International
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals, the 1978 Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, the
1978 International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean and its protocol, the
1980 Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries, the 1980
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, the 1982 Convention for
Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean, etc.
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pollution,21etc. Each of these treaties had a specific issue-area. Some of them are global
conventions with specific issues, and the others are regional conventions with more or
less specific issues. None of them can be considered to be an integrated convention in
terms of the issue-area and applicability.
1.2.2 Integrated approach of the 1982 UNCLOS
As discussed above, the 1982 UNCLOS establishes a set of norms covering all
issue-areas of the law of the sea, applicable to all States of the world and to all seas and
oceans of the globe. As Rene Jean Dupuy asserts, it has transformed the law of the sea
from a uni-dimensional law to a pluri-dimensional law.24
1.2.3 Post-UNCLOS approaches
Since the 1982 UNCLOS is a framework convention covering all issues relating to the
law of the sea, applicable to all States of the world and to all seas and oceans of the globe,
it is natural that there is no other treaty which has such a comprehensive issue-area and
such a universal applicability. If there were such a treaty, it would compete with the
Convention. In fact, new legal regimes of the law of the sea established after the 1982
UNCLOS are issue-specific regional regimes,25 issue-specific global regimes26 or general
23 The 1969 Agreement for Co-operation in dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, the 1978
Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution
and its protocol, the 1981 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of
the Southeast Pacific, the 1982 Regional Convention for the Conservation of Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
Environment and its protocol.
24 See Rene Jean Dupuy, Dialectiques du droit international, Editions A. PEDONE, 1999, pp. 161-163
« Le droit de la mer etait unidimensionnel, il devient pluridimensionnel. »
25 Examples: the 1990 Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea, the 1990 Protocol to the
Kuwait Regional Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution from Land-
Based Sources, the 1991 Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas
(ASCOBANS), the 1992 Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in
the South Pacific Region, the 1992 Convention for the Conservation of the Biodiversity and Protection of
Wilderness Areas in Central America, the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna,
the 1994 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources Central Bering Sea, the
1996 Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous
Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS), the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation
Measures for the Siberian Crane, the 1999 Agreement Between The Government of Iceland, the
Government ofNorway and the Government of the Russia Federation Concerning Certain Aspects of
Cooperation in the Area of Fisheries, the 2000 Framework Agreement for the Conservation of Living
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regional regimes (regional regimes with general issues).27
However, the 1987 WCED and 1992 UNCED have contributed to a further
development of the integrated approach of the 1982 UNCLOS, by elaborating the
inchoate concepts embedded in the Convention and by further enlarging its perspective.
The idea of integration of development and environment, vaguely embedded in
1972 UNCHE28 and the 1982 UNCLOS,29 has been consolidated into the concept of
sustainable development formulated in the 1987 WCED Report and endorsed in the 1992
UNCED.
In addition to this elaboration of the idea of integration of development with
environment, the 1992 UNCED has further enlarged the perspective of the 1982
UNCLOS, in two ways. First, by introducing the concept of sustainable development, and
thereby the concept of intergenerational equity into the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS,
Agenda 21 has enlarged the temporal perspective of the regime.30 Second, Agenda 21 has
widened the spatial perspective of the 1982 UNCLOS, by declaring; "the marine
environment - including the oceans and all seas and adjacent coastal areas - forms an
integrated whole that is an essential component of the global life-support system..."31
This phrase contains two postulates, which go beyond the vision embedded in the 1982
UNCLOS: 1) the marine environment includes not only all seas and oceans but also
Marine Resources on the High Seas of the South Pacific (Galapagos Agreement)
26 Examples: the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution, Preparedness, Response and Cooperation
(OPRC), the 1994 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, the 1995 Agreement, the 1998 Agreement on
the International Dolphin Conservation Program.
27 Examples: the 1983 Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the
Wider Caribbean Region, the Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine
and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, the 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation
ofNature and Natural Resources, the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
(Madrid Protocol), the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Area, the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, the 1992 Convention for
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic, and others.
28 Declaration of the 1972 UNCHE Principle 13; "In order to achieve a more rational management of
resources and thus to improve the environment, States should adopt an integrated and coordinated approach
to their development planning so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to protect and
improve the human environment for the benefit of their population."
29 See infra. 3. Sustainable Development and the 1982 UNCLOS
30 The concept of sustainable development contains that of intergenerational equity; See infra. 3.
Sustainable Development and the 1982 UNCLOS
31 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, Introduction
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adjacent coastal areas; 2) the marine environment is a component of the global life-
support system. The two postulates stem from the ecosystem perspective.32
1.3 Conclusion
The integrated approach provides good soil for the development of the ecosystem
approach, sustainable development. The integration of complex biological issues into a
system leads to the ecosystem approach.33 The integration of environmental protection
and economic development has generated the concept of sustainable development.
2. Ecosystem approach and the 1982 UNCLOS
2.1 Concepts
2.1.1 The concept of ecosystem
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity defines ecosystem as "a dynamic complex
of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living environment
interacting as a functional unit."34
In the FAO Glossary, ecosystem is defined as "a spatio-temporal system of the
biosphere, including its living components (plants, animals, micro-organisms) and the
32 In the same line, Lawrence Juda asserts; "continuing contemplation of ecosystem-based management
gives new impetus to the need for a closer relationship between coastal and ocean management efforts and
a need to move away from what Cicin-Sain and Knecht refer to as a "dual system" ofmanagement in which
coastal and ocean management serve as separate points of focus." Lawrence Juda, Considerations in
Developing a Functional Approach to the Governance of Large Marine Ecosystems, ODIL, 30, 1999, p. 90
33 For Anthony Charles, "The ecosystem approach is a key conceptual tool to embrace complexity in
fisheries, and a good example of integrated thinking, in which the system is considered as a whole,
incorporating the various components and interactions amongst them." Anthony Charles, Sustainable
Fishery Systems, Blackwell Science, 2001, p.p.237-8
33 See infra. 2. Ecosystem approach and the 1982 UNCLOS
34 Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), Article 2
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non-living components of their environment, with their relationships, as determined by
past and present environmental forcing functions and interactions amongst biota."35
The Center for International Forestry Research defines ecosystem as "the biotic
and abiotic components of an environment that interact to produce a flow of energy and
cycling of nutrients."36
These definitions, among others, contain some common elements in different
terms.
First, any ecosystem is composed of biotic components (plants, animals, micro¬
organisms commonly classified into producers, consumers and decomposers) and abiotic
ones (air, water, inorganic substances).37
Second, these biotic and abiotic components form a functional unit by interacting
through the flow of energy and the cycling of nutrients.38 It is this functional unit that
differentiates the concept of ecosystem from that of environment and other ecological
units such as species, population and community."
Third, any ecosystem is a dynamic open system.39 The terms "dynamic complex",
"spatio-temporal system", "flow of energy and cycling of nutrients" employed in the
definitions of ecosystem signify that an ecosystem is an open system operating through
continuous flow of energy and cycling of materials.40 In the process of energy flow and
35 www.fao.org/fi/glossary
35 Center for International Forestry Research (C1FOR), The CIFOR criteria and indicators generic template,
1999, p.53
37 Components of an ecosystem are: (1) inorganic substances involved in material cycles; (2) organic
compounds that link biotic and abiotic; (3) air, water, and substrate environment including the climate
regime and other physical factors; (4) producers; (5) macroconsumers; (6) microconsumers, or
decomposers. See Eugene P. Odum, Basic Ecology, Saunders College Publishing, 1983, pp. 17-18
38 See Odum, Ibid., p. 175 "The chemical elements, including all the essential elements of protoplasm, tend
to circulate in the biosphere in characteristic paths from environment to organisms and back to the
environment. These more or less circular paths are known as biogeochemical circles. The movement of
those elements and inorganic compounds that are essential to life can be conveniently designated as
nutrient cycling."
See also Robert W. Christopherson, Elemental Geosystems, Second edition, Prenticehall, 1998, p. 476
"Nearly all ecosystems depend on an input of solar energy; the few limited ecosystems that exist in dark
caves or on the ocean floor depend on chemical reactions (chemosynthesis)."
39 See Anthony Charles, ibid., p. 34 "The ecological system as a whole is seen to be in a dynamic process of
self-organisation and self-maintenance."
40 See Eugene P. Odum, Basic Ecology, op.cit., p. 16 "All ecosystems, even the ultimate biosphere, are
open systems: there is a necessary inflow and outflow of energy. Of course, ecosystems below the level of
the biosphere are also open in varying degrees to material flows and to the immigration and emigration of
organisms. Accordingly, an important part of the ecosystem concept is recognizing that there is both an
input environment and an output environment that are coupled and essential for the ecosystem to function
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nutrient cycling, ecosystem components constantly change, while maintaining their
dynamic equilibrium or ecosystem homeostasis. The geographical boundary of an
ecosystem also changes with time. Although each ecosystem constitutes an independent
biological unity, it is not isolated from other ecosystems.41 In the marine realm, multiple
ecosystems are intertwined and smaller ecosystems are nested in larger systems. The
biosphere itself is regarded as the ecosystem of the highest level, i.e. the Earth's
ecosystem.42
2.1.2 The Concept of ecosystem approach
As the 1992 UNCED declares; "States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to
conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem",43
ecosystem approach means the way of exploiting and conserving natural resources in
such a manner as to maintain the ecosystem health and ecosystem integrity.44 For P. A.
Larkin, an ecosystem approach has three essential components: (1) sustainable yield of
products for human consumption and animal foods; (2) maintenance of biodiversity; (3)
protection from the effects of pollution and habitat degradation.45
and maintain itself."
41 Robert W. Christopherson, Elemental Geosystems, op.cit., p. 476
"Natural ecosystems are open systems for both energy and matter, with almost all ecosystem boundaries
functioning as transition zones rather than a sharp demarcations."
42 The 1992 Rio Declaration, Principle 7 employs the term the Earth's ecosystem.
43 The 1992 Rio Declaration, Principle 7
44 CIFOR defines ecosystem integrity "as the ability to support and maintain a balanced, integrated,
adaptive biological community having a species composition, diversity and functional organization
comparable to that of natural habitat in the region." See CIFOR (1999): The CIFOR criteria and indicators
generic template. Center for International Forestry Research: 53 p.
For J.J. Kay & E. Scheneider, "Ecosystem integrity encompasses three major ecosystem organisational
facets. Ecosystem health, the ability to maintain normal operations under normal environmental conditions,
is the first prerequisite for ecosystem integrity. But it alone is not sufficient. To have integrity, an
ecosystem must also be able to cope with changes (which can be catastrophic) in environmental conditions;
that is, it must be able to cope with stress. As well, an ecosystem which has integrity must be able to
continue the process of self-organisation on an ongoing basis. It must be able to evolve, develop and
proceed with the birth, growth, death and renewal cycle. It is these latter two facets of ecosystem integrity
that differentiates it from the notion of ecosystem health." See J.J. Kay & E. Scheneider, Embracing
complexity: The challenge of the ecosystem concept, Alternatives, 20 (1994), p. 37
45 P. A. Larkin, ibid.
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Since a given ecosystem occupies a certain area within the limits of its moving
boundary, an ecosystem approach requires that the geographical scope of the applicability
of conservation measures correspond to the ecosystem boundary.46
The content of conservation measures should be focused on the maintenance of
the ecosystem health and integrity. This requires that the principle of sustainable use be
applied not only to the target species but also to dependent or associated species.47 To
maintain the ecosystem health and integrity, it is essential to preserve biological diversity
and protect physical environment of the ecosystem from pollution. This integrated and
systemic perspective differentiates ecosystem approaches from species approaches or
zonal approaches.
2.1.3 The Concept of species approach
Species approach means that stock assessment and fishery management are focused on
particular single or multiple species. In single-species approach, "each fish stock is
analyzed and managed individually, separate from other species and from the
surrounding ecosystem."48 John Gulland asserts that traditional stock assessment work is
too often concerned only with what happens to a single species and proper account is not
taken ofwhat is happening to other species with which the target species interacts.49
Considering the ecological interdependence among species and the increasing
fishing capacity of humans, many fishery scientists recognize the limits of single-species
46 Lawrence Juda underlines that the ecosystem boundary is important since it indicates whose actions and
what human activities must be considered in providing for management of the LME (Large Marine
Ecosystem) and its resources. See Lawrence Juda, Considerations in Developing a Functional Approach to
the Governance of Large Marine Ecosystems, ODIL, 30, 1999, p. 92
47 The 1982 World Charter for Nature declares; "Ecosystems and organisms... shall be managed to achieve
and maintain optimum sustainable productivity, but not in such a way as to endanger the integrity of those
other ecosystems or species with which they coexist." I. General Principles, para.4
48 For Anthony Charles, "it seems clear that the practice of stock assessment and fishery management, at
least in industrialized nations, has developed largely on the basis of single-species approaches. Typically,
each fish stock is analysed and managed individually, separate from other species and from the surrounding
ecosystem. This almost exclusive focus on single species may be found, for example, in classic stock
assessment manuals such as Ricker's (1975) Computation and Interpretation of Biological Statistics of Fish
Populations. Even today, most stock assessment practice, and almost all fishery management endeavours,
are based on single-species methods." Anthony Charles, ibid., p. 226
49 J. A. Gulland, Fish Stocks Assessment: A Manual of Basic Methods, Wiley-Interscience, 1983, p. 186
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approaches,50and propose multi-species approaches, taking into account the ecological
relationship between target species and non-target species.5'In many international
instruments, the multi-species perspective is reflected in the provisions expressing
concerns over the effects on dependent or associated species.52
The multi-species approach, which pays more attention to the biological
interdependence among species, constitutes an element of the ecosystem approach.55
In order to effectively apply a species approach, it is required that the
geographical scope of the relevant regime correspond to the "range"54 of that species.
2.1.4 The concept of zonal approach
Many traditional rules of international law on the exploitation and conservation of marine
living resources have been developed on the basis of jurisdictional zones, such as the
territorial sea, the system of straight baselines, the fishery zones, and the exclusive
economic zone. By providing relatively simple maritime configurations, such maritime
zoning may enhance legal practicality in prescribing and enforcing laws and regulations
relating to the activities in the sea.
A common feature of the international regimes created by zonal approaches is that
they distinguish the coastal States from other States and attribute rights and obligations
50 J. A. Gulland asserts; "In the past, the history of analysis and advice based on single-species
approaches...has been moderately satisfactory. This comforting situation is changing with the increasing
range of species being exploited by present-day fisheries. There is an increasing risk that analysis and
advice based on a single-species approach will be incomplete in some important aspects." Ibid., p. 187
51 See N. Daan, Multispecies assessment issues for the North Sea, in E.L. Pikitch, D.D. Huppert & M.P.
Sissenwine (ed.), Global Trends: Fisheries Management, 1997, pp.126-133 "The primary objective of
multi-species virtual population analysis (MSVPA) is to quantify feeding interactions among species in
relationship to the interaction between fish stocks and fisheries."
52 For example, Article 61, para.3, 4 of the 1982 UNCLOS, among others.
53 See Anthony Charles, op. cit., p.228 "As interest in an ecosystem approach becomes widespread, it is
likely that the development ofmulti-species assessment methods will also progress as an important
component of this effort, although it must be noted that adopting an ecosystem approach is by no means
dependent on solving the tricky problems inherent in multi-species assessment!"
54 According to the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, "Range"
means all the areas of land or water that a migratory species inhabits, stays in temporarily, crosses or
overlies at any time on its normal migration route. Article I, l.f)
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on the basis of this distinction.55 In a zonal approach, the geographical scope of a given
regime is defined according to the boundaries of jurisdictional maritime zones.
Zonal approaches can be combined with species approaches. For example, if the
geographical scope of a regime based on a species approach spans several jurisdictional
zones, from the coastal zones to the high seas for example, the range of the species can be
divided into the jurisdictional zones and the rights and obligations relating to the
conservation of the species can be attributed accordingly.56 In the same way, a zonal
approach can be also combined with an ecosystem approach, by dividing the ecosystem
boundary into several jurisdictional zones, and by attributing rights and obligations to
each State according to its status in each jurisdictional zone.57
The main characteristics of these approaches can be summarized as follows:
Species approach Zonal approach Ecosystem approach




































55 An ecosystem approach also requires a kind of maritime zoning in that a set of regulations and measures
designed for the conservation of a given ecosystem should be applied in a certain maritime area defined
according to the ecosystem boundary, rather than the boundary established by jurisdictional maritime
zoning.
56 In the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, the Parties, recognizing that
southern bluefin tuna is a highly migratory species which migrates through such zones, note that the coastal
States through whose exclusive economic or fishery zones southern bluefin tuna migrates exercise
sovereign rights within such zones for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing
the living resources including southern bluefin tuna. Preamble
57 The regime under the 1980 CCAMLR is the case. See infra. Paragraph 2.2.1.4
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* When a zonal approach is combined with a species approach or an ecosystem approach,
the rights and obligations are distributed according to the status of each State in each
jurisdictional zone within the range of the species or the ecosystem boundary.
2.2 Evolution of principles for the conservation of the marine resources
2.2.1 Pre-UNCLOS approaches for the conservation of marine resources
2.2.1.1 Species approaches in the pre-UNCLOS regimes
The whaling regime under the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling, the tuna regimes under the 1949 Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission and the 1966 International Convention for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas are examples of typical species approach. The issue-areas
of these regimes are confined to the conservation of particular species.58 Their
geographical scopes cover implicitly or explicitly the range of the target species,
irrespective of the boundaries of the jurisdictional zones.59 The content of conservation
measures are focused on the conservation of particular species and the dependent or
associated species.60 These regimes do not define the attribution of the rights and
58 The whaling conventions purport to conserve whale stocks without classifying them. See the 1946
Whaling Convention, Preamble.
The Inter-American tuna regime is aimed to conserving "the populations of yellowfin and skipjack tuna and
of other kinds of fish taken by tuna fishing vessels in the eastern Pacific Ocean." See the 1949 Convention
for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Preamble.
The 1966 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas purport to conserve "tuna and
tuna-like fishes found in the Atlantic Ocean." Preamble
59 Considering the long ranges of whale stocks, the Whaling Convention does not specify its geographical
scope, but it is implied to cover the range of the whale stocks.
The 1949 Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission does not
precisely define its geographical scope, but it is clear that it intends to be applicable to the eastern Pacific
Ocean. See Preamble
The 1966 International Convention for the Conservation ofAtlantic Tunas defines the "Convention area"
as "all waters of the Atlantic Ocean, including the adjacent Seas". Article 1
60 The Inter-American tuna regime is obviously inspired by ecosystem considerations when it stipulates, in
Article II, "the Commission shall perform the following functions and duties:
1. Make investigations concerning the abundance, biology, biometry, and ecology ofyellowfin
(Neothunnus) and skipjack (Kaisuwonus) tuna in the waters of the eastern Pacific Ocean fished by the
nationals of the High Contracting Parties, and the kinds of fishes commonly used as bait in the tuna
fisheries, especially the anchovetta, and of other kinds of fish taken by tuna fishing vessels; and the effects
of natural factors and human activities on the abundance of the populations of fishes supporting all these
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obligations relating to the exploitation and conservation of the species on the basis of
jurisdictional maritime zones.
Similarly, the regimes under the 1956 Convention on the Conservation of North
Pacific Fur Seals and the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals are
based on species approaches: their issue-areas are confined to the conservation of
particular seal species; their geographical scopes are not defined on the basis of the
jurisdictional maritime zones; the content of their conservation measures are focused on
the conservation of particular species; and they do not attribute the rights and obligations
on the basis of the jurisdictional maritime zones.
2.2.1.2 Zonal approaches in the pre-UNCLOS regimes
The 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea have elaborated the foundation for
zonal approaches by codifying the rules of customary international law concerning
maritime zones.61 The 1958 Geneva Conventions have even made separate regimes in
separate instruments for the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, the high seas, and the
continental shelf. UNCLOS II held in 1960 has furthered the development of maritime
zoning by consolidating the concept of exclusive fishery zone, up to 12 nautical miles
from the baselines. On the basis of these maritime zones, many regimes have been
created for the conservation of marine living resources and the protection of the marine
environment.
ICJ has contributed to the development of zonal approaches by providing a legal
basis for the system of straight baselines and the fishery jurisdiction of the coastal States.
In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (1951),62 ICJ provided a criterion for the
contemporary maritime zoning, by recognizing the Norwegian system of straight
baselines as the starting points of measuring fishery jurisdiction of the coastal State.
Afterwards, the system of straight baselines, concurrently with low-water marks, has
been developed as a basis for measuring outer limits of different zones under national
fisheries."
61 As for the areas under national jurisdiction, the 1958 Geneva Conventions have established the territorial
sea, contiguous zone, fishery zone and continental shelf. But the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone did not define the breadth of the territorial sea.
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jurisdiction, i.e. the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive fishery zone, EEZ and the
continental shelf.
In the Iceland-UK (and Iceland - the Federal Republic of Germany) Fisheries
Jurisdiction case (1972-74), ICJ, recognizing the preferential fishing rights of Iceland in
the areas between the 12-mile and 50-mile limits as well as the traditional fishing rights
of the United Kingdom (and Germany), held that Iceland and the UK (and Germany)
were under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for an equitable
solution of their differences.63 Although the Court recognized the traditional rights of the
fishing States, the basic idea which underlies this decision is the legitimation of the right
of the coastal State to establish its preferential fishery zone up to certain limits beyond its
territorial sea.
2.2.1.3 Species approach combined with zonal approach in the pre-UNCLOS
regimes
The regime under the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic
Ocean64 is based on a species approach in that it was established to promote the
conservation, restoration, enhancement and rational management of salmon stocks in the
North Atlantic Ocean. But this regime combines this species approach with a zonal
approach by stipulating some rules based on the fisheries jurisdictions of coastal States.65
2.2.1.4 Ecosystem approaches in the pre-UNCLOS regimes
62 ICJ Reports, 1951
63 In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case between the United Kingdom and Iceland, ICJ held that "In order to
reach an equitable solution of the present dispute it was necessary that the preferential rights of Iceland
should be reconciled with the traditional fishing rights of the United Kingdom through the appraisal at any
given moment of the relative dependence of either State on the fisheries in question, while taking into
account the rights of other States and the needs of conservation." In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case between
the Federal Republic ofGermany and Iceland, ICJ held the identical position. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case,
merits, ICJ Reports, 1974
64 Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean done at Reykjavik, 1982
65 Under Article 2, "Fishing of salmon is prohibited beyond areas of fisheries", and "Within areas of
fisheries jurisdiction of coastal States, fishing of salmon is prohibited beyond 12 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
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The 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Marine Living Resources of Antarctica
(CCAMLR) is "a path-breaking example of the ecosystem approach to resource
conservation and management."66 The issue-area of the regime under CCAMLR is the
conservation of Antarctic Marine living resources at the ecosystem level.67 The
geographical scope of CCAMLR, defined on the basis of the boundaries of the Antarctic
ecosystems, is composed of two parts; "the area south of 60 degrees South latitude", and
"the area between that latitude and the Antarctic Convergence."68 The Antarctic
Convergence, which goes beyond the geographical scope of the Antarctic Treaty, was
chosen as the natural biological frontier where warmer waters flowing south meet the
colder Antarctic waters, separating distinct maritime communities on either side.66
The principles of conservation adopted by CCAMLR focus on the conservation of
the Antarctic ecosystem, as it emphasizes the importance of the "maintenance of the
ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and related populations of
Antarctic marine living resources and the restoration of depleted populations...", and the
"prevention of changes or minimization of the risk of changes in the marine ecosystem
which are not potentially reversible over two or three decades..."70
The ecosystem approach of the regime under CCAMLR is partially combined
with zonal approaches, by recognizing the sovereign rights of the coastal States over the
coastal seas around some islands located within the limits of the Convention area.71
2.2.2 The UNCLOS approaches for the conservation ofmarine resources
66 Catherine Redgwell, Protection of Ecosystems under International Law: Lessons from Antarctica, in
Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds.) International Law and Sustainable Development, Oxford University
Press, 1999, pp. 205-224
67 Antarctic marine living resources mean the populations of finfish, molluscs, crustaceans and all other
species of living organisms, including birds, found south of the Antarctic Convergence. CCAMLR, Article
I, para.2
68 CCAMLR, Article I
69 See Simon Lyster, International Wildlife Law, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 161
70 Article II, para. 3
71 For EEZs surrounding the islands such as Kerguelen, Crozet, Prince Edward, Marion, McDonald, Heard,
Falklands, South Georgia, South Sandwich, etc. the sovereign rights of the coastal States are exercised, but
in harmony with the CCAMLR regime.
See Daniel Vignes, Le regime de la peche maritime dans l'Antarctique, in Daniel Vignes, Giuseppe Cataldi
et Rafael Casado Raigon (ed.), Le Droit International de la Peche Maritime, Editions de I'Universite de
Bruxelles, 2000, pp.245-279
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The 1982 UNCLOS has further elaborated the system ofmaritime zoning which had been
incompletely established by the 1958 Geneva Conventions.72 The 1982 UNCLOS has
defined the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, EEZ, the continental shelf,
the archipelagic waters. It has also provided the principles of delimitation of these zones.
The attribution of the rights and obligations to these categories of States constitutes a
legal foundation for many international regimes for the conservation of marine living
resources and for the protection of the marine environment.
The 1982 UNCLOS envisages also species approaches for the conservation of
some particular species, such as the "stocks occurring within the exclusive economic
zones of two or more coastal States or both within the exclusive economic zone and in an
area beyond and adjacent to it",73 highly migratory species,74 marine mammals,75
anadromous stocks,7('catadromous species. 77 Species approaches for these stocks are
coupled with zonal approaches, since the Convention recognizes the rights and duties of
the coastal States on the conservation of these species (except for the marine mammals).
However, the Convention indicates that the strict separation of the coastal zones from the
high seas is not appropriate.78
The 1982 UNCLOS lays down many provisions inspired by ecosystem
considerations. For example, States are required to take into account "the
interdependence of stocks",79 "the effects on species associated with or dependent upon
harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated
72 In the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the breadth of the territorial
sea was not defined.
73 Article 63
74 Article 64
75 Articles 65 and 120
76 Article 66
77 Article 67
78 For the transboundary or straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species, the Convention requires the
coastal States and distant water fishing States to agree upon necessary conservation measures.
For the conservation of marine mammals, the Convention does not restrict the right of the coastal
State or the competence of an international organization to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of
marine mammals more strictly than provided for other species and requires States to cooperate.
For the conservation of anadromous species, the Convention provides for special rights and
responsibility of the State of origin. See Daniel Vignes, Giuseppe Cataldi et Rafael Casado Raigon, Le
Droit International de la Peche Maritime, Editions de I'Universite de Bruxelles, 2000, p. 235
For the conservation of catadromous species, the Convention provides for a special responsibility
of the coastal State in whose waters such species spend the greater part of their life cycle.
79 Article 61, para. 3, Article 119, para. 1 (a)
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and dependent species."80 Concerning the activities in the Area, the Convention draws
attention to the importance of the ecological balance of the marine environment.81 In
taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment,
States are required to include the necessary measures to protect and preserve rare and
fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species
and other forms ofmarine life.82
2.2.3 Post-UNCLOS approaches for the conservation ofmarine resources
2.2.3.1 Species approaches in the post-UNCLOS regimes
Many regimes have, as their issue-areas, the conservation of migratory species whose
"ranges"83 exceed the outer limits of the areas under national jurisdiction. Most of such
regimes adopt species approaches.
The 1992 Amendment to the Whaling Convention continues to embrace the
species approach of the 1946 Whaling Convention for the conservation of the species of
whales.84 The 1984 Protocol Amending the International Convention for the Conservation
ofAtlantic Tunas85 follows the species approach of the 1966 Atlantic Tunas Convention.
Different regimes for the protection of cetaceans adopt also species approaches,
with notable ecosystem considerations. The cetaceans regimes under the 1991 Agreement
on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas (ASCOBANS) and
the 1996 Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean
Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS) are based on species approaches.86
80 Article 61, para. 4, Article 119, para 1. (b)
81 In Article 145, the Convention requires the ISBA to adopt appropriate rules, regulations and procedures
for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution and other hazards to the marine environment,
including the coastline, and of interference with the ecological balance of the marine environment.
82 Article 194, para.5
83 The 1979 Convention on the Conservation ofMigratory Species of Wild Animals defines "range" as all
the areas of land or water that a migratory species inhabits, stays in temporarily, crosses or overlies at any
time on its normal migration route. Article 1 1. f)
84 Amendments to the Schedule to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling of 2
December 1946 (Adopted at Glasgow on 3 July 1992)
85 The 1984 Protocol Amending the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas,
adopted at Paris on 10 July 1984
86 For the Regimes under Ascobans and Accobams, see Robin Churchill, Sustaining Small Cetaceans: A
Preliminary Evaluation of the Ascobans and Accobams Agreements, in Alan Boyle and David Freestone
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The issue-area of these regimes is the conservation of specific species, i.e. small
cetaceans and cetaceans. Their geographical scopes, termed "Area of the agreement" or
"Agreement area", are defined according to the range of these species,87 irrespective of
jurisdictional zones. The conservation measures focus on the achievement and
maintenance of a favourable conservation status of cetaceans. These regimes introduce
many elements of the ecosystem approach, such as the recognition of the fact that
cetaceans are an integral part of marine ecosystems88 and the awareness of the close
relationship of the conservation status of cetaceans with their habitats, pollution,
reduction of food resources. However, these regimes remain in species approaches in that
their issue-areas are confined to the conservation of specific species rather than the entire
ecosystems to which they belong. The 1991 Action Plan for the Conservation of
Cetaceans in the Mediterranean Sea also adopts a similar approach.
The regime under the 1990 Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the
Wadden Sea adopts a species approach. Its issue-area is the conservation of Wadden Sea
Seals, its geographical scope is defined according to the range of the Wadden Sea Seals,
across the jurisdictional boundaries. Without relying on the rights based on the
jurisdictional maritime zones, the regime prohibits States from taking Seals.
2.2.3.2 Zonal approaches in the post-UNCLOS regimes
The 1992 Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in
the South Pacific Region is based on a zonal approach in that it is aimed at reinforcing
cooperation in fisheries surveillance and law enforcement on the basis of the "sovereign
rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
fisheries resources of their exclusive economic zones and fisheries zones."89
2.2.3.3 Species approach combined with zonal approach in the post-UNCLOS
regimes
(eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.225-252
87 ASCOBANS, Article 1.2 (b), ACCOBAMS, Article I 1. a)
88 ASCOBANS, Preamble, ACCOBAMS, Preamble
89 Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region,
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Many fisheries regimes established after the conclusion of the 1982 UNCLOS combine
species approaches with zonal approaches. Their issue-areas are confined to the
conservation of specific species, but their conservation measures are based on the
jurisdictional zones.
For example, the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna
was concluded for the conservation of southern bluefin tuna which migrates through
exclusive economic or fishery zones. But the conservation measures are to be taken
without affecting the sovereign rights of the coastal States in their corresponding EEZs or
exclusive fishery zones.90
The 1994 Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention purports to conserve the pollock
resources in the Bering Sea.91 The geographic scope of the Convention is limited to the
Doughnut Hole, the high seas of the Bering Sea beyond EEZs of the coastal States,
except for activities for scientific purposes.92
The fisheries regime for the Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole for the conservation of
Pollock stocks in the enclave high seas of the Sea of Okhotsk was established to conserve
specific stocks on the basis of the rights of Russia over its EEZ which surrounds the
Peanut Hole in the high seas.92
The regime for fisheries in the Loophole of the Barents Sea takes a similar
approach, purporting to conserve the cod stock in the Barents Sea on the basis of the
done at Honiara, 9 July 1992, Preamble
90 The 1993 Southern Bluefin Tuna Convention declares; "the coastal States through whose exclusive
economic or fishery zones southern bluefin tuna migrates exercise sovereign rights within such zones for
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the living resources including southern
bluefin tuna;", Preamble
91 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources Central Bering Sea was signed
in 1994 by the coastal States (USA, Russia) and distant water fishing States (People's Republic of China,
the Republic of Korea, Japan, Poland).
92 Article I
Considering the range of the Bering Sea pollock stocks which straddle the boundaries between the high
seas and EEZs, it is provided that activities for scientific purposes may extend beyond the Convention Area
within the Bering Sea.
93 See Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole De Facto Extension of Coastal State
Control, in Olav Schram Stokke (ed.) Governing High Seas Fisheries, op.cit., pp. 179-205
See also Evelyne Meltzer, Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: The
Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries, ODIL, Volume 25, 1994,
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division between EEZs of the coastal States (Russia and Norway) and the remaining high
94
seas.
The 1995 Agreement adopts a multi-species approach coupled with a zonal
approach. Its issue-area is the long-term conservation and sustainable use of particular
species, i.e. straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks."Although the
jurisdictional barrier is somewhat mitigated by the obligation of the coastal State and
distant water fishing States to cooperate in maintaining compatibility of conservation and
management measures inside and outside of 200 miles and to take into account the
biological unity, the regime is based on the jurisdictional division cutting the range of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.
2.2.3.4 Ecosystem approaches in the post-UNCLOS regimes
The 1992 UNCED instruments place particular emphasis on the ecosystem approach. The
1992 Rio Declaration calls for States to cooperate to protect and restore the health and
integrity of the Earth's ecosystem.9'' The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity
emphasizes the importance of the preservation of ecosystems and the inseparability of the
concept of biological diversity from that of ecosystems, when it defines Biological
diversity as the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia,
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which
they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems.97
Agenda 21, Chapter 17 calls for States to preserve and protect marine ecosystems. The
most important contribution made by Agenda 21 to the progress of the ecosystem
approach is the introduction of the concept of 'the integrated management and sustainable
development of coastal and marine areas', by which a particular attention is drawn to the
biological unity between marine ecosystems and terrestrial ecosystems.98
94 See Olav Schram Stokke, The Loophole of the Barents Sea Fisheries Regime, in Olav Schram Stokke
(ed.) Governing High Seas Fisheries, op.cit., pp. 273-301
95 Article 2
96 The 1992 Rio Declaration, Principle 7
97 Article 2
98 For this reason, Agenda 21 declares that priority should be accorded to: coral reef ecosystems, estuaries;
temperate and tropical wetlands, including mangroves; seagrass beds; other spawning and nursery areas.
Agenda, Chapter 17, para. 17.85
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When the ecosystem approach is combined with the concept of integrated
management of coastal and marine areas as in Agenda 21, greater priority is naturally
given to the protection of the marine ecosystem from land-based pollution." In this line,
the 1995 Washington Declaration on protection of the Marine Environment from Land-
Based Activities and the ensuing Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the
Marine Environment from Land-based Activities have paid much attention to the impact
of the land-based activities on the marine ecosystems.100
The 2000 Framework Agreement for the Conservation of Living Marine
Resources on the High Seas of the South Pacific adopts an ecosystem approach coupled
with a zonal approach. The South Pacific Permanent Commission (SPPC) is created to
coordinate the maritime policies of the coastal States and to promote the adoption of
measures to preserve the environment and protect the integrity of the South Pacific's
marine ecosystem.101 This Agreement is based on the zonal approach in that it relies on
the sovereign rights of the coastal States over EEZs although it is intended to extend
these rights beyond the 200 miles and applicable to a certain part of the high seas of the
South Pacific.102
The 2001 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources
in the South-East Atlantic Ocean adopts a similar approach. This Convention purports to
realize the long term conservation and sustainable use of all living marine resources in
the South-East Atlantic Ocean and to safeguard the environment and marine ecosystems
in which the resources occur.103 The Convention is applicable to a certain part of the high
seas of the South-East Atlantic Ocean.104
99 For the interdependence between the issue of the protection of marine ecosystems and the land-based
activities, see Andre Nollkaemper, Balancing the Protection of Marine Ecosystems with Economic Benefits
from Land-Based Activities: The Quest for International Legal Barriers, ODIL, 17:153-179, 1996
100 The 1995 Washington Declaration recognizes "the interdependence of human populations and the
coastal and marine environment, and the growing and serious threat from land-based activities, to both
human health and well-being and the integrity of coastal and marine ecosystems and biodiversity."
Preamble
101 Preamble
102 Article 3 "The Framework Agreement shall apply exclusively to the high seas of the Southeast Pacific,
encompassed by the outer limits of the coastal States" national jurisdiction zones and a line traced along the
complete length of the 120 west meridian of longitude, from the 5 north parallel of latitude to the 60 south
parallel of latitude."
103 Preamble
104 The Convention area is defined as all waters beyond areas of national jurisdiction in the area bounded by
a line joining the following points along parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude:
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2.3 Conclusion
The principal merit of species approaches resides in the relative simplicity in
devising conservation measures. But the conservation of one or more particular species
may have little meaning in the context of marine ecosystems. In an effort to make up for
this shortcoming of species approach, many instruments lay down provisions which
require the parties to take into consideration the effects of conservation measures on
species associated with or dependent upon the target species.
Zonal approaches simplify the enforcement of conservation measures. In some
situations, maritime zoning may become an obstacle to the species or ecosystem
approaches by cutting the range of a given species or the boundary of a given ecosystem
into different jurisdictional zones. However, when properly combined with species or
ecosystem approaches, zonal approaches may contribute to the enhancement of the
effectiveness of conservation measures by relying on the sovereign rights of the coastal
States.
Compared to species approaches or zonal approaches, ecosystem approaches are
conceptually more sophisticated and ecologically better justified. From the 1980s, even
the regimes which do not adopt an ecosystem approach tend to emphasize the importance
of ecosystem integrity. The main difficulty in applying an ecosystem approach resides in
devising conservation measures, taking into account all the ecological complexities of the
ecosystem. To apply an ecosystem approach to a given ecosystem, thorough scientific
knowledge on the complex mechanisms of the ecosystem and its surrounding
environment is required as a prerequisite.105 For these reasons, many regimes confine
themselves to providing a legal basis for an ecosystem approach by expressing the
necessity and importance of the maintenance of ecosystem integrity, without formulating
— beginning at the outer limit of waters under national jurisdiction at a point 6° South, thence due west
along the 6° South parallel to the meridian 10° West, thence due north along the 10° West meridian to the
equator, thence due west along the equator to the meridian 20° West, thence due south along the 20° West
meridian to a parallel 50° South, thence due east along the 50° South parallel to the meridian 30° East,
thence due north along the 30° East meridian to the coast of the African continent. Article 4
105 In this sense, the 1980 CCAMLR states; "it is essential to increase knowledge of the Antarctic marine
ecosystem and its components so as to able to base decisions on harvesting on sound scientific
information." Preamble
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concrete measures to that end. By doing so, the founders of such regimes may expect that
the regimes will be able to be supplemented by subsequent measures on the basis of
better scientific information to be developed in the future.106
The 1982 UNCLOS has made an important contribution to the development of the
ecosystem approach by introducing many elements of ecosystem approach. These
elements are not sufficient to form a complete ecosystem approach in that they are
provided in a fragmentary way and the Convention divides oceans and seas into different
jurisdictional zones which are not congruent with ecosystem boundaries. However, the
incomplete ecosystem approach may evolve further toward appropriate ecosystem
approaches, by means of reinterpretation, conclusions of additional agreements, or
creation of sub-regimes.
3. Sustainable Development and the 1982 UNCLOS
3.1 Concepts
3.1.1 The concept of sustainable development
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) presented a
definition of the sustainable development; "Sustainable development is development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs."107 This concept was endorsed in the Efnited Nations Conference
106 For example, in the regime under the 1980 CCAMLR, the Commission for the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources is mandated to "formulate, adopt and revise conservation measures on
the basis of the best scientific evidence available." Article IX, 1 (f). The Commission has elaborated the
conservation measures for the protection of the Antarctic ecosystems.
107 The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future
(Brundtland Report), Oxford University Press, 1987, p.43
It is not World Commission on Environment and Development that coined the term 'sustainable
development'.
The term "sustainable development" first used in a publication of IUCN in 1980. IUCN, World
Conservation Strategy: Living Resources Conservation for Sustainable Development, Gland, Switzerland,
1980.
Before the WCED Report, the 1985 Montreal guidelines for the protection of the marine environment
against pollution from land-based sources employed the term sustainable development.
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on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and has
become the most authoritative definition of sustainable development.108
Defined as such, the concept of sustainable development is composed of several
elements. Some authors presents four elements of sustainable development: the principle
of intergenerational equity, the principle of sustainable use, the principle of intra-
generational equity, the principle of integration.109 Some others identify six elements of
sustainable development: sustainable utilization; integration of environmental protection
and economic development; the right to development; inter-generational equity; intra-
generational equity; procedural elements."0 In addition to these six elements, Patricia
Birnie and Alan Boyle find another element; the polluter pays principle.1"
3.1.1.1 Sustainable utilization
The key principle underlying traditional conservation policies has been sustainable
utilization or sustainable use. When applied to reality, the principle of sustainable
utilization is often translated into more concrete concepts, such as maximum sustainable
yield, optimum sustainable yield, optimum sustainable productivity, etc. The maximum
sustainable yield or maximum sustainable productivity is the level which allows the
maximum harvest of fish that can, in theory, be caught year after year indefinitely into
the future."2 This idea relies on the reproductive capacity of living resources and the
What the WCED Report has contributed to the evolution of the concept of sustainable development is
the fact that it has established the theoretical scheme of sustainable development, as is generally endorsed
by international society.
108 The concept of sustainable development has been introduced into the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, Agenda 21, the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
1992 Non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus on the management,
conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests (The Forest principles)
Among the instruments adopted in the 1992 UNCED, United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
employs the concept of sustainable use instead of sustainable development.
109 Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, Manchester University Press, 1995,
pp. 198-208
110 See Alan Boyle and David Freestone, International Law and Sustainable Development, Oxford
University Press, 1999, Introduction, pp. 1-18
111 Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle, International Law & the Environment, Second edition, Oxford University
Press, 2002, pp. 84-97
112 See Anthony Charles, Sustainable Fishery Systems, Blackwell Science Ltd., 2001, Chapter 5 Fishery
management.
The 1956 Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals provides, in its preamble, the concept of
maximum sustainable productivity; "Desiring to take effective measures towards achieving the maximum
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finiteness of the environmental carrying capacity."1 Within the limits of these two
capacities, can be found the maximum level at which humans can harvest the species
without causing the decrease in the population size in the long run."4 The harvest at this
equilibrium point is termed 'the maximum sustainable yield'. In ecological economics,
renewable resources are often treated as natural capital, assimilated with interest bearing
capital."5
When the cost of fishing is taken into account, the maximum sustainable yield,
which is based on biological concepts, can be converted into the concept of maximum
economic yield (MEY)."6 The optimum sustainable yield, which is created by including a
variety of socio-economic considerations into the concept of maximum sustainable
yield,"7 means the maximization of "a multi-objective blend of socio-economic values,
perhaps including equity, employment and rents, with appropriate weighting of each
goal."118
sustainable productivity of the fur seal resources of the North Pacific Ocean so that the fur seal populations
can be brought to and maintained at the levels which will provide the greatest harvest year after year, with
due regard to their relation to the productivity of other living marine resources of the area."
The 1949 Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission provides, in
its preamble, a similar concept of maximum sustained catch; "...maintaining the populations of these fishes
at a level which will permit maximum sustained catches year after year."
In other words, maximum sustainable yield is the highest point of the curve traced between the annual
standard fishing effort applied by all fleets and the yield that should result if that level were maintained
until equilibrium is reached. See Reference Points for Fisheries Management: Their Potential Application
to Straddling and Highly Migratory Resources, UN Doc. A/CONF. 164/INF/9 (1994) para.27
113 See Sandra Postel, Carrying capacity: Earth's Bottom Line, in Robert N. Wells, Jr. (ed.) Law, Values,
and the Environment, The Scarecrow Press, 1996, p. 168 "Biologists often apply the concept of'carrying
capacity' to questions of population pressures on an environment. Carrying capacity is the largest number
of any given species that a habitat can support indefinitely. When that maximum sustainable population
level is surpassed, the resources base begins to decline; sometimes thereafter, so does the population."
114 In terms of the WCED Report, sustainable use means the fact that "renewable resources like forests and
fish stocks need not be depleted provided the rate of use is within the limits of regeneration and natural
growth." WCED, Our Common Future, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 45
115 See Nick Hanley, Jason F. Shogren and Ben White, Environmental Economics, MacMillan Press, 1997,
Chapter 7 An Introduction to the Economics of Natural Resource Exploitation.
116 Because the costs of fishing are supposed to increase with the intensity of exploitation, maximum
economic yield (MEY) is determined at a lower level than maximum sustainable yield (MSY). See
Christopher D. Stone, Can the Oceans be Harboured? A Four Step Plan for the 21st Century, Review of
European Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL), Volume 8, Issue 1, 199, pp. 37-47
117 Whereas "maximum" is a quantity objective, "optimum" is a quality objective involving value
judgement.
The Convention implies that MSY should be qualified by environmental and economic factors. In Articles
61 and 119, the Convention stipulates "...to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic
factors..."
118 Anthony Charles, Sustainable Fishery Systems, Blackwell Science Ltd., 2001, p.87
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In spite of the attractive rationale which supports the principle of sustainable use,
the limit of its merits resides in the fact that it is a kind ofmicro-analytical rational choice
model in vitro, applicable to individual species, without taking into account the complex
ecosystems. Optimum utilization at the species level does not necessarily mean optimum
utilization at the ecosystem level. To be more realistic, the logic of the sustainable use
should be integrated into a wider and systemic perspective, as the WCED report asserts;
"maximum sustainable yield must be defined after taking into account system-wide
effects of exploitation.""9
3.1.1.2 Integration of environmental protection and economic development
Sustainable development is a conceptual model for integrating environmental protection
and development objectives.120 Environmental protection and economic development are
seemingly conflicting goals which sustainable development purports to reconcile,121 as
ICJ states; "This need to reconcile economic development with protection of the
environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development."122 Before the
formulation of the concept of sustainable development by the 1987 WCED Report,
international society had expressed the necessity of harmonizing development with the
protection of the environment.122 In 1992, UNCED declared; "in order to achieve
sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the
119 WCED, Our Common Future, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 45
120 See Gunther Handl, in Winfried Lang (eds.), Sustainable Development and International Law, Graham
& Trotman: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995, p.35
The idea of integration of development and environment was already developed in the 1971 Founex Report,
Development and Environment: Report and Working Papers of a Panel of Experts Convened by the
UNCHE, the 1972 UNCHE Declaration, the 1982 World Charter for Nature, the ECOSOC Resolution 1536
(XLIX), the UN General Assembly Resolutions 2657 (XXV), 2849 (XXVI), 297 (XXVII)
121 For Mary Pat Williams Silveira, "The Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, the Forest Principles, the Framework
Convention on Climate Change and Biodiversity Convention, together and separately, mark the marriage of
environment and development. This is a major achievement. For decades there has been a tug ofwar
between environment and development. For many countries and many different actors, they were viewed as
irreconcilable opposites." Mary Pat Williams Silveira, in Winfried Lang (eds.), op.cit., p. 10
122 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 25 September 1997, Judgment, para. 140
123 The 1972 UNCHE proclaims; "The protection and improvement of the human environment is a major
issue which affects the well-being of peoples and economic development throughout the world." I. para.2
The 1982 World Charter for Nature declares; "In the planning and implementation of social and economic
development activities, due account shall be taken of the fact that the conservation of nature is an integral
part of those activities." para.7
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development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it."124 In this sense, the
integration of environment and development can be interpreted as the question of
equitable distribution of finite natural resources (renewable or not) among humans of the
present generation, or between the present generation and future generations.125 In other
words, sustainable development is the recognition of the right to development for the
present and future generations.
<The right to development
After the General Assembly of the United Nations declared in 1986; "The right to
development is an inalienable human right,126 the Right to Development was reiterated in
the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights,127 and reaffirmed in the 1992 Rio
Declaration.128 The core of the concept of the right to development is the right of all
people to pursue a better quality of life, as the 1972 UNCHE declares; "Economic and
social development is essential for ensuring a favourable living and working environment
for man and for creating conditions on earth that are necessary for the improvement of
the quality of life."129 In the 1982 World Charter for Nature, the right to development is
expressed in terms of "the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life."130 In the WCED Report, the right to development is paraphrased as
"the right to satisfy essential needs of vast numbers of people in developing countries -
for food, clothing, shelter, jobs - ' and 'legitimate aspirations for an improved quality of
life.'"31
The right to development constitutes the basis for the concepts of intra-
generational equity and intergenerational equity.
124 Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, 1992, Principle 4
125 Gunther Handl points out that UNCED documents do not clearly spell out the logical inevitability of the
triangular relationship between "sustainable development", limited ecological carrying capacity and
distributional consequences. Gunther Handl, op.cit. p.39
126 UNGA Res. 41/128 (1986) "Declaration on the Right to Development".
127 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and programme of Action, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 157/23 (1993)32 ILM 1661
128 The Rio Declaration, Principle 3; "The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations."
129 The 1972 UNCHE Declaration, Principle 8
130 The 1982 World Charter for Nature, Principle 1
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<Intra-generational equity>
The ideal of intra-generational equity reflects the aspiration of developing countries to
attenuate the deep gulf between the rich and the poor, as stated in the 1992 Rio
Declaration; "All States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating
poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development, in order to decrease
the disparities in standards of living and better meet the needs of the majority of the
people of the world."112 Such concept can be considered to be a new formulation of the
right to development.111 While recognizing the right of all people to pursue economic
development which can only be realized with more or less indispensable consumption of
natural resources, sustainable development requires that such right be exercised within
the bounds of the ecological possible.134
Intra-generational equity can be realized by enhancing the capacity of developing
countries in their pursuit of the right to development. For this, many international
instruments call for the technological and financial assistance to developing countries,115
and the alleviation of the responsibility of the developing countries in the common effort
of international society to protect the environment.116
<Intergenerational equity>
Intergenerational equity can be achieved when the humans of the present generation
131 WCED Report, p. 43
132 Principle 5
133 That is why some authors omit the right to development from the elements of the concept of sustainable
development.
134 WCED, Our Common Future, 1987, pp.43-44
"The satisfaction of human needs and aspirations is the major objective of development. The essential
needs of vast numbers of people in developing countries - for food, clothing, shelter, jobs - are not being
met, and beyond their basic needs these people have legitimate aspirations for an improved quality of
life... Sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity
to satisfy their aspirations for a better life. Living standards that go beyond the basic minimum are
sustainable only if consumption standards everywhere have regard for long-term sustainability... Perceived
needs are socially and culturally determined, and sustainable development requires the promotion of values
that encourage consumption standards that are within the bounds of the ecological possible and to which all
can reasonably aspire."
135 For example, Principle 9 of the 1972 UNCHE Declaration states: "Environmental deficiencies generated
by the conditions of underdevelopment and natural disasters pose grave problems and can best be remedied
by accelerated development through the transfer of substantial quantities of financial and technological
assistance as a supplement to the domestic effort of the developing countries..."
136 The 1992 UNCED Declaration and the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change have
established the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities.
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abstain from overexploiting or depleting natural resources on which future generations
may depend to meet their own needs. This means an equity perceived in a longer term.
Prior to the 1987 WCED Report, the idea of intergenerational equity had already been
born in some international instruments, such as the 1946 Whaling Convention'" and the
1972 UNCHE Declaration,118 as well as the 1982 World Charter for Nature.139 The
concept of intergenerational equity, as formulated in the WCED Report, is embraced in
the 1992 Rio Instruments and other subsequent international instruments.140
Conceptually simple and elegant, the concept of intergenerational equity is
problematic when it is to be applied to reality. The concept of intergenerational equity is
composed of two problematic terms; the needs and the future generations. What will be
the needs of future generations? The 'essential needs' - for food, clothing, shelter, energy,
water, sanitation, jobs - may be relatively stable from generation to generation. But the
'legitimate aspirations for an improved quality of life' of future generations, which are
socially and culturally determined, are difficult to predict,141 and therefore infinitely
variable. What state of natural resources should the present generation bequeath to future
generations so as not to compromise their ability to meet their own needs?
The concept of future generations'42 is also extremely elastic and difficult to
define. Future generations may include today's younger generations, generations to come
in next decades, in next centuries, in next millennia, and so on.'43 Since future generations
137 The 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling recognizes "the interest of the nations
of the world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented by the whale
stocks". Preamble
138 In the 1972 UNCHE, Principle 1 declares; "Man...bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve
the environment for present and future generations." Principle 2 declares; "The natural resources of the
earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural
ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning
or management, as appropriate."
139 The 1982 World Charter for Nature reaffirms that "man must acquire the knowledge to maintain and
enhance his ability to use natural resources in a manner which ensures the preservation of the species and
ecosystems for the benefit of present and future generations." Preamble
140 The principle of intergenerational equity is introduced in the 1992 Rio Declaration, the 1992 Convention
on Climate Change and the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights.
141 See WCED Report, p. 44
142 The concept of future generations began to receive attention since it is incorporated into the concept of
sustainable development. But, the 1946 Whaling Convention had already used the term future generations,
in the same meaning as used in the concept of sustainable development.
143 For Martin Golding, future generations mean the people who are not born when the present generation is
alive. For the generation n, future generations begins from the generation n+3. See Martin Golding,
Obligations to future generations, Monist 56 (1972), pp. 85-99
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remain always in the future, it is the present generation who can stand proxy for the
future generations in claiming their rights, as in the Minors Oposa case in the Philippines
Supreme Court.144
A principle so abstract as this does not directly provide any operational rules. But
if it bears a well-founded ideological concept, it can be fecund in generating concrete
action-oriented rules. In the context of the concept of sustainable development,
intergenerational equity should be perceived as the sense of obligation that the present
generation should bear with regard to generations yet unborn, in the perspective of a
longer time frame. From this concept, a variety of policy paradigms as well as legal
obligations can be derived in dealing with nature.
3.1.1.3 Procedural elements for the application of sustainable development
As an ideological cause, sustainable development is widely embraced by international
society. But its concept remains still too abstract and too general to guide human actions
in concrete reality. Pending further concretization of the concept of sustainable
development and generation of concrete rules therefrom, international society may rely
on procedural obligations to legitimise abstract substantive norms.145 In a similar line,
Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle asserts; "Environmental impact assessment, access to
information, and public participation in decision-making perform the function of
legitimizing decisions and, if properly employed, may also improve their quality."146
The 1992 Rio Declaration requires States to undertake environmental impact
Dieter Birnbacher perceives future generations in a relatively short term. For him, future generations mean
the children and the children of the children. Or, for the generation «, future generations begin from the
generation n+1. By doing so, we can have more sense of responsibility toward future generations. See
Dieter Birnbacher, Verantwortungfur zukiinftige Generationen translated into French by Olivier Mannoni
La responsabilite envers les generations futures, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994, pp. 15-18
For John Peezy, sustainability should be considered in the time scale of millennia, since "a few thousands
years is vastly longer than any current political timescale, but does not allow significant natural genetic
evolution in human beings." John Peezy, Sustainability: An Interdisciplinary Guide, Environmental Values
1 (1992), p. 323
144 Moniors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 33 ILM (1994),
173.
145 See infra. Chapter 6, 1. Decision-making procedures
See also Jean de Munck , Normes etprocedures : les coordonnees dim debat, in Jean de Munck and Marie
Verhoeven (ed.), Les mutations du rapport a la norme, Un changement dans la modernite ? De Boeck
Universite, 1997,
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assessment as a national instrument,147 and states that environmental issues are best
handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level.148 The 1987
UNEP Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment calls for States
(including their competent authorities) not to undertake or authorize activities without
prior consideration, at an early stage, of their environmental effects.149 EIA and public
participation in the decision-making process may be helpful to decision-makers in
avoiding environmental overshooting150 or in making value judgment on the question of
what is equity, intra-generational or intergenerational.151
3.2 Evolution of the norms on sustainable development
3.2.1 Pre-UNCLOS conservation norms
At the initial stage of the development of international regimes for the conservation of
marine living resources, many multilateral treaties embraced the principle of sustainable
use paraphrased in different terms such as 'maximum sustainable catch',152 'maximum
sustainable productivity',153 'optimum sustainable yield', etc.
Tuna regimes under the 1949 Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission and the 1966 International Convention for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas employed the term 'maximum sustained catch' or
'maximum sustainable catch'. The 1956 Convention on Conservation of North Pacific
Fur Seals used the term 'maximum sustainable productivity'. The 1958 Geneva
146 Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle, 2001, op.cit, p. 95
147 Principle 17
148 Principle 10
149 UNEP Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment, 1987, Principle 1
150 The 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo
Convention) underlines the importance EIA as a means of preventing, mitigating and monitoring
significant adverse environmental impact. Preamble
For the concept of environmental overshooting, see Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen
Randers, Beyond the Limits, Global collapse or sustainable future, Earthscan, 1992, Chapter I Overshoot.
151 Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration does not explain how "Environmental issues are best handled
with the participation of all concerned citizens." But this provision can be interpreted to mean that a
consensual decision among concerned people can be best suitable for the decisions requiring value
judgment.
152 The 1949 Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission and the
1966 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
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Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas
employed the term "optimum sustainable yield".
In this variety of appellations, the basic idea is the same; to harvest living
resources in such a way as to maintain the populations of the species at the level which
will provide the greatest harvest year after year, in the context of species approach.
However, even before international society embraced the principle of sustainable
development, international society had expressed, in 1970s, its consciousness of the
necessity of harmony between development and environment, in the form of the United
Nations resolutions and declarations,154 as well as the World Charter for Nature.155
3.2.2 Conservation norms of the 1982 UNCLOS
The traditional principle of sustainable use continues to occupy the central place
in the conservationism embraced by the 1982 UNCLOS. However, this Convention has
bridged the development of the principle of sustainable use toward the principle of
sustainable development by introducing most of the components of the concept of
sustainable development; sustainable use, integration of environment and development,
intra-generational equity, and some procedural elements of sustainable development.
The concept of sustainable use underlies the 1982 UNCLOS in such terms as
'maximum sustainable yield',156 'optimum utilization',,57and 'allowable catch'.158 In order
to achieve maximum sustainable yield and optimum utilization of the marine living
resources in the exclusive economic zone, the Convention empowers and requires the
153 The 1956 Conservation ofNorth Pacific Fur Seals
154 In 1971, UN General Assembly Resolution 2849 (XXVI) on Development and the Environment
declared; development plans should be compatible with a sound ecology and that adequate environmental
conditions can be best ensured by the promotion of development, at both the national and international
levels."
The 1972 UNCHE Declaration declares, in Principle 13, "In order to achieve a more rational management
of resources and thus to improve the environment, States should adopt an integrated and co-ordinated
approach to their development planning so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to
protect and improve environment for the benefit of their population."
155 The 1982 World Charter for Nature, para.7; "In the planning and implementation of social and
economic development activities, due account shall be taken of the fact that the conservation of nature is an
integral part of those activities."
156 Articles 61, 119
157 Articles 62, 64
158 Articles 61, 119
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coastal States to determine allowable catch (TAC) in their EEZ.'59 This means that
fishing activities in EEZ should be regulated by way of licence. In the territorial sea, it is
not written but implied that the same power is vested in the coastal States a fortiori. For
the living resources of the high seas also, the 1982 UNCLOS indicates that fishing
activities will be regulated by means of allowable catch, but without specifying who is
empowered to determine the allowable catch.160 When many provisions of the
Convention call for States to apply proper conservation and management measures in
EEZ and in the high seas by means of TAC on the basis of the best scientific evidence
available, the underlying rationale is the belief that humans are able and required to act as
stewards of living resources.161 For the non-living resources under national jurisdiction,
the Convention vests virtually unrestricted rights in the coastal States. Regarding non¬
living marine resources, the main concern of the Convention was expressed on possible
conflicts between the rights of States, by stipulating "the obligation to have due regard to
the rights and duties of other States",162 "the obligation not to infringe or result in any
unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other
States",161 and "the general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment".164
As for the natural resources in the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction, the management
is entrusted to the International Sea-bed Authority. The core elements of the policy
orientation for the resources in the Area are "orderly, safe and rational management",165
and "equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in
the Area."166
Without using the term 'integration of environment and development', the 1982
UNCLOS is oriented toward the balance between the aspiration for development and the
159 Articles 61, 62, 66, 69, 70
160 Article 119 stipulates; "In determining the allowable catch and establishing other conservation measures
for the living resources in the high seas, ..."
161 Robin Attfield asserts that "there has been a strong tradition in Europe and lands of European settlement,
a tradition of Judeo-Christian origins but not confined to adherents of Judaism and Christianity, of belief
that people are the stewards of the earth, and responsible for its conservation, for its lasting improvement,
and also for the care of our fellow-creatures, its nonhuman inhabitants. Robin Attfield, The Ethics of
environmental concern, 2nd edition, The University of Georgia Press, 1991, p.45
162 Article 56 para 2





necessity of environmental protection. It expresses the desire of the States Parties to
realize "the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of
their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and
preservation of the marine environment."167 In dealing with the marine resources, the
relevant provisions of the Convention are inspired by the sense of balance between
development and environment. The very concept of EEZ signifies that the resources of
the coastal seas are to be utilized for the economic development of the coastal State. This
standpoint underlies such concepts as maximum sustainable yield and optimum
utilization.168 However, the Convention is intended to counterbalance these rights of the
coastal States with the duties of the conservation of the marine living resources169 and the
protection of the marine environment.170 Similar sense of balance between utilization of
the marine resources and environmental protection is also expressed in dealing with the
marine living resources of the high seas. When the Convention stipulates; "All States
have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas...",171 the marine
living resources of the high seas are regarded as economic resources for all peoples of the
world. But the Convention lays down the duty of States to adopt with respect to their
national measures for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas and to
cooperate in the conservation and management of living resources.172 As for the mineral
resources of the Area, the Convention treats them as resources to be utilized "to foster
healthy development of the world economy and balanced growth of international trade
and to promote international co-operation for the over-all development of all countries,
especially developing States."173 This economic purpose is counterbalanced by the
concern on the protection of the marine environment; when the Convention stipulates;
"Necessary measures shall be taken in accordance with this Convention with respect to
167 Preamble
168 Article 62, para.2 indicates more directly that marine living resources are economic resources; "In giving
access to other States to its exclusive economic zone under this article, the coastal State shall take into
account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, the significance of the living resources of the area to the
economy of the coastal State concerned and its other national interests..."
I<w Articles 56, 61
170 Article 218, 220
171 Article 116
172 Articles 117, 118, 119, 120
173 Article 150
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activities in the Area to ensure effective protection for the marine environment from
harmful effects which may arise from such activities."174
The 1982 UNCLOS does not employ the term intra-generational equity. But the
idea of intra-generational equity permeates the Convention in terms of the just and
equitable international economic order,175 and in many provisions expressing special
concerns or preferential treatment for developing States,176 land-locked States,177 and
geographically disadvantaged States.178 The concept of the right to development, if not
explicitly formulated, is embedded in many provisions expressing the aspiration for "the
equitable and efficient utilization of their resources" or "to foster healthy development of
the world economy and balanced growth of international trade and to promote
international co-operation for the over-all development of all countries, especially
developing States."
For the purpose of the protection of the marine environment, the Convention
provides some procedural elements, such as monitoring, environmental assessment and
access to information. It calls for States to endeavour to observe, measure, evaluate and
analyse, by recognized scientific methods, the risks or effects of pollution of the marine
environment, and to keep under surveillance the effects of any activities which they
permit or in which they engage in order to determine whether these activities are likely to
pollute the marine environment.179 In particular, States are required to publish reports of
the results of such monitoring and environmental assessment, 180 and to assess potential
effects of activities when States have reasonable grounds for believing that planned
activities under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or
significant and harmful changes to the marine environment.181 The Convention contains
several provisions on the right of access to information. Article 198 stipulates the
obligation of States to notify imminent or actual damage to other States deemed likely to
174 Article 145
175 Preamble
176 Preamble, Articles 61, 62, 82, 140, 143, 144, 148, 150, 152, 155, 160, 161, 164, 173,202,203,207,244,
266, 268, 269, 271, 272, 274, 276
177 Articles 69, 82, 254, 266, 269, 272, 274, Part X





be affected by such damage,l82to cooperate for the purpose of...encouraging the exchange
of information and data acquired about pollution of the marine environment. 181The duty
of States to provide scientific and technical assistance to developing countries184 can be
also understood in the context of the access to information.
As such, the 1982 UNCLOS contains almost all elements of the concept of
sustainable development. What is missing in the Convention to form the complete
concept of sustainable development is the concept of intergenerational equity. For these
reasons, the Convention can be considered to be in the process of the formation of the
concept of sustainable development. For some authors, "When examining the influence
of UNCLOS on the concept of integrated management and sustainable development of
marine resources it is necessary to indicate that the formation of this concept has been a
long process in which UNCLOS was only a beginning."185
3.2.3. Post-UNCLOS conservation norms
Continuation of the principle of Sustainable use>
Even after the adoption of the 1982 UNCLOS and the universal endorsement of the
concept of sustainable development in the 1992 UNCED, sustainable use continues to be
the central principle in many regimes for the conservation of the marine living resources.
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity employs the concept of sustainable use
together with sustainable development.186 The 1994 Bering Sea Doughnut Elole
Convention relies on the concepts of maximum sustainable yield and optimum
utilization.187 The 2001 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery
Resources in the South-East Atlantic Ocean purports to realize sustainable use of all




185 Alexander Yankov, The Law of the Sea Convention and Agenda 21: Marine Environmental Implications,
in Alan Boyle and David Freestone, (eds.) op.cit., p. 274
186 Articles 6, 8
187 Article II
188 Preamble, Articles 2, 3, 18
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<Evolution of the principle of sustainable development
The 1985 Montreal guidelines for the protection of the marine environment against
pollution from land-based sources introduced the term 'sustainable development',
without presenting any definition of the term.189 The 1987 WCED Report and the 1992
UNCED were important phases in the process of the consolidation of the principle of
sustainable development. The titles 'the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development' and 'the Declaration of the United Nations on Environment and
Development' themselves imply that the dominant theme of the conference and
declaration is sustainable development. Agenda 21, Chapter 17, adopted in the 1992 Rio
Summit, introduces sustainable development as the principal concept in the field of the
marine and coastal environment. Furthermore, by recognizing the 1982 UNCLOS as "the
legal basis for the protection and sustainable development of the marine and coastal
environment and its resources",'90 Agenda 21 tries to infuse the concept of sustainable
development into the Convention. The concept of sustainable development is introduced
also into two legally binding treaties adopted in the 1992 UNCED. The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change declares; "The Parties have a right to, and
should, promote sustainable development."'91 Convention on Biological Diversity
stipulates; "Each Contracting Party shall... Promote environmentally sound and
sustainable development in areas adjacent to protected areas with a view to furthering
protection of these areas."192 In the text of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity,
the term 'sustainable development' is used only in the context of in-situ conservation. But,
the Convention as a whole is based on the concept of sustainable development; the
objective of the Convention are the conservation of biological diversity and the
sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising
out of the utilization of genetic resources;'93 and the emphasis on the maintenance of
189 Para. 5.1
190 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, Introduction.
The General Assembly of the United Nations also infuse the concept of sustainable development into the
1982 UNCLOS, emphasizing, virtually as an annual ritual, "its fundamental importance of...for the
sustainable use and development of the seas and oceans and their resources." UNGA Resolutions
A/RES/51/34 (1997), A/RES/52/26 (1998), A/RES/53/32 (1999), A/RES/54/31 (2000), A/RES/55/7 (2001)
191 The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 3, para.4
192 Article 8, (e)
193 Article 1
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biological diversity constitutes an essential element of the concept of strong
sustainability,194
After Rio, the concept of sustainable development is welcomed by many
conventions, such as the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin
Tuna,195 the 1994 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa,196
the 1994 Energy Charter, etc.197
The 1995 Agreement relies on the concept of sustainable use, rather than
sustainable development.198
In the 1990s, the concept of sustainable development began to be introduced in
the jurisprudence of international courts. The case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
project was the first to draw attention on the concept of sustainable development in the
ICJ's jurisprudence. But the court was very cautious in using the concept of sustainable
development. Without attributing a clear legal status to the concept of sustainable
development, ICJ considered it as one of the "new norms and standards...which have to
be taken into consideration".199
3.3 Conclusion
194 Strong sustainability "would require maintaining both man-made and natural capital intact separately, on
the assumption that they are really not substitutes but complements in most productive functions." See
Herman Daly, Steady-State Economics, Second edition, 1992, Earthscan, p. 254,
For the concept of strong sustainability see also D.W. Pearce, A. Markandya and E.B. Barbier, Blueprint
for a Green Economy, 1989, Earthscan, p. 37, and Michael Redclift, Sustainable Development: Needs,
Values, Rights, Environmental Values 2 (1993), p. 18
In contrast with strong sustainability, 'weak sustainability' is based on the assumption of high degree of
substitutability between natural capital and manmade capital, in the extreme, the assumption of Principle of
Infinite Intersubstitutabi 1 ity (PII). In such a belief, sustainability is naturally understood as a simple balance
of'human welfare' across time. See Bryan Norton, Sustainability, Human Welfare, and Ecosystem Health,
Environmental Values 1 (1992), pp. 97-111, and John Peezey, Sustainability: An Interdisciplinary Guide,
Environmental Values 1 (1992), p.323
195 Article 8, para 4 (b)
196 Preamble
197 Article 19, (1)
198 The 1995 Agreement employs the term 'sustainable development' only to designate the Commission on
Sustainable Development. Article 24, para.l
199 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 25 September 1997, Judgment, para. 140.
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Sustainable development is not a new ideology but a new formulation of an old wisdom,
as Judge Weeramantry asserts; "The concept of reconciling the needs of development
with the protection of the environment is thus not new. Millennia ago these concerns
were noted and their twin demands well reconciled in a manner so meaningful as to carry
a message to our age."200
The 1982 UNCLOS bears most of the essential elements of sustainable
development which go beyond the concept of sustainable use. Although the Convention
lacks some elements of the principle of sustainable development, it is consistent
therewith. Thus, the Convention has paved the way for the introduction of the principle of
sustainable development into the law of the sea. The 1992 UNCED instruments have
accelerated this process by complementing the conceptual scheme of the principle of
sustainable development, which was inchoate in the 1982 UNCLOS.
In spite of its wide acceptance by legally binding and non-binding instruments in
the 1992 UNCED and after, the principle of sustainable development falls short of a
concrete injunction ready to dictate human behaviour, and its legal status remains
ambiguous to date.201 The meaning of each component of sustainable development is no
less abstract than that of sustainable development. However, the difficulty in applying
this abstract principle to concrete reality cannot be a reason to invalidate it. By nature, a
principle remains abstract and inapt to dictate directly human behaviour. In regime
theoretical concept, a principle is not a rule but a generator of rules. For the principle of
sustainable development to guide human behaviour, it should be translated into concrete
operational rules. This can be done through subsequent international instruments adopted
to embody the principle of sustainable development in particular issue-areas.
4. Precautionary Principle and thel982 UNCLOS
4.1 Concept of the precautionary principle
200 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 25 September 1997, Separate Opinion of Vice-
President Weeramantry
201 For Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle, "Normative uncertainty, coupled with the absence ofjusticiable
standards for review, strongly suggest that there is as yet no international legal obligation that development
must be sustainable." Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle, op.cit., p.96
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The 1984 Declaration of the International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea
was the first international instrument to adopt the concept of the precautionary approach
in the term 'precautionary measures'.202 Since then, a variety of definitions have been
proposed for the precautionary principle or precautionary approach in legal instruments
as well as in legal literature.202
4.1.1 Conceptual definitions
The Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea elaborated the
concept of precautionary approach; "in order to protect the North Sea from possibly
damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is
necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a
causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence."204 The
subsequent International Conferences on the Protection of the North Sea have continued
to reaffirm the necessity of the precautionary principle.205
It was in the 1992 UNCED that the precautionary approach was first formulated
in an international instrument adopted by global consensus.206 The 1992 UNCED
Declaration defines the precautionary approach in the following terms: "In order to
202 The Declaration of the International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea held in Bremen in
1984, para.D4.
203 It is known that the precautionary principle, as a legal principle, originated from the Vorsorgeprinzip
applied in German environmental policy and legislation in the 1970s. See Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen,
The Precautionary Principle in Germany - enabling Government, in Timothy O'Riordan & James Cameron
(ed.), Interpreting Precautionary Principle, Earthscan, 1994, pp. 31-60
See also Konrad von Moltke, The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental Policy, Institute for
European Environmental Policy, February 1987
It is recognized that the precautionary principle was philosophically inspired by Hans Jonas. Jonas has
contributed to the formation of the precautionary principle by laying particular emphasis on long-term
responsibility. See Hans Jonas, Le principe de responsabilite, traduit de l'allemand « Das Prinzip
Verantwortung, 1979 » par Jean Greisch, Flammarion, 1990.
204 Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, held in London in 1987, Ministerial
Declaration, para. VII.
205 The Ministerial Declarations adopted in the Third International Conference on the Protection of the
North Sea, held in the Hague in 1990 and the Fourth North Sea Conference held in Esbjerg in 1995 employ
the term precautionary principle instead of precautionary approach. In the Fifth North Sea Conference held
in Bergen in 2002, the Ministerial Declaration does not explicitly use the term precautionary principle or
precautionary approach, but there are many paragraphs in which the precautionary principle is embedded.
206 The concept of precautionary approach had already been introduced in the 1982 World Charter for
Nature, although the term 'precautionary approach' is not explicitly used. See para.l 1 (a), (b)
193
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation."207
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change provides the
concept of precautionary approach in similar but not identical terms: "The Parties should
take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate
change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change
should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost."208
4.1.2 Operational definitions
Conceptual definitions, as presented above, are so abstract that it is difficult to rely on
them in guiding human behaviour in concrete issue-areas.
Agenda 21, instead of formulating a conceptual definition, provides a modus
operandi to be applied in the field of the marine environment: "A precautionary and
anticipatory rather than a reactive approach is necessary to prevent the degradation of the
marine environment. This requires, inter alia, the adoption of precautionary measures,
environmental impact assessments, clean production techniques, recycling, waste audits
and minimization, construction and/or improvement of sewage treatment facilities,
quality management criteria for the proper handling of hazardous substances, and a
comprehensive approach to damaging impacts from air, land and water."209
Similarly, the 1995 Agreement provides a modus operandi of the precautionary
approach in the field of the conservation of fish stocks,210 by elaborating the "guidelines
207 The United Nations Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15
208 Article 3, para.3
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity also adopts the concept of precautionary approach, while not
explicitly using the term; "Noting also that where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of
biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures
to avoid or minimize such a threat.
209 Para. 17.21
210 The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
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for the application of precautionary reference points in conservation and management of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks."2" These guidelines require States
to use two types of precautionary reference points: Limit reference points and
Management reference points. The former set down boundaries which are intended to
constrain harvesting within safe biological limits within which the stocks can produce
maximum sustainable yield;2l2the latter are intended to meet management objectives, i. e.
to maintain or restore populations of harvested stocks, and where necessary associated
and dependent species, at levels consistent with previously agreed precautionary
reference points. When information for determining reference points for a fishery is poor
or absent, provisional reference points shall be set by analogy to similar and better-known
stocks.211
These operational definitions recommend, not only substantive measures but also
some procedural measures that States should take to reduce risks and uncertainty, such as
conducting EIA, setting limit reference points, and improving reliable knowledge and
information.
4.1.3 Elements of the precautionary principle
<Anticipatory approach>
A precautionary approach is a paradigm of risk management.214 The concept of risk is
composed of two elements; the consequences of a hazard and the probability of
occurrence of the hazard.21^ Any risk belongs to the future, as Ulrich Beck asserts; "The
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish




214 See Marc Mormont, Sociologie de la precaution: Risques et connaissances pertinentes, in Zaccai & Jean
Noel Missa (ed.), Le Principe de Precaution, Editions de I'Universite de Bruxelles, 1994, pp.183-194
See also R. Castel, La gestion des risques, Minuit, 1982
215 EU instruments define risk as the combination of the consequences of a hazard and the likelihood of the
occurrence of a hazard. In the context of the regulation of commercialization of genetically modified
organisms: A "hazard" (harmful characteristics) is defined as the potential of an organism to cause harm to
or adverse effects on human health and/or the environment. A "risk" is the combination of the magnitude of
the consequences of a hazard, if it occurs, and the likelihood that the consequences occur. See Commission
Decision 2002/623/EC of 24 July 2002, Annex I, para.4.2
Ulrich Beck defines risk in modern society as "a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities
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centre of risk consciousness lies not in the present, but in the future."2I6 A precautionary
approach commands, necessarily, anticipatory and proactive attitudes, differentiated from
reactive ones.217 This differentiation is clearly shown in Agenda 21, which states; "A
precautionary and anticipatory rather than a reactive approach is necessary to prevent the
degradation of the marine environment."218 The precautionary approach places emphasis
on preventive measures to be taken ex ante, rather than remedial or compensatory
measures ex post factof9 In this aspect, a precautionary approach is assimilated with a
preventive approach, since prevention also deals with the phase prior to the situation
where significant harm or damage might actually occur, and the duty to prevent is
opposed to the obligation to repair, remedy or compensate.220 But the distinction between
preventive measures and reactive measures is not always clear, because in many cases
reactive measures are taken not only to repair or to compensate but also to prevent the
repetition of the same damage in the future.221 In some instruments, preventive measures
are defined as actions to be taken ex postfacto to prevent or minimize damage.222
<Behaviour under uncertainty>
Whereas a precautionary approach is a new paradigm, a preventive approach is inherent
in all human behaviour. Therefore, a precautionary approach should be differentiated
induced and introduced by modernization itself." See Ulrich Beck, Risk Society, Towards a New
Modernity, translated by Mark Ritter from Riskogesellschaft: Aufdem Weg in eine andere Moderne, SAGE
Publications, 1992, p.21
216 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society, op. cit., p. 34
In other words, Ulrich Beck says, "By nature, then, risks have something to do with anticipation, with
destruction that has not yet happened but is threatening, and of course in that sense risks are already real
today." P.33
217 Vorsorge means 'beforehand or prior care and worry'. See Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, The
precautionary Principle in Germany - enabling Government, in Timothy O'Riordan & James Cameron
op.cit., 1994, p.38
218 Para. 17.21
219 See Pierre Lascoumes, La precaution comme anticipation des risques residuels et hybridation des la
responsabilite, L 'Annee sociologique, Etudes sur le risque et la rationalite, Volume 46/1996- N°2
220 Draft articles on Prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities, adopted by the
International Commission at its fifty-third session (2001), The report of the International Law Commission
on the work of its fifty-third session, 2001, p. 377
221 Alan Boyle points out; "Even in the Trail Smelter Case, Canada was ordered by the tribunal to take
specific measures to prevent future injury." See Alan Boyle, Land-based sources of marine pollution.
Marine policy, January 1992
222 For example, the 1993 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous
to the Environment defines preventive measures as "any reasonable measures taken by any person, after an
incident has occurred to prevent or minimize loss or damage..."Article 2, para.9
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from a preventive approach. There is a difference in the range of risks covered by each
approach.
Any risk is associated with uncertainty.223 The distinction between prevention and
precaution is parallel with the distinction between identified risk (risque avere) and
potential risk (risque potentiel).224 An identified risk means a risk known under
probabilistic uncertainty: the causal link is established, but the chances that a certain
event occurs can only be measured in terms of probability with a certain degree of
confidence. A potential risk means a risk under scientific uncertainty: the causal
relationship itself is not scientifically established,225 and therefore the risk is not
probabilistically quantifiable (risques non probabilisables),226 If a prudential action is
taken to avoid a risk under probabilistic uncertainty, it is preventive approach. If a
prudential action is taken to avoid a risk under scientific uncertainty, it is precautionary
behaviour.
The distinction between prevention and precaution according to this criterion can
be illustrated by comparing the measures taken in dealing with the blood contaminated by
HIV. It was in 1980 in the US and in 1981 in Europe that AIDS was first recognized. The
hypothesis of the transmission of the disease through contaminated blood was formulated
in April 1982. The causal relationship between HIV and AIDS was established in April
1984. In the course of this progress of scientific evidence, human reaction has changed.
The measure taken by the French government in June 1983 was the selection of blood
223 See Ulrich Beck, op. cit. p. 28: "Risks are /^visible. The implied causality always remains more or less
uncertain and tentative." EU definition of risk implies also uncertainty in the term "likelihood that the
consequences occur." See Commission Decision 2002/623/EC of 24 July 2002, Annex I, para.4.2
224 See Dominique Bourg & Jean-Louis Schlegel, Parer aux risques de demain, Le principe de precaution,
Editions du Seuil, p. 2001
225 The Commission of the European Communities presents three factors which trigger recourse to the
precautionary principle: Identification of potentially negative effects; Scientific evaluation; scientific
uncertainty. Scientific uncertainty results usually from five characteristics of the scientific method: the
variable chosen, the measurements made, the sample drawn, the models used and the causal relationship
employed. See Communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle COM (2000) 1 final,
para.5.1 This means that scientific uncertainty is based on a scientific presumption as a result of scientific
efforts. Scientific uncertainty should be distinguished from ignorance.
226 Philippe Kourilsky, Genevieve Viney, Le principe de precaution, Rapport au Premier minister. Editions
Odile Jacob, 2000, p. 19
See also Anthony Giddens, Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, Polity, 1991, p. 137 "The
causes and effects of climate change are not established with scientific certainty, and therefore "the dangers
posed by global warming are high-consequence risks which collectively we face, but about which precise
risk assessment is virtually impossible."
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donors. It was a precautionary measure in the sense that it was taken while the causal link
was still hypothetical and uncertain. The measure taken by the French government since
1985 is the obligatory blood test before collecting blood. This was a preventive measure
because it was taken after the causal link had been established with an acceptable degree
of scientific certainty.227
This example shows also the fact that it is not the nature of an event but the
degree of human knowledge on the event that distinguishes scientific uncertainty from
probabilistic uncertainty. In the period between April 1982 and April 1984, the risk of
AIDS through transfusion of blood contaminated with HIV remained a risk under
scientific uncertainty. After April 1984, as a result of the progress of human knowledge,
the risk of the same event has become a risk under probabilistic uncertainty.
However, the distinction between identified risk and potential risk depends not
only on objective knowledge but also on the degree of human conviction. An identified
risk does not mean a state of a complete absence of uncertainty.228It is the level of
certainty of risk required for action that distinguishes the preventive approach and
precautionary approach.229 What is the acceptable level of risk? In a situation where
causal relationship itself is not established, it is difficult or meaningless to determine an
objective criterion of the acceptable degree of risk. In such a situation, humans cannot but
rely on subjective acceptability of risk. Some authors underline the necessary
involvement of a sense of 'construction' in the configuration of risk-perception.210 For
227 See Michel Setbon, Le cas du sang contamine confronte au principe de precaution, in Philippe Kourilsky,
Geneviere Viney, op.cit., Annexe 4, pp. 387-402.
See also Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes, Yannick Barthe,, Agir dans un monde incertain, Editions du
Seuil, 2001, op. cit. p. 270
228 See Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes, Yannick Barthe, op.cit., p. 268 : « Un risque potentiel est
construit a partir d'un faisceau d'indices et d'hypotheses qui ne sont pas encore scientifiquement validees
mais permettent de declencher une alerte. Son identification repose sur la mise en relation d'informations
heterogenes, produites aussi bien par la recherche confinee que par la recherche de plein air, qui permettent
progressivement de cantonner l'incertitude...Une fois le risque avere, c'est-a-dire connu dans ses
manifestations et explique, les decisions ulterieures relevent de la prevention. Cela ne veut pas dire que
toute incertitude a disparu et que toutes les preuves sont apportees. »
229 See Daniel Bodansky, The Precautionary Principle in US Environmental Law, in Timothy O'Riodan &
James Cameron op.cit., p. 203
See also Kenneth Caiman & Denis Smith, Works in theory but not in practice? The role of the
precautionary principle in public health policy, Public Administration, an international quarterly, Volume
79 Number 1, 2001, pp. 185-204
230 Barbara Adam and Joost van Loon, Positioning Risk; the Challenge for Social Theory, in Barbara Adam,
Ulrich Beck and Joost van Loon (ed.), The Risk Society and Beyond, SAGE Publications, 2000, p. 2
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Ulrich Beck, for example, technologically induced risks, such as radioactivity, toxins and
pollutants in the air, the water and foodstuffs, which completely evade human perceptive
abilities or generally remain invisible, are based on causal interpretations, and thus only
exist in terms of the (scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them. They can thus
be changed, magnified, dramatized or minimized within knowledge, and to that extent
they are particularly open to social definition and construction,231 In this sense, risks
imply collective decision-making.232 The commercial dispute between the United States
and the European Union on the subject of trade of the genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) is a typical example of the fact that risk perception depends on social
construction.233
<Threats of serious and irreversible consequences>
A precautionary approach is a paradigm of human behaviour in coping with a certain
category of risks. It is impossible for humans to live a completely risk-free life. In
everyday life, humans run a certain degree of risks, when they eat, sleep, walk, swim,
drive a car, or take a flight. The risks in question in the precautionary principle are not the
risks of this kind but the risks which threaten serious or irreversible damage. Most, not all,
of these risks are the "new risks" introduced by modern technology (technico-
scientifically produced risks). For Anthony Giddens, these 'high-consequence risks' have
231 Ulrich Beck, op. cit, pp.22-23 Ulrich Beck asserts also: "the historically novel quality of today's risks
derives from internal decision. They depend on a simultaneous scientific and social construction. P. 155
See also Denis Duclos, La construction sociale du risque, le cas des ouvriers de la chimie face aux dangers
industriels, Revue frangaise de sociologie, XXVIII, 1 (1987), pp. 17-42
Patrick Peretti-Watel, Sociologie du risque, Armand Colin, 2000
Jane Hunt, The Social Construction of Precaution, in Timothy O'Riordan & James Cameron (ed.),
Interpreting Precautionary Principle, Earthscan, 1994, pp. 117-125
232 Barbara Adam and Joost van Loon, Positioning Risk; the Challenge for Social Theory, in Barbara Adam,
Ulrich Beck and Joost van Loon (ed.), op.cit, p. 13
See also Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture, University of California Press, 1984
Claude Fischler, Alimentation contemporaine et perception du risque, in Universite de tous les savoirs, La
nature et les Risques, Poches Odile Jacob, 2002, pp.86-97
233 The European Union regulates the commercialisation ofGMOs on the basis of the precautionary
principle: See Council Directive 90/220/EECof 23 April 1990, Council Directive 2001/18/EC of March
2001 repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, Commission Decision 2002/623/EC of 24 July 2002.
For the US government, this EU regulation does not conform to the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). See Christine Noiville et Pierre-Henri Gouyon, Principe de
precaution et organismes genetiquement modifies. Le cas du Mai's transgenique, in Philippe Kourilsky &
Genevieve Viney (ed.), op.cit., pp. 277-340
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a distinctive quality: "The more calamitous the hazards they involve, the less we have
any real experience of what we risk: for if things 'go wrong', it is already too late."234
Irreversible damage signifies technical impossibility of the return to the status quo
ante,235 while serious damage implies economic impossibility without excluding technical
possibility.236 However, the distinction between irreversible or serious damage from
ordinary damage is relative one.237
4.2 Legal implications of the precautionary principle
4.2.1 The precautionary principle and proportionality
The definition of precautionary approach is qualified by the term "cost-effective" in the
1992 UNCED Declaration, and by the term "cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits
at the lowest possible cost" in the 1992 Climate Change Convention. These qualifications
signify the integration of the concept of proportionality with the precautionary principle.
Risks lurk not only in action but also in inaction. In order to minimize damage, it
is therefore necessary to weigh the risks on both sides. If the precautionary principle is
applied in an absolutist way on the basis of cost-oblivious standards, it might cause more
serious damage or paralyze many human activities.238 The controversy on the use of DDT
234 Anthony Giddens, op.cit., p. 122
Giddens points out another character of the new risks: "Risk assessment endeavours in the case of high-
consequence risks have to be correspondingly different from those concerned with risks where outcomes
can be regularly observed and monitored - although these interpretations have to be constantly revised and
updated in the light of new theories and information."
235 For example, if a species is completely extinguished, it cannot be restored.
236 In case of serious damage, the cost of reparation or restoration is too high to undertake the restoration.
For example, if an oil tanker grounds, it would not be technically impossible to remove completely the oil
slick. For example, if a marine ecosystem is destroyed, it will be too costly and take too long to restore it.
When the cost of restoration is too high, such damage cannot be covered by insurance.
237 For example, the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East
Atlantic (Paris Convention) requires States Parties to apply the precautionary principle to all kinds of
damage, as enumerated in the definition of marine pollution: "The Contracting Parties shall apply...the
precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventive measures are to be taken when there are reasonable
grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine
environment may bring about hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems,
damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive
evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and the effects." Article 2, para.2 (a)
238 See William H. Rodgers, Jr. Benefits, Costs and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environment
Decisionmaking, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 4 (1980), pp. 191-226
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is an example of this dilemma. DDT is classified in the category of persistent organic
pollutants (POPs) that threaten the health of humans and wildlife. For this reason, WWF
has called for a global DDT ban, invoking the precautionary principle.239 On the other
hand, DDT is proven to be highly efficient in combating malaria.240 And according to
WHO, some 1.1 million people die from malaria each year.241 To use or not to use DDT?
In most developed countries where malaria has been eradicated (and DDT had
contributed much to extinguishing malaria mosquitos), DDT has been banned long
since.242 In many developing countries where the death rate due to malaria is still very
high, the damage caused by not using DDT might outweigh the damage caused by using
DDT.243 In the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, a
provisional compromise was made in such a manner as to allow the use of DDT until
appropriate substitutes will be developed.244 Similarly, most newly developed medicines
and GMOs are characterized by this kind of dual aspect of risks coming from action (use)
and inaction (nonuse). 245 If a decision-maker is one-sidedly preoccupied with the risks
239 WWF, Persistent Organic Pollutants: Hand-Me-Down Poisons That Threaten Wildlife and People, Issue
Brief. World Wildlife Fund, 1999
240 See Indur M. Goklany, Applying the Precautionary Principle in a Broader Context, in Julian Morris (ed.),
Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle, 2000, Butterworth-Fteinemann, pp. 189-228.
Roberts, D.R. et al. DDT, Global Strategies, and a Malaria Control Crisis in South America, Emerging
Infectious Diseases 3 (1997), pp. 295-301, Roberts D.R., S. Manguin, and J. Mouchet, DDT House
Spraying and Re-Emerging Malaria, Lancet 356 (2000), pp.330-32
241 WHO, The World Health report 2000, World Health Organization, 2000
242 See Environmental Defense Fund, 1997, 25 Years of DDT Ban, Bald Eagles, Osprey Numbers Soar,
Press release, June 13, 1997, www.edf.org/pubs/NewsReleases/
243 See Indur M. Goklany, The Precautionary Principle, A Critical Approach of Environmental Risk
Assessment, CATO Institute, 2001, p. 18 "The fact that the public health effects of DDT are disputed
indicates that even if they are real, they are probably not of the same order of magnitude as either the 300
million malaria cases or the 1.1 million estimated deaths due to malaria in 1999 - or they are delayed." See
also Attaran, Amir Donald R. Roberts, Chris F. Curtis, and Wenceslaus L. Klima, Balancing Risks on the
Backs of the Poor. Nature Medicine 6 (2000), pp.729-31
244 The 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, most of the 12 POPs are subject to an
immediate ban. However, a health-related exemption has been granted for DDT, under restriction. This will
permit governments to protect their citizens from malaria - a major killer in many tropical regions - until
they are able to replace DDT with chemical and non-chemical alternatives that are cost-effective and
environmentally friendly. See the Stockholm Convention, Annex B
243 See Philippe Kourilsky & Genevieve Viney, op.cit., p. 43 « Le risque d'agir doit etre compare au risque
de ne pas agir. Cette regie qui est au coeur des preoccupations et de la deontologie du corps medical, est
Fusage evident dans le domaine de la sante publique oil les alternatives du choix ont des consequences qui,
le plus souvent, apparaissent clairement. Ce n'est pas toujours le cas dans les domaines de I'alimentation ou
de l'environnement. Par exemple, on peut, a premiere vue, se dispenser des OGM pour l'alimentation
puisque, dans les pays developpes du moins, les sources alimentaires sont deja surabondantes. »
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associated with action, he may risk falling into an 'abstentionism', which is not the
objective of the precautionary principle.246
In the field of environmental protection, a strict application of the precautionary
principle could entail virtually infinite real costs247 and/or opportunity costs.248 For
example, some authors argue that requiring developing countries to reduce greenhouse
gases emissions would be particularly devastating to their prospects for economic
growth.249 Even for developed countries, drastic and immediate reduction in the use of
greenhouse gases would cause unbearable socio-economic consequences.
On the other hand, a minimalist application of the precautionary principle would
reduce the principle to the level of a preventive approach.250 Some authors point out the
danger of the cost-effective measures on the ground that such measures are too subjective
and too discretionary.251
Reasonable or rationalized precaution can be achieved by ensuring the balance
between the positive and negative effects of an action (balancing risks and benefits) as
well as the balance between the risks associated with action and those associated with
inaction (balancing risks and risks).252 This requires scientific knowledge combined with
246 See Olivier Godard, De la nature du principe de precaution, in Edwin Zaccai & Jean Noel Missa (ed.),
Le Principe de Precaution, Editions de I'Universite de Bruxelles, 2000, p.25 « Le principe de precaution
n'est pas une regie d'abstention. See also Olivier Godard, L'ambivalence de la precaution , in Olivier
Godard (dir.) Le Principe de Precaution dans la conduite des affaires humaines, Edition de la Maison des
sciences de l'homme, 1997
247 See David Fleming, The Economics of Taking Care: An Evaluation of the Precautionary Principle, in
David Freestone and Ellen Hey (ed.), The Precautionary Principle and International Law, Kluwer Law
International, 1996, pp. 147-167
248 In the dispute concerning the MOX plant, international movements of radioactive materials, and the
protection of the marine environment of the Irish Sea (Ireland v. United Kingdom), the United Kingdom
presented an argument on the basis of "the likely impact of any delay to plutonium commissioning; such as
Loss of revenue from losing contracted business, Cost to BNFL ofmaintaining the MOX Plant in a "static
state", and Damage to BNFL's competitive position caused by continuing delay" as a reason to refute the
provisional measures requested by Ireland. This is an argument based on the concept of opportunity cost.
249 See Indur M. Goklany, op.cit., p. 72, See also Indur M. Goklany, Strategies to Enhance Adaptability:
Technological Change, Economic Growth and Free Trade, Climate Change 30 (1995), pp.427-49
250 See Philippe Kourilsky & Genevieve op.cit., pp. 139-141
251 J. F. Neuray, Le droit a I'environnement et la liberte du commerce et de Findustrie. Reflexions sur un
nouveau conflit de normes, Rev. Dr. ULB, N°12, 1995, p.68 : « le recours systematique au principe de
proportionnalite n'est pas sans danger, parce que le regie est trop subjective pour offrir au justiciable une
garantie absolue. »
See also Christian Gollier, Economie du Principe de precaution, in Fran?ois Ewald, Christian Gollier,
Nocolas Sadeleer (ed.), Le Principe de Precaution, Presses Universitaires de France, 2001, pp. 104-125
252 See Andre Nollkaemper, « What you risk reveals what you value », and Other dilemmas Encountered in
the Legal Assaults on Risks, in David Freestone and Ellen Hey (ed.), op.cit, pp. 73-94
See also William H. Rodgers Jr., Benefits, Costs and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental
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social consensus (science for policy). Socially acceptable standards can be determined
through processes of political decision based on scientific expertise and transparent
public participation.253 For example, ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) and
BATNEEC (best available techniques not entailing excessive costs) are guidelines
designed to generate socially acceptable standards in the light of the concept of
proportionality.
The World Charter for Nature articulates the concept of proportionality, by
commanding the cost-effective approach: "Activities which are likely to pose a
significant risk to nature shall be preceded by an exhaustive examination; their
proponents shall demonstrate that expected benefits outweigh potential damage to
nature."254 The concept of sustainable development itself is an embodiment of this sense
of proportionality, balancing environmental protection and economic development.2'5 On
the basis of a precautionary approach qualified by proportionality, the Climate Change
Convention opts for a gradual reduction of the emission of greenhouse gases.256
Proportionality is also embedded in the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities in the sense that this principle reflects the differences between different
categories of the Parties in their socially acceptable standards. The ILC Draft Articles
also introduces the concept of proportionality in the term 'equitable balance of
interests'.257
Decisionmaking, Harvard Environmental Law Review 4 (1980)
See also Henry I. Miller and Gregory Conko, The Perils of Precaution, Why Regulators' "Precautionary
Principle" Is Doing More Harm Than Good, Policy Review, June & July 2001, pp.25-39
253 See Pierre Lascoumes, La precaution comme anticipation des risques residuels et hybridation de la
responsabilite, TAnnee sociologique. Etudes sur le risque et la rationalite, Volume 46 (1996), N°2, pp. 359-
382 See also Jacques de Gerlache, Entreprises: pour integrer precaution et proportion, in Edwin Zaccai &
Jean Noel Missa (ed.), op.cit., pp. 104-116
John S. Gray, Integrating Precautionary Scientific Methods into Decision-Making, in David Freestone and
Ellen Hey (ed.), op.cit., pp. 133-146
254 The 1982 World Charter for Nature, para.l 1 (b)
255 See E. Rehbinder Precaution and sustainable development, two sides of the same coin; in A. Kiss & F.
Burhenne-Guilmin (ed.) A Law for the Environment: Essays in honour of Wolfgang E. Burhenne, IUCN-
The World Conservation Union, 1994 pp. 93-101
256 For developing country Parties, no quantified reduction targets are set. For the Annex I Parties, 1990 is
chosen as the base year.
257 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities, adopted by the
International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001), Article 10: "In order to achieve an equitable
balance of interests...the States concerned shall take into account all relevant factors and circumstances,
including: (a) The degree of risk of significant transboundary harm and of the availability of means of
preventing such harm, or minimizing the risk thereof or repairing the harm."
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4.2.2 The precautionary principle and the burden of proof
"Actori incumbit probation" is the basic principle governing the burden of proof. When
the public authority in charge of deciding whether to allow or prohibit a certain category
of activities bears the burden of proof. Before it prohibits the production or
commercialization of a certain substance, for instance, it should justify such a decision on
the basis of scientific evidence. If not, it would encounter critics of abuse of power,
violation of equality, etc.258
If the precautionary principle is strictly applied to a situation with a high degree of
uncertainty, the burden of proof can be shifted to those who propose to undertake
activities which threaten serious or irreversible damage.259 Until and unless the operator
provides proof of the innocuousness of the proposed activities, he may not be allowed to
undertake the activities. Reversing the burden of proof can induce prevention in cases
where thresholds are not crossed and shift the balance between risks and benefits.260
However, proving complete innocuousness may require infinite costs or even
technically impracticable tasks in many cases, because negativa non sunt probanda,261 In
some situations, a strict application of burden-shifting may be therefore assimilated with
the requirement of zero risk and may induce humans to an abstentionism.262
Having this dual aspect, some authors argue that the debate on the burden-shifting
is futile, in particular in the context of sustainable development.262 The burden-shifting
may better contribute to the effectiveness of the precautionary principle when applied
case by case in accordance with appropriate evidentiary standards established in the
258 See Nicolas de Sadeleer, op.cit, p. 191
259 See William H. Rodgers Jr., Benefits, Costs and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental
Decisionmaking, Harvard Environmental Law Review 4 (1980)
260 Andre Nollkaemper, "What you risk reveals what you value ", and Other dilemmas Encountered in the
Legal Assaults on Risks, in David Freestone and Ellen Hey (ed.), op.cit, p.85
261 Julien Cazala, Principe de Precaution et procedure devant le juge international, in Charles Leben & Joe
Verhoeven (ed.), Le principe de precaution : Aspects de droit international et communautaire, Editions
Pantheon-Assas, 2002, p. 171 «Apporter la preuve de l'innocuite d'un produit pour la sante ou pour
Penvironnement, est assimilable a la recherche d'une preuve negative. Or, negativa non sunt probanda (les
faits negatifs ne se prouvent pas).
262 See Oliver Godard, op. cit., p.58
263 Julien Cazala, op. cit., pp. 162-172 Sterility
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context of proportionality,264 as the EC Commission states that the precautionary
principle does not imply automatically the shift of the burden of proof.265
The reversed burden of proof is instituted in many international instruments, in
dealing with the introduction of new substances on the market,266 the preservation of
whale species,267 the introduction of GMOs,268 the World Charter for Nature,269etc. The
burden-shifting is often translated into more concrete rules, such as the 'prior justification
rule',270 'the reverse listing'.271
4.2.3 The precautionary principle and procedural obligations
The precautionary principle indicates a general orientation of human behaviour in
particular situations. It is too abstract to guide human actions directly, as Konrad von
Moltke asserts; "Principles, such as the precautionary principle, are by definition not
operational. They are situated at a meta-level which requires explication and
264 Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle assert that "who bears the burden of proving that a risk exists cannot be
answered be reference to Principle 15 alone, but will depend on the context in which the question arises."
Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment, Oxford, 2001, p. 118
265 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the precautionary
principle, COM (2000) 1 final. Para.6.4: "Action taken under the head of the precautionary principle must
in certain cases include reversing the burden of proof and placing it on the producer, manufacturer or
importer, but such an obligation cannot be systematically entertained as a general principle. This possibility
should be examined on a case-by-case basis when a measure is adopted under the precautionary principle."
266 European Community levies the burden of proof on the producers: the introduction of new substances is
prohibited unless such substances have been proven to be safe. Council Directive 67/548/EEC on the
Approximation of the Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions of the member States Relating to
the Classification, Packing, and Labelling of Dangerous Substances. OJ 1967 L196/1, amended by
Directive 93/21/EEC, JO 1993 L 110/20
267 Before the moratorium on commercial whaling was established in 1979 by the Amendments to the
Schedule of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, the whalers demanded the sound
evidence that whales were endangered. After the moratorium, sound evidence is demanded that it is safe to
resume whaling.
268 See Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990, Council Directive 2001/18/EC of March 2001
repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, Commission Decision 2002/623/EC of 24 July 2002.
269 World Charter for Nature, 1982, para. 11 (b) provides: "Activities which are likely to pose a significant
risk to nature shall be preceded by an exhaustive examination...where potential adverse effects are not fully
understood, the activities should not proceed
270 Decision of Oslo Commission of 1989 OSCOM 89/91
271 The 1992 Paris Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North Atlantic prohibits
dumping of wastes, with the exceptions provided for in the Convention. See the 1992 Paris Convention,
Annex II, Article 3. Similarly, the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping ofWastes and Other Matter requires Contracting Parties to prohibit the dumping of
any wastes or other matter and incineration at sea of wastes or other matter, with the exceptions provided
for in the Protocol.
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operationalization."272 A principle can be operationalized either by deriving more
concrete substantive rules therefrom, or by devising procedural rules in conformity
therewith. This 'proceduralization of norms' is necessary to bridge the gap between an
abstract principle and practice.271
The precautionary principle is rooted in the ambivalent attitude of the modern
society toward science: the trend of scientific scepticism; and the necessity of further
dependency on science. Science is being demystified.274 Nevertheless, humans are
obliged to rely more and more on science. In this sense, Ulrich Beck asserts; "It is not
their failure but their success that has dethroned the sciences." 275 This dual aspect of the
man-science relationship requires the integration of science and policy when coping with
risks, and orients the formation of procedural rules under the precautionary principle in
two directions: 1) procedural rules designed to enhance cognitive rationality, individual
or collective; 2) procedural rules designed to facilitate social construction. The first
category of rules may contribute to reducing the uncertainty on the basis of available
scientific knowledge, while the second category may enhance the quality of the standards
of conduct on the basis of social consensus.
Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental Risk Assessment
While EIA had been widely introduced in many national laws and international
instruments prior to the formulation of the precautionary principle, its utility and
significance have been further increased in the context of the precautionary principle. In
international adjudications, there have been some arguments on the question of whether
EIA is inherent in the precautionary principle. But, the positions of the international
courts on the matter remain unclear.276
272 Konrad von Moltke, The Relationship between Policy, Science, Technology, Economics and Law in the
Implementation of the Precautionary Principle, in David Freestone and Ellen Hey (ed.), The Precautionary
Principle and International Law, Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 101
273 On the concept of proceduralization of norms, see infra. Chapter 6, 1. Decision-making procedures
274 See Jean-Yves Goffi, Le principe de precaution: un moment nouveau dans la philosophic de la technique,
in Edwin Zaccai & Jean Noel Missa (ed.), op.cit., pp. 203-209
275 See Ulrich Beck, Risk Society, op. cit., Chapter 7 Science beyond truth and enlightenment? pp. 155-182
276 In the Request for an examination of the situation in accordance with paragraph 63 of the court's
judgment of December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case, New Zealand invoked the
obligation of France in connection with the precautionary principle: "both by virtue of specific treaty
undertakings (in the Convention of the protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South
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In recent years, the concept of Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) is
introduced in some international instruments as a procedure designed to cope with
risks.277 By defining a process which is acceptable to most of those concerned and which
is either accessible or transparent to all key parties, risk assessment attempts to develop a
systemic approach to bridging the gap between science and policy.278
<Continuous review>
Precautionary measures are taken in situations where "most answers in science are
considered subject to revision in the light of new evidence."279 In such situations, "risk
assessment itself is risky", as Anthony Giddens asserts; "Risk assessment endeavours in
the case of high-consequence risks have to be correspondingly different from those
concerned with risks where outcomes can be regularly observed and monitored -
Pacific Region of 25 November 1986 or "Noumea Convention") and customary international law derived
from widespread international practice, France has on obligation to conduct an environmental impact
assessment before carrying out any further nuclear tests at Mururoa and Fangataufa...France's conduct is
illegal in that it causes, or likely to cause, the introduction into the marine environment of radioactive
material, France being under a obligation, before carrying out its new underground nuclear tests, to provide
evidence that they will not result in the introduction of such material to that environment, in accordance
with the "precautionary principle" very widely accepted in contemporary international law." The Court,
without mentioning this argument, dismissed the request ofNew Zealand on the grounds that it does not
fall within the provisions of the paragraph 63 of the Judgment of the Court of 20 December 1974. Request
for Examination...Order, ICJ Reports (1995), pp.288-308
In the Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary argued: "a joint environmental impact
assessment of the region and of the future of Variant C structures in the context of the sustainable
development of the region should be carried out." The Court, without giving precise significance of the
precautionary principle or the requirement of EIA, ordered both parties to take into consideration 'new
norms and standards'. ICJ Reports (1997), the Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project,
Judgment para. 125 and para. 140
The Commission of the European Communities takes the position that EI A is inherent in the precautionary
principle, when it states: "The implementation of an approach based on the precautionary principle should
start with a scientific evaluation, as complete as possible, and where possible, identifying at each stage the
degree of scientific uncertainty. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission COM (2000) 1 final, para.6.1
277 ILC provides; "Any decision in respect of the authorization of an activity within the scope of the present
articles shall, in particular, be based on an assessment of the possible transboundary harm caused by that
activity, including any environmental impact assessment." ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, adopted by ILC at its fifty-third session (2001), Article 7
Assessment of risk.
In the context of the regulation ofGMOs, EU instruments define Environmental Risk Assessment as "the
evaluation of risks to human health and the environment, whether direct or indirect, immediate or delayed,
which the deliberate release or the placing on the market ofGMOs may pose." Directive 2001/18/EC,
Article 2(8)
278 See Konrad von Moltke, The Relationship between Policy, Science, Technology, Economics and Law in
the Implementation of the Precautionary Principle, in David Freestone and Ellen Hey (ed.), op.cit., p. 100
270 Konrad von Moltke, The relationship between Policy, Science, Technology, Economics and Law in the
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although these interpretations have to be constantly revised and updated in the light of
new theories and information."280 Any measures taken under such circumstances are
provisional ones, open to a successive revision in the course of the progress of human
knowledge. In addition, serious or irreversible damage arises, in most cases, as a result of
long-term cumulative effects. Therefore, "measures based on the precautionary principle
shall be reexamined and if necessary modified depending on the results of the scientific
research and the follow up of their impact."281 The step-by-step approach, adopted in the
EU Directive in dealing with GMOs is a further example of the mechanisms of
282
continuous review.
<Exchange of information and communication and public participation>
In order to enhance the rationality in forging social consensus for risk assessment and risk
management, it is essential for the participants to share a common cognitive basis.281 The
right of access to information is not developed for the application of the precautionary
principle, but its validity is highlighted in the context of the precautionary principle.
Since socially acceptable standards can be determined through the process of political
decision based on scientific expertise and transparent public participation, exchange of
information and supply of information to the public are preconditions to an efficient
public participation, which is a necessary procedure to ensure rational collective decision¬
makings in the absence of deterministic knowledge.284
4.3 Precautionary principle and the 1982 UNCLOS
4.3.1 Preventive approach
Implementation of the Precautionary Principle, in David Freestone and Ellen Hey (ed.), op.cit, pp.97-108
280 Anthony Giddens, op.cit., p. 122
281 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the precautionary
principle. COM (2000) 1 final, para.6.3
ILC states also; "the precautionary principle implies the need for States to review their obligations of
prevention in a continuous manner to keep abreast with the advances in scientific knowledge." ILC, Draft
Articles on Prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities, 2001, General commentary.
282 See Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive
90/220/EEC, Preamble, para. (24)
283 For the right to information, see infra. Chapter 6, 3. Compliance system
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The general paradigm for the protection of the marine environment and the conservation
of the marine living resources embraced by the 1982 UNCLOS can be qualified as a
preventive approach.285
Under the general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment,286
States shall take all measures that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution
of the marine environment.287 For this, States are required to adopt laws and
regulations,288 to enforce them,289 to cooperate to establish international rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures,290 to provide technical assistance,291 to
monitor and assess the risks and effects of pollution.292 All of these obligations are aimed
at preventing, reducing and controlling marine pollution from any source. Measures taken
to prevent marine pollution belong to a preventive approach. Measures to reduce and
control marine pollution are remedial actions and therefore belong to a reactive approach.
Since a preventive approach is not contradictory with but complementary to a reactive
approach, the 1982 UNCLOS can be said to embrace both approaches.
Under the 1982 UNCLOS, the measures that States are required to take in
utilizing and conserving the marine living resources belong mostly to a preventive
approach. In the exclusive economic zones, the coastal States are required to promote the
objective of optimum utilization of the living resources, 293 to determine the allowable
catch at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield.294 These obligations of
the coastal States are directed to the balance between exploitation and conservation of the
marine living resources. For the conservation of the species that have particular
284 See infra. Chapter 6, 3.Compliance system
285 For Ulrich Beyerlin, it appears that UNCLOS follows a preventive approach which does not meet the
specific demands of the precautionary principle. The latter was unknown at the time when UNCLOS was
agreed upon. Nevertheless, the shift from remedial to preventive action was certainly a decisive step
forward. Ulrich Beyerlin, New Developments in the Protection of the Marine Environment: Potential
Effects of the Rio Process, ZAORV, 1995, p. 554
286 Article 192
287 Article 194
288 Articles 207 to 212
289 Articles 213 to 222
290 Article 197
291 Article 202




characteristics, such as straddling fish stocks, transboundary fish stocks, marine
mammals, anadromous stocks, catadromous stocks, the Convention lays down similar
obligations, but puts more emphasis on cooperation among all States. 295 Conservation
measures here means preventive measures in that the conservation is nothing but the
prevention of depletion or over-exploitation.
With regard to the marine living resources of the high seas, States have
obligations of the same nature. States are required to determine the allowable catch at
levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield and to take other conservation
measures for the marine living resources of the high seas.296
4.3.2 Elements of the precautionary approach
In spite of its apparent preventive approach, the 1982 UNCLOS contains some provisions
which can be interpreted as elements of the precautionary principle, or at least as clauses
which may facilitate the application of the precautionary principle under the framework
of the Convention.
The definition of pollution of the marine environment provided in the 1982
UNCLOS includes the concept of potential risks: "pollution of the marine environment
means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such
deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health,
hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea,
impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities."297 The term
"which...is likely to result in such deleterious effects" is the expression which refers to
hypothetical and uncertain risks. On the other hand, the Convention requires States to
take all measures necessary to prevent pollution of the marine environment from every
source.298 This means that States are under obligation to take all preventive measures not
only against identified risks but also potential risks. Although the Convention does not
295 Articles 63 to 67
296 Article 119
297 Article 1, para. 1 (4)
298 Article 194
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employ the term "serious or irreversible damage", preventive measures are required a
fortiori where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage.
The provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS relating to particularly dangerous situations
are virtually complete versions of the precautionary principle. Regarding marine
pollution in ice-covered areas, the Convention stipulates; "Coastal States have the right to
adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction
and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas, where pollution of the
marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the
ecological balance...based on the best available scientific evidence."2WConsidering the
serious damage in the event of an accident of nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying
nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances, the Convention requires
such ships to observe special precautionary measures established for such ships by
international agreements.300
The 1982 UNCLOS provides for many procedural obligations which would be
required in applying the precautionary principle. The Convention pays particular
attention to potential risks, by requiring States to keep under surveillance the effects of
any activities which they permit or in which they engage in order to determine whether
these activities are likely to pollute the marine environment.30' Furthermore, "when States
have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under their jurisdiction or
control may cause substantial pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the
marine environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential effects of such
activities on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of the results of such
assessments." This is an articulation of the precautionary principle in all aspects but in
name. The Convention provides for the obligations of exchange of information and
publication of reports, which are also indispensable procedural obligations when applying
the precautionary principle.302 The Convention provides for the mechanisms of






to re-examine from time to time the rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures established at the global or regional level.301
As in other fields where the precautionary principle is applied, scientific
knowledge is always insufficient but an indispensable condition to the rational human
response to uncertain risks in the field of marine environment. The transfer of technology
is a procedural obligation necessary to form a common cognitive basis at the global level.
The 1982 UNCLOS dedicates a special part (Part XIV) to the issues of development and
transfer of marine technology. The development of marine technology is a multipurpose
activity. As enumerated in the Convention, the protection and preservation of the marine
environment as well as the conservation of marine resources are among the objectives of
the development of marine scientific and technological capacity.304 The Convention calls
for international cooperation for the development and transfer of marine technology
though bilateral, regional or multilateral channels.305
As such, many elements of the precautionary principle are embedded in many
provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS. By virtue of these provisions, there would be no
difficulty in incorporating into the framework of the Convention newly developed rules
in the subsequent instruments for the application of the precautionary principle to the
issue-area of the protection of the marine environment.
4.4 Post-UNCLOS development of the precautionary principle
The precautionary principle, first conceived in the 1980s in the regime for the protection
of the marine environment of the North Sea, has rapidly proliferated since 1990s in many
international or regional agreements in the issue-areas of the protection of the marine
environment from pollution and the conservation of the marine living resources.
The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and
Cooperation emphasizes precautionary measures in avoiding oil pollution in the first
instance, and sets down procedural rules necessary to take precautionary measures, such
as oil pollution emergency plans, reporting procedures, exchange of information,
303 Articles 207, 208, 209, 210, 211
304 Article 266, para.2
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reporting, R&D and technical cooperation. The 1992 Convention on the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area introduces the precautionary principle as one
of the fundamental principles and obligations and includes a trigger clause for the
recourse to the precautionary principle (reason to assume).306 The 1992 Paris Convention
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (the OSPAR
Convention) adopts the precautionary principle as one of the general obligations.307 The
1996 Protocol to the Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of
wastes and other matter introduces the precautionary approach. In this protocol the
precautionary principle is not adopted as a declaratory principle but materialized into the
reverse list method.308
In the issue-area of the conservation of the marine living resources, the 1995 FAO
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries provides for a set of guidelines for the
application of the precautionary approach to the conservation, management and
exploitation of fisheries resources.309 The 1995 Agreement embraces the precautionary
approach to the conservation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks at
the global level.310
In the regional regimes, the North Sea regime was the forerunner in introducing
the precautionary principle, as noted above. The precautionary principle or precautionary
approach is introduced in many other regional instruments in a variety of formulations.3"
305 Articles 270, 272
306 Article 3, para.2: "The Contracting Parties shall apply the precautionary principle, i.e., to take preventive
measures when there is reason to assume that substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into
the marine environment may create hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems,
damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea even when there is no conclusive
evidence of a causal relationship between inputs and their alleged effects."
307 Article 2, 2 (a): "...preventive measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern
that substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about
hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with
other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between
the inputs and the effects;"
308 The 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and
other matter, 1972, Articles 4, Annex I, II. See also supra. Chapter 3
309 See Para 7.5 Precautionary approach
310 See Articles 5, 6 and Annex II
31lSee, inter alia, the 1997 Agreement for the Establishment of a General Fisheries Commission for the
Mediterranean, the 1999 Agreement between the Government of Iceland, the Government ofNorway and
the Government of the Russia Federation Concerning Certain Aspects ofCooperation in the Area of
Fisheries, the 1999 Agreement for the Establishment of the Regional Commission for Fisheries (concluded
among Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE.), the 2000 Framework Agreement
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In the European Union, the precautionary principle was introduced into the 1992
Maastricht Treaty on European Union, and thereby has gained the status of one of the
basic environmental principles of the European Community which must be integrated
into the definition and implementation of other Community policies.112
Compared with international law-makers, international courts have so far shown
themselves more cautious in dealing with arguments based on the precautionary principle.
In the Request for an Examination of the Situation and the case concerning the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ did not pronounce an explicit position on the legal
value of the precautionary principle, invoked respectively by New Zealand and Hungary.
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, the complainants (Australia/New Zealand) argued on
the basis of the precautionary principle,111 but the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea did not expressly address the applicability of the precautionary principle,
although it took into account the concept of the principle.314 In the MOX plant case, the
for the Conservation of Living Marine Resources on the High Seas of the South Pacific (The Galapagos
Agreement), the 2000 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, the 2001 Convention on the Conservation and Management of
Fishery Resources in the South-East Atlantic Ocean, the Agreement on the International Dolphin
Conservation Program (AIDCP amended in 2002).
312 Treaty on European Union (the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht on European Union), Article I30R (which
became Article 174 of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam on European Union): " 2. Community policy on the
environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the
various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles
that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source
and that the polluter should pay. Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the
definitions of implementation of other Community policies."
313 In their request for provisional measures, New Zealand and Australia invoked "the requirements of the
precautionary principle". ITLOS, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 1999, Requests for provisional measures,
Order
314 ITLOS, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, Requests for provisional measures, 1999, Order
The Tribunal implied its consideration of the precautionary principles in vague terms; "in the view of the
Tribunal, the parties should in the circumstances act with prudence and caution to ensure that effective
conservation measures are taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of southern bluefin tuna;... there is
scientific uncertainty regarding measures to be taken to conserve the stock of southern bluefin tuna..."
Order paras.77, 79 By giving order to refrain from conducting an experimental fishing programme, the
Tribunal embraced the precautionary principle implicitly.
Francisco Orrego Vicuna considers that ITLOS's decision is the first to apply the precautionary
approach within the limited meaning to a dispute on high seas fisheries. Francisco Orrego Vicuna, From the
1893 Bering Sea Fur Seals Case to the 1999 Southern Bluefin Tuna cases: A Century of Efforts at
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, YIEL, Vol.10 (1999), p. 44
But, the following observation would be more pertinent:
"Le Tribunal, tout en se gardant de prendre clairement position sur la nature juridique ou pas du principe,
devait toutefois indiquer que les parties au differend se doivent d'agir avec prudence et precaution...On
observera cependant que la notion meme de precaution semble implicitement liee a celle de mesures
conservatoire: en prescrivant ce type de mesures, le juge vise par precaution a preserver une situation
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complainant, Ireland invoked the precautionary principle more fervently,3l5but ITLOS
was more cautious in expressing its position on the principle.316 The jurisprudence of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities is more favourable to the precautionary
principle. The Court, without explicitly referring to the precautionary principle, has
implicitly recognized the precautionary principle by admitting the legality of the
measures taken by the European Council to regulate the use of driftnets on the grounds
that the absence of conclusive scientific evidence cannot prevent the Council from
adopting such measures,317 and the legality of the emergency measures taken by the
European Commission against bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Mad cow disease).318
4.5 Conclusion
Although the precautionary principle has widely proliferated into international
instruments, binding or non-binding, its meaning remains polysemous and its legal status
unclear.
incertaines." Marie-Pierre LANFRANCHI & Sandrine MALJEAN-DUBOIS, Le Controle juridictionnel
sur le plan international, in Sandrine MALJEAN-DUBOIS (dir.) L'effectivite du droit europeen de
l'environnement, La documentation frangaise, 2000, pp.269-270
315 In the Mox Plant case, Ireland argued: "...the precautionary principle is now recognised as a rule of
customary international law, that it is binding upon Ireland and the United Kingdom, and that it is of
singular importance for the provisional measures phase of this case. The precautionary principle is a free¬
standing obligation which binds the United Kingdom but which it has failed to apply, and it is a principle
applicable to the interpretation of each and every provision of LOSC upon which Ireland relies."
The MOX Plant case, Request for Provisional measures and Statement of case of Ireland, para.97
The United Kingdom replied that it is generally accepted that the precautionary principle can operate only
where there are some reasonable grounds for concern. The MOX Plant case, Written Response of the
United Kingdom.
3,6 ITLOS expressed its view that "prudence and caution require that Ireland and the United Kingdom
cooperate in exchanging information concerning risks or effects of the operation of the MOX plant and in
devising ways to deal with them, as appropriate," and prescribed, pending a decision by the arbitral tribunal,
that "Ireland and the United Kingdom shall cooperate and...enter into consultations in order to exchange
further information with regard to possible consequences...and monitor risks or the effects of the operation
of the MOX plant..." ITLOS, The Mox Plant Case Order, 3 December 2001, para.84, 89
In this ways, showed an ambiguous position with regard the precautionary principle.
317 The European Court of Justice declared: "It follows from the very wording of that provision that the
measures for the conservation of fishery resources need not be completely consistent with the scientific
advice and the absence of such advice or the fact that it is inconclusive cannot prevent the Council from
adopting such measures as it deems necessary for achieving the objectives of the common fisheries policy."
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 24 November 1993. Case C-405/92.European Court reports
1993 Page 1-06133, Grounds of the judgment, para.31
318 See the Court of Justice of the European Communities, Judgment of the Court, 5 May 1998 (Agriculture
- Animal health - Emergency measures against bovine spongiform encephalopathy - 'Mad cow disease')
Case C-180/96, and Order of the Court, Case C-180/96 R. European Court reports 1996
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The legal status of the precautionary approach embraced by international "soft
law" instruments is as ambiguous as that of the "soft law" instruments.319 In the binding
instruments, the wordings introducing the precautionary principle or the precautionary
approach differ from instrument to instrument. In most instruments dealing with the
conservation of the marine living resources, the precautionary principle is formulated in
abstract terms as one of the general principles. Some instruments provide rather concrete
guidelines for the application of the precautionary approach, either by incorporating the
rules set down in the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries or the Annex
II of the 1995 Agreement.320 The reverse listing method adopted in the 1996 Protocol to
the London Dumping Convention is a concrete application of the precautionary
principle.321
As such, the meaning and applicability of the precautionary principle differ from
instrument to instrument. Therefore, the legal status of the precautionary principle should
be perceived case by case in the context of each instrument and in the light of the
language employed therein. In general terms, it would be difficult to say, at this stage,
that the precautionary principle is a free-standing obligation or a rule of customary
international law.322
Although the basic paradigm for the protection of the marine environment
embraced by the 1982 UNCLOS is the preventive approach, the precautionary principle
319 See a series of the ministerial declarations adopted in the International Conference on the Protection of
the North Sea: The 1984 Bremen Declaration (the first), para.D4; the 1987 London Declaration (the
second), para.VII; the 1990 Hague Declaration (the third); the 1995 Esbjerg 1995 Declaration (the fourth);
the 2002 Bergen Declaration (the Fifth) The 1992 Rio Declaration, the Agenda 21, etc.
320 See the 2001 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South-East
Atlantic Ocean, Article 7 Application of the precautionary approach, and the 2000 Convention on the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
Article 6
321 See Articles 4, 5, 8 and Annex I
322 See Pierre-Maire DUPUY, Le principe de precaution regie emergente du droit international general, in
Charles Leben et Joe Verhoeven (ed.), Le principe de precaution : Aspects de droit international et
communautaire, Editions Pantheon-Assas, Paris, 2002, p.95 «Dire du principe de precaution qu'il constitue
d'ores et deja un principe 'emergente' du droit international signifie que son affirmation progressive en tant
que regie de droit positif, enonce par un nombre croissant d'instruments juridique dont beaucoup sont
conventionnels, constitue un phenomene socio-juridique en cours de developpement. Principe deja
consacre sur des bases conventionnelles determinees, done au titre de 'les specialis', le principe de
precaution n'a sans doute pas encore acquis, en droit international general, la consistance et la precision
necessaire pour qu'on puisse y deceler l'expression d'une 'opiniojuris' collective suffisamment forte et
unanime pour engendrer une regie de droit coutumier.»
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is developing in the regime under the Convention through many mechanisms of evolution
examined in Chapter 3.
5. Equality of States and Equitable International Order
5.1 Equality of States and Equity
As discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of equality of States is inseparable from that of
sovereignty. Equality of States constitutes one of the fundamental principles of the
contemporary international law enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.323 Equity
is an inherent principle of international law, as ICJ states: "Equity as a legal concept is a
direct emanation of the idea of justice",324 and "Whatever the legal reasoning of a court of
justice, its decisions must by definition be just, and therefore in that sense equitable."325
However, in some situations, equality and equity do not concord very well.
In legal literature, the doctrine of absolute sovereign equality developed as a
reflection of the concept of sovereignty.326 In State practice, the 1648 Treaty of
Westphalia is usually recognized as the beginning of the transition from the vertical
323 Article 2, para. 1
324 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) Judgement, ICJ Reports 1982, p. 60, para.71
325 Judgements of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints made against UNESCO, ICJ
Reports 1956, p. 100
Similarly, the Institut de Droit International states: "1'equite est normalement inherente a une saine
application du droit." Resolution de 1'Institut de Droit International (1937) 38 Annuaire de I'lnstitut de
Droit International 271
326 In the seventeenth century, the concept of equality of States was conceived as being implied in the
concept of sovereignty, in particular in that of independence and territorial integrity.
In the theory of Jean Bodin, recognized as the precursor of the principle of sovereignty, the essence of the
concept of sovereignty was the autonomy of the sovereign, i.e. the power to make its own law. See Jean
Bodin, Six Livres de la Republique, 1576. On Jean Bodin, see also Gerard Mairet, Le principe de
souverainete, Gallimard, 1997, and Simone Goyard-Fabre, Jean Bodin, Ellipses, 1999
Grotius himself did not advance the concept of equality of States. However, when he formulated the
concept of the law of nations, jus gentium, as the law which has received its obligatory force from the will
of all nations or ofmany, and which belongs to that society which is established by nations amongst
themselves, the necessity of equality was already implied therein. Many other theorists of the seventeenth
century, such as Suarez, Gentilli, Hobbes, Pufendorf, etc. developed the doctrines of sovereignty and
independence, by conceiving the world as a society composed of separate, independent States, contrasted
with the world under the authority of Pope or Emperor. Even though they didn't formulate explicitly the
doctrine of sovereign equality, it was implied in their concept of independence and territorial integrity of
States.
See P. H. Kooijmans, The Doctrine of the equality of States, A.W. Sythhoff- Leyden, 1964
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imperial to the horizontal interstate model.327 However, before the end of the Second
World War, there was a wide gap between the doctrine and the practice concerning
sovereign equality. The application of the doctrine was limited to the relationship among
the members of the club of selected western States. On a global scale, in particular during
the age of colonialism and imperialism, the doctrine of sovereign equality was never
applied to interstate relations.328 After the Second World War, this gap between theory
and practice has narrowed. In theory, the concept of equality of States has been
relativized.329 In practice, the principle has been more effectively applied under the
Charter of the United Nations.
In the contemporary world, central concepts of international law, such as
territorial integrity, non-intervention, self-defence or permanent sovereignty over natural
resources all rely on the exclusive or dominant role of the State.330 However, the concept
of sovereignty itself is undergoing an evolution, due to challenges coming from several
sides.331
First, the concept of sovereignty is evolving under the influence of non-State
actors in international life. As ICJ declared; "Throughout the history, the development of
international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life, and the
progressive increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise to
327 See R. Faulk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order, in R.
Faulk & C. Black (ed.), The Future of the International Legal Order, vol. 1 (1969), pp. 32-43
See also Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalen Myth, IO 55, 2,
Spring 2001, pp. 251 -287
328 In the age of imperialism, it was a common practice for the imperial powers to impose unilateral
extraterritorial jurisdiction on weak States. In addition, many States were under the suzerainty of other
countries, e.g. Egypt under the suzerainty of the Sultan ofOttoman Turkey from 1840 to 1914.
329 The doctrine of the absolute sovereignty and the doctrine of the absolute equality of States were
established by the authors of natural law. Many positivists have contested these doctrines. In particular,
Hans Kelsen, among others, is an opponent of the doctrine of the absolute equality of States. Stating that
the dogma of absolute equality of States arises mainly from two fundamental hypotheses, namely, that of
the unlimited sovereignty of the State and that of fundamental or natural rights, Kelsen admits neither of
these hypotheses. For him, in the context of the hierarchy of norms, sovereignty of the State is the legal
authority of the States under the authority of international law, and therefore means only that legal authority
of States is solely restricted by international law and not by the national law of another State.
See Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization,
Yale Law Journal, vol. 53 (1944)
M. J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant ? AJIL, vol. 84 (1990)
330 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, 32 Harvard International Law Journal (1991)
331 See Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, EJIL, Vol. 9, 1998
See also Eli Lauterpacht, Sovereignty - Myth or reality? International Affairs vol.73, No. 1(1997)
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instances of action on the international plane by certain entities which are not States",332
the exclusive status of States as the subjects of international law has been mitigated by
the entry onto the scene of non-States actors, such as international organizations,333
NGOs,334 and individuals,335 although the competence of these non-State actors under
international law is limited to varying degrees.336
Second, "sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct",337 by being eroded or challenged
by universal values, such as human rights and the global environment. Although the
principle of non-intervention, as a component of the concept of sovereignty, is
consolidated in the Charter of the United Nations,338 it is challenged by the cause of the
protection of human rights, which is defined as one of the purposes of the Charter.339In
some situations where a serious violation of fundamental human rights has occurred, the
Security Council has formed United Nations missions to intervene in the internal affairs
of a sovereign State for the protection of human rights or has authorized the use of
332 In the Advisory Opinion on the question of the reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the
United Nations, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 178
333 In the Advisory Opinion on the question of the reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the
United Nations, ICJ declared; "the attribution of international personality to the United Nations is
indispensable."
ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 178
In practice, international organizations are allowed to become parties to many international conventions,
although their legal capacity is limited, as in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (Article 1, para.2 (2)
334 In some international regimes, NGOs are recognized as partners of the States. In some regimes, NGOs
are even entrusted with the role of secretariat of international conventions. See infra. Chapter 5
335 The international legal personality of individuals is primarily, but not exclusively, recognized in human
rights law and international criminal law. In the advisory opinion concerning the Danzig Railway Officials
case, PCIJ declared that there is nothing in international law to prevent individuals from acquiring directly
rights under a treaty provided that this is the intention of the contracting parties. PCIJ Rep. Series B, N°11
(1925) In the Nuremberg Trial and Tokyo Trial, the Tribunal declared: "Crimes against international law
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes
can provisions of international law be enforced." Ed. 41 AJIL, 221 (1947). Article 25 of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, stipulates individual criminal responsibility. There are many other
treaties which recognize the international legal personality of individuals, to a limited extent.
336 See Christopher Schreuer, The waning of the Sovereign state: Towards a New paradigm for
International Law, European Journal of International Law, vol. 4, 1993, N° 4
Stephen Hobe, Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role ofNongovernmental
Organizations, Indiana Journal ofGlobal Legal Studies, vol. 5, Fall 1997
337 J. Chopra & T.G. Weisse, Sovereignty is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention
(1992) 6 Ethics & International Affairs, pp.95-117
338 The Charter of the United Nations, Article 2 (7)
339 In the Preamble, the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms "faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person..." In Article I (3), "international cooperation... in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights..." is included in the purposes of the United Nations.
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force.340 Such humanitarian interventions, easily understandable from a humanitarian
point of view but hardly reconcilable with the principle of non-intervention, have entailed
many controversies.341
340 See the following resolutions of the Security Council;
Resolution 688 of5 April I991and subsequent resolutions concerning the intervention in Iraq to relieve
the Iraqi civilian population in particular the Kurdish population from repression inflicted by the Iraqi
authorities.
Resolution 767 of 27 July 1992 and subsequent resolutions concerning the intervention for the delivery
of humanitarian assistance and the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia.
Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992 and subsequent resolutions concerning the intervention by the
United Nations Protection Force for the relief operation in Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Resolution 867 of 23 September 1993 and subsequent resolutions concerning the establishment of the
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and United Nations Police Monitors (UNPMS) to protect
human rights by stabilizing the internal situation in Haiti.
341 See Charles Zorgbibe, Le Droit d'ingerence, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994, Mario Bettati, Le
droit d'ingerence, Odile Jacob, 1996, Michael J. Glennon, Sovereignty and Community after Haiti:
Rethinking the collective use of force, AJIL, vol. 89 (1995); W.D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention
under International Law, Netherlands International Law Review, vol. XXXII, 1985/3; Thomas M. Franck
and Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, AJIL,
Vol. 67 (1973)
For some authors, humanitarian intervention can be justified through a reinterpretation of the concept of
sovereignty: "sovereignty today means the people's sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty."
W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law, AJIL, vol. 84
(1990)
Others find a justification of humanitarian intervention in the relativity of the concepts of the terms
employed in Article 2 (7) of the Charter, i.e. "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state' and 'intervene'. See Mario Bettati, op.cit., pp.20-21 : « Tout depend de ce qu'on entend par
' affaires qui relevent essentiellement de la competence nationale ' et par' intervenir'. On comprendra que
le gouvernement jaloux de leur souverainete et militants de la non-ingerence adoptent une liste aussi large
que possible de ces ' affaires ' et qu'ils considerent comme ' intervention ' la moindre indiscretion sur leurs
comportements internes. On comprend, a l'inverse, que les defenseurs des droits de I'individu s'efforcent
d'abord d'exclure de ces 'affaires ' tout ce qui concerne les liberies fondamentales et le sort reserve aux
etres humains vivant dans un perimetre etatique, puis de reduire la notion d' intervention au cas
d'incursions violentes.
On the other side, there are some authors who are reluctant to recognize the legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention. Some of them assert that a unilateral resort to force can be justified only in case of self-
defense. See Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, University ofChicago
Law Review, 1986, p. 113
For Bernhard Graefrath, the machinery of the United Nations is not endowed with the mechanism of
intervention as a reaction against serious violations of human rights and therefore the solution of these
problems through armed intervention undermines the very foundation of the international legal order. See
Bernhard Graefrath, Ingerence et droit international, Les nouveaux cahiers de l'lnstitut Universitaire
d'etudes du Developpement, Derives humanitaires, 1994 , N° 1, pp. 17-32
In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, ICJ has taken a
negative position regarding the military intervention undertaken at the request of the opposition, by stating
"The principle of non-intervention derives from customary international law. It would certainly lose its
effectiveness as a principle of law if intervention were to be justified by a mere request for assistance made
by an opposition group in another State... Indeed, it is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of
non-intervention in international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the
government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition. This would permit any State
to intervene at any moment in the internal affairs of another State, whether at the request of the government
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The protection of the global environment is also a universal value which may
enter into conflict with the concept of spatial-territorial sovereignty. The responsibility of
States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction was
recognized as a principle of customary international law.342 It has been reiterated in
universal instruments, although counterbalanced by the sovereign right of States to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies.343 In particular,
concerning situations where activities conducted in a territory produce adverse effects on
humanity as a whole, the concept of ecological intervention (Eco-intervention) has been
proposed.344 Some authors propose somewhat radical ideas, such as the creation of the
Ecological Security Council,345 or the Green Helmets,346 etc. A prominent example of the
idea of ecological intervention is the debate on the effects of exploitation of tropical
rainforest on climate change.347 In particular, there are pressures from many countries on
the Brazilian government to preserve the Amazon as a public good.348 Some authors
present the rationale of the ecological intervention on the grounds that appropriation of
the Amazon leaves the rest of the international community disadvantaged, and will not
leave "enough and as good" for other peoples and future generations,349 that the oxygen
produced by the Amazonian forest should be declared common heritage of mankind,350or
or at the request of its opposition." But, the military intervention in Nicaragua should be differentiated from
humanitarian interventions undertaken on the basis of the Security Council's resolution.
342 See Trail Smelter case, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, the Lac Lanoux Case, 24 ILR 1957, the Nuclear Test cases, ICJ
Reports 1974
343 The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Principle 21, the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, Principle 2
344 See Laurence Boissons de Chazournes, Variations juridiques sur le theme de l'ingerence ecologique,
Nouveaux cahiers de I'lnstitut Universitaire d'etudes du developpement, N° 3, 1995, pp. 53-59, Andrea
Dall'Aglio, ingerence ecologique : un debat, Noitveaivc cahiers N° 3, 1995, p. 169-191, M. Bachelet,
L'ingerence ecologique, Frison-Roche, Paris, 1995
345 See P. Mische, National Sovereignty and Environmental Law, in S. Bilderbeek (ed.). Biodiversity in
International law, OIS Press, 1992, Oxford, pp. 105-114 and R. Wilson, A Comprehensive Approach to
Global Environmental Problems, in S. Bilderbeek (ed.).
346 See L. A. Malone, Green Helmets: A Conceptual Framework for Security Council Authority in
Environmental Emergencies, (1996) 17 Michigan Journal ofInternational Law pp.515-536.
347 See Jose Goldemberg & Eunice Ribeiro Durham, Amazonia and National Sovereignty, International
Environmental Affairs, vol. 2 N°l, Winter 1990
348 See R.M. McClearly, The International Communities Claim to Rights in Brazilian Amazonia (1991) 39
Political Studies pp. 691-707
349 See C.R. Beitz, Justice and International Relations, in Beitz C.R. et al., (ed.) International Ethics,
Princeton University Press, pp. 282-311
350 See A.A. Cocca, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Doctrine and Principles of Space Law: An
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that Brazil must realize that they are not conserving their forests, but are determining the
future of mankind.151 Against these claims, the Brazilian government defends its policy
on the basis of the concept of sovereignty and the Principle of the Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources.352
If the concept of sovereignty is relativized, so is the concept of equality of States.
There is another type of the evolution of the principle of equality of States
through its adaptation to contextual differences.
In the field of international economic relations, it is commonplace for States to
institute preferential treatment in favour of disadvantaged States. The Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) applied to the LDCs is a typical example.351 Preferential
treatment mean unequal treatment, which can be justified for several reasons. Such a
treatment is not considered as an impairment of the sovereignty of the beneficiary States,
because it is not imposed on them but requested by them. Such a differentiated treatment
can be considered to be more equitable and fair than a treatment on mechanical equal
footing.
Since the 1970s, developing States have claimed a new principle embodying more
equitable considerations for the economically disadvantaged States. After having adopted
the United Nations Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources154
in 1962, developing States, reinforced in number by newborn States, claimed in the 1970s
a more equitable new order based on "welfare principles" rather than on free-market
forces, with a view to narrowing the gulf between rich and poor countries. This claim was
crystallized into the "Declaration on the Establishment of New International Economic
Order (NIEO)", embracing the principles of equity, sovereign equality, common interest
and cooperation among all States.155
Overview (1986) 29th Collections on the Law ofOuter Space pp. 17-24
351 W. McGee & K. Zimmerman, The Deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon: Law, Politics and
International Cooperation (1990) 21/3 University ofMiami Inter-American Law Review, pp. 513-550
352 The Brazilian Government has declared: "We are masters of our destiny and will not permit any
interference in our territory.' See R. M. Mc Clearly, The International Communities Claim to Rights in
Brazilian Amazonia (1991) 39 Political Studies, pp. 691-707
353 Under GSP, each industrial country would admit some quantity of imports from less-developed
countries either free of tariffs or at a lower rate than what other exporters pay. See Richard E. Caves &
Ronald W. Jones, World Trade and Payments, Fourth Edition, Little, Brown and Company, 1985, p. 257
354 UNGA Res. 1803 : UN Doc. A/5217 (1962)
355 UNGA Res. 3201: UN Doc. A/9559 (1974)
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In the field of environmental protection, the idea of the necessity of asymmetrical
standards, first reflected in the Stockholm Declaration,356 has evolved into the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities in some issue-areas. In the field of the law of
the sea, the ideology of equitable international order is embodied in many provisions of
the Convention stipulating preferential treatments of developing States and other
disadvantaged States.
5.2 Principles of equality and equity in the 1982 UNCLOS
5.2.1 Application of the principle of equality of States
The principle of equality of States embodied in the Charter of the United Nations is
introduced into the 1982 UNCLOS in different expressions.357 Throughout the
Convention, this principle is translated into the principle of non-discrimination that
underlies the norms and rules governing navigation, the conservation of living resources
of the high seas, the prevention of the marine environment, and the exploitation of
mineral resources in the Area.
In respect of navigation, the coastal State is prohibited from discriminating in
form or in fact against the ships of any State, in allowing the innocent passage in its
territorial sea,358 in suspending temporarily the innocent passage for the protection of its
security,359 and in levying charges on foreign ships passing through its territorial sea.360
Similarly, States bordering straits are not allowed to discriminate in form or in fact
among foreign ships in adopting laws and regulations relating to transit passage through
straits.361 In archipelagic waters, the archipelagic State is not allowed to discriminate in
form or in fact among foreign ships, in suspending temporarily in specified areas of its
356 The 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 23; "...it will be essential in all cases to consider... the
extent of the applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be
inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the developing countries."
357 Preamble, ... "with due regard for the sovereignty of all States" "Believing... in conformity with the
principles of justice and equal rights...of all peoples of the world..." Article 157, para.3; "The Authority is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members."
358 Article 24, para. 1 (b)
359 Article 25, para.3
360 Article 26, para.2
361 Article 42, para 2
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archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships for the protection of its
security.362 Ships flying the flag of land-locked States are entitled to enjoy treatment
equal to that accorded to other foreign ships in maritime ports.363
With respect to the conservation of living resources of the high seas, States
concerned shall ensure that conservation measures and their implementation do not
discriminate in form or in fact against the fishermen of any State.364
With regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment, States,
in exercising their rights and performing their duties, are required not to discriminate in
form or in fact against vessels of any other State.365 For the protection of ice-covered
areas, coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in
ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone.366
In the field of the administration of ISBA, the 1982 UNCLOS provides in detail
the principle of non-discrimination, in sharing financial and economic benefits derived
from activities in the Area,367 in using the Area for peaceful means.368 In particular, ISBA
is required to assure non-discriminatory policies, in carrying out its obligations in respect
of activities in the Area,369 in exercising its powers and functions.370 In Annex III to the
Convention concerning basic conditions of prospecting, exploration and exploitation of
the mineral resources of the Area, the principle of non-discrimination is required in every
aspect of activities in the Area.371
5.2.2 Adjustment of the principle of equality of States
362 Article 52, para 2
363 Article 131
364 Article 119, para.3
365 Article 227
366 Article 234
367 Article 140, para 2
368 Article 141
3<w Article 151, para 1 (c)
370 Article 152
371 Annex III, Article 6, para 5, Article 7, para 2, 5, Article 13, para 1 (d), 14, Article 17, para 1 (c),
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Embracing the cause of just and equitable international economic order, the 1982
UNCLOS provides many rules intended to adjust the application of the principle of
equality of States to some categories of States.
5.2.2.1 Incorporation of the cause ofjust and equitable international economic
order
The 1982 UNCLOS expresses its aspiration for "the realization of a just and equitable
international economic order, which takes into account the interests and needs of
mankind as a whole and, in particular, the special interests and needs of developing
countries, whether coastal or land-locked".372 This principle, which reflects the spirit of
the New International Economic Order, is embodied in many provisions of the
Convention, including those concerning the protection of the marine environment and the
exploitation and conservation of marine living resources.
5.2.2.2 Preferential treatments of developing States
Special consideration for developing States is most notably manifested in the regime of
sea-bed activities. The concept of the common heritage of mankind itself is rooted in the
ideology ofNIEO, in that it is aimed at equitable benefit-sharing in favour of developing
States.373 This philosophical foundation permeates the whole mechanism of the sea-bed
regime under the Convention, as manifested in the call for special consideration for
developing countries in defining the powers and functions of ISBA,374 in constituting the
Council of ISBA,375in transferring technology,376 in providing economic assistance,377 etc.
372 Preamble
373 In Article 140, para.2, and Article 160, para.2 (f)(i), the Convention requires the ISBA to provide for the
equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area, taking into
consideration the interests of developing countries.
See Kemal Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1998
See also M. Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden? Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989
374 Article 152, para2, Article 160, para.2 (f) (i)
375 Article 161, para. 1 The 1994 Agreement, Annex, Section 3
376 The 1994 Agreement, Annex, Section 5,
377 The 1994 Agreement, Annex, Section 7
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With regard to the protection of the marine environment, the 1982 UNCLOS lays
down a principle of preferential treatment of developing States; "Developing States shall,
for the purpose of prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine
environment or minimization of its effects, be granted preference by international
organizations in: (a) the allocation of appropriate funds and technical assistance; and (b)
the utilization of their specialized services."378 The duty of scientific and technical
assistance in the field of the protection and preservation of the marine environment is also
a provision stipulating preferential treatment of developing States.379
The provisions on the development and transfer of marine technology focus also
on the necessity of improving the level of marine technology in developing States by
transferring marine technology from developed to developing States.380
5.2.2.3 Special treatments of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States
In dealing with marine living resources in EEZ, the 1982 UNCLOS provides land-locked
States (LLS) and geographically disadvantaged States (GDS) with the right to participate
in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of EEZ of
the coastal States of the same subregion or region. This special treatment of LLS and
GDS is, however, mitigated by several difficult conditions attached thereto:381 (1) LLS
and GDS may claim their right of access only to the surplus resources, which are derived
from the determination of TAC by the coastal State in its EEZ,382and its own harvesting
capacity;383 (2) LLS and GDS can enjoy their right of access to the surplus resources only
on the basis of bilateral, subregional or regional agreements;384 (3) LLS and GDS are
required to take into account the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of all
the States concerned, especially the need to avoid effects detrimental to fishing
communities or fishing industries of the coastal State.385 These are conditions hard to
378 Article 203
379 Article 202
380 Part XIV, Articles 266-274
381 Article 69, 70
382 Article 61, para. 1
383 Article 62, para.2
384 Article 69, para.2. Article 70, para.3
385 Article 61, para., Article 70, para. 1
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satisfy in the current state of the coastal seas characterized by the scarcity of marine
resources.
In respect of marine scientific research, the Convention requires States and
competent international organizations to inform the neighbouring LLS/GDS of proposed
marine scientific research projects with a view to giving them the opportunity to
participate in such projects.386
In the field of the development and transfer of marine technology also, the
Convention requires States to give special consideration to developing States, including
LLS and GDS in such a way as to accelerate the social and economic development of the
developing States for the benefit of all parties concerned on an equitable basis.387
5.3 Post-UNCLOS evolution of equality of States and equity
The 1992 UNCED instruments have explicitly formulated the concept of common but
differentiated responsibilities as a principle designed to promote equitable balance
between developed and developing States.
The 1992 UNCED Declaration explicates the context of common but
differentiated responsibilities: developed countries should bear heavier responsibilities
than developing countries, considering the differences in their contributions to global
environmental degradation as well as in their technological and financial capacity in
pursuing sustainable development.388 The responsibility to protect the global environment
in the pursuit of sustainable development is declared to be common to all States.
However, it is acknowledged that, compared with developing countries, developed
countries have made more contributions to global environmental degradation by
consuming more materials causing ozone depletion and greenhouse effects, and it is more
equitable to apply higher standards of conduct to developed countries in the international
efforts to solve these global environmental problems. On the other hand, considering
386 Article 254
387 Article 266, para.2, Article 269 (a), Article 272
388 Principle 7 "...In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have
common but different responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they
bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on
the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command."
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differences between developed and developing countries in their capacities ofmobilizing
technological and financial resources to protect the global environment, it is recognized
that the application of differentiated standards of conduct to developed and developing
countries is more equitable. As such, the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities is characterized by the elements of conditionality and solidarity.389
In the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities is more concretely elaborated. Differently from the
UNCED Declaration, the Climate Change Convention is silent on the historical
responsibility of developed countries, but it lays more emphasis on the differences in the
capabilities and socio-economic conditions between developed and developing countries,
by juxtaposing the term "respective capabilities and their social and economic
conditions" to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.390 The Climate
Change Convention classifies the responsibilities into three categories: 1) the
commitments undertaken by all Parties;391 2) the commitments undertaken by developed
countries and countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy
(Annex I Parties);392 3) the commitments undertaken only by developed countries (Annex
II Parties).393 The commitments undertaken by all Parties as common responsibilities are
based on the recognition of climate change as a 'common concern'. These are obligations
to develop and publish national inventories of anthropogenic emissions and sinks of all
greenhouse gases, to formulate and implement national and regional programmes to
mitigate climate change, to promote scientific and technical cooperation, to promote
sustainable management of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases, to cooperate in
preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change, to integrate climate change
considerations into social, economic and environmental policies and actions, to promote
education, training and public awareness related to climate change, etc. The commitments
undertaken by Annex I Parties are more onerous, such as the commitments to adopt
national policies and measures to limit the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases
and to protect the greenhouse sinks and reservoirs with the aim of returning to their 1990
389 Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle, International Law & the Environment, op.cit., p. 102
390 Preamble, and Article 3(1)
391 Article 4(1)
392 Article 4 (2)
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levels these anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by the end of the present
decade, to implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and assist
other parties in reaching the objectives set by the Convention, etc. The commitments of
solidarity assistance undertaken by Annex II Parties are the obligations to provide new
and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full incremental costs incurred by
developing country parties in complying with their obligations under the Convention.
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change has
specified the differentiated responsibilities in quantitative scales. In Annex B of the
Protocol, different limits (expressed in terms of percentage of base year or period) to be
achieved within the period 2008 to 2012 are laid down for each of the Parties listed in
Annex I of the Convention, taking into account their circumstances and the differences in
their respective ability to reduce emissions, access to clean technology, use of energy, etc.
Since developing States are not listed in Annex B. no emission limits apply to them.
Developing country Parties are required only to meet the commitments undertaken by all
Parties under Article 4 (1) of the Convention.
The 1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity does not employ
the explicit term of 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. In content, it contains
the elements of the principle. In its text, the rationale of the differentiated responsibilities
is embedded in the acknowledgement of the fact that "the provision of new and additional
financial resources and appropriate access to relevant technologies can be expected to
make a substantial difference in the world's ability to address the loss of biological
diversity", and the fact that "special provision is required to meet the needs of developing
countries, including the provision of new and additional financial resources and
appropriate access to relevant technologies".394 In addition, every obligation to be
undertaken by each Contracting Party is expected to be implemented 'as far as possible
and as appropriate', implying differentiated standards of obligation.
5.4 Conclusion
393 Article 4 (3)
394 Preamble
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As Thomas Franck asserts, "Fairness is an underlying issue almost everywhere in
environmental law, not only in the creating of new norms but also in designing the new
order's necessary penumbra of procedures as well as its means of implementation and
enforcement."395In global environmental affairs, complex issues are intertwined. Such
issues should be dealt with through cooperation among multiple actors. In such an issue-
area, a strict application of the principle of equality of States may not be conducive to
positive results. Therefore the concepts of equity, fairness and justice permeate widely
international norms dealing with the global environment. Equality of States adjusted by
special treatments and differentiated responsibilities is proportional equality, which
recommends; "treat the equal equally, and the unequal unequally."396
The 1982 UNCLOS was negotiated during the years when the voice of
developing States claiming a more equitable international order was particularly strong. It
was necessary to reconcile the claims of developing States and the established principle
of equality of States. Under the general principle of equality of States, the Convention
lays down different provisions stipulating preferential treatment for developing States or
other categories of States, such as land-locked States and geographically disadvantaged
States. In this way, the Convention had already conceived the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities all but in name, before it was formulated in the 1992
UNCED.
395 Thomas M. Frank, General Course on Public International Law, Recueil des Corns, 1993, III, p.345
396 For the concept of proportional equality, see P.H. Kooijmans, The Doctrine of the Legal equality of
States, A.W. Sythoff-Leyden, 1964, pp. 223-238
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Chapter 5
Substantive norms of the regime for the protection of the marine
environment under the 1982 UNCLOS: Rules
1. Theory of rationality and international regimes
International regimes are those institutions which are intended to orient State behaviour
towards a set of goals on the basis of normative injunctions. Behaviour based on such
injunctions can be said to be rational. However, rationality is a highly polysemous and
multidimensional concept.
In the first place, rational action is based on the expectations formed as means of
attainment of a chosen end (instrumental rationality) and derived from a belief in certain
values (axiological rationality). In the Max Weber's taxonomy of social action, rational
action is classified into instrumentally rational (zweckrational) action and value-rational
(wertrational) action, distinguished from non-rational actions, such as affectual and
traditional actions.' In addition to these two aspects of rationality, sociologists and
philosophers, such as Raymond Boudon2 and Carl G. Hempel,3 introduce the concept of
cognitive rationality as another dimension of rationality.
1.1 Instrumental rationality
For Max Weber, instrumentally rational action is oriented through "expectations as to the
behaviour of objects in the external situation and of other human individuals, making use
of these expectations as 'conditions' or 'means' for the successful attainment of the
actor's own rationally chosen ends."4 Broadly speaking, an action will qualify as rational
1 See Max Weber, Economie et Societe, translated from Wirtschaft und Geselschaft by Julien Freund, Pierre
Kamnitzer, Pierre Bertrand, Eric de Dampierre, Jean Maillard et Jacques Chavy, Plon, 1971, pp. 55-57
See also Rene POIRIER, Rationalite juridique et rationalite scientifique, in Archives de philosophie
du droit, Tome 23 Formes de rationalite en droit, Sirey 1978, pp.11-35 « II ya a done la Raison comme fin
et la Raison comme moyen. »
2 See Raymond Boudon, Le Juste et Le Vrai, Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1995
3 See Carl G. Hempel, The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel, edited by James H. Fetzer, Oxford University
Press, 2001
4 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, English translation by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons as
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if, on the basis of the given information, it offers optimal prospects of achieving its
objectives.5 In economic theory, rationality means simply a choice which, among all
possible choices, best achieves the goals of the person making the choice.6 In this sense,
rationality is synonymous with optimisation, such as profit maximization, cost
minimization, and other types of optimisation. In the rational choice models, "human
goals and motivations are assumed to be given a priori in the form of utility function,
which allows an individual to make consistent choices among all possible bundles of
goods and services. Economic actors are also assumed always to choose, among the
alternatives open to them, that one of the alternatives that yields the greatest utility."7
Rationality here means only instrumental rationality which guides rational choice of
means in achieving a given goal. This is partial rationality in that it does not deal with the
choice of goals, which is inherently a matter of value judgement. Not only the rational
choice models, but also other utilitarian and functionalist theories focus on the
instrumental aspect of rationality.8
1.2 Axiological rationality
Whereas instrumental rationality is the rationality in achieving a given goal, axiological
rationality is the rationality in determining the goals. For Max Weber, value-rational
(wertrational) action is determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of
some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behaviour, independently of its
'Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization', the Free Press, 1964, pp. 115-117
Weber's original terms 'zweckrationaP and 'wertrationaF are translated in some different ways.
The Cambridge Companion to WEBER translates them as 'instrumentally rational' and 'value-
rational' respectively. Stephen Turner (ed.) The Cambridge Companion ofWEBER, Cambridge University
Press, 2000, p. 31
Raymond Boudon translates 'Zwerckrationalildt' and 'Wertrationalitaf into 'rationalite
instrumentale' et'rationalite axiologique\ Raymond Boudon, Le sens des valeurs, Presses Universitaires
de France, 1999, p. 154
5 Carl G. Hempel, The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel, op.cit., 2001, p.3l I
6 Michael Parkin, Economics, Second edition, Addision-Wesley Publishing Company, 1994, p. 19
7 See Herbert A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, Volume 3 Empirically Grounded Economic
Reason. The MIT Press, 1997, p. 277
The theory of subjective expected utility (SEU theory) underlying neo-classical economics postulates that
choices are made: (1) among a given, fixed set of alternatives; (2) with (subjectively) known probability
distributions of outcomes for each; and (3) in such a way as to maximize the expected value of a given
utility functions. See Herbert A. Simon, ibid, p. 291
8 See Raymond Boudon, Le sens des valeurs, Presses Universitaires de France, 1999, 11 De la rationalite
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prospects of success. Examples of pure rational orientation to absolute values would be
the action of persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into
practice their convictions of what seems to them to be required by duty, honour, the
pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some 'cause' no
matter in what it consists...when action is oriented to absolute values, it always involves
'commands' or 'demands' to the fulfilment of which the actor feels obliged.9 This simply
means the conformity to the value system.10 Normative values constitute core elements of
axiological rationality, as Joseph Raz lays emphasis on the normativity as the central
characteristic of rationality, by maintaining: "rationality is the ability to realize the
normative significance of the normative features of the world, and the ability to respond
accordingly."" John Rawls perceives goodness as rationality.12
1.3 Cognitive rationality
Raymond Boudon proposes the concept of cognitive rationality as the basis of axiological
rationality and instrumental rationality.12 In a cognitivist perspective, a rational action is a
product of cognition, which is the representation of circumstances of action, of a rational
choice of a course of action among several possible ones, a selection of means
appropriate for the goals and objectives.14 Raymond Boudon asserts that an actor achieves
instrumentale a la rationalite axiologique, pp. 81-136
9 See Max Weber, op.cit, pp.115-118. See also Elster, rationality, economy, and society, in Stephen Turner
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Weber, op.cit.
Instrumentally rational (zweckrational) action is determined by expectations as to the behaviour of objects
in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as "condition" or "means" for
the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends. Value-rational (wertrational)
action is determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious,
or other form of behaviour, independently of its prospects of success. The Cambridge Companion, p. 31
See also Julien Freund, La rationalization du droit selon Max Weber, in Formes de rationalite en
droit, Archives de philosophic du droit, tome 23, Sirey, 1978, pp.69-92
10 See Raymond Boudon, Le Juste et le Vrai, op. cit., p. 279. « Wertrational est alors un simple synonyme
de 'conforme a ces valeurs ' ». See also Raymond Boudon, Le sens des valeurs, op. cit., P. 155 « rationalite
axiologique veut simplement dire «soumission a des valeurs', 'attitude de conformisme a l'egard de telle ou
telle valeur'.
" Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason, On the Theory of Value and Action, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 68
12 See John Rawls, A theory ofjustice, Oxford University Press, 1993, Chapter VII. Goodness as rationality
13 Raymond Boudon, op.cit., p. 273, « ...II faut introduire pour les comprendre, a cote de la « rationalite
instrumentale » caracteristique de I'utilitarisme, la « rationalite axiologique »...ce qu'on peut appeler la
« rationalite cognitive ».
14 Louis Ouere, La cognition comme action incarnee, in Anni Borzeik, Alban Bouvier, Patrick Pharo, (ed.),
Sociologie et connaissance Nouvelles approches cognitives, CNRS Editions, 1998, pp. 143-175
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cognitive rationality by constructing, in more or less intuitive ways, a "theory" which
permits him to cope with a situation of decision.15 The actor will endorse this theory if he
has the impression that it is based on good or strong reasons {raisons fortes). Human
beings accept descriptive belief (X is true) or normative belief (Y is good) when they can
theorize their beliefs on the basis of good reasons. Such beliefs may or may not be
objectively correct.16 According to the concept of cognitive rationality, it is not the reality
itself, but the perceived reality that shapes human actions. Such a concept of cognitive
rationality lies in line with the concept of "factual premise" ofHerbert Simon.17
Carl G. Hempel underlines the information basis of rational decision and action,
by maintaining: "to judge the rationality of a decision, we have to consider, not what
empirical facts - particular facts as well as general laws - are actually relevant to the
success or failure of the action decided upon, but what information concerning such facts
is available to the decision-maker." 18
As such, cognitive rationality constitutes the foundation of axiological rationality
as well as instrumental rationality, by providing humans with logical coherence, in
forming their normative beliefs as well as descriptive beliefs.19 In the context of
international politics, cognitive rationality is based on common knowledge, which
concerns actors' beliefs about each other's rationality, strategies, preferences, and beliefs,
as well as about states of the external world.20 Shared knowledge is also a necessary
« Dans cette perspective, 1'action est vraiment le produit d'une cognition, c'est-a-dire d'une representation
des circonstances de I'action, d'un choix rationnel d'un cours d'action parmi plusieurs possibles, d'une
selection des moyens appropries aux fins ou aux buts de l'agent, et d'une subdivision de Taction en actions
partielles permettant de parvenir methodiquement au but vise. »
15 See Raymond Boudon, Le sens des valeurs, op.cit., p. 96 : «Souvent, I'acteur doit construire, sur un
mode plus ou moins intuitif, une 'theorie' lui permettant de faire face a une situation de decision .»
16 See Raymond Boudon, Le Juste et le Vrai, op.cit., p. 97-136
17 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, the Free Press, Fourth Edition, 1997, p. 69
"The term factual premise does not mean an empirically correct statement but a belief, that is, an assertion
of fact. The assertion may or may not be supported by evidence, and such evidence as exists may be of
greater or lesser validity. Human decision-making uses beliefs, which may or may not describe how the
world really is. We call such beliefs, whether true or false, "factual premises".
18 Carl G. Hempel, op.cit, p.312 Hempel asserts: " The total empirical information that is available for a
given decision may be thought of as represented by a set of sentences, which I will call the information
basis of the decision or of the corresponding action.
19 A person's beliefs are his or her 'view' of the world, what they 'hold' to be true about it, what they
'accept' as true. See Richard Swinburne, Epistemic Justification, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 32
20 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 159
For Wendt, "these beliefs need not be true, just believed to be true. Knowledge of a proposition P is
"common" to a group G if the members ofG all believe that P, believe that the members ofG believe that P,
believe that the members of G believe that the members ofG believe that P, and so on."
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condition of regime formation.21 Special cultural forms like norms, rules, institutions,
conventions, ideologies, customs, and laws are all made of common knowledge.22
But knowledge is always limited. The theory of bounded rationality postulates
that human rationality is bounded by cognitive limitations. For Herbert A. Simon, human
beings satisfice, rather than maximize.21 Under the constraint of cognitive limitations,
humans seek a solution which is 'good enough' rather than the best one.24
1. 4 Unicity and relativity of rationality
The three dimensions of rationality are conceptually analysed elements of the same thing,
i.e. rationality. Joseph Raz underlines the unicity of rationality in that the same capacity
(capacity-rationality) is involved in determining the goals as well as in choosing the
means to achieve the goals.25 He argues; "The reasoning ability and other capacities
which make people rational in forming beliefs about scientific matters, or about the
weather, or anything else which can be said not to be in itself normative, are the same
abilities which make people rational in the way they adopt and maintain goals. Therefore,
there is only one kind of rationality."26Raymond Boudon also believes that instrumental
rationality, cognitive rationality and axiological rationality form a system composed of
indissociable elements.27
Furthermore, the distinction of axiological rationality from instrumental
rationality is a relative one, perceived in the means-end hierarchy. In the relationship
21 Martin List and Volker Rittberger, Regime Theory and International Environmental Management, in
Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), The International Politics of the Environment, Oxford
University Press, 1992, p; 103
See also John G. Ruggie, International Responses to technology: Concepts and Trends', lO, 29 (1975),
557-83
22 Alexander Wendt, op.cit., 1999, p. 160
23 See Herbert Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, Volume 3, p. 295 "A decision maker who chooses
the best available alternative according to some criterion is said to optimize; one who chooses an
alternative that meets or exceeds specified criteria, but that is not guaranteed to be either unique or in any
sense the best, is said to satisfice."
24 For Simon, the term 'bounded rationality' is used to designate rational choice that takes into account the
cognitive limitations of the decision-maker- limitations of both knowledge and computational capacity.
Herbert Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, Volume 3, p. 291
25 Capacity-rationality means "a capacity to see the normative significance of the way things are, to
comprehend what reasons they constitute, and the significance of that fact for oneself." Joseph Raz, op. cit.,
p.69
26 Joseph Raz, op. cit., p. 74
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between means and ends, an end can become a means with regard to a higher end. Pierre
Demeulenaere maintains that a means can be considered as an intermediary end, since a
means is evaluated in relation to the targeted end on the one hand, and it is evaluated in
itself as an intermediary end. 28 Similarly, Herbert Simon asserts; "In the process of
decision those alternatives are chosen which are considered to be appropriate means for
reaching desired ends. Ends themselves, however, are often merely instrumental to more
final objectives. We are thus led to the conception of a series, or hierarchy, of ends.
Rationality has to do with the construction of means-ends chains of this kind."29 But the
structure of the hierarchy of means and ends is not always neatly established, as Herbert
Simon states; "It is also as true of organizational as of individual behavior that the means-
end hierarchy is seldom an integrated, completely connected chain. Often the connections
between organization activities and ultimate objectives is obscure, or these ultimate
objectives are incompletely formulated, or there are internal conflicts and contradictions
among the ultimate objectives, or among the means selected to attain them...Both
organizations and individuals, then, fail to attain a complete integration of their behavior
through consideration of these means-end relationships. Nevertheless, what remains of
rationality in their behavior is precisely the incomplete, and sometimes inconsistent,
hierarchy."30
The theory of rationality in general is applicable to legal rationality, because law
is essentially a problem of decision-making, which requires rationality.31
27 Raymond Boudon, Le Juste et le Vrai, op. cit., p. 277
28 Pierre Demeulenaere, Normativite et rationalite dans I'analyse sociologique de Taction, in Raymond
Boudon, Pierre Demeulenaere, Riccardo Viale (ed.), L'explication des normes sociales, Presses
Universitaires de France, 2001, p. 191
"II est evident que les moyens font Tobjet d'une double evaluation : d'une part, dans leur statut meme de
moyen au regard d'une fin visee ; d'autre part, les moyens represented eux-memes, s'ils sont retenus dans
Taction en tant qu'ils permettent d'atteindre une fin visee, des finalites intermediates qui doivent alors etre
evaluees pour elles-memes (il s'agit de savoir si ces moyens sont acceptables, s'ils ne sont pas trop couteux,
ou dangereux, ou immoraux, etc.)
29 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, op. cit. p. 73
30 Ibid, pp. 74-75
31 Cha'i'm Perelman, Ethique et Droit, Editions de TUniversite de Bruxelles, 1990, Partie II Le Droit,
Chapitre I La rationalite juridique. P. 448 « Le droit, tel qu'elle fonctionne effectivement, est
essentiellement un probleme de decision : le legislateur doit decider quelles seront les lois obligatoires dans
une communaute organisee, le juge doit decider de ce qui est le droit dans chaque situation soumise a son
jugement. Mais ni le legislateur ni le juge ne prennent des decisions purement arbitraires : Texpose des
motifs indique les raisons pour lesquelles une loi a ete votee et, dans un systeme moderne, tout jugement
236
2. Rules of the 1982 UNCLOS and their rationality
The regime for the protection of the marine environment is composed of rules and
procedures in which different types of rationality are embedded to orient actors toward
rational behaviour. As indicated above, axiological rationality and instrumental
rationality are relative concepts. Sometimes, it is difficult or arbitrary to distinguish
axiological rationality and instrumental rationality embedded in the single rule. In
particular, most legal rules for the protection of the marine environment are instrumental
in that the prescribed actions are not ultimate goals, but such rules are themselves highly
value-laden. This is true of the rules of the 1982 UNCLOS for the protection of the
marine environment. In contrast, the rules for cognitive rationality are relatively distinct
from the rules for axiological or instrumental rationality, although right cognition can be
also regarded as an instrument to achieve an objective. In this section, the rules set out in
the Convention are classified into two categories: 1) rules for axiological and
instrumental rationality; 2) rules for cognitive rationality. In each category, the rules are
grouped into sub-categories according to their subject-matter.
2.1 Rules for axiological and instrumental rationality
2.1.1 Rules for maritime zoning32
From the early stages of its development, the law of the sea has developed on the basis of
the idea of dividing the ocean space into two categories of zones: 1) the marginal belt of
the coastal sea over which the coastal State exercises certain rights; 2) the remaining open
seas in which all States enjoy the freedom of navigation and fishing. This zonal approach
was consolidated into the concepts of the territorial sea and the high seas, and further
elaborated in the 1982 UNCLOS.
The 1982 UNCLOS divides the seas and oceans into several jurisdictional zones,
i.e. the internal waters, archipelagic waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
doit etre motive. »
32 For the concept of zonal approach, see above, Section I, 2
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exclusive economic zone and the high seas. Accordingly, the sea-bed is also divided into
the continental shelf under national jurisdiction and the Area beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. The Convention incorporates the rules of the customary
international law and provides a set of new rules for the definition of the geographical
scopes of these zones.31
The Convention provides other rules and criteria necessary for maritime zoning:
the rules for the establishment of the system of straight baselines and those for the
delimitation of the coastal zones between the States with opposite or adjacent coasts.34
For the determination of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines, the Convention has instituted the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf.35
The maritime zones determined in accordance with these rules constitute the
jurisdictional basis on which Convention defines the rights and obligations of the coastal
States and other States. This maritime zoning can be regarded as one of the instruments
which serve higher ends, such as the establishment of "a legal order for the seas and
oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful
uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the
conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the
marine environment."36 But, the rules for maritime zoning can be regarded as axiological
rules in that each maritime zone is heavily charged with teleological or ideological values.
The territorial sea is established by extending the sovereignty toward the coastal sea; the
high seas are inseparably linked with the concept of the freedom of the seas; the regime
of EEZ is established as a reflection of the aspiration of developing countries for
economic development and the desire to gain greater control over the economic resources
33 Article 8, para. 1 for internal waters;
Article 49, para. I for the archipelagic waters;
Article 3 for the breadth of the territorial sea;
Article 33, para.2 for the contiguous zone;
Article 57 for the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone
Article 76 for the outer limits of the continental shelf;
Article 86 for the definition of the high seas
Article 1 for the definition of the Area.
34 Article 15 for the delimitation of the territorial sea, Article 74 for the delimitation of EEZ,
Article 83 for the delimitation of the continental shelf.
35 Article 76, para.8 & Annex II
36 Preamble
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off their coasts;37 the Area is established on the basis of the concept of the common
heritage of mankind, which carries moral and political meaning in line with a socialist
system of ownership;38 the concept of continental shelf is based on the inherent right of
the coastal State, as declared by ICJ.39
The rules set down in the Convention for the maritime zoning contribute to the
stabilization of the jurisdictional basis in the sea. These rules, which are better elaborated
than ever, are still incomplete, but may facilitate the settlement of the issues of
delimitation of continental shelf and EEZ in many coastal seas throughout the world.
However, the legal status of each zone, expressed in terms of rights and
obligations conferred on the coastal State and other States in respect thereof, change with
the passage of time. In particular, the status of the high seas undergoes rapid evolution
through the Convention and after.
2.1.2 The freedom of the high seas
Since Grotius, the freedom of the high seas had been consolidated as a rule of customary
international law and was codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas as a
cornerstone of the law of the sea. It was reincorporated into the 1982 UNCLOS, in
slightly different terms.40
To counterbalance the freedom of the high seas, the Convention lays down a set
of duties of States in the high seas in respect of the interests of other States, the safety at
sea and the conservation of the living resources. All States have the duty to give due
regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas,
37 See R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, Manchester University Press, op. cit., p. 133
38 See Kemal Balsar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of mankind in International law, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, pp. 63-64 Balsar argues that the term common heritage will carry purely moral
and political, rather than legal meaning.
39 In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ stated: "the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area
of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist
ipso facto and ab initio... In short there is here an inherent right." 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, at 23
40 The freedom of the high seas articulated in the Convention includes; (a) freedom of navigation, (b)
freedom of overflight, (c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, (d) freedom to construct artificial
islands and other installations permitted under international law, (e) freedom of fishing, (f) freedom of
scientific research (Article 87, para.l), while the freedom of the high seas provided for in the 1958 High
Seas Convention includes, inter alia\ (1) Freedom of navigation; (2) Freedom of fishing; (3) Freedom to lay
submarine cables and pipelines; (4) Freedom to fly over the high seas (Article 2).
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and due regard for the rights with respect to activities in the Area,41 the duty to take such
measures for their nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living
resources of the high seas,42 the duty to co-operate with each other in the conservation
and management of living resources in the areas of the high seas,43 and the duty to take
measures which are designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at
levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield.44 The flag State has the duty to
take measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea.45
Under the Convention, the conceptual basis of the freedom of the high seas is
preserved. In a sense the content of the freedom is further reinforced compared with that
under the 1958 Geneva Convention.46 However, in reality, the freedom of the high seas
has been reduced in many ways through the Convention and subsequent agreements,
reflecting the desire of the coastal States to expand their seaward jurisdiction and the
necessity of conserving marine living resources and protecting the marine environment.
First, the space of the high seas has been substantially reduced. By definition, the
term 'high seas' designates the residual space.47 As a result of the introduction of the EEZ
regime, a substantial part of the high seas is converted into EEZ. If all coastal States
proclaim 200 nautical miles of EEZ, the sum of EEZs amounts to 37,745,000 square
nautical miles,48 which represents some 36 % of the global ocean space.49 These seas
converted or convertible into EEZ are the areas where human activities such as fishing,
navigation, overflight, exploitation of sea-bed resources, laying cables and pipelines and
41 Article 87, para.2
42 Article 117
43 Article 118
44 Article 119, para. 1
45 Article 94
46 Compared with the freedom of the high seas enumerated in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas, the 1982 Convention adds some new elements, i.e. freedom to construct artificial islands and other
installations, and freedom of scientific research.
Of course, these new elements could be included in the category of "others" in the Geneva Convention.
47 Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas defines the high seas as "all parts of the sea
that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State." In the 1982 UNCLOS, the
seas under national jurisdiction has increased, and the high seas as " all parts of the sea that are not included
in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State."
48 Limits in the Seas, No. 36, 4th revision (1981)
4g The global ocean space is around 361 million sq. km. (105,251,000 sq. nautical miles) See The Ocean
our Future, The Report of the Independent World Commission on the Oceans, Cambridge University Press,
1998, p. 164
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scientific research are particularly intensive. Among these activities, the freedom of
navigation and the freedom of laying cables and pipelines are preserved under the EEZ
regime, but fishing and scientific research are brought under the jurisdiction and control
of the coastal States. In addition, as a result of the redefinition of the continental shelf
under the Convention, the sovereign rights of coastal States have been extended to the
mineral resources therein and the sedentary species dependent thereupon, which were
treated as res nullius before.
Second, the freedom of the high seas is reduced by the introduction of the concept
of the common heritage ofmankind. By the establishment of the deep sea-bed regime, the
controversies over the freedom ofmining in the sea-bed under the high seas are over.
Third, even in the remaining high seas, the freedom is substantially restricted for
the sake of conservation of marine living resources. The Convention lays down several
conditions on the freedom of fishing in the high seas:50 Regarding straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory species, the Convention calls for the coastal States and fishing
States to cooperate for the conservation of these species in the seas adjacent to EEZ or
throughout the region. This resulted in the adoption of the 1995 Agreement.51 By virtue
of this Agreement, fishing of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks is
regulated in the high seas. In addition, in the high seas surrounded by EEZs, such as the
Bering Sea Doughnut Hole, the Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole, the North-East Atlantic
Banana Hole, the Loophole of the Barents Sea, the fishing of straddling fish stocks in the
high seas are regulated under regional or bilateral regimes.52 For the conservation of
marine mammals, the Convention allows coastal States and the competent international
organizations to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more
50 Article 116: "All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, but subject
to: (a) their treaty obligations, (b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States provided for,
inter alia, in article 63, paragraph 2, and articles 64 to 67, and (c) provisions for the conservation of living
resources of the high seas.
51 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
52 See the following articles in Olav Schram Stokke (ed.) Governing High Seas Fisheries, Oxford
University Press, 2001
David A. Balton, The Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention: Regional Solution, Global Implications;
Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole De facto Extension of Coastal State Control;
Robin R. Churchill, Managing Straddling Fish Stocks in the North-East Atlantic: A Multiplicity of
Instruments and regime Linkages - but How Effective a Management?
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strictly than other species, in EEZ as well as in the high seas.53 In fact, the twelve large
whale species are protected under the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling,54 and other marine mammals under some regional regimes.55 In case of
anadromous stocks, fisheries can only be conducted in waters landward of the outer limits
of EEZs, except in cases such restriction would result in economic dislocation for a state
other than the state of origin.56 This means that fishing of these stocks is virtually banned
in the high seas, except in special cases.57 Some regional agreements have been
concluded for the conservation of salmon and other anadromous stocks.58 For the
management of catadromous species, the Convention recognizes the responsibility of the
coastal State in whose waters catadromous species spend the greater part of their life
cycle, and harvesting of these species can be conducted only in waters landward of the
outer limits of exclusive economic zones.59 Therefore, fishing in the high seas for
catadromous species is banned without exception.
The 1989 Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the
South Pacific regulates the high seas fishing by prohibiting a certain type of fishing gears.
Considering these regulations, among others, of the high seas fishing, it is not an
Olav Scliram Stokke, The Loophole of the Barents Sea Fisheries Regime
53 Articles 65, 120
54 The 1982 Amendment to the 1946 Whaling Convention has introduced the moratorium of commercial
catches of the whale species.
55 The following regional regimes have been created for the protection of the cetaceans and other marine
mammals:
The cetaceans regime under the 1991 Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the
Baltic and North Seas (ASCOBANS).
The cetaceans regime under the 1996 Agreement on the Conservation ofCetaceans of the Black
Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS).
The cetaceans regime under the 1991 Action plan for the conservation of cetaceans in the
Mediterranean Sea.
The regime under the 1990 Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and
Management of Marine Mammals in the North Atlantic.
56 Article 66, para.3 (a)
57 According to Article 66, para.3 (a), fisheries of anadromous species in the high seas are allowed only in
cases where the banning of such fishing in the high seas would result in economic dislocation for a State
other than the State of origin. With respect to such fishing beyond the outer limits of the EEZ, States
concerned shall maintain consultations with a view to achieving agreement on terms and conditions of such
fishing giving due regard to the conservation requirements and the needs of the State of origin in respect of
these stocks.
58 The 1982 Reykjavik Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean (NASCO),
the 1992 Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific.
See William T. Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries, UNCLOS 1982 and beyond, Oxford
University Press, 1994, Chapter 4 anadromous species
59 Article 67
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exaggeration to ask: "What remains of the freedom of fishing in the high seas?"60
This trend of contraction of the freedom of the high seas is rooted in the
axiological rationality, as was the establishment of the regime of the high seas. Originally
the cause of the freedom of the high seas was justified by the necessity of the freedom of
navigation and the freedom of fishing. Now that the protection of the marine environment
has emerged as a new axiological objective, the concept of the freedom of the high seas
should be changed. The 1982 UNCLOS has made an axiological compromise: on the one
hand, it maintains the freedom of navigation and other means of maritime
communications; on the other, it restricts the freedom of fishing and the freedom of
activities causing marine pollution in the high seas.
2.1.3 Duty of cooperation
The duty of cooperation in its largest sense is inherent in all international regimes
and agreements. It is always associated with the concept of good faith,61 i.e. it means the
duty to cooperate in good faith. When expressed in abstract terms, the duty of
cooperation can be regarded as a principle. An all-purpose abstract duty of cooperation
underlies all of other principles, in particular, the principle of good neighbourliness, the
duty not to cause damage to others, etc. However, the duty of cooperation can be
formulated in concrete requirement of certain type of actions, such as duty of prompt
notification, duty of exchange of information, etc. These concrete duties can be regarded
as instrumental rules, since they guide human actions toward a certain objective.
Any regime or any agreement, if not unilaterally imposed, is an instrument
designed to induce the parties to concerted actions on the basis of the principles and rules
set down therein. Many international instruments, in particular the Charter of the United
Nations,62 the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,63 the 1992 Rio Declaration,64 inter alia,
60 See Magali Le Hardy, Que reste-t-il de la liberte de la peche en haute mer, Institut du droit economique
de la mer, Editions Pedone, 2002
61 See ILC Draft Articles on International Liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not
prohibited by international law, Art. 4: "States concerned shall cooperate in good faith and..."
In the Nuclear Tests case, ICJ declared; "one of the basic principles governing the creation and
performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith." ICJ reports 1974,
p.268
62 Article 1: "The purposes of the United Nations are...To achieve international cooperation in solving
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articulate, more or less concretely, the duty of cooperation. Even in the international
agreements in which the duty of cooperation is not explicitly formulated, compliance
with the agreement is in itself a kind of cooperation. Therefore, in games theories, the
term "cooperate" and the term "comply" are synonymously and interchangeably used.
The 1982 UNCLOS emphasises the spirit of all-purpose cooperation.65 In addition,
it provides specific duties of cooperation among States concerned in their efforts for the
protection of the marine environment from pollution and the conservation of marine
resources.
<Duty of cooperation for the protection of the marine environment from pollution>
The 1982 UNCLOS calls for States to cooperate in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment.66
Prompt notification to a State concerned is also a means of cooperation. The duty
to inform other States of known environmental hazards can be deduced from the
judgment of ICJ, which recognised, in the Corfu Channel, the responsibility of Albania
for having failed to notify imminent and foreseeable damage.67 Early notification of
imminent or actual environmental damage is an essential means of preventing, reducing
and controlling the pollution of the marine environment.68 The Convention provides the
obligation of prompt notification as a guideline in case of imminent or actual
environmental damage by pollution.69 When States take any measures against foreign
vessels for the protection of the marine environment, they are required to promptly notify
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character..."
63 Principle 24
64 Principle 27
65 Preamble: "The States Parties to this Convention, prompted by the desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual
understanding and cooperation, all issues relating to the law of the sea."
66 Article 197
67 See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, Third edition. Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.540
68ILC Draft Articles combines 'notification' and 'information'. Draft Articles on International Liability for
injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, Articles 8
It is sure that notification is an act of providing information. But, the act of informing a concerned party of
the risk of damage in an emergency situation is closer to the concept of cooperation than to the concept of




the flag State and any other State concerned of the measures taken.70
The Convention requires the States in the area affected by pollution to jointly
develop and promote contingency plans to eliminate the effects of pollution and
preventing or minimizing the damage.71 Contingency plans can be established by an
individual State. But in the provision of the Convention, the emphasis is placed on the
cooperation in establishing contingency plans.
In the MOX plant case (Ireland v. UK), ITLOS ordered provisional measures
focusing on the duty of cooperation to prevent pollution of the marine environment which
might result from the operation of the MOX plant.72
<Duty of cooperation for the conservation of marine living resources>
In the 1982 UNCLOS, the duties of cooperation in conserving marine living resources are
formulated in the context of the problems of dealing with shared resources, reflecting the
duty of cooperation articulated in the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States.77
For the conservation of living resources in EEZ, the coastal State and competent
international organizations are required to cooperate.74
The species with a wide range of movement, such as straddling or transboundary
stocks, marine mammals, anadromous and catadromous species, are shared resources and
thus create the situations which necessitate close cooperation among States concerned.
For these species, the Convention provides particular obligations of cooperation.75
Cooperation through prompt notification is also required in relation to the
exercise of jurisdiction for the conservation of marine living resources. When the
coastal State arrests or detains foreign vessels, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to
explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in its EEZ, it is obliged to
70 Article 231
71 Article 199
72 ITLOS ordered Ireland and the United Kingdom to cooperate and consult in order to exchange further
information, to monitor risks and effects of the operation of the plant, and to devise measures to prevent
marine pollution. ITLOS, the MOX Plant case, Order of 3 December 2001
73 UNGA Res. 3281 XXIX, Article 3: "In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more
countries each state must cooperate on the basis of a system of information and prior consultation in order
to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing damage to the legitimate interests of others."
74 Article 61, para.2
75 Articles 63, 64, 65, 66, 67,
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promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken and on
any penalties subsequently imposed.76
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna case (Australia and NZ v. Japan), 1TLOS required
the cooperation between the parties to the dispute as well as other States engaged in
fishing for the stock.77
2.1.4 Rules for the protection of the marine environment from pollution
2.1.4.1 Obligation of States to protect and preserve the marine environment
The 1982 UNCLOS postulates: "States have the obligation to protect and preserve the
marine environment."78 This is a reformulation of the obligation not to cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,
which has already been consolidated into a rule of customary international law. The
obligation not to cause damage to the environment of "other States" had been recognised
since the Trail Smelter arbitration.79 The 1972 Stockholm Declaration has extended the
spatial scope of this responsibility to "areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."80
This enlarged responsibility has remained, however, in the language of 'soft law'
instrument.81 The 1982 UNCLOS consolidates this responsibility into a legally binding
obligation: the Convention itself is a legally binding instrument and Article 192 is
formulated in legally binding terms. However, compared with Principle 21 of the 1972
Stockholm Declaration, Article 192 of the Convention is limited in geographical scope.
The "marine environment" in Article 192 is interpreted as the environment of all seas and
oceans. But the spatial scope of this obligation is limited to the "marine" environment,
excluding terrestrial and atmospheric environment.
76 Article 73, para.4
77 In the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, ITLOS prescribed provisional measures, ordering the parties, i.a., to
resume negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on measures for the conservation and management
of Southern Bluefin Tuna and to seek agreement with other states engaged in fishing for Southern Bluefin
Tuna. ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, order of 27 August 1999
78 Article 192
79 Trail Smelter Arbitration, 33 AJIL (1939), 35 AJIL (1941)
80 Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972, Principle 21
81 The same obligation is reiterated in the 1992 Rio Declaration, in Principle 2
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As in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 Rio Declaration, this
provision of the Convention is balanced with the sovereign right of States to exploit their
resources pursuant to their environmental policies, as provided in Article 193.
The general obligation under Article 192 is more concretely reformulated in
Article 194, which requires States to take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment from any source within the limit of their
capacity. On the one hand, the general obligation under Article 192 seems further
strengthened by Article 194, which requires States to take "all measures" that are
necessary. On the other hand, the tone of obligation is moderated by the qualifying terms
"using for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with
their capabilities."
2.1.4.2 The best practicable means
The 1982 UNCLOS sets down the obligation of States to take measures that are
necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any
source, using "the best practicable means".82
The concept of "the best practicable means (BPM)" was first introduced in
British law, i.e. the Alkali etc. Works Regulation Act 1906.81 The concept of the best
practicable means is similar to that of "the best practicable environmental option
(BPEO)", which is defined as follows: "A 'bpeo' is the outcome of a systematic
consultative decision making procedure which emphasises the protection and
conservation of the environment across land, air and water. The 'bpeo' procedure
establishes, for a given set of objectives, the option that provides the most benefit or least
damage to the environment as a whole, at acceptable cost, in the long term as well as in
the short term."84 Since the terms 'most benefit' and 'least damage' remain subjective and
abstract, this definition relies on the procedural rule as a means to achieve them, instead
of providing substantive standards.
82 Article 194, para. I
83 See David Hughes, Environmental Law, Butterworths, 1996, p. 470, Albert Mumma, Environmental
Law: Meeting UK and EC Requirements, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1995, p. 132
84 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1988
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Some other concepts which are similar to that of the best practicable means or
BPEO have been elaborated in other international instruments. The 1992 Convention on
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes defines
the "best available technology (BAT)" as "the latest stage of development of process,
facilities or methods of operation which indicate the practical suitability of a particular
measure for limiting discharges, emissions and waste."85 This definition focuses on the
technological feasibility in choosing a measure to take. When combined with economic
feasibility, the criterion of the best available technology becomes "the best technology (or
techniques) not entailing excessive costs (BATNEEC).86 The term 'not entailing
excessive costs' indicates the necessity of maintaining the balance between the economic
costs of an environmental measure and its effectiveness in reducing environmental
damage. As BAT changes with time in the light of changes in technological, economic
and social factors, as well as changes in scientific knowledge and understanding,87
BATNEEC is a contextual concept. It depends on the level of technological development
and socioeconomic context. In this sense, these rules belong to the category of process
standards.88
2.1.5 Rules for the conservation ofmarine living resources
2.1.5.1 Optimum utilization
The 1982 UNCLOS presents optimum utilization as the objective of the exploitation and
conservation of living resources in EEZ.89 Optimum utilization seems to give more
weight to utilization than to conservation, but it does not require full utilization.90 It is an
expression of the necessity of balance between the two conflicting objectives, the
85 The 1992 Convention on the protection and use of transboundary watercourses and international lakes,
Annex I
86 See Albert Mumma, Environmental Law: Meeting UK and EC Requirements, McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1995, pp. 138-9
87 The 1992 Convention on the protection and use of transboundary watercourses and international lakes,
Annex I, para.2
88 See Stuart Bell & Donald McGillivray, Environmental Law, 5th edition, Blackstone Press, 2001, p. 185
89 Article 62
Article 64 places the same objective for highly migratory species, within and beyond EEZ.
90 See Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle, International Law & the Environment, op.cit., pp.660-661
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exploitation and the conservation.
The objective of "optimum use" was already formulated in the 1974 Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, in dealing with shared resources.91 The term
"optimum" is highly subjective and abstract concept. Optimum utilization itself does not
provide a quantitative criterion. It should be translated into some quantitative rules, such
as maximum sustainable yield, or total allowable catch, etc. The rule of optimum
utilization is an axiological rule in that it is presented as an objective. On the other hand,
in the hierarchy of means and ends, it may be regarded as an instrument for a higher
objective, such as sustainable development.
2.1.5.2 Maximum sustainable yield
The 1982 UNCLOS presents the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) as a basic guideline
for the conservation of the marine living resources.92 MSY is an instrumental rule serving
the objective of optimum utilization.
In its EEZ, the coastal State is obligated to take measures designed to maintain or
restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum
sustainable yield.93 In the high seas also. States are required to take measures designed to
maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the
maximum sustainable yield.94
In concept, MSY is a model for rational action on the basis of quantitative
analysis. In practice, the validity and effectiveness of this method is questionable. It is a
purely biological model, lacking economic considerations. When combined with
economic factors, it can be converted into maximum economic yield.95 But the main
shortcoming of MSY resides in the fact that it is a model based on a single species
approach.96 From a systemic viewpoint, the 'balance' among the components of an
91 UNGA Res. 3281 XXIX, Article 3: "In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more
countries each state must cooperate... in order to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing
damage to the legitimate interests of others."
92 For the concept of MSY, see supra. Chapter 4, III. Sustainable development
93 Article 61, para.3
94 Article 1 19, para. 1
95 See supra. Chapter 4, 3. Sustainable development and the 1982 UNCLOS
96 See supra. Chapter 4, 3. Sustainable development and the 1982 UNCLOS
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ecosystem is more important than the 'maximization' of the yield of a given species.
2.1.5.3 Total Allowable Catch
The application of MSY presupposes a regulatory fishing on the basis of an output
control system. An authority should determine the total quantity of harvest, which should
be appropriately distributed in the form of quota. For this, the Convention requires the
application of the method of total allowable catch (TAC). For the living resources in its
EEZ, the coastal State is required to determine the allowable catch.97 For the living
resources of the high seas, States are supposed to determine the allowable catch.98 Since
no individual State is entitled to determine TAC in the high seas, it can only be
determined in the context of regional or international regimes, in which a multilateral
commission is generally empowered to determine TAC.99 TAC is also a rule which is
instrumental to the objective embedded in the rule of MSY, which in turn serves the
objective of optimum utilization.
2.1.5.4 Consideration on dependent and associated species
The 1982 UNCLOS requires the coastal State, in taking conservation and management
measures for the living resources of the EEZ, to "take into account the interdependence
of stocks", and "take into consideration the effects on species associated with or
dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of
such associated or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may
become seriously threatened".100 In parallel, with regard to the conservation measures for
the living resources in the high seas, the 1982 UNCLOS calls upon States to "take into
account the interdependence of stocks" and "take into consideration the effects on species
97 Article 61
98 Article 119 stipulates; "In determining the allowable catch...States shall take measures..."
99 For example, under the 1994 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pol lock Resources
Central Bering Sea, the Annual Conference of the Parties is empowered to determine the allowable harvest
level for pollock in the Convention Area. Article IV.
The 1995 Agreement provides: "In fulfilling their obligation to cooperate through subregional or regional
fisheries management organizations or arrangements, States shall... agree, as appropriate, on participatory
rights such as allocations of allowable catch or levels of fishing effort. Article 10 (b)
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associated with or dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or
restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above levels at which their
reproduction may become seriously threatened,'.'°l
These provisions require States to look beyond the target species. The
consideration of the effects on species associated with and dependent upon harvested
species constitutes an element of ecosystem approach, although it is not a complete
ecosystem approach by itself.'^Consideration on dependent and associated species is
instrumental to the conservation of ecosystem, which is instrumental to the goal of
sustainable development.
2.1.6 Rules for the distribution of jurisdiction
The 1982 UNCLOS provides a complex set of rules governing the distribution of
jurisdiction for the protection of the marine environment. The persons who are entitled to
exercise jurisdiction are classified into the flag State, the coastal State and the port State.
The powers that these legal persons can exercise are classified into the legislation and
enforcement. The persons on whom these States can exercise these powers (jurisdiction
ratione personae) are generally classified into the category of the vessels flying their flag
(or their nationals) and that of foreign vessels (or foreign nationals). The area in which a
particular jurisdiction can be exercised (jurisdiction ratione loci) is divided into the
maritime zones and the port. The subject-matter covered by the Convention in the issue-
area of the marine environment is divided into two categories: the protection of the
marine environment from pollution and the conservation of marine living resources.
2.1.6.1 Distribution ofjurisdiction ratione personae
Conceptually, the traditional flag State jurisdiction on vessels in the sea is largely
maintained in the Convention. Flag States are required to provide for the effective
enforcement of international rules, standards, laws and regulations, irrespective of where
100 Article 61
101 Article 119
102 See supra. 2. Ecosystem approach and the 1982 UNCLOS
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a violation occurs.103
However, as a result of the expansion of the coastal seas under national
jurisdiction, the space in which a coastal State is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction
ratione loci has been substantially extended at the expense of flag State jurisdiction.
Under article 56, the coastal State has jurisdiction with regard to the protection and
preservation of the marine environment in its EEZ. The coastal State has also the right to
take reasonable measures for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from
pipelines,104 and from or in connection with sea-bed activities in the areas under national
jurisdiction. On the basis of the jurisdictional zones, the coastal State is entitled to
exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction in respect of dumping within its territorial sea and
EEZ or onto its continental shelf,105 and pollution from ships within its territorial sea and
EEZ.106 In respect of pollution from vessels, the coastal State may exercise enforcement
jurisdiction within its territorial sea and EEZ. When a vessel has violated, or there are
clear grounds for believing that it has violated, within its territorial sea or EEZ, its laws
and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels, the
coastal State may institute proceedings, under physical inspection, or require the vessel to
give relevant information.107 In addition, the coastal State has the sovereign rights for the
purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources in
its EEZ and continental shelf.1118
The Convention provides also a set of rules for port State jurisdiction, which
empower a port State to exercise the jurisdiction over foreign ships which are voluntarily
present in its ports or its off-shore terminals in respect of violations of international rules
and standards, committed outside its internal waters, territorial sea or EEZ.100 Port State
jurisdiction has developed as a complementary means of ensuring maritime safety and
preventing marine pollution from vessels. Therefore, it has been introduced into
international conventions dealing with maritime safety or marine pollution from
103 Article 217, para. I
104 Article 79, para.2
105 Article 210, para.5
106 Article 211, para.4, 5
107 Article 220
108 Article 56, para. 1
109 For Hakapaa, the basic idea of port State jurisdiction is "the exercise of enforcement authority over
violations not physically affecting the port State". K. Hakapaa, Marine Pollution in International Law.
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vessels."0 In addition, a number of non-binding regional Memoranda of Understanding
on Port State Control,"1 in the wake of the 1982 Paris MOU, have elaborated detailed
and harmonized guidelines for carrying out port State inspections."2 Under the
Convention, port States are required to exercise jurisdiction, but only in respect of
discharges and seaworthiness."2 Port State jurisdiction is complementary and secondary
to flag State jurisdiction and coastal State jurisdiction in that the enforcement by the port
State is dependent on the request by the damaged coastal State or flag State: 1) In the
case of discharge violation in the internal waters, territorial sea or EEZ of another State,
the port State shall not institute proceedings unless requested by the flag State or the State
damaged or threatened by the discharge violation;"4 2) When any State requests the port
State to investigate a discharge violation which is believed to have occurred in, cause, or
threatened damage to the internal waters, territorial sea or EEZ of the requesting State,
the port State shall comply with the request as far as practicable, and the records of such
investigation should be transmitted upon the request to the flag State or to the coastal
State;"5 3) Any proceedings instituted by the port State on the basis of such an
investigation may be suspended at the request of the coastal State when the violation has
occurred within the latter's internal waters, territorial sea or EEZ."6
2.1.6.2 Rules for concurrent jurisdictions
Flag States are entitled and required to exercise their jurisdiction for the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment from vessels flying their
flag, wherever the vessels navigate or anchor. Therefore, when a vessel is present in a
Material Obligations and Jurisdiction, Helsinki Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1981, p. 174
110 For example, the 1966 International Convention on Load Lines, the 1969 International Convention on
Tonnage Measurement of Ships, the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, MARPOL
73/78, the 1978 International Convention on Standards ofTraining, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers, the 1976 ILO Convention No. 147 "Merchant Shipping Convention", etc.
"'At present there are seven regional MOU: the 1982 Paris MOU, the 1992 Vina del Mare (Chile) MOU,
the 1993 Tokyo MOU, the 1996 Caribbean MOU, the 1997 Mediterranean MOU, the 1998 Indian Ocean
MOU, the 1999 Abuja MOU
112 http://www.parismou.org/ParisMOU.html
111 Articles 218, 219
114 Article 218, para.2
115 Article 218, para.3, 4
"<> Article 218, para.4
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port or a sea area under the jurisdiction of a State other than the flag State, the problem of
concurrent jurisdiction arise: 1) concurrence ofjurisdiction between the flag State and the
coastal State; 2) concurrence ofjurisdiction between the flag State and the port State.
In respect of an environmental damage caused by a vessel in a foreign EEZ, the
jurisdiction of the flag State prevails over the jurisdiction of the coastal State. When a
violation has occurred in EEZ causing an environmental damage to the coastline or
related interests of the coastal State, or to any resources of its territorial sea or EEZ, the
coastal State may institute proceedings, including detention of the vessel, in accordance
with its laws."7 However, the right of the flag State is safeguarded. If the flag State takes
proceedings within six months of the date on which proceedings were first instituted by
the coastal State, the latter should suspend the proceedings. In this sense, the flag State
jurisdiction has priority over coastal State jurisdiction. But, this priority is not absolute
because the proceedings instituted by the coastal State may not be suspended if they are
related to a case of major damage to the coastal State."8 Ambiguity remains on the
question of the priority between flag State jurisdiction and coastal State jurisdiction,
because there is no objective criterion to determine what is "major damage".
In the field of fishing in EEZ, the priority of coastal State jurisdiction over flag
State jurisdiction is clear. The coastal State has the sovereign rights for the purposes of
exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the marine living resources in its EEZ,
foreign vessels may fish there only on the basis of quota accorded by the coastal State. In
this context, the Convention requires States to comply with the laws and regulations
adopted by the coastal State."9
Between flag State jurisdiction and port State jurisdiction, the priority of the
former is clear, because port State jurisdiction was conceived from the beginning as a
complement to the existing jurisdiction of the flag and coastal States.120 Under Article 218
of the Convention, the power of the port State for investigation and proceedings is
secondary to that of the coastal State or the flag State.
117 Article 220, para.6
118 Article 228, para. 1
110 Article 58, para3
120 British Branch Committee on the Law of the Sea, "The Concept of Port State Jurisdiction", International
Law Association Report 1974, pp.400-408
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2.2 Rules for cognitive rationality
Cognitive rationality can be enhanced by relying on the best knowledge available to
decision-makers, by sharing the knowledge base through exchange of information and by
enriching the knowledge base through scientific research. The 1982 UNCLOS provides a
set of rules designed to improve the quality of collective cognition in these ways.
2.2.1 The best scientific evidence
Under the 1982 UNCLOS, the coastal State is required to take into account the best
scientific evidence available to it, in taking conservation and management measures in its
EEZ.121 In parallel, the Convention calls for States to take conservation measures for the
living resources in the high seas on the best scientific evidence available to the State
concerned in taking conservation measures.122 In dealing with ice-covered areas, coastal
States have the right to adopt and enforce laws and regulations based on the best
available scientific evidence for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution
from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of their EEZ.123
While the best practicable means, BAT and BATNEEC are rules for the
enhancement of instrumental rationality, the best available scientific evidence is a rule
aimed at improving the quality of cognition. The best scientific evidence available is a
fluid concept. It is a subjective judgment to determine what is the best among available
scientific evidence. Furthermore, availability in scientific evidence varies greatly from
State to State. When there is no objective criterion for decision-making, cognitive
rationality can be improved through procedural rules, such as EIA, environmental
monitoring, or exchange of information, transfer of technology, as provided for by the
Convention.
2.2.2 EIA and environmental monitoring
121 Article 61
122 Article 119, para. 1 (a)
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The 1982 UNCLOS requires States to observe, measure, evaluate and analyse, by
recognized scientific methods, the risks or effects of pollution of the marine
environment.124 States are also obligated to take precautions against potential effects of
planned activities.125
Environmental Impact Assessment, l26defined as "an examination, analysis and
assessment of planned activities with a view to ensuring environmentally sound and
sustainable development", is a "necessary tool to improve the quality of information
presented to decision makers so that environmentally sound decisions can be made
paying careful attention to minimizing significant adverse impact."'27
Since EIA is a national procedure for evaluating the likely impact of a proposed
activity on the environment, common guidelines and principles are necessary to ensure a
common ground of perception shared by all States concerned. The 1987 UNEP Goals and
Principles of EIA and the 1991 Convention on EIA in a Transboundary Context have
been adopted to this end. These instruments require not only the assessment in its narrow
sense but also the proposal of alternatives and notification and consultation between
States concerned. The essential requirements set down in these instruments are, among
others, a description of a proposed activity, a description of the potentially affected
environment, a description of alternatives, notification to and consultation with
potentially affected States.128 The degree of depth of environmental assessment will be
proportional to the degree of significance of likely effects on the environment.129 For
example, the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid
protocol) lays down the process of EIA in gradual steps, from Initial Environmental





126 The 1987 UNEP Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment, preamble.
127 The 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo
Convention), preamble.
128 The 1987 UNEP Goals and Principles, Principle 4, the 1991 Espoo Convention, Article 5 and Appendix
II Content of the Environmental Impact Assessment Documentation
129 UNEP Goals and Principles, Principle 5: "The environmental effects in an EIA should be assesses with a
degree of detail commensurate with their likely environmental significance."
130 The 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. Annex I Environmental
Impact Assessment. If an activity is determined, in the preliminary stage, as having less than a minor or
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Although EIA is basically an ex ante procedure to be taken prior to the beginning
of an activity,131 the 1991 Convention on EIA lays down also the post-project analysis as
an ex post procedure to be taken in particular situations, but not in all cases.132
Environmental monitoring is a continuous process (ex ante and ex post) of
gathering information through surveillance of the effects of any activities. Monitoring
provides constant feedback for decision-making, from long-term protection to rapid
guidance in emergency situations.133 As such, monitoring can be regarded as an element
of EIA. However, the function of environmental monitoring may go beyond the scope of
EIA in that monitoring is a continuous process and it means not only the surveillance of
environmental phenomena but also the surveillance of compliance by different actors.134
2.2.3 Obligation to exchange information
Information sharing among regime members is a way of establishing a common basis for
collective cognition. Without consensual knowledge, their actions may diverge, rather
than converging around a common goal. The 1982 UNCLOS lays down the duty of States
to exchange information in many fields.
To protect the marine environment from pollution, the Convention calls for States
to co-operate, directly or through competent international organizations, for the purpose
of promoting studies, undertaking programmes of scientific research and encouraging the
exchange of information and data acquired about pollution of the marine environment.135
transitory impact, the activity may proceed forthwith; if is has been determined that an activity will have
more than a minor or transitory impact, an Initial Environmental Evaluation shall be conducted; If an Initial
Environmental Evaluation indicates or if it is otherwise determined that a proposed activity is likely to have
more than a minor or transitory impact, a Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation shall be prepared.
131 See The UNEP goals and Principles, Goals: "1. To establish that before decisions ate taken by the
competent authority or authorities to undertake or to authorize activities that are likely to significantly
affect the environment, the environmental effects of those activities should be taken fully into account."
The Espoo Convention, preamble: "the need and importance to develop anticipatory policies..."
The Madrid Protocol, Article 8, para.2: "the assessment procedures set out in Annex I are applied in the
planning processes leading to decisions about any activities..."
132 The Convention on EIA in a Transboundary Context, particle 7: The concerned Parties, at the request of
any such Party, shall determine whether, and if so to what extent, a post-project analysis shall be carried
out...
133 See Alexander Kiss & Dinah Shelton, Manual of European Environmental Law, Second edition,
Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 135
134 See infra. Chapter 6, 3. Compliance System
135 Articles 200, 204, 205
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States are required to contribute and exchange available scientific information
relevant to the conservation of fish stocks in EEZ.136 The same obligation is set down for
the conservation of fish stocks in the high seas.'"
Concerning scientific research, the Convention lays down the duty of a State to
provide other States with the information necessary to prevent and control damage to the
health and safety of persons and to the marine environment,138 and the duty to make
available by publication and dissemination information on major programmes and their
objectives as well as knowledge resulting from marine scientific research.139
The duty of transfer of marine science and marine technology can be also
regarded as an obligation of information exchange.140
The duty of exchange of information is particularly emphasised in the ILC's
Draft Articles. 141
2.2.4 Obligation of due publicity
While the duty of information exchange is a rule of action between the actors concerned,
the duty of due publicity is a duty to give information to the rest of the world. Under the
1982 UNCLOS, coastal States are entitled and obligated to adopt a variety of laws and
regulations applicable to foreigners in respect of the safety at sea, the conservation of
living resources, the protection of the marine environment, etc. To be complied with by
foreigners, these laws and regulations should be properly communicated to those
foreigners through due publicity.
The most basic duty of due publicity laid down on a coastal State is to clarify the
geographical scope of the areas in which it exercises its jurisdiction. A coastal State is
required to give due publicity to the charts or lists of geographical co-ordinates of its
baselines, the outer limits of its territorial sea,142 the charts or lists of geographical co-
136 Article 61, para.5
137 Article 119, para.4
138 Article 242, para.2
l3Q Article 244
140 Article 266
141 ILC Draft Articles on International Liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited
by international law. Articles 8, 12, 13
142 Article 16, para 2
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ordinates of outer limits of the EEZ and the lines of delimitation thereof,l45and the charts
or lists of geographical co-ordinates of outer limits of the continental shelf and the lines
of delimitation thereof.144 An archipelagic State is obliged to give due publicity to the
charts or lists of geographical co-ordinates of its archipelagic baselines.145
For the safety of navigation, the coastal State is required to give due publicity to
all laws and regulations relating to the innocent passage in its territorial sea,146 to sea
lanes and traffic separation schemes in the territorial sea,147 as well as any danger to
navigation of which it has knowledge within its territorial sea.148 States bordering
international straits are required to give appropriate publicity to all sea lanes and traffic
separation schemes,149 and to any danger to navigation or overflight within or over the
strait of which they have knowledge.150 An archipelagic State is obligated to give due
publicity to the sea lanes and traffic separation schemes established in the archipelagic
waters.151 A coastal State is required to give due notice of the construction of artificial
islands, installations or structures, and to give appropriate publicity to the depth, position
and dimensions of any installations or structures not entirely removed.152
When a State has established particular requirements for the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry
of foreign vessels into their ports or internal waters or for a call at their off-shore
terminals, that State is required to communicate such requirements to the competent
international organizations for the diffusion of the relevant information.155
States are required to publish reports of the results obtained when monitoring the
risks or effects or pollution,154 and to communicate the reports of the results of
environmental assessment.155
143 Article 75, para 2
144 Article 84, para 2
145 Article 47, para 9
146 Article 21, para 3
147 Article 22, para 4
148 Article 24, para 2
l4<) Article 41, para 6
150 Article 44
151 Article 53, para 10
152 Article 60, para 4




When a coastal State has established a specially protected area in its EEZ, the
coastal State is obligated to publish the limits of any such area.156
2.2.5 Obligation to promote scientific research
Development of marine science and marine technology is essential in improving
cognitive rationality as well as instrumental rationality for the protection of the marine
environment from pollution and the conservation of the marine living resources. To this
end, the 1982 UNCLOS dedicates one complete part to the subject-matter of
Development and Transfer of Marine Technology. Part XIV of the Convention underlines
the necessity and importance of development of marine science and marine technology.
For this, it calls for States to cooperate, directly or through competent international
organizations for the development and transfer marine science and marine technology.
2.3 Conclusion
Since the 1982 UNCLOS is a framework convention, it is not rich in technical rules for
the protection of the marine environment. However, international rules developed and to
be developed in other agreements may be incorporated into the regime under the 1982
UNCLOS through the mechanisms examined in Chapter 3.
156 Article 211, para 6(b)
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Chapter 6
Procedural and behavioural aspects of the regime for the protection of
the marine environment under the 1982 UNCLOS
1. Decision-making procedures
A regime is created, operated and transformed through decisions made by its members.
Such decisions are collective choices based on the common will of its members. In order
to facilitate decision-making, a set of pre-established procedures is necessary.
Legitimacy of decisions based on procedural justice is crucial in generating convergent
expectations and inducing thereby regime members to cooperate.' Institutionalization of
procedures contributes to the enhancement of procedural rationality in the making,
functioning and evolution of regimes, in particular in multilateral regimes.2
The decision-making procedures in the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS can be
classified into three categories: 1) a set of decision-making procedures employed for the
creation of the regime; 2) a set of decision-making procedures for the functioning of the
regime; 3) a set of decision-making procedures for the transformation of the regime.
1.1 Decision-making procedures for the creation of the regime
The regime under the 1982 UNCLOS has been established by the adoption and entry into
force of the text of the Convention.
1 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, AJ1L, 86 (1992)
For Franck, "In the international context, legitimacy is achieved if- or to the extent that - those addressed
by a rule, or by a rule-making institution, perceive the rule or institution to have come into being and to be
operating in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process." Franck proposes four
indicators of legitimacy of rule-making: pedigree, determinancy, coherence and adherence.
See also Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law?, AJIL, 93 (1999)
2 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit international public, 3e edition, Dalloz, 1995, p. 288-9 Institutionalisation des
procedures.
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1.1.1 Procedures for the negotiation and adoption of the 1982 UNCLOS
Although convened by the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United
Nations,1 UNCLOS III was an independent body and adopted its own rules of procedure.4
The procedures of the negotiation and elaboration of the text of the Convention were
characterized by the practices of package deal combined with the procedures of decision¬
making by consensus. Package deal and consensus are distinct concepts; the former is a
technique of negotiation, the latter is a method of making collective decisions at the end
of negotiation. But both of them are rooted in the spirit of compromise, which is
indispensable in hammering out agreements on numerous issues among numerous States.
From the preparatory stage of UNCLOS III, the idea of package deal was
embedded in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution, which declared "the
problems relating to the high seas, territorial waters, contiguous zones, the continental
shelf, the superjacent waters, and the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction are closely linked together."5 In the universal conference dealing
with virtually all the issues relating to the maritime affairs, it would have been practically
impossible to devise formulae acceptable to all States in every issue, if all individual
issues had been separately dealt with. The President of the Conference gave an
explanation of the meaning of the package deal; "The very nature of the concept of a
package deal must mean that no delegation's position on a particular issue would be
3 A/Res. 2750 c (XXV), 17 December 1970
4 There have been many debates at different levels on the question whether the rules of procedure of the
United Nations are automatically applicable to the conferences convened by the United Nations.
In 1980, the ILC, in its comments to the Secretary-General on the review of the multilateral treaty-making
process, stated; "Each United Nations codification conference... approves its own rules of procedure." See
Review of the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process, Report of the Secretary-General, Addendum 1,
Observations of the International Law Commission, para.95, UN Doc. A/35/312/Add.2 (1980)
In 1985, the United Nations prepared draft standard rules of procedure applicable to all the conferences
convened by the General Assembly of the United Nations. See Draft standard rules of procedure for
United Nations conferences, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/40/611 (1985) These standard
rules of procedure are "so formulated that, if approved by the General Assembly, they will automatically
govern all conferences hereafter convened by any organ of the United Nations, except to the extent
otherwise specified by the convening organ." UN Doc. A/40/611 (1985), para. 9 This draft was not adopted.
The general practice of the international conferences is that "where a conference of plenipotentiaries is
convened by the UN (or in the past by the League ofNations), the convening body prepares provisional
rules of procedure. The conference, although usually adopting the provisional rules as its own provisional
rules, does this as an independent act of the conference and not by virtue of it being convened by the UN."
Robbie Sabel, Procedure at International Conferences, Cambridge University Press, 1997,
5 GA Resolution 2574 (XXIV) (Dec. 15, 1969)
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treated as irrevocable until at least all the elements of the 'package' as contemplated had
formed the subject of agreement. Every delegation, therefore, had the right to reserve its
position on any particular issue until it had received satisfaction on other issues which it
considered to be of vital importance to it."6 Thus, compromise is essential for package
deal, in which each State calculates its overall interests until the last moment of
negotiations, by making concessions in some issues and taking compensations in other
issues.7 In a package deal, "by bringing together a number of proposals, each fervently
supported by some delegations but opposed by others, it may be possible to obtain a
'package', which contains attractive features for so many States that it will gain wide
support, even though each State also finds some less acceptable elements in it."8 In a
series of issue-linkages, a general equilibrium of interests can be achieved through
compromises among all the participants. In general, a solution worked out in such a deal
can be completely satisfactory to no participant but it should be acceptable to every
participant, as the President of the Conference stated; "...delegations have said that the
Convention does not fully satisfy the interests and objectives of any State...It has
successfully accommodated the competing interests of all nations."9 In this process,
unofficial intersessional meetings facilitated the negotiations.10
It should be noted that not all the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS are the
products of package deal. A majority of the provisions of the Convention are the result of
the codification of the existing rules of customary international law." In principle, there
could be little room for a deal in the process of codification. In practice, however, as
6 Explanatory Memorandum by the President of the Conference, UN Doc. A/CON F.62/WP. 10/Rev. I
(1979)
7 The spirit of compromise through package deal which prevailed in UNCLOS III was clearly expressed in
the speech by the U.S. Representative to the second session; "We are prepared to accept, and indeed we
would welcome, general agreement on a 12-mile outer limit of the territorial sea and a 200-mile outer limit
for the economic zone, provided it is part of an acceptable comprehensive package including a satisfactory
regime within and beyond the economic zone and provision for unimpeded transit of straits used for
international navigation." Speech by U.S. Representative John R. Stevenson to the Second Session of
UNCLOS III, July 11, in 71 Department of States Bulletin, 232, 233 (1974)
8 Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1995, p. 499
"
Closing Statement by the President of Conference on the Law of the Sea. See Myron H. Nordquist and
Choon-ho Park, (ed.), Reports of the United States Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, Occasional Paper No. 33, Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1983, p. 687
10 See Judge Jennings, Law-Making and Package Deal, op. cit. p. 348
11 See Hugo Caminos and Michael R. Molitor, Progressive Development of International Law and the
Package Deal, A.JIL, 1985
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Judge Jennings has pointed out, even the firmly established principle of the freedom of
the high seas has seen significant changes as a result of the bargaining process.12
In the global conference with the participation of some 150 States dealing with all
the issues of the laws of the sea, conflicts of interest were inevitable from the outset;
between developing States (assembled under the banner of 'Group of 77') and developed
States, between coastal States and maritime powers, between coastal States and land¬
locked or geographically disadvantaged States. In the conference, developing States were
overwhelming in number, but weak in real power. Considering this complexity of the
negotiations, UNCLOS III decided to apply consensus rule by adopting the Gentleman's
Agreement at its second session in 1974.13 Consensus rule showed its merits as a
procedure which was more consistent with the concept of sovereign equality and more
conducive to a general acceptance compared with majority voting, and more flexible than
unanimity rule. 14 Consensus rule revealed also its demerits, such as the tendency of
blurring the expression of common will,15 the protraction of negotiations inevitable to
achieve the desired concurrence of views and to avoid express objections.16
In UNCLOS III, not all the decisions were made by consensus. Discussions of the
conference were divided into three main committees,17 and ad hoc negotiating groups.
Consensus rule was systematically employed in the works of the committees. But the
adoption of the final text of the Convention was made through a formal vote, in which
130 States voted in favour, 4 voted against, 17 abstained.18 The lack of general
12 See Judge Jennings, Law-Making and Package Deal, in Melanges Offerts a Paul Reuter, 1981, p. 623
13 The so-called Gentleman's Agreement, appended to the Rules of Procedure adopted at Caracas in 1974,
provides: "Bearing in mind the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered
as a whole...the Conference should make every effort to reach agreement on substantive matters by way of
consensus and there should be no voting on such matters until all efforts at consensus have been
exhausted." UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/30 (1974)
14 Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blikker state the advantages of consensus; "Like unanimity, it fully
respects sovereignty, and in common with majority voting, it fully takes into account the interests of the
majority of States. Finally, it acknowledges the differences in power and interests between States." Henry
G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, op. cit. p. 785
15 Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blikker point out the disadvantages of decisions be consensus; "the
private character of negotiations, leaving no room for extensive public records which might facilitate the
solution of future questions of interpretation; furthermore, negotiations are usually time-consuming and the
content of decisions may be excessively watered down through almost endless compromises." Idem.
16 For the disadvantage of consensus, see Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, op.cit. p. 773
17 Committee One dealt with the issue-area of Sea-bed, Committee Two with the maritime zoning such as,
territorial sea, contiguous zone, the continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, the high seas, and the high
seas fishing. Committee Three with the preservation of the marine environment and scientific research.
18 UNCLOS III, Official Records, vol. XVI. pp. 152-67
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acceptance in the process of the adoption of the final text revealed the deficiency inherent
in the majority voting. Most of the States which voted against or abstained in this voting
were industrial powers, which were outnumbered by developing States, but powerful
enough to block the launch of the regime. The entry into force of the Convention was
delayed until the claims of the outnumbered minorities were incorporated in the 1994
Agreement, which modified the Convention in respect of activities in the Area.19
1.1.2 Procedures for the entry into force of the 1982 UNCLOS
For the establishment of a regime based on a legal text, the adoption of the text is not the
final step of the regime creation. For the regime to start up, the text should come into
force by a definitive expression of consent by a required number of States.20 The 1982
UNCLOS was open for signature for a specified period of time at specified places, from
10 December 1982 until 9 December 1984 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Jamaica
and also, from 1 July 1983 until 9 December 1984, at the United Nations Headquarters in
New York.21
As means of the final expression of the consent to be bound, the Convention
provides for ratification, accession and formal confirmation.22 For the entry into force, the
Convention requires ratification or accession by at least 60 States and the elapse of 12
19 Article 2 of the Implementing Agreement defines the relationship between the Convention and the
Implementing Agreement. "1. The provisions of this Agreement and Part XI shall be interpreted and
applied together as a single instrument. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and part
XI, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail."
See supra. Chapter 3
20 As the procedures for the final expression of consent, the Convention specifies the methods of ratification
and accession for States, and formal confirmation for international organizations.
21 Article 305
22 Ratification is defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties as "the international act so
named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty". Article 2
(1) (b)
Accession is primarily the means for a State to become a party if, for whatever reason, it is unable to sign
the treaty. This may be because...the treaty restricts signature to certain States, or because there is a
deadline for signature and it has passed. See Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge
University Press, 2000, p. 88
Formal confirmation is the means for an international organization to express its consent to be bound by
the treaty. Article 3 of Annex IX to the Convention stipulates; "An international organization may deposit
its instrument of formal confirmation or of accession if a majority of its member States deposit or have
deposited their instruments of ratification or accession."
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months after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession.23
For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the sixtieth
instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the
thirtieth day following the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession.24
The rules for the entry into force of the 1982 UNCLOS are quite different from
those employed in the process of its negotiation and adoption in many aspects. First, the
process of the entry into force of a treaty is a particular type of collective choice. While
the negotiation and adoption of a multilateral treaty are conducted through simultaneous
participation of States in a conference, decisions to ratify or accede to a treaty are made
individually by the signatories, but the effect of such serial decisions is produced en bloc,
when individual decisions are accumulated to a predetermined number. Second, "When a
treaty has entered into force, it is in force only for those States which have consented to
be bound by it",25 unless the treaty is consolidated into customary international law, and
except to the extent it is applicable to non-parties in some particular cases. In this respect,
the procedures for the entry into force of the Convention, like other multilateral treaties,
can be regarded as a special type of unanimity rule. Third, in the procedures of decision¬
making by consensus employed in the process of the negotiation, except for the adoption
of the final text, the expression of the will of each individual State can be either explicit
or implicit. In such a process, silence is normally regarded as tacit consent. To the
contrary, in the process of the entry into force of the Convention, only the consent
expressed explicitly, in the form of instruments of ratification or accession, is counted. In
this process, silence is regarded as non-acceptance.26
1.2 Decision-making procedures for the functioning of the regime
Decisions for the routine functioning of the regime are made in the meetings of the States
Parties. When a dispute arises among States Parties in the course of the functioning, such
a dispute should be settled to avoid disruption of the regime.
23 Article 308, para. 1
24 Article 308. para. 2
25 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, op.cit., p. 131
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1.2.1 Procedures for the Meetings of the States Parties
For a regime to function efficiently, it should be equipped with some mechanisms
designed to facilitate communication and exchange of views among regime members. For
this, the 1982 UNCLOS requires the Secretary-General of the United Nations to
"convene necessary meetings of States Parties".27 After the entry into force of the
Convention, a regular forum has been instituted in the name of "the Meeting of States
Parties to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (SPLOS)". Since
there is no formal secretariat for the Convention, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations plays the role of secretariat. SPLOS deals with the matters concerning the
institutions established by the Convention, such as the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf; the elections of
their members as well as their budgetary and administrative matters. In addition, SPLOS
serves as a forum for the exchange of information and discussions on matters related to
the Convention.
SPLOS has adopted the "Rules of Procedures for Meetings of States Parties" on
the model of the procedures employed in UNCLOS III. In the Rules of Procedures for
SPLOS, the term "general agreement" is employed in place of "consensus",28 but with the
same meaning.29 The meeting may proceed to a vote only after all efforts at achieving
general agreement have been exhausted. In the event of a vote, decisions on questions of
substance shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties present and voting,
provided that such majority includes a majority of the States Parties participating in the
26 In case a State manifests sufficient evidence of acquiescence to the application of the Convention in its
practices, the Convention might be applicable to that State.
27 Article 319, para 2. (e)
28 The Convention defines consensus as "the absence of any formal objection". Article 161, para. 8. (e)
29 The traditional consensus method established in the UNCLOS III is summarized in Article 312 of the
Convention defining the procedures of amendment., "...The conference should make every effort to reach
agreement by way of consensus and there should be no voting on them until all efforts at consensus have
been exhausted." In the Rules of Procedures for meetings of States Parties, "general agreement" is defined;
"Meeting may proceed to a vote only after all efforts at achieving general agreement have been exhausted.
SPLOS/2/Rev.3 adopted on 26 July 1995
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Meeting.10 Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a majority of the States
Parties present and voting.11
1.2.2 Procedures for the settlement of disputes
Dispute settlement is a special type of decision-making. Decisions are made by a third
party. The dispute settlement system, as a component of a regime, is designed to resolve a
particular type of problem, i.e. disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the
constituent treaty. Without an appropriate mechanism designed for dispute settlement, a
regime may be disrupted or paralyzed. The dispute settlement system of a given regime
reflects the nature of the regime. Since the 1982 UNCLOS covers a variety of issue-areas
and contains many equivocal provisions as a result of the package deal and compromise,
there is much room for diverging interpretations and applications, which may result in
disputes. Reflecting these characteristics of the regime, the Convention provides a variety
of dispute settlement mechanisms: bilateral procedures, such as exchange of views,
consultation and negotiation; third party procedures, such as conciliation and procedures
entailing binding decisions.12
1.3 Decision-making procedures for the transformation of the regime
A regime may evolve through the modification of regime injunctions or through
the change in the composition of its members. The 1982 UNCLOS sets out a set of
procedures for these two ways of regime change.
1.3.1 Procedures for the amendment of the 1982 UNCLOS
For a treaty to adapt to the changing environment, it should be endowed with a
mechanism of amendment. The 1982 UNCLOS provides for two sets of procedures for
30 Rules of Procedures of SPLOS, SPLOS/2/Rev.3, Rule 53
31 Idem. Rule 54
32 See infra. 3. Compliance System
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amendment: 1) procedures for the amendment to the provisions other than those of Part
XI; 2) procedures for the amendment to the provisions of Part XI.33
An amendment to the provisions other than those relating to activities in the Area
is not a routine decision but a critical decision tantamount to partial legislation. It requires
therefore a set of procedures similar to those applied in the process of the adoption of the
Convention.
Since the International Sea-Bed Authority (ISBA) is created for the administration
of activities in the Area, amendment to the provisions of Part XI and Annex VI is
entrusted to ISBA.34
1.3.2 Procedures for the entry and withdrawal of regime members
A change in the composition of the regime members entails a change in the character of
the regime. In a bilateral regime, the withdrawal of one of the members results in the
complete collapse of the regime. In a global regime, the entry or withdrawal of a small
number of members may not result in a drastic change in the nature of the regime, but the
entry or withdrawal of a great number of members or of one or more key members may
change the nature of the regime.35
The Convention provides the mechanisms for the entry into and withdrawal from
the regime under the Convention. A State can be a member of the regime by becoming a
State Party to the Convention by way of ratification or accession.36 An international
organization may become a member by means of official confirmation.37
A State may withdraw from the regime under the Convention by denouncing the
Convention. A State Party may denounce the Convention by written notification to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the denunciation shall take effect one year
after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.38
33 See supra. Chapter 3
34 Article 314
35 In the case of the regime of the League ofNations, the non-participation of the United States of America
was one of the main causes of the weakness of the regime.
36 Article 306, 307
37 At present, the European Community is the only international organization that became party to the
Convention by means of official confirmation.
38 Article 317
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However, when the Convention is consolidated into customary international law, a State
may not withdraw from the regime under the Convention. In this vein, the Convention
stipulates that the denunciation shall not in any way affect the duty of any State Party to
fulfil any obligation embodied in this Convention to which it would be subject under
international law independently of this Convention."
1.4 Evolution of the decision-making procedures in international forums
The doctrine of absolute sovereignty which dominated for most of the nineteenth
century entailed the general application of the rule of unanimity in the vast majority of
international conferences held during the period.40 Unanimity rule was also the basic
procedure for decision-making in the League of Nations.41 In this period, the application
ofmajority voting was considered acceptable for the adoption of agendas or certain other
procedural matters. It was within the more technical public unions that majority rule
came into general use, especially in those concerned with technical or scientific matters
and involving non-diplomatic representation, such as UPU, ITU, the Metric Union, etc.42
The Charter of the United Nations marked a turning point in the development of
decision-making procedures from the unanimity rule to the majority vote.43 In the Charter,
the majority vote became the rule, with some exceptions.44 The problems of the majority
voting emerged sharply in UNCTAD, where, as a result of decolonization, developing
countries could adopt decisions by overwhelming vote, but the implementation of such
decisions depended on the cooperation by the developed countries which were
39 Article 317, para. 3
40 Louis Henkin ascertains that the principle of unanimity has been justified on the ground of the sovereign
equality of states. See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave? Columbia University Press, 1979, p. 33
41 The Covenant of the League ofNations, Art. 5
42 See Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, Bowett's Law of International Institutions, Fifth Edition, Sweet &
Maxwell, 2001, p. 263
43 See Miguel Marin-Bosch, Votes in the UN General Assembly, Kluwer Law International, 1998
See also Louis B. Sohn, Voting Procedures in United Nations Conferences for the Codification of
International Law, A.JIL, vol. 69 (1975)
44 In the General Assembly, decisions on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the
members present and voting. Decisions on other matters shall be made by a majority of the members
present and voting. (Art. 18) In the Security Council, decisions on procedural matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members. Decisions on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of
nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members. (Art. 27) In the ECOSOC and the
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outnumbered in the voting.45 As B. Buzan pointes out, the key problem in contemporary
international decision-making is the divorce of power from voting majorities.46
As a reaction to these problems inherent in the majority vote, a tendency towards
decision-making by consensus began to be preferred in a large number of international
organizations in the 1960s.47 Since then, increasing number of resolutions of the General
Assembly have been taken by consensus.48 As such, UNCLOS III was not the first to
employ consensus rule but "the first formalization of consensus."49 Before UNCLOS III,
"nearly all prior use of consensus had been conducted informally, and has been based
simply on the consent of the actors involved."50
The innovative element of the decision-making procedures employed in
UNCLOS III resided in the new way of making consensus, termed "active consensus", in
which "the most important element of this special form of decision-making by consensus
was according the president and the three main committee chairmen the initiative in
producing so-called informal negotiating texts, which effectively obliged interested States
to take position to encourage or discourage the formation of consensus around them."51
Another novel aspect of the decision-making procedures of UNCLOS III was the
combination of consensus rule with package deal. Before UNCLOS III, it was rare that a
single conference dealt with such a variety of issues. In a negotiation dealing with a
single issue or a small number of issues, there is little room to make a variety of packages.
In UNCLOS III, the issues were so numerous that package deal was not only possible but
also inevitable. In UNCLOS III, as in many other subsequent meetings, consensus was
not an absolute rule. It was backed up by the majority voting procedure. After the
Trusteeship Council, all decisions shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting. (Art. 67,
89)
45 See Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, op.cit, p. 265
46 B. Buzon, Negotiating by consensus: Developments in Technique at the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, 75 AJIL (1981), p. 326
47 See C. Wilfred Jenks, Unanimity, The Veto, Weighted Voting, Special and Simple Majorities and
Consensus as Modes of Decision in International Organizations, in Cambridge Essays in International law,
Essays in Honour of Lord McNair 48 (1965), K. Zemanek, Majority Rule and Consensus Technique in
Law-making Diplomacy, in R. St. J. MacDonald and D. M. Johnston (ed.), The Structure and Process of
International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory, 1983, pp. 857-887
48 M. Morin-Bosch, How nations vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations, International
Organization, 41, (1987), pp. 705-724
49 Robbie Sabel, Procedure at International Conferences, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.307
50 Barry Buzon, op.cit., p. 328
51 Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blikker, op. cit., p. 779
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exhaustion of efforts to reach consensus, the Conference could proceed to a vote. This
approach of 'qualified consensus' exercised important psychological pressure on
delegations toward mutual compromise, as B. Buzon comments; "It was necessary to
have voting rules in order to both to give the weak some leverage and to guard against the
tendency of consensus procedures to drift into paralysis because of a lack of pressure to
come to decisions."52 In fact, as the representative of Norway stated, "delegations taking
part in substantive negotiations on matters of great national interest would be more
inclined to seek mutual accommodation of interests if they were aware that the alternative
to general agreement was a Conference decision by way of a vote."53
After UNCLOS III, consensus rule is widely applied to the adoption of
international instruments, in particular soft-law instruments and binding treaties dealing
with environmental issues. The 1992 UNCED was a typical forum where many
international instruments were adopted by universal consensus. In parallel with this
development, a variety of voting methods, such as simple majority, two-thirds majority,
qualified majority, weighted majority, etc. continue to be employed in many international
organizations, according to the characteristics of the organizations and the subjects.
The evolution of decision-making procedures in international society is closely
linked with that of the concept of sovereignty. As long as the sovereign equality remains
one of the fundamental principles of international law, it will be difficult to apply the
majority voting at the global level to decision-making on matters sensitively related to the
concept of sovereignty. No State is flexible in compromising its sovereignty. In most
cases, the majority voting will be limited to decision-making on procedural and technical
matters, except in international economic organizations.54
Another element of the evolution in decision-making procedures is the trend of
imposition of procedural obligations to realize substantive norms. Jean de Munck
underlines the growing importance of proceduralization of norms (proceduralisation de
52 Barry Buzon, op. cit. p. 331
53 Official Records of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, Vol. I, p. 21, Summary Records of the 8,h
Meeting of the Plenary, para. 11, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62 (1973)
54 See Stephen Zamora, Voting in international economic organizations, A.JIL, vol. 74 (1980)
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la norme) in contemporary societies.55 Procedural rationality may generate substantive
rationality.56 The phenomenon of proceduralization of norms can be found in situations
where some substantive norms are widely welcomed but the concept of which remains so
abstract and uncertain that they are not appropriate to guide concrete actions. Sustainable
development is an example of such norms. Due to the uncertainty of its meaning and the
lack of operational standards, it is difficult to apply the concept of sustainable
development to real situations as a legal obligation. However, certain procedural rules
may be required in the cause of sustainable development, as Patricia Birnie and Alan
Boyle asserts; "...although international law may not require development to be
sustainable, it does require development decisions to be the outcome of a process which
promotes sustainable development."57 Precautionary principle is also a norm difficult to
apply directly to human actions. But it may lay procedural obligations, such as EIA,
environmental monitoring, scientific research, in order to reduce uncertainty to an
acceptable degree. The main rationale of procedural obligations set down in international
environmental agreements is the fact that they serve as a vehicle for the resolution of
conflicts between States proposing the conduct of activities and those likely to be
affected.58
2. Convergence of expectations
2.1 Convergence of expectations in the making of the regime
2.1.1 Convergence of expectations through the universal participation
55 Jean de Munck , Normes et procedures : les coordonnees d'un debat, in Jean de Munck & Marie
Verhoeven (ed.), Les mutations du rapport a la norme, Un changement dans la modernite ? De Boeck
Universite, 1997,
56 See Niklas Luhmann, La legitimation par la procedure, traduit par Lukas K. Sosoe et Stephane Bouchard
de Legitimation durch Verfahren, Les Presses de I'Universite Laval, 2001
57 Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd edition, chapter 3.
58 See Phoebe N. Okowa, Procedural obligations in international environmental agreements, BYIL, 1996, pp.
275-336
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The regime under the 1982 UNCLOS has been created through negotiation. From the
beginning, the universal character of the regime was manifested by "the participation by
more than 150 countries representing all regions of the world, all legal and political
systems, all degrees of socio-economic development."59 The number of States
participating in UNCLOS III increased in the course of the Conference due to the
proliferation of newborn States in the tide of decolonization which began in the 1960s
and lasted until the 1970s. In the voting for the adoption of the Convention, 130 States
voted in favour, 4 voted against, and 17 abstained.60 This means that in its final session,
the Conference was attended by 151 States, the quasi-totality of the independent States of
the world of the time.61
Through this universal participation, every State was given the opportunity to
propose and defend its ideas in the Conference. In theory, every State had the right to
accept or refuse the positions of other States, although in reality its ability to do so was
more or less limited according to its bargaining power in the Conference. In this way, the
Convention was elaborated through negotiation, without being imposed either by any
hegemonic powers or by any majority of States. The fact that the text of the Convention
was elaborated through universal participation means that the Convention is a set of self-
made and self-governing rules for every State. This is an important factor in fostering the
convergence of expectations of States around the Convention. Only those States which
have become independent after the conclusion of UNCLOS III find themselves faced
with the Convention presented to them as afait accompli, which is to be accepted en bloc
or not.
2.1.2 Convergence of expectations through the package deal and consensus rule
59 See Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, "20 Years of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982-2002"
www.un.org:Depts/los/convention agreements/convention_20 years.htm
60 UNCLOS III, Official Records, vol. XVI. Pp. 152-167
61 In 1982, there were 157 members States of the United Nations. See United Nations, Growth in United
Nations Membership 1945-2000, www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm
Besides these UN members, there were a few non-member States, such as the Republic of Korea, the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Switzerland, etc. This means that there were some 160 States in
the world at the moment of the adoption of the Convention.
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Universal participation itself does not guarantee a successful fusion of the will of all
States. If the will of the majority of States is imposed on the minority by means of voting,
the will of all States cannot be merged. In the process of the elaboration of the 1982
UNCLOS, the convergence of the will of all participating States was reinforced by the
practices of package deal and consensus rule. Except in the final session, no vote was
taken. Compromises among the States in the making of a regime constitute a good
foundation for the convergence of expectations of the States in the functioning of the
regime. Through the process of package deal and consensus rule, diverging ideas were
integrated into a consistent set of norms.
2.2 Convergence of expectations through the text of the 1982 UNCLOS
2.2.1 Uniform application of the 1982 UNCLOS
For the sake of uniform application, the 1982 UNCLOS stipulates; "No reservations or
exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles
of this Convention."62 And there is no article which permits expressly a reservation or
exception.
In UNCLOS III, package deal in procedure engendered a package of provisions in
substance. The provisions of the Convention are closely inter-related and form an
integrated package.63 Since this integrated package was made through a series of
compromises, it is consistent that no reservations or exceptions are allowed. If a State
makes a reservation64 to any of the provisions contained in the integrated package, it
means that the reserving State intends to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain
provisions in their application to that State. If a reservation is made in a substantial matter,
it is tantamount to a request of an additional concession from other participants. If such
62 Article 310 of the Convention
63 Closing Statement by the President of Conference on the Law of the Sea, in Myron H. Nordquist &
Choon-ho Park (ed.), Reports of the United Nations Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, Occasional Paper, No.33. p. 687
64 Reservation is defined as "a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify
the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State." Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, Article 2 (1) (d)
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reservations are allowed in a multilateral treaty, the application of the treaty will be
complicated, since the relations among States Parties will be split into several categories;
the relations between the reserving States and the objecting States, the relations between
the reserving States and the States which have accepted the reservations, and the relations
between the States which have made no reservations.65 The objecting States may or not
consider the reserving State as a party to the treaty. Even in the case where the reserving
State is considered a party, the content of the set of applicable provisions will differ
according to the different categories of relations among States parties. In such a case, the
integrity and uniformity of the treaty would be undermined.
In the case of the 1982 UNCLOS, reservations or exceptions are prohibited to
avoid these problems. In this sense, the President of UNCLOS III stated; "...the
provisions of the Convention are closely inter-related and form an integral package. Thus
it is not possible for a state to pick what it likes and to disregard what it does not like. It
was also said that rights and obligations go hand in hand, and it is not permissible to
claim rights under the Convention without being willing to shoulder the corresponding
obligations."66 Similar opinions have been expressed by many delegations, as stated in
the Reports of the U. S. delegation; "Since the Convention is an overall 'package deal'
reflecting different priorities of different States, to permit reservations would inevitably
permit one State to eliminate the 'quid' of another State's 'quo'. Thus there was general
agreement in the Conference that in principle reservations could not be permitted."67
65 The International Court of Justice provided a guideline on the applicability of a treaty to which a
reservation is made: (1) If a reservation has been objected to by one or more parties, but not by others, the
reserving state will be a party, provided the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose. (2) If a
party objects to a reservation because it considers it incompatible with the object and purpose, that party
may consider the reserving state as not a party. (3) If a party accepts a reservation as being compatible with
the object and purpose, it may consider the reserving state as a party. !CJ Reports, 1951, p. 15
In a similar vein, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (a) acceptance by another
contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that other
State of or when the treaty is in force for those States; (b) an objection by another contracting State to a
reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States
unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State, (c) an act expressing a State's
consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other
contracting State has accepted the reservation. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 20 (4)
66 Closing Statement by the President of Conference on the Law of the Sea. ibid. p. 687
67 Myron H. Nordquist and Choon-ho Park, (ed.), Reports of the United States Delegation to the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, op.cit., p.449
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Luke T. Lee asserts; "the decision not to accept adherence with reservations also suggests
a purpose to achieve a universal regime applicable to all states."68
In addition, consensus procedure is hardly compatible with reservations, as Eric
Suy writes; "if a text is adopted by consensus, statements expressing fundamental
reservations would be contrary to the very idea of the non-objection procedure which
implies a positive attitude of the participants towards the substance."69 In the case of the
1982 UNCLOS, the consensus procedure was systematically applied in the negotiating
committees, except in the final session, where the Convention was adopted by vote.
Therefore, the Convention cannot be said to have been adopted through a no-objection
procedure. But in general, it can be said that the text of the Convention has been
elaborated by consensus.
The mechanism for the uniform application of the Convention thus constructed
may enhance the convergence of expectations, since every State has good reason to
expect that the Convention will apply to all States Parties without exception.
2.2.2 Universalism embedded in the 1982 UNCLOS
2.2.2.1 Openness of the 1982 UNCLOS to all States
The universalism of the 1982 UNCLOS is embedded in the provisions stipulating the
procedures of becoming parties thereto. The Convention is open to all States of the world
without requiring any specific qualification.70 Every State can become party to the
Convention by depositing the instruments of ratification or accession. Every State is thus
free to decide whether or not to become party to the Convention.71 Furthermore, the
68 Luke T. Lee, The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States, AJIL, 1983, Vol. 77, p. 548
69 Eric Suy, Consensus, in R. Bernhardt, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 1992, vol. I, p. 759
70 Article 305, 1 (a)
This is a point which differentiates the regime under the Convention from the regime under the Charter of
the United Nations, although both are universal regimes today. Differently from the Convention, the
Charter lays down certain conditions for membership. For non-original members to become its members,
they are required to satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 4, para.l of the Charter and they should be
accepted by the decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
71 In this aspect, the Convention differs from the Charter of the United Nations, under which non-original
members can only apply to become members and it is the Organization which decides whether or not to
accept the application. See Article 4 of the Charter.
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Convention is also open to certain categories of entities which have not obtained the
status of sovereign States72 and to international organizations to the extent that these are
entitled to represent their members as specified in Annex IX,73 although the Convention
differentiates these entities and international organizations from sovereign States Parties
in its application.74
2.2.2.2 Provisions formulated for universal applicability
The universalism of the 1982 UNCLOS is manifested in many provisions which provide
for the rights or obligations of "all States", "every State" or "States", whether they are
States Parties or not. For example, under Article 116 "All States" have the right for their
nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas... and under Article 3 "Every State" has
the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12
nautical miles...There are many other provisions addressed to "all States"75 or "Every
State."76 Many provisions, in particular those which lay down obligations relating to the
protection and preservation of the marine environment, are addressed to 'States', without
any qualifying or limiting epithets. For example, Article 192 stipulates; "States have the
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment." In such provisions, "States"
can be understood to mean "all States".77
At first glance, these provisions appear to be contradictory to the customary rule
of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt,78 which is incorporated in the 1969 Vienna
72 Article 305, 1 (b), (c), (d), (e)
73 Article 305 I (f), Annex IX For an international organization to become party to the Convention, it
should obtain a status to represent all its members
74 To these categories of parties, the Convention applies mutates mutandis. See Articles I, 2 (2)
75 There are provisions addressed to 'all States' in the preamble, Articles 17, 58, 79, 86, 87, 100, 108, 109,
112, 116, 117, 238, 256, 257, 260, 274.
76 Provisions addressed to 'Every State' are contained in Articles 3, 90, 91, 94, 98, 99, 105, 113, 114, 115,
211
77 The following Articles contain such provisions: Articles 58, 65, 79, 118, 119, 138, 192, 193, 194, 195,
196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 217, 219, 220, 222,
223, 225,226, 227, 231,232, 235, 237, 239, 242, 243, 244, 248, 249, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 263, 266,
267, 268, 269, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 303
78 The rule ofpacta tertiis which dates back to Roman Law has been reaffirmed by Court practices. In
Upper Silesia case the PCIJ stated: 3A treaty only creates law as between the States which are parties to it;
in case of doubt no rights can be deduced from it in favor of third States." 1926 PCIJ ser. A, No. 7 at 29.
In Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District ofGex case, the PCIJ stated: "Article 435 of the Treaty of
Versailles is not binding upon Switzerland, who is not a party to the Treaty, except to the extent to which
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Convention on the Law of Treaties: "A treaty does not create either obligations or rights
for a third State without its consent."79 But, these provisions addressed to all States can be
regarded as justifiable exceptions to the rule ofpacta tertiis.
First, treaty provisions resulting from the codification of pre-existing rules of
customary international law have binding force on non-parties to the treaty. As the
International Law Commission stated; "A principle or rule of customary international law
may be embodied in a bipartite or multipartite agreement so as to have, within the stated
limits, conventional force for the States parties to the agreement so long as the agreement
is in force; yet it would continue to be binding as a principle or rule of customary
international law for other States",80 such treaty provisions may form a double regime,
conventional for parties to the treaty, and customary to non-parties.81 In fact, many of the
provisions of the Convention addressed to 'all States', 'every State' or 'States' are the
results of the codification of the pre-existing customary international rules.
Second, the stipulation pour autrui can be another exception to the principle of
pacta tertiis.82 The doctrine of stipulation pour autrui, developed through court and State
practices,83 is incorporated into the 1969 Vienna Convention, which provides; "A right
arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the
that country accepted it." 1932 PCIJ series. A/B, No. 46 at 141. In North Sea Continental Shelf case, the
ICJ held that "...not having become a party to the convention it could not claim any rights under it until the
professed willingness and acceptance had been manifested in the prescribed form."
79 Article 34
801LC Report 1950, Yearbook International Law Commission, 364, 368.
81 The term "double regime" means that a treaty is governed by the Convention for one party or parties, and
by the rules of customary law for the other party or parties. See E. W. Vierdag, The Law Governing Treaty
Relations between Parties to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and States not Party to the
Convention, AJIL, 1982, Vol. 76
82 In the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District ofGex case, the PCIJ stated: "It cannot be lightly
presumed that stipulations favourable to a third State have been adopted with the object of creating an
actual right in its favour. There is however nothing to prevent the will of sovereign States from having this
object and this effect. The question of the existence of a right acquired under an instrument drawn between
other states is therefore one to be decided in each particular case: it must be ascertained whether the states
which have stipulated in favour of a third state meant to create for that state an actual right which the latter
has accepted as such." 1932 PCIJ series A/B, No. 46 pp. 147-48. The stipulation pour autrui appears most
often in the regime of passage of international straits: Article 1 of the 1888 Constantinople Convention on
the Suez Canal, stipulating "the Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open in time ofwar as in
time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or ofwar without distinction of flag"; In the Wimbledon case,
the PCIJ held that "the effect of article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles 1919 maintaining that the Kiel Canal
was to be open to all the ships of all countries at peace with Germany; intended to provide under treaty
guarantee easier access to the Baltic for the benefit of all nations of the world." 1923 PCIJ Series A, no. 1,
p. 99. Under the Law of the Sea Convention also, the provisions on innocent passage and transit passage
are formulated in such a way as to be applicable to all ships of all States.
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provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group of States to which it
belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed
so long as the contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides."84 The
Convention contains many such provisions that stipulate rights intended to be enjoyed by
all States.85
The 1982 UNCLOS contains also many obligations addressed to all States,
including non-parties. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties lays down
much more stringent conditions for the establishment of obligations of non-parties than
those for the stipulation of rights of non-parties: "An obligation arises for a third State
from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means
of establishing the obligation and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in
writing." In the case of the 1982 UNCLOS, there are few cases where the States have
expressly accepted the obligation laid down in the Convention without becoming
parties.86
2.2.3 Stringent conditions for amendment
Any amendment to the 1982 UNCLOS can be adopted by consensus, with the possibility
of voting as the last resort.87 On the basis of this provision, each State Party may expect
83 See Edouardo Jimenez de Arechaga, Treaty Stipulations in favor of third States, AJIL, vol. 50 (1956)
84 Article 36, para. 1
85 For example, Article 3 stipulates: "Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea
up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles...", Article 17 stipulates: "...ships of all States, whether
coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.", and so on.
The United States, the USSR, and many other States, have proclaimed the 200 mile-EEZ without becoming,
or before becoming, party to the Convention on the ground that the EEZ regime had been established as
customary international law.
86 The United States has expressed its intention to accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests
as reflected in the Convention. In 1983, the President of the United States, which was not party to the
Convention, made a statement, in writing, "First, the United States is prepared to accept and act in
accordance with the balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans - such as navigation and
overflight. In this respect, the United States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their
coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States and others
under international law are recognized by such coastal states. Second, the United States will exercise and
assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent
with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention. The United States will not, however, acquiesce in
unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in
navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses." Statement by the president, March 10, 1983, 19
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 383
87 Articles 312, 313
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that the integrity of the Convention will be maintained until all, or virtually all, States
Parties agree to amend it. These stringent conditions for amendments constitute a
safeguard for the integrity, stability and continuity of the Convention. Such an assurance
may foster the convergence of expectations.
2,3 Convergence of expectations through State practices
2.3.1 World-wide adherence
The most important act of a State in its relations to the 1982 UNCLOS is to become a
party. By becoming a party to the Convention, a State consents to be bound by the entire
set of norms laid down in the Convention. The Convention was enthusiastically
welcomed by international society, as the President of the Conference stated; "Never in
the annals of international law has a Convention been signed by 119 countries on the very
first day on which it is opened for signature."88 This initial enthusiasm was bound to cool
down soon, as manifested by the delay of its entry into force for a dozen of years. This
was the proof that the 'integrated package' had not been really integrated with regard to
the deep sea-bed regime. A new impetus was given to the Convention in 1994 by the
conclusion of the Implementing Agreement, through which a supplementary compromise
was made by incorporating the claims of the industrial States around the deep sea-bed
regime. From then on, the number of States ratifying or acceding to the Convention has
increased notably. After having entered into force in 1994, the Convention has now an
absolute majority of the States of the world as its parties.89 Considering the fact that the
overwhelming majority of the States of the world are parties to the Convention and few
States remain persistent-objectors, the Convention can be considered to have acquired a
quasi-universal acceptance. Such a world-wide adherence constitutes a good foundation
for the convergence of expectations among the States of the world. Since the absolute
88 Closing Statement by the President of Conference on the Law of the Sea, in Myron H. Nordquist &
Choon-ho Park (ed.). Reports of the United Nations Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Seas, op.cit., No.33. p. 686
89 As at 9 December 2002, the number of Parties to the Convention is 142. See Status of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and related Agreements as at 9 December 2002, Division for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, www.un.org/Depts/los/los94st.htm
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majority of States of the world have given consent to be bound by the Convention, each
State has good reason to expect that other States intend to act in accordance with the
Convention. Such expectations may converge in a global scale.90
2.3.2 Political declarations on the 1982 UNCLOS in universal forums
The convergence of expectations around the 1982 UNCLOS has also been manifested in
many political declarations adopted in global forums, in particular the General Assembly
of the United Nations. For example, from 1991 on, the General Assembly has adopted
each year resolutions or decisions under the title of "Oceans and the Law of the Sea".
Some of them have dealt with specific issues, such as large-scale pelagic drift-net
fishing,91 straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks,92 Agreement relating to
the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982,93 the relationship between the United Nations and the International
Seabed Authority,94the cooperation and relationship between the United Nations and the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,95 results of the review by the Commission
on Sustainable Development,96 fisheries by-catch and discards and their impact on the
sustainable use of the world's living resources,"unauthorized fishing in zones of national
jurisdiction and its impact on the living marine resources of the world's oceans and
seas.98Others are reiterations of general opinions of international society on the law of the
sea, such as "the fundamental importance of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security",
90 See Bernard H. Oxman, The Rule of Law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
EJIL, Vol. 7, 1996, N°3 "Global ratification would unite the nations of the world in the most
comprehensive and far-reaching treaty for protection of the global environment yet achieved, establishing a
clear and inexorable link between the rule of law in international affairs and the preoccupation of people
everywhere to ensure that their children inherit a safe and healthy home."
91 A/RES/46/215 (1991), Decision: 48/445 (1993), Decision: 47/443 (1992), Decision: 48/445 (1993),
Decision: 49/436 (1994), A/RES/50/25 (1995), A/RES/51/36 (1996), A/RES/52/29 (1997), A/RES/53/33
(1998), A/RES/55/8 (2000), A/RES/57/142 (2002)
92 A/RES/47/192 (1992), A/RES/48/l 94 (1993), A/RES/49/121 (1994), A/RES/50/24 (1995), A/RES/51/35







"the universal character of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea", "the
importance of the effective implementation of the Convention", "the strategic importance
of the Convention as a framework for national, regional and global action in the marine
sector".99 These resolutions and decisions, as manifestations of converging expectations,
have a particular importance, considering that they are adopted by consensus or by virtual
unanimityl00in the universal forum in which not only Parties to the 1982 UNCLOS but
also non-Parties have participated.
Converging expectations of the international society around the 1982 UNCLOS
have been expressed in other universal forums such as the 1992 UNCED, as evidenced in
the Agenda 21, Chapter 17, in which the 1982 UNCLOS was reaffirmed as the legal basis
for action programmes in all fields of the Protection of the Oceans.101
Such a repetition of political declarations of a global character may consolidate
the legitimacy of the Convention as the basic legal framework, and thereby form
legitimate expectations. Such legitimate expectations reinforce global convergence of
expectations that the Convention will function as the basic legal framework in the issue-
area ofmaritime affairs.
2.3.3 References to the 1982 UNCLOS made by other treaties
Many regional or global treaties refer to the 1982 UNCLOS and regard it more or less
explicitly as the basic legal framework governing international relations in maritime
issues.
Even before the Convention was still in the process of negotiation, many treaties
expressed the beforehand confirmation of their consistency with the Convention. For
example, the 1976 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against
Pollution declared; "Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the codification and
development of the law of the sea by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the
98 A/RES/49/116 (1994)
99 UNGA resolutions: A/RES/49/28(l994), A/RES/50/23(1995), A/RES/51/34(1996), A/RES/52/26( 1997),
A/RES/53/32( 1998), A/RES/54/31, A/RES/55/7(2000), A/RES/56/12(2001), A/RES/57/141 (2002)
,0° Some resolutions, such as A/RES/52/26, A/RES/53/32, A/RES/54/31, A/RES/56/12, A/RES/56/13, are
adopted by vote, in which only one or two States voted against.
101 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para 17.22, 17.49, 17.77, 17.78, 17.87, 17.99
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Sea convened pursuant to resolution 2750 C (XXV) of the General Assembly of the
United Nations."102 This example was followed in identical terms by the Protocol
Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Area adopted in 1982 and the 1981
Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and
Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region.102 The 1978 Protocol
Amending the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean expressed its concern on consistency with the Convention, by stipulating; "This
Convention shall be subject to review by the Contracting Parties upon the conclusion of a
multilateral treaty resulting from the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea."10JThe 1982 Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean
declared that its parties should "take into account international law, the provisions on
anadromous stocks of fish in the Draft Convention of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea and other developments in international fora relating to
anadromous stocks."105
After the adoption of the 1982 UNCLOS, many regional and global instruments
have made reference to the Convention in different terms. The Parties to the 1990
Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation, and Management of marine
Mammals in the North Atlantic expressed "their common concerns for the rational
management, conservation and optimum utilization of the living resources of the sea in
accordance with generally accepted principles of international law as reflected in the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea..."'06 The 1992 Convention for
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic recalled "the
relevant provisions of customary international law reflected in Part XII of the United
Nations Law of the Sea Convention and, in particular, Article 197 on global and regional
cooperation for the protection and preservation of the marine environment."107 The 1994
102 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, open for signature in 1976,
entered into force in 1978, Article 3, para.2
103 Convention for co-operation in the protection and development of the marine and coastal environment of
the West and Central African Region, Article 3, para.3
104 Protocol Amending The International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean
(1978), Article XII, para.2
105 Preamble
106 Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the
North Atlantic adopted in 1990, Preamble
107 The 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic, Preamble
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Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas recognized that "all States have the right
for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject to the relevant rules of
international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea"
and "under international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, all States have the duty to take, or to cooperate with other States in taking, such
measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the
living resources of the high seas."108
Many other international instruments have expressed their consistency with the
Convention in more or less concrete terms, such as "being aware of the provisions of the
United Nations Convention",109 "mindful of the relevant rules of international law,
including the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea","0
"noting the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea","1 "in
accordance with international law as expressed in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea","2 "having regard to the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea","3 "defines Relevant provisions of international law
as those recognized in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other
international instruments currently in force,""4 "principles drawn from relevant existing
agreements such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Part XII).""5
In different terms, but in common conviction, these treaties recognize the 1982
UNCLOS as the basic legal basis on which they are adopted or with which they are
108 The 1994 FAO Agreement to promote compliance with international conservation and management
measures by fishing vessels on the high seas, Preamble
l0') The 1990 Protocol to the Kuwait Regional Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment
Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, Preamble
110 The 1989 Convention for the prohibition of fishing with long driftnets in the South Pacific, Preamble
111 The 1994 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources Central Bering Sea
and Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna "note the adoption of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982", in their Preambles.
112 The 1992 Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South
Pacific Region, Preamble
113 The 1999 Agreement Between The Government of Iceland, the Government ofNorway and the
Government of the Russia Federation Concerning Certain Aspects of Cooperation in the Area of Fisheries,
Preamble
114 The 2000 Framework agreement for the conservation of living marine resources on the high seas of the
South Pacific (The Galapagos Agreement), Article 1, para. 1.14
115 Montreal guidelines for the protection of the marine environment against pollution from land-based
sources, Introduction.
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consistent. Such attitudes show that expectations of international society on the issues
relating to the law of the sea are converging around the Convention.
2.3.4 Expectations converged in the Meetings of the States Parties
The 1982 UNCLOS provides that the Secretary-General of the United Nations "shall
convene necessary meetings of States Parties in accordance with this Convention"."6
The first Meeting of States Parties (SPLOS) was convened in New York on 21 and 22
November 1994, immediately following the entry into force of the Convention. Since
then, annual and ad hoc meetings of SPLOS have been held.
SPLOS may serve as a forum to facilitate the convergence of expectations among
States Parties around the Convention. "The Meetings have dealt primarily with elections
of the members of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and of the members
of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf as well as with budgetary and
administrative matters of the Tribunal."'"Orderly functioning of such institutions may
contribute to the reinforcement of the conviction of States Parties that the Convention is
successfully governing international relations in the given issue-area. Agenda items of
SPLOS are not confined to matters concerning the functioning of these institutions. A
variety of opinions can be exchanged on a variety of issues relating to the Convention."8
Such opinions may converge or diverge. States Parties may consolidate convergence of
opinions or attenuate divergence of opinions through debates in the meetings.
2.3.5 Incorporation of the 1982 UNCLOS in domestic legislation
When becoming a party to the 1982 UNCLOS, each State takes necessary measures
according to its internal procedures so as to apply the Convention to its nationals. Many
116 Article 319, para.2 (e)
1,7 United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Meetings of States Parties to the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
118 See United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Press Release SEA/1587, 15
May 1998; "The meeting is also scheduled to discuss the future role of the States parties in the review of
issues related to oceans and the law of the sea. At present, the only global forum where those issues are
addressed in a comprehensive manner is the General Assembly of the United Nations. The States parties, at
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States incorporate the rules and standards of the Convention into their national legislation,
explicitly referring to the Convention or implicitly complying with the relevant rules and
standards laid down in the Convention."9 For example, after the entry into force of the
Convention, sea areas under national jurisdiction are standardized. Before the entry into
force of the Convention, the practices of States in determining the breadth of their
territorial sea were divergent. Today, the breadth of the territorial sea is virtually
standardized as 12 miles. Before the entry into force of the Convention, there were
divergent practices of the EEZ regime. Today, many States have proclaimed EEZ in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention.120 The Convention requires States to
adopt laws and regulations or take other measures to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from different sources.121 In adopting such national
laws and regulations, States are required to "take into account internationally agreed rules,
standards and recommended practices and procedures",122 to ensure that such laws,
regulations and measures "shall be no less effective than international rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures",123 "shall be no less effective than the global
rules and standards",124 or "shall have at least the same effect as that of generally
accepted international rules and standards".125 By virtue of these provisions, each State
may expect other States to adopt laws, regulations and measures, which will be at least as
effective as international standards.
2.4 Convergence of expectations through the dispute settlement system
2.4.1 Possibility of divergent interpretations
their last meeting, expressed the desire to maintain this issue on their agenda, thus providing them with the
opportunity to undertake a regular review of matters relating to oceans and the law of the sea."
"g See Jonas Ebbesson, Compatibility of International and National Environmental Law, Kluwer Law
International, 1996
120 For example, see Exclusive Economic Zone Act of the Republic of Korea, 1996, Law on the Exclusive
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of Japan, 1996
121 Articles 207 to 212
122 Articles 207,212




States Parties to a treaty behave in accordance with the treaty by internalising principles
and rules of the treaty. Principles and rules of the treaty can be internalised into the
mindset of the States Parties by being interpreted, explicitly or implicitly. Therefore, for a
treaty to orient States Parties to behave in the direction envisioned by the treaty, its text
has to be interpreted by States Parties in a convergent way. Thus, the convergence of
interpretations of the treaty is a prerequisite to the convergence of expectations around
the treaty. If not, different members may deduce different rules and standards from the
same treaty. Diverging interpretations may result in diverging applications, which in turn
may result in disputes.
However, it is difficult to expect all States Parties to interpret the treaty in a
uniform way, since the formulation of the treaty texts is not always unequivocal, and each
State tends to interpret the text in the light of its national interest. In most cases, the
problems arising from diverging interpretations remain dormant until the conflicting
interpretations result in conflicting actions in reality.
In some cases, diverging interpretations are revealed when States Parties make
interpretive declarations. The 1982 UNCLOS, while prohibiting reservations and
exceptions, does not preclude States Parties from making declarations and statements
with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization of its laws and regulations with the
provisions of the Convention, provided that such declarations or statements do not
purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of the provisions of the Convention in their
application.I26To date, some fifty States have made such declarations and statements.127
Many of them are reiterations of the principles set out in the Convention, notifications of
their decision on the choice of forums for dispute settlement, or reconfirmations of their
position on particular regimes of international straits, which seem generally compatible
with the Convention. However, some declarations reveal diverging or conflicting
interpretations among States Parties. In particular, a diametric contrast is manifested
between the positions of the two groups of States on the issues relating to the innocent
passage in territorial seas, military exercises in EEZ of a foreign State and the principles
for the delimitation ofEEZ and the continental shelf.
126 Article 310
127 United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the law of the Sea, Declarations and statements, date of
most recent addition: 06 February 2002
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On the issue of innocent passage, some States, such as Algeria, China, Croatia,
Egypt, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Yugoslavia, have declared that the
Convention does not prohibit the coastal State from requiring prior notification or
authorization for the innocent passage of warships through its territorial seas.128 For some
others, such as Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Convention
does not authorize the coastal State to require prior notification or authorization for the
innocent passage through its territorial seas.129
On the issue of military exercises or manoeuvres in EEZ, some States, such as
Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Uruguay, have declared that the
Convention does not authorize a State to carry out military exercises or manoeuvres in
EEZ of other States, whereas some others, such as Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, have claimed that the Convention does not prohibit a State from
carrying out military exercises or manoeuvres in EEZ of other States.120
The issue of the delimitation of EEZ and the continental shelf is also a cause of
divergent interpretations. The Convention stipulates that the delimitation of EEZ and the
continental shelf shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, without
specifying whether the median/equidistant line or the equitable principle shall be
applied.121 Some States have given unilateral interpretations to Articles 74 and 83
concerning the delimitation of EEZ and the continental shelf. For example, Malaysia,
Malta, and Yemen have declared that the delimitation of EEZ and the continental shelf
shall be done by the median line, whereas for China such delimitation shall be done on
the basis of international law and in accordance with the principle of equitability.
These diverging interpretations may not immediately entail disputes, but they
remain potential causes of disputes.122 A dispute settlement system can contribute to the





131 Articles 74, 83
132 For example, when a State (like Germany) which interprets that the Convention does not authorize the
coastal State to prohibit military exercises or manoeuvres by other States in the EEZ conducts a military
exercise in the EEZ of a State (like Brazil) which interprets that the Convention does not authorize such
military exercises in the EEZ of other States, the divergence of interpretations may result in a dispute.
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2.4.2 Convergence of interpretations through the dispute settlement system
The role of the dispute settlement system in settling disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of a treaty is passive but decisive. An international court can
provide only ex post interpretations in relation to the disputes brought to the court or in
answer to a request by an international organization.
Though piecemeal by nature, judicial interpretations made by international courts
endowed with authority can be a safeguard against diverging interpretations. Each State
may expect that the dispute settlement system may provide authoritative interpretations
when necessary, even though States Parties have interpreted divergently. In addition,
principles and rules articulated or implied in court decisions form jurisprudence, which
can shed light on subsequent interpretations by State or private actors, and thereby
contribute to the convergence of interpretations. By enhancing the convergence of
interpretations, the dispute settlement system may foster the convergence of expectations
among regime members. If all States have confidence in the dispute settlement system,
each State will have the conviction that it can rely on the judicial settlement as a final
resort for correct interpretations, and thereby have the expectation that the same rules will
apply to all States Parties. Such a conviction may foster intersubjective expectations.133
The Convention provides a variety of dispute settlement procedures which may
foster the convergence of expectations by assuring converging interpretations.
2.5 Evolution of the mechanisms of convergence of expectations
UNCLOS III was an important milestone in the history ofmaking international treaties in
that it was the first conference inspired by universalism, as manifested in the universal
participation and the process of moulding consensus through the concept of package deal.
UNCLOS III realized a new achievement in the process of progressive
development of international law and the codification which international society has
pursued since the end of the Second World War under the auspices of the United
133 See supra. P. 69, a paragraph quoted from John Rawls.
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Nations.I14ln accordance with Resolution 174 (II) of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, the International Law Commission was created for the promotion of the
progressive development of international law and its codification.'15 On the basis of the
contribution made by ILC, many international treaties have been adopted as the result of
the codification of customary international rules or the progressive development of
international law. The process of UNCLOS III was quite different from other processes
of the codification of international law. Before UNCLOS III, drafts of the treaties
codifying customary international law had been prepared by the legal experts of ILC
before they were presented to the diplomatic conference held under the auspices of the
United Nations, as in the cases of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea,
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the 1963 Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations and the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, among
others.116 In the case of the 1982 UNCLOS, the diplomatic conference was involved
directly in drafting the text without relying on the draft proposal elaborated by legal
experts. This approach was inevitable because there were too many issues at stake around
which the interests and positions of States were divergent or conflicting. In such a
situation political considerations were indispensable in parallel with legal reasoning. On
the other hand, the rules of customary international law in the law of the sea had already
been elaborated comprehensively, if not completely, in the texts of the 1958 Geneva
Conventions on the law of the sea. UNCLOS III could start on the basis of the texts of the
1958 Geneva Conventions, which would be partly incorporated into the new Convention
and partly modified or rejected.
How then can the codification of the rules of customary international law
contribute to a convergence of expectations around the rules? The merits of codified rules
can be understood in the light of cognitive rationality and a stability of rules. Common
perception and shared understanding of the rules constitute the starting point for common
134 The idea of codification of international law was already proposed in the last quarter of the eighteenth
century by Jeremy Bentham. In 1924, the League ofNations adopted the Resolution for the Committee of
Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law. This Committee had few results. See
www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm
135 Besides these organs established by the intergovernmental organizations, the International Law
Association founded in 1873, and the Institute of International Law founded in 1873, and some other
private law associations established at the national or regional level contributed to the progress of
international law and its codification.
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expectations. In this sense, codification of customary rules may facilitate a common
cognition thereof and thereby contribute to the convergence of expectations. In many
cases, customary international rules have been too difficult to identify without the
intervention of international courts. Henkin asserts; "It was never easy to prove
customary law among 'civilized nations'; it will be far more difficult to show that some
new practice is generally accepted, or even acquiesced in, among 150-odd states", and
"As concerns customary law in particular, there is often uncertainty and little confidence
as to what it is."137 Once codified, rules can be more easily recognizable. Interpretation of
a treaty may differ from State to State, but at least they have the same text. By enhancing
common cognition of the rules, codification of customary international law may reinforce
convergence of expectations.
In general, codified rules are more stable than customary rules. Treaties evolve
also in many ways.138 But they are subject to more constraints than customary rules are,
because they are crystallized in written texts.
Another important element which contributes to enhancing convergence of
expectations of international society around the 1982 UNCLOS is the continued
expression of the animus of international society, as shown in different universal political
declarations which affirm and reaffirm the importance and significance of the Convention
in the law of the sea.139 Such political declarations, having no binding force, might be
considered as rhetoric, but such rhetoric is not meaningless, as Henkin asserts; "We may
be cynical about the rhetoric of nations and their proclamations of respect for
law...Rhetoric, moreover, is often employed in the hope that it will be believed; this can
only be if, to an extent at least, it is consistent with the nation's behaviour."140 The rituals
of international society reiterating political declarations may consolidate the Weberian
concept of "belief in the existence of a legitimate order".141
136 See www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm
137 Louis Henkin, How nations behave? Columbia University Press, Second edition, 1979, p. 123 and 23
138 See supra. Chapter 3
139 See supra, paragraph 3.2




3.1.1 Compliance, implementation and governance
Converging expectations and compliance are distinct but closely linked concepts. They
are distinct in that expectation is a mental antecedent of an action, while compliance is an
action.142 They are closely linked because convergence of expectations around a set of
norms is an inter-subjectively perceived animus obligandi, which creates a favourable
condition to induce actors to comply with the norms. As such, in independent individual
behaviour, antecedence of expectation to action is evident. But in interdependent actions,
where the best choice for each player depends on what he expects the other to do,
knowing that the other is similarly guided,141 there is reciprocal feedback between
expectation and action. When player A expects what player B will do, A's expectation
relies on his information on B's action, and vice versa.144 Such proposition holds true in
bilateral games, but is particularly valid in repeated games among multiple players, as
those in multilateral regimes.145 This is also relevant to the cooperation between
developed States and developing States in fulfilling their common but differentiated
responsibilities, as Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle assert; "if they (developed States) want
141 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A. M. Henderson and
Talcott Parsons, The Free Press, 1964, p. 124 See also supra. Chapter 2, para.2.5
142 On the concept of mental antecedent, see Bede Rundle, Mind in Action, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1997,
Chapter I Mental Antecedents of Action; "Indeed, for the functionalist, the very concept of a mental state is
nothing other than the concept of a state which is apt for the production of certain sorts of behaviour."
143 See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1960, fifteenth printing,
1995, in particular Chapter 4 Toward a theory of interdependent decision.
144 See Glenn H. Snyder & Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations, Princeton University Press, 1977.
145 See Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, translated by William Rehg from Faktizitaat und
Geltung, Polity Press, 1997, pp. 17-18. "Every social interaction that comes about without the exercise of
manifest violence can be understood as solution to the problem of how the action plans of several actors
can be coordinated with each other in such a way that one party's actions "link up" with those of others. An
ongoing connection of this sort reduces the possibilities of clashes among the doubly contingent decisions
of participants to the point where intentions and actions can form more or less conflict-free networks, thus
allowing behavior patterns and social order in general to emerge."
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developing States to participate actively in securing the goals of each agreement they
must honour the expectation that the necessary resources will be provided.146
In such a way, convergence of expectations and compliance are inseparably
connected. Therefore, it would be better to extend the definition of regimes by adding the
concept of compliance:
"An international regime is an international institution founded on a set of
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actors' expectations converge and in compliance with which actors
behave in a given area of international relations."147
In its narrow concept, compliance can be defined as "an actor's behaviour that
conforms to a treaty's explicit rules." 148 For regime theorists, compliance is more broadly
understood as the behaviour which conforms not only to specific treaty provisions, but
also to a treaty's broad principles, implicit norms, informal agreements.149 This broader
concept of compliance is more meaningful in the issue-areas of environmental protection
where many regimes have been built on the basis of non-binding instruments.150
The choice between compliance and non-compliance of a State depends on its
animus and capacity.151 Generally, if not always, compliance entails costs, such as
financial and technological resources, administrative costs, manpower, political energy,
etc. On the other hand, a State may expect various advantages from compliance, such as
national reputation and shared benefits from the maintenance of world order and the
rational management of common goods, etc. In making a choice, each State will evaluate
146 Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment, Oxford University Press, second
edition, 2002, p. 103
147 Italic letters are added to the definition of regimes proposed by Stephen Krasner. See supra, p.60 & p.75
148 Ronald B. Michel, Compliance Theory: an Overview, in James Cameron, Jacob Werksman & Peter
Roderick (ed.), Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law, Earthscan, 1996, p. 5
See also R. Fisher, Improving Compliance with International Law, University Press of Virginia, 1981, p. 20
l4<> See Chayes A. and Chayes A. On Compliance, lO, vol. 47, 2, Spring 1993, Charles Lipson, Why are
some international agreements informal ? IO, 45, 4, Autumn 1991
150 On the subject of compliance with non-binding norms, see Dinah Shelton, Commitment and Compliance,
Oxford University Press, 1999, Part II Perspectives on compliance with non-binding norms.
151 See Peter M. Haas, Compliance Theories Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations
and Comparative Politics, in Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance, op.cit, 1999
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these expected costs and benefits in the light of its motivations. 152 Compliance theories
propose a variety of ways of classifying the sources of compliance: some classify them
into 'compliance as independent self-interest' and 'compliance as interdependent self-
interest',152 others identify domestic sources of compliance and international sources,154
and so on. Whatever their criteria, these taxonomies can provide only partial explanations
in that they focus on the animus of States, without paying sufficient attention to the other
aspect of behaviour; the capacity to comply. Even though a State is determined to comply
with a given international norm, that animus is not enough to lead the State to compliance,
unless it is backed by real capacity. In reality, wilful violation is the exception, not the
rule, because most States enter into agreements intending to comply.155 The most
common factors that restrain States from complying are financial and technological
resources as well as administrative capacity. That is why international environmental
regimes are paying more and more attention to financial mechanisms and capacity-
building.
Non-compliance156 also entails costs and advantages. The principal cost is usually
individual responses of an affected State such as protest and varying degrees of
retaliation, or communal responses such as social opprobrium and international sanctions,
152 See Max Gounelle, La motivation des actes juridiques en droit international public, Editions A. Pedone,
1979. For Gounelle, « Tout acte juridique, et done tout acte juridique international, a necessairement une
motivation materielle. » p. 28
See also Louis Henkin, How Nations behave? Columbia University Press, Second edition, 1979
153 Ronald B. Mitchell, Compliance Theory: an Overview, pp. 6-11
154 Peter M. Haas, Compliance Theories, in Dinah Shelton, Commitment and Compliance, Oxford
University Press, 1999 As domestic sources, Haas presents technical and political factors which intervene
in the choice to comply, and as international sources, he presents realist views which argue that compliance
depends on threats of sanctions for non-compliance levied by a powerful state, and functional
institutionalist views which draw attention to the fact that a State's choice also can be influenced by
international institutions.
155 See Antonia Handler Chayes, Abraham Chayes and Ronald B. Mitchell, Active Compliance
Management in Environmental Treaties, in Winfried Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and
International Law, Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1995,
156 For the concept of non-compliance in comparison with breach, see Shabtai Rosenne, Developments in
the Law of Treaties 1945-1986, 1989, p. 94 For Rosenne, while "breach" would signify an ascertained
violation of a binding treaty obligation and give rise to international responsibility, non-compliance would
be a political matter: whether it exists and what countermeasures (short of suspension of rights) might seem
appropriate would be determined through a treaty-specific political process.
See also Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-compliance? Reflections on the enforcement of the
Montreal Protocol, YIEL, 1992, vol. 31
For Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, "when used in a treaty context it is not entirely clear that 'non¬
compliance differs in any material sense from 'breach' or 'non-application', in that breach of a treaty is a
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etc."7 The most common type of benefits from non-compliance in the field of
environmental protection is the advantage of free-riding and externalization of costs. In
many cases, benefits from non-compliance are more tangible and immediate, while the
costs of non-compliance are relatively more abstract and remote. Therefore, the shorter
the time frame in which the calculation is made, the more the benefits of non-compliance
tend to outweigh the costs, as caricatured by the tragedy of the commons.
Implementation is a set of measures taken to ensure compliance. For Dinah
Shelton; "Implementation of international norms refers to incorporating them in domestic
law through legislation, judicial decision, executive decree, or other process. Compliance
includes implementation, but is broader, concerned with factual matching of state
behaviour and international norms."158 This is a narrow concept of implementation
because it means only domestic implementation. In reality, not only domestic laws and
policies but also international agreements and institutions may serve as tools of
implementation. International society may take implementing measures by adopting
agreements which provide for more action-oriented concrete rules, such as criteria and
standards, commonly taken in the form of implementing agreements and protocols. In
addition, international regimes may establish mechanisms of international control and
supervision."9 As such, implementation can be understood as regulatory actions taken by
governments or other institutions to induce and control real actors by means of legislation
and enforcement,160 while compliance refers to all kinds of actions taken in accordance
wrongful act entailing a duty to afford reparation." See Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law
& the Environment, op.cit., p. 194, 207
157 See Louis Henkin, op. cit., p. 54
158 Dinah Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problems of'Soft Law', in Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment
and Compliance, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 5
For Brown Weiss E. and Jacobson H.K., compliance refers to whether countries in fact adhere to the
provisions of the accord and to the implementing measures that they have instituted. See Brown Weiss, E.,
and Jacobson H.K., Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with Environmental Accords, 1998
Riidiger Wolfrum uses also the term compliance to mean giving full effect to commitments, and
implementation to mean the adoption of appropriate laws. 272 Recueil des cours (1998), p. 29
15,5 For example, the Commission on Sustainable Development is an institution created to 'keep under
review the implementation of Agenda 21. UNGA Res. 47/191, para.4(c). Another example is the vessel
monitoring systems established in some international fishery regimes.
160ILC employs the term 'implementation' in this sense. In the context of the Draft Articles on Prevention
of transboundary harm from hazardous activities, adopted by ILC in 2001, 'Implementation' means the
measures to be taken by States. Under Article 5 entitled 'Implementation', "States concerned shall take the
necessary legislative, administrative or other action including the establishment of suitable monitoring
mechanisms to implement the provisions of the present articles." In this article, two-level structure is
implied, i.e. the State as regulator on the one hand, and operators to be regulated on the other.
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with relevant norms.161 However, 'implementation' and 'compliance' are often used
interchangeably, in legal literature as well as in legal instruments.162
In today's anarchical international society, characterized by the absence of
authority empowered to enforce international norms, many international regimes rely on
mechanisms of international governance to ensure or enhance compliance with regime
norms. Whereas compliance refers to a certain pattern of behaviour of individual actors,
governance is a system-wide mechanism aimed at ensuring compliance without
necessarily resorting to a formal authority. In this line, global governance can be defined
as "the sum of the many ways of individuals and institutions, public and private, manage
their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse
interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal
institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal
arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their
interest."163 Regime theorists propose similar definitions. For James N. Rosenau,
"governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from
legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police
powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance. Governance, in other words, is a
more encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions,
but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby those persons and
This is clearly explained in the Commentary of ILC; "To say that States must take the necessary
measures does not mean that they must themselves get involved in operational issues relating to the
activities to which article 1 applies. Where these activities are conducted by private persons or enterprises,
the obligation of the State is limited to establishing the appropriate regulatory framework and applying it in
accordance with these articles." See ILC Report, 2001, Chapter V International Liability for injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law (Prevention of transboundary harm
from hazardous activities). P.399
For the implementation of the obligations under the Convention for the protection and preservation of
the marine environment, the Convention requires States to legislation and enforcement. See Part XII,
Section 5, Section 6.
161 See Philippe Sands, Compliance with International Environmental Obligations: Existing International
Legal Arrangements, in James Cameron James Cameron, Jacob Werksman & Peter Roderick (ed.),
Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law, Earthscan, 1996, pp. 52-53
162 For example, in the regime under the Montreal Protocol, the organ which is entrusted with a set of steps
in the non-compliance procedure is entitled 'Implementation Committee' instead of'Non-compliance
Committee'.
162 The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Our Common Neighbourhood, Oxford
University Press, 1995, pp. 2-4
See also, Stephen J. Toope, Emerging patterns of Governance and International law, in Michael Byers (ed.),
The Role of Law in International Politics, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.94-108
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organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfil their
wants."164 For Oran Young, the concept of governance system is assimilated to that of a
regime; "Governance system is an institution that specializes in making collective
choices on matters of common concern to the members of a distinct social group.
Although the distinction is not a sharp one, a regime is a governance system intended to
deal with a more limited set of issues or a single issue area."165 Thus, international
governance is linked to power.166
3.1.2 Compliance system
Each regime provides a compliance system designed to elicit compliance and deter non¬
compliance with regime injunctions by strengthening animus obligandi and by assisting
its members in building their capacity to comply. Compliance system can be defined as
"the subset of the treaty rules and procedures that influence the compliance level of a
given rule."167 It can be classified into three categories: a primary rule system; a
compliance information system; and a non-compliance response system.168
Primary rule systems are traditional methods of ensuring compliance with legal
rules on the basis of coercive orders. For Hart, under primary rules, human beings are
required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or not.169 Primary rule
systems can be effective in domestic legal systems, where legal norms are backed by
164 See James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics, in James N. Rosenau and
Ernest-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.4
See also Ernest-Otto Czempiel, Governance and Democratization, in James N. Rosenau and Ernest-Otto
Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government. Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 250 "I
understand "governance" to mean the capacity to get things done without the legal competence to
command that they be done. Where governments...can distribute values authoritatively, governance can
distribute them in a way which is not authoritative but equally effective. Governments exercise rule,
governance uses power. From this point of view the international system is a system of governance."
I6- Oran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society, Cornell
University Press, 1994, p. 26 For Young, "It follows that all regimes are governance systems and all
governance systems are social institutions but not vice versa."
166 See Elizabeth Zoller, Institutional Aspects of International Governance, Indiana Journal ofGlobal Legal
Studies, vol. 3, Fall 1995. For Zoller, "Governance means setting priorities and using power to attain them"
See also Daniel Bodansky, The legitimacy of international governance: A Coming challenge for
international environmental Law? AJIL, vol. 93 (1999)
167 Oran Young, Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with international Applications, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1979, p. 3
168 See Ronald B. Mitchell, op. cit. pp. 16-24
164 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Second edition, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 81
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threats of sanctions. In international society, however, the effectiveness of primary rule
systems are much more limited due to the lack of an authority entitled to take coercive
measures against non-compliers, especially in the context of international regimes based
on non-binding hortative norms. Common measures employed in the compliance system
are liability rules, judicial dispute settlement, termination or suspension of the operation
of a treaty as a consequence of its breach,170 collective economic or military sanctions,171
etc.
Compliance information systems are designed to enhance compliance by
maximizing transparency, which can be realized by means of self-reporting,
monitoring,172 access to information,'"dissemination of information, fact-finding and
research.174 Transparency can be an effective means of inducing compliance, as Oran
Young argues; "the effectiveness of international institutions varies directly with the ease
of monitoring or verifying compliance with their principal behavioral prescriptions...
There are, in other words, many situations in which those contemplating violations will
refrain from breaking the rules if they expect their non-compliant behavior to be exposed,
even if they know that the probability that their violations will be met with sanctions is
low."175 Information systems foster coordination by facilitating the convergence of inter-
subjective expectations,176 and help 'good faith non-compliers' by elucidating the causes
of involuntary defection and by finding out effective means of capacity-building.
Non-compliance response system consists of the actors, rules, and processes
governing the formal and informal responses undertaken to induce those identified as in
170 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law Treaties, Article 60
171 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of peace,
and acts of aggression
172 On the effect of reporting and monitoring mechanisms on compliance, see Kamen Sachariev, Promoting
Compliance with International Environmental Legal Standards: Reflections on Monitoring and Reporting
Mechanisms, in Y/EL, vol. 2 (1991), pp. 31-52
173 See Le Droit a I'information en matiere d'environnement dans les pays de I'Union Europeenne, par
L'Association Eurpeenne de Droit de I'Environnement, Presses Universitaires de Limoges, 1997
See Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in
environmental matters, done at Aarhus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998 (Aarhus Convention)
174 See Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment, op.cit., pp. 205-206
175 Oran R. Young, The effectiveness of international institutions: hard cases and critical variables, in James
N. Rosenau and Ernest-Otto Chempiel (eds.), Governance without Government, Cambridge University
Press, 1992, pp. 176-177
176 See Antonia Handler Chayes, Abraham Chayes and Ronald B. Mitchell, op. cit. p.81. See also game
theory models showing how players can coordinate their action simply by correctly expecting their
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non-compliance to comply.'"Non-compliance response system or non-compliance
procedures are composed of mechanisms of fact-finding, compliance-inducement and
varying degrees of sanctions. For 'good faith non-compliers', international regimes may
provide financial assistance, education, technology transfer, joint funding mechanisms,
etc. For intentional non-compliers, international regimes may resort to different
mechanisms of public, diplomatic and legal pressures, which can be exercised through
the conference of the parties, the participation of NGOs, etc. The basic rationale
underlying non-compliance systems is the conviction that "persuasion instead of
enforcement is the appropriate cure of the malady of non-compliance and States cannot
be coerced into implementation but must be assisted thereto."178
3.2 Compliance system under the 1982 UNCLOS
3.2.1 Dispute settlement system under the 1982 UNCLOS
The 1982 UNCLOS has made an important progress in the development of compliance
system by establishing the dispute settlement system characterized by a variety of
procedures and the introduction of compulsory procedures. During UNCLOS III, the
Informal Working Group on the Settlement of Disputes arising from the Law of the Sea
Convention envisaged the creation of a flexible dispute settlement system which might
give parties to a dispute maximum freedom to choose the means of settlement suitable to
the nature of each case.179 As a result, the Convention provides a set of dispute settlement
procedures ranging from diplomatic means to compulsory procedures entailing binding
decisions.
partners' reactions. The prisoners' dilemma is a typical case where the players fail to achieve the optimal
outcome because each player has no means of mutual communication.
177 Ronald B. Mitchell, Compliance Theory: an Overview, op. cit. p. 17
178 Martti Koskenniemi, New Institutions and procedures for Implementation Control and reaction, in Jacob
Werksman (ed.), Greening International Institutions, Earthscan, 1996, p. 237
179 See A.O. Adede, Settlement of Disputes Arising under the Law of the Sea Convention, AJIL, vol. 69,
1975
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3.2.1.1 Diplomatic means of dispute settlement180
The first principle of the settlement of disputes arising between States Parties concerning
the interpretation or application of the 1982 UNCLOS is the obligation to settle disputes
by peaceful means.181 The Convention encourages States Parties to choose any of the
peaceful means of dispute settlement, 182and gives priority to diplomatic means.183
The Convention obligates the parties to a dispute to proceed to an exchange of
views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means, or on the manner
of implementing the settlement.184 Exchange of views is an effective means of settling
disputes, as Connie Peck states; "Reduced Communication Increases Misperceptions",185
and many game theory models show that communication between players may facilitate
the avoidance of conflicts.
As means of non-judicial third-party settlement, the Convention provides for
conciliation procedures.186 For some categories of disputes concerning the exercise of the
coastal State's discretionary power in EEZ (or continental shelf) and certain types of
disputes excluded from compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions by way of
optional exceptions, the Convention requires compulsory submission to conciliation.187
180 Diplomatic means of dispute settlement refers to negotiation, mediation, inquiry and conciliation, in
which the parties retain control of the dispute and a proposed settlement is not binding upon the parties.
See J.G. Merrils, International Dispute Settlement, second edition, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 80
181 Article 279. This provision is derived from Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations.
182 Articles 280, 281
The Convention does not specify other types of diplomatic means, such as good offices, mediation, inquiry.
These can be included in the category of 'any peaceful means of dispute settlement at their own choice'.
181 Article 286
184 Article 283
185 Connie Peck, The United Nations as a Dispute Settlement System, Kluwer Law International, 1996, p.
31
For Connie Peck, "Lack of communication makes it more difficult to understand the other's motivations
and exacerbates each other's fear of the other. It is interesting to note that one of the first responses to
conflict is to reduce one's contact with the other side."
186 Article 284, Annex V
187 Article 297, para.2 (b) provides for a procedure of compulsory conciliation in relation to a dispute
arising from marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf under
Articles 246 and 253.
Article 297, para.3 (b) provides lays down a procedure of compulsory conciliation in relation to a
dispute concerning the fulfillment of the obligation of a coastal State to take proper conservation and
management measures to maintain the living resources in EEZ and the exercise of the right of a coastal
State to determine the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest living resources, and to allocate the whole
or part of the surplus.
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3.2.1.2 Compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions
As legal means of third-party settlement, the 1982 UNCLOS provides a complex system
of compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions: (a) the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea; (b) the International Court of Justice; (c) an arbitral tribunal; (d) a
special arbitral tribunal.188Among these, a State is free to choose one or more, and modify
the choice on three month's notice. This variety of procedures and flexibility of choice
reflect the different positions of the delegations participating in the negotiation of the
Convention,'89 integrated finally into the package of these four procedures established by
elaborating the Montreux formula.190 Aside from these, with respect to some categories of
disputes arising from activities in the Area, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS has
compulsory jurisdiction.19'
However, the applicability of these compulsory procedures is restricted by a range
of automatic or optional exceptions. Certain types of disputes are automatically excluded
from compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions: disputes arising out of the
exercise of the rights of the coastal State with respect to the marine scientific research in
its EEZ or on its continental shelf and disputes relating to the sovereign rights of the
Article 298, para. 1 (a) (i) provides also a compulsory submission to conciliation for the disputes
concerning sea boundary delimitations and those involving historic bays or titles in certain conditions; In
case a party or parties to such a dispute has opted out the compulsory procedures entailing binding
decisions on the matter, a party may request the submission to conciliation where no agreement is reached
in negotiations between the parties within a reasonable period of time.
Annex V, Section 2 establishes the procedure of conciliation submitted pursuant to the provisions
of the Convention on compulsory conciliation.
188 Article 287, para.l
189 See Myron H. Nordquist, Shabtai Rosenne, Louis B. Sohn, United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea 1982, A Commentary, Volume V, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, pp. 41-45
A group of States argued for conferring jurisdiction over law of the sea disputes on the International Court
of Justice for the sake of the uniformity of international jurisprudence. Other States proposed the creation
of a special Law of the Sea Tribunal, which would be less conservative than ICJ, better qualified in the law
of the sea, more equitably representative of various legal systems and the different regions of the world. A
third group of States opposed the establishment of such tribunal and preferred arbitration, which is a more
flexible procedure. Still another group of States advocated a more functional approach which would
establish special procedures for each main category of disputes.
190 The informal working group on the settlement of disputes arranged a private meeting of some interested
delegations at Montreux in 1975, which proposed a formula presenting three possible choices - arbitral
tribunal, special law of the sea tribunal and ICJ. A fourth choice, special arbitration, was added in the
subsequent session held in 1976. See the Commentary, op. cit.
191 Article 187
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coastal State with respect to the living resources in its EEZ.192 With regard to certain
categories of disputes concerning maritime boundary delimitations or military activities,
and disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the United Nations is exercising
the functions assigned to it by the UN Charter, a State may declare that it does not accept
any one or more of the compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions, and this
declaration can be withdrawn or modified.192 The introduction of these exceptions was
inevitable due to the reluctance of States to submit politically sensitive issues to
compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions.194 Without these exceptions, many
States would hesitate to ratify the Convention.195 With these exceptions, which have no
functional basis, the overall integrity of the Convention is diminished.I9<' It is noteworthy
that disputes concerning the protection of the marine environment, together with disputes
concerning the freedom of navigation, are unequivocally subject to compulsory
procedures; 197 they are included neither in the category of automatic exceptions nor in
that of optional exceptions.
Each of the four forums has some particular aspects. ITLOS and ICJ have
common aspects as international judicial bodies, but they differ in their jurisdiction
ralione materiae and rationae personae. The two judicial bodies have largely
overlapping jurisdiction ratione materiae, but that of ITLOS is limited to the disputes
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the matters
specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on it,198 while
ICJ has jurisdiction in all legal disputes between States.199 With respect to some subject-
192 Article 297
These provisions have been formulated with a view to balancing the interests of the coastal States and those
of the States with major navigational interests, as well as those of the landlocked and geographically
disadvantaged States. See Myron H. Nordquist, Shabtai Rosenne, Louis B. Sohn, op. cit. p. 105
193 Article 298
194 See Myron H. Nordquist, Shabtai Rosenne, Louis B. Sohn, op. cit., p. 88
195 Since the beginning of the negotiations of the provisions concerning the settlement of disputes, various
States qualified their willingness to accept such provisions by reservations with respect to certain categories
of disputes. See Myron H. Nordquist, Shabtai Rosenne, Louis B. Sohn, op. cit., pp.38-39
196 See Alan Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of fragmentation and
jurisdiction. ICLQ, volume 46, 1997, see also Alan Boyle, Problems of Compulsory Jurisdiction and the
Settlement of Disputes Relating to Straddling Fish Stocks, The International Journal ofMarine and
Coastal Law, Volume 14, Number I, March 1999
197 Article 297, para 1
198 Annex VI. Statute of the International Tribunal for the law of the Sea, Article 22
199 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36
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matters, such as provisional measures and the prompt release of vessels, the Convention
has given preference to 1TLOS over ICJ.200
As for the jurisdiction ratione personae, ITLOS has broader competence than that
of ICJ. Whereas only States may be parties in cases before ICJ, ITLOS is open to non-
State entities also, to the extent specified in Article 305.201 In addition, with respect to
some categories of disputes arising from sea-bed activities, not only the States Parties but
also the International Sea-bed Authority, the Enterprise, state enterprises and natural or
juridical persons may have locus standi before the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of
ITLOS.202
Arbitral Tribunal and Special Arbitral Tribunal, constituted in accordance with
Annex VII and Annex VIII respectively, have common aspects as arbitral procedures.
But they are different in terms of their jurisdiction; the jurisdiction ratione materiae of
the latter is limited to technical disputes concerning the interpretation or application of
the articles of the Convention relating to (1) fisheries, (2) protection and preservation of
the marine environment, (3) marine scientific research, or (4) navigation, including
pollution from vessels and by dumping,20\vhile the former may have jurisdiction on any
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention.
The compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions under the Convention are
contrasted with the optional clause of the ICJ Statue and the Optional Protocol to the
1958 Geneva Conventions, where consensual jurisdiction is the rule, and compulsory
jurisdiction is the exception.204 Considering the fact that the Convention contains many
equivocal provisions as a result of inevitable compromises in the process of package deal
and consensus rule, the introduction of compulsory procedures entailing binding
decisions was necessary to maintain the integrity of the Convention, as Alan Boyle
asserts; "In this context, binding compulsory dispute settlement becomes the cement
which should hold the whole structure together and guarantee its continued acceptability
200 See Articles 290, 292. See also Tullio Treves, The Law of the Sea Tribunal: Its Status and Scope of
Jurisdiction after November 16, 1994, ZAORV, 1995
201 For example, the European Community, which is a party to the Convention, may have locus standi
before ITLOS, but not before ICJ.
202 Article 187 and Annex VI, Article 37. See also Tullio Treves, op. cit.
203 Annex VIII
204 The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36, para.2. and Optional Protocol of Signature
concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1958
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and endurance for all parties. Without such provision the Convention would inevitably be
interpreted and applied differently by different States, even when acting entirely in good
faith."205
Judicial proliferation by the creation of new international judicial bodies, such as
ITLOS, has raised the question of the unity of international jurisprudence. In the
negotiations on the dispute settlement system under the Convention, some States argued
for conferring jurisdiction over law of the sea disputes on ICJ, emphasizing the need for
uniformity of international jurisprudence and the danger of having too many tribunals
which might render conflicting decisions.206 Some members of ICJ, such as Judge
Shigeru Oda and Judge Gilbert Guillaume have expressed their worry about the
possibility of impairment of the unity of international law by the creation of a specialized
tribunal.207 For President Schwebel of ICJ, "differing outcomes or even the same outcome
with differing reasoning may affect the uniformity, even the coherence, of international
law." Other authors express rather positive views on the multiplicity of forums. Jonathan
Charney, without denying the possibility of uneven development in the jurisprudence of
public international law, believes that the growth in number of international forums
necessarily will serve the objective of the peaceful settlement of international disputes.208
Alan Boyle, recognizing the possibility of problems of consistency and continuity in the
jurisprudence from the proliferation of tribunals, maintains that other forms of
fragmentation - different procedures for different categories of disputes ("salami-slicing"
of disputes) - may be more problematic.20'1 Shabtai Rosenne argues that there is no
evidence to support an eventual impairment of the unity of jurisprudence by the creation
of ITLOS.210 Carl-August Fleischhauer envisions a division of labour between ITLOS
and ICJ.2" Both lines of thought are speculative arguments rather than evidential ones.
205 Alan Boyle, op. cit.
206 See Myron H. Nordquist, Shabtai Rosenne, Louis B. Sohn, op. cit., p. 41
207 See Shigeru Oda, The ICJ Viewed from the Bench, The Hague Academy, Recueil des Cows, 244:12
(1993-V1I), and Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea, ICLQ, vol. 44 (1995),
Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of International Judicial Institutions, ICLQ, vol. 44 (1995)
208 Jonathan I. Charney, The Implications of expanding international dispute settlement systems: The 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea, AJIL, vol. 90 (1996)
20<) Alan Boyle, op. cit.
210 Shabtai Rosenne, Establishing the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, AJIL, vol. 89 (1995)
211 Carl-August Fleischhauer, The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Newly
Created International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations
Law, I (1997), p. 327-33
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Although it is natural to consider that the unity of jurisprudence can be better maintained
when adjudications are monopolized by a single judicial body, it is too early to see to
what extent jurisprudence of different tribunals will diverge or converge. Considering the
fact that different judicial bodies will make decisions on the basis of the same relevant
corpus of international law, the divergence of jurisprudence will be contained within
certain limits, although the boundaries of the corpus of international law are not static.212
On the other hand, one may question why the unity of jurisprudence is the sole criterion
in evaluating a dispute settlement system? Is there no other criterion that might be as
important as the unity of jurisprudence, for example, the efficiency in settling disputes?
3.2.1.3 Achievements of the dispute settlement system under the 1982 UNCLOS
After the establishment, in 1996, of the dispute settlement system under the 1982
UNCLOS, several cases concerning the law of the sea have been brought to ITLOS or
arbitral tribunal constituted under the Convention. Except for some prompt release cases,
the disputes submitted to ITLOS for provisional measures or merits are related to the
lacunae or ambiguous provisions of the Convention.
In the Saiga case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea),212 the main legal
question, besides some auxiliary questions, was whether the coastal State was entitled to
apply its customs laws to its EEZ.214 ITLOS found that Guinea, by applying its customs
212 For Robert Jennings, "Of course the Court cannot 'make' new law in the sense that a legislature can
make law. It is, however, a process of judicial reasoning well recognized by courts and lawyers throughout
the world." Judge Sir Robert Jennings, The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Development of
International Environment Protection Law, RECIEL, vol.1 (1992), number 3
For the authors who regard international law as a continuing process of authoritative decisions, the
task of the judge is not merely finding the appropriate rule but the choice between conflicting legal claims
which have varying degrees of legal merit. In such a view, the degree of divergence between different
judicial bodies can be expected to be relatively higher. See Rosalyn Higgins, Policy Considerations and the
International Judicial Process, ICLQ, vol. 17, Part 1, January 1968
See also Hersch Lauterpacht, Development of International Law by the International Court, Grotius
Publications, 1983, p. 398-399
213 The oiltanker Saiga, flying the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, supplied gas oil to three fishing
vessels in the Guinean EEZ (at a point approximately 22 nautical miles from Guinea's island Alcatraz). The
Guinean patrol boasts, applying the Guinean customs laws establishing the customs radius up to 250
nautical miles from the coast ofGuinea, arrested and detained the vessel and its Master. The master was
charged in the Guinean court for having violated the Guinean customs laws. ITLOS, Proceedings and
Judgments, Case No. 1 (Prompt Release) (1997)
214 The main charge against the Saiga in the Guinean court was that it violated the Guinean law establishing
the customs radius up to 250 nautical miles from the coast ofGuinea, thus including Guinea's EEZ. The
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law to a customs radius, including its EEZ, acted in a manner contrary to the 1982
UNCLOS. The Convention leaves some ambiguity with regard to the residual rights in
EEZ. Guinea might have enacted the customs law, interpreting this ambiguity in its
favour. ITLOS made clear that, except Article 33, paragraph 1 and Article 60, paragraph
2, the Convention does not empower a coastal State to apply its customs laws in respect
of any other parts of the exclusive economic zone.
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Australia and NZ v. Japan) concerning the
1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, ITLOS decided on the
provisional measures, and the merits were submitted to the arbitral tribunal constituted
under Annex VII to the 1982 UNCLOS.215 In the provisional measure cases, Australia
and New Zealand, invoking the precautionary principle, requested the Tribunal to
prescribe that Japan immediately cease its unilateral experimental fishing for the
Southern Bluefin Tuna. ITLOS prescribed a series of provisional measures: It ordered the
Parties to prevent aggravation or extension of the dispute, to prevent prejudice to the
decision on the merits, to keep catches to levels last agreed, to refrain from conducting an
experimental fishing programme, to resume negotiations, and to seek agreement with
others engaged in fishing for Southern Bluefin Tuna. In deciding these provisional
measures, ITLOS did not explicitly state its position on the precautionary principle, but
the concept of the principle is embedded in the prescriptions and the reasons given by the
Tribunal.216 On the other hand, the arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the
1982 UNCLOS found that it had no jurisdiction over disputes concerning the 1993
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, which provides its own
Accordingly, the arrest and detention of the Saiga, the prosecution and conviction of its Master, the
confiscation of the cargo and the seizure of the ship were contrary to the Convention.
There were some auxiliary legal questions, such as offshore bunkering, hot pursuit, use of force,
compliance with the judgment on prompt release, reparation, financial security. ITLOS, Proceedings and
Judgments, Case No.2 (Provisional measures and merits) (1998, 1999)
215 The dispute concerning Southern Bluefin Tuna arose in the context of the regional regime under the
1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, to which Australia, New Zealand and
Japan are parties. The Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna established under the
Convention decides a TAC and its distribution among the member States. Starting in 1995, Japan has
proposed an increase in the TAC, but no agreement was reached. The Commission since 1998 has agreed
no change of the TAC. In 1998, Japan undertook what it describes as experimental fishing. In their requests
of provisional measures, Australia and New Zealand claim this to be essentially for Japanese commercial
purposes, with minimal scientific gain, thereby increasing the risk of the Southern Bluefin Tuna stock.
ITLOS, Proceedings and Judgments, Cases No. 3-4 (Provisional measures) (1999)
216 See supra. Chapter 4
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dispute settlement procedures. This arbitral award has left room for controversies in
respect of the jurisdiction of the dispute settlement system established under the 1982
UNCLOS and the dispute settlement system set down in each regional or bilateral
instrument which have the overlapping issue-areas with the Convention.217
The dispute concerning the conservation and sustainable exploitation of swordfish
stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile vs. EC) arose from the ambiguity of the
provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS on the highly migratory species. Chile requested ITLOS
to decide whether the European Community complied with its obligations under the 1982
UNCLOS to ensure conservation of swordfish, by allowing vessels flying the flag of any
of its member States to undertake fishing activities for the swordfish stocks in the high
seas adjacent to Chile's EEZ. The European Community requested ITLOS to decide
whether Chile's unilateral conservation measures relating to the swordfish stocks on the
high seas and the Galapagos Agreement were compatible with the provisions of the 1982
UNCLOS.218 Before the Tribunal decided, the parties to the dispute had reached a
provisional arrangement concerning the dispute and requested that the proceedings be
suspended.2 19
In the MOX plant case (Ireland v. UK) concerning the risks of marine pollution of
the Irish Sea from intended or accidental discharges of radioactive materials and wastes
from the MOX plant, ITLOS dealt with the provisional measures, and the merits were
submitted to the arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the 1982 UNCLOS.220
Ireland invoked the precautionary principle, but ITLOS, without clearly expressing its
position on the application of the precautionary principle, prescribed mutual cooperation
and consultation.22'
217 See Alan Boyle, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, ICLQ, Vol. 50, April 2001
218 ITLOS, Proceedings and Judgments, Case No.7 (2000-2001)
On the problems concerning the Galapagos Agreement, see supra. Chapter 3
219 See ITLOS Order 2000/3, 2001/1, ITLOS/Press 43,45, M.A. Orellana, The Swordfish Dispute between
the EU and Chile at the ITLOS and the WTO. Nordic Journal of International Law, 2002, vol.71 N°l,
pp.55-81
220 See supra. Chapter 4
221 The tribunal prescribed that Ireland and the United Kingdom to cooperate and shall enter into
consultation in order to (a) exchange further information with regard to possible consequences for the Irish
Sea arising out of the commissioning of the MOX plant; (b) monitor risks or the effects of the operation of
the MOX plant for the Irish Sea; (c) devise, as appropriate, measures to prevent pollution of the marine
environment which might result from the operation of the MOX plant.
See ITLOS, The MOX Plant Case, Order, 3 December 2001, see also supra. Chapter 4
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As such, disputes arise when real issues encounter the equivocal provisions of the
1982 UNCLOS or the new principles which emerge after the conclusion of the
Convention. The ambiguity or incompleteness of the treaty text is the very raison d'etre
of the dispute settlement system. However obscure or imperfect a treaty text might be, the
court can decide on a case by applying the categories of norms enumerated in Article 38
of the ICJ Statue, when requested to do so by the parties to the dispute over which the
court has jurisdiction.222 However, in many cases, the essence of the dispute arising from
fishing activities or marine pollution is a problem of cognizance of the fact in question
rather than a legal question. For example, in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, the points
were whether the experimental fishing undertaken by Japan (a few hundreds tones of
Southern Bluefin Tuna as stated by Japan) was purely experimental fishing or
commercial fishing and whether such fishing could have any material effect on the
Southern Bluefin Tuna stock. It is not a legal interpretation but a scientific judgment that
can give right answers to these questions. Similarly, in the MOX case, the point is not
whether the precautionary principle is an established legal rule but whether and to what
extent the operation of the MOX plant would pollute the Irish Sea by discharges of
radioactive materials and wastes, and whether the measures taken by the United Kingdom
are sufficient. In so far as the precautionary principle remains abstract, the task of
determining a threshold to apply it to a specific situation is dependent more on scientific
and socio-economic evaluations than a pure legal reasoning.
Another aspect of the nature of a dispute arising from the issues of fisheries or
marine pollution is that the interest at stake is relatively limited and divisible. This aspect
makes easier to reach an out of court agreement between the parties to a dispute.
Considering these characteristics of the disputes arising in the issue-area of the
marine environment and the flexibility and variety of the dispute settlement procedures
set out in the 1982 UNCLOS, there can be ample possibility and desirability of non¬
judicial settlement by agreement between the parties to a dispute, backed by the judicial
procedures as the last resort.
222 Article 4 of the Code Civil of France stipulates;
« Le juge qui refusera de juger, sous pretexte du silence, de l'obscurite ou de I'insuffisance de la loi, pourra
etre poursuivi comme coupable de deni de justice. »
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3.2.2 Meeting of States Parties
After the entry into force of the 1982 UNCLOS, the Meeting of States Parties to the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (SPLOS)" is convened on an annual
and ad hoc basis at the headquarters of the United Nations.223 The function of the Meeting
of States Parties is not defined in the Convention. Considering that the Secretary-General
is entrusted with the duty to report to all States on issues of a general nature that have
arisen with respect to the Convention, we may understand SPLOS to have the
competence to deal with questions relating to the implementation of the Convention and
the compliance therewith. The main tasks of SPLOS are the budgetary and administrative
matters relating to the institutions established under the Convention; the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Seabed Authority, and the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.224 Because of the ambiguity of the mandate of
SPLOS, in particular the ambiguity of the division of labour between SPLOS and the
General Assembly of the United Nations,225 the discussion on the 'Role of the Meeting of
States Parties with respect to the implementation of the United Nations Convention of the
Law of the Sea' began in the tenth Meeting of States Parties. Some delegations
maintained that the role of SPLOS should not be confined to dealing with only budgetary
and other administrative matters and certain issues pertaining to the implementation of
the Convention could be discussed by the Meeting of States Parties. Other delegations
expressed the view that an expansion of the mandate of the meeting of States parties
beyond budgetary and administrative matters was not provided for in the Convention.226
If SPLOS makes decisions on the matters relating to the functioning of the
institutions established under the Convention, such as the election of their members, the
determination of their budgets, such tasks are basic elements of the implementation of the
Convention. Besides these routines tasks, SPLOS has initiated the creation of the three
221 See supra. 1. Decision-making procedures
224 See Reports of the Meeting of States Parties, SPLOS/60 (2000), SPLOS/73 (2001), etc.
225 The General Assembly serves as a forum for general discussion on the law of the sea. In particular, it has
created an open-ended informal consultative process in order to facilitate the annual review by the General
Assembly. A/RES/54/33, 18 January 2000.
226 See Report of the tenth Meeting of States Parties, SPLOS/60, 22 June 2000. In view of the divergent
views expressed, the meeting agreed to include in the agenda of the eleventh Meeting of States Parties an
item entitled "matters related to article 319 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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trust funds, approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations.227 SPLOS has also
decided to invite an NGO to participate in the meeting as an observer.228 These are
examples of the decisions made by SPLOS in its effort to enhance the implementation of
the Convention by improving the capacity-building of developing countries and
encouraging public participation.
3.2.3 Information system
The 1982 UNCLOS provides several provisions requiring States to collect, exchange and
disseminate information on the conservation of marine living resources and the
prevention of pollution, as well as to monitor and assess the risks and effects of pollution
of the marine environment.229
3.2.4 Development and transfer of marine technology
The 1982 UNCLOS calls for States to cooperate in promoting the development and
transfer of marine technology. In particular, States are required to promote the acquisition,
evaluation and dissemination of marine technological knowledge and facilitate access to
such information and data, the development of the necessary technological infrastructure
to facilitate the transfer of marine technology, and the development of human
resources.220 Also, the Convention requires States to provide scientific and technical
227 See SPLOS/60, paras.47, 57, 60, UNGA Resolution A/RES55/7, paras.9, 18, 20
The three trust funds are (a) a voluntary trust fund to assist States in the settlement of disputes through
ITLOS; (b) a voluntary trust fund to provide training for technical and administrative staff and technical
and scientific advice as well as personnel to assist developing countries to prepare submissions and submit
information under Article 76 and annex II to the Convention; (c) a voluntary trust fund for the purpose of
defraying the costs of participation of the members of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf from developing States in the meeting of the Commission.
228 Rule 18, paragraph 4 of the Rules of procedure for Meetings of States Parties (SPLOS/2/Rev.3/Add. 1)
The Seamen's Church Institute has drawn attention to the problems faced by seafarers.
229 Articles 61, para.5, 119, para. 2, 200, 201, 204, 205, 244
See supra. Chapter 4
See also FAO Fisheries Circular No. 953 FIDI/C953 Legal Aspects of the Collection of Fisheries Data
230 Part XIV
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assistance to developing States.231 These provisions can be understood as the 'capacity-
building clauses'.232
3.3 Post-UNCLOS evolution of compliance systems
3.3.1 Development of information system
As the 1998 UN/ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters declares; "in the field
of the environment, improved access to information and public participation in decision¬
making enhance the quality and the implementation of decisions...",233 the development
of information system is essential for the furtherance of the effectiveness of regimes by
enhancing cognitive rationality. For this reason, virtually all of international regimes are
endowed with information systems.234 These systems are oriented in two directions: (a)
developing and sharing knowledge on natural phenomena in the relevant issue-areas; (b)
monitoring activities of regime members or other actors with a view to verifying
compliance.235 The first category of information systems is introduced in many
international environmental regimes in the form of the right of access to information or
the obligation to exchange information, as laid down, for example, in the ILC Draft
Articles.236 But the second category of information systems is politically sensitive and is
not yet widely accepted in international environmental regimes. Some fisheries regimes
adopt strong methods of monitoring activities of real actors, such as boarding and
inspection by observers,237and Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) through satellite
231 Article 202
232 On the concept of capacity-building, see infra, para.3.3.4
233 Preamble.
234 See supra. Chapter 3
235 See Patrick Szell, The Development of Multilateral Mechanisms for Monitoring Compliance, in
Winfried Lang (ed.), op. cit.
236 ILC, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, adopted by ILC at
its fifty-third session (2001), Articles 12, 13
237 Some examples of the instruments laying down the observation by boarding and inspection are: the
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement (Articles 21, 22), the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources (Article XXIV), the 1994 Convention on the Conservation and Management of
Pollock Resources Central Bering Sea (Article XI)
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position-fixing transmitters.238 In regimes equipped with non-compliance system, the
second category of information system is incorporated into the non-compliance system.
In regimes without a non-compliance system, the information system is built as an
independent mechanism. The importance of the information system is more and more
frequently emphasized in international environmental norms, for example, the core
element of the 'Draft articles on Prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous
activities' resides in procedural norms designed to improve the information system, such
as risk assessment, notification, exchange of information, information to the public.239 In
order to facilitate the exchange of information, some new procedures have been
developed, such as information clearing house or PIC procedure. For example, the 1995
Washington Declaration on Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based
Activities calls upon States to establish a clearing-house mechanism to provide decision
makers in all States with direct access to relevant sources of information, practical
experience and scientific and technical expertise and to facilitate effective scientific,
technical and financial cooperation as well as capacity-building.240 The 1989 Amended
London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade
has introduced the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure to help control imports of
unwanted chemicals that have been banned or severely restricted.241
3.3.2 Development of public participation
As declared in the 1992 UNCED Declaration, Principle 10, environmental issues can be
best handled with public participation. Responding to this principle, the Aarhus
Convention provides general guidelines on public participation to be ensured in three
fields: 1) public participation in decisions on specific activities; 2) public participation
concerning plans, programmes and policies relating to the environment; 3) public
238 For example, the 1994 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources Central
Bering Sea (Article XI)
23g ICL, op.cit.
240 Para. 13 (b)
241 The PIC procedure is implemented jointly by FAO and UNEP through the FAP/UNEP Joint Programme
for the Operation of PIC. The aim of PIC procedure is to promote a shared responsibility between exporting
and importing countries in protecting human health and the environment from the harmful effects of certain
hazardous chemicals being traded internationally. See UNEP, PIC home page.
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participation during the preparation of executive regulations and/or generally applicable
legally binding normative instruments.242 In each of these fields, the required methods
focus on providing right information to the public and ensuring the public's right to
express its opinion. To promote effective public participation, the public authority is
required to inform the public concerned of the subject of decisions to be made in a
sufficiently early stage of the process so that the public may have a sufficient time-frame
for effective participation. The public should be given the opportunity to comment,
directly or through representative consultative bodies.
In the contemporary world, the most influential entities among non-State actors
involved in public participation in the global environmental issues are non-governmental
organizations, whose activities are rapidly being reinforced at national, regional and
international level.241 The Charter of the United Nations has already recognized the
necessity of the cooperation of the United Nations system with NGOs. 244 But the Charter
has envisioned only consultation with NGOs, instead of participation of NGOs.245 In
general, NGOs are not allowed to participate directly in intergovernmental regimes. But
in democratic societies, there are many means by which they can be indirectly involved
in the making and functioning of many intergovernmental regimes. They may orient the
position of individual governments through their domestic activities. They may provide
State actors with relevant ideas and knowledge, or mobilize public opinion, at national,
regional or global level.246 The most remarkable success story of non-State actors in the
242 Articles 6, 7, 8
243 For the history of the development ofNGOs, see Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences ofGlobalization:
The Status ofNon-Governmental Organizations Under International Law, Indiana Journal ofGlobal Legal
Studies, vol. 6 (1999)
244 UN Charter, Particle 71; "The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its
competence..."
245 This provision of the Charter is regarded as a compromise among those who advocate NGO
participation in the United Nations' work and those who oppose such participation. See Stephen Hobe,
Global Challenge to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental Organizations,
Indiana Journal ofGlobal Legal Studies, vol. 5 Fall 1997, pp. 191-210
246 For example, IUCN has taken initiatives or participated in the preparation of conclusion ofmany
international conventions, such as the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar
Convention), the 1973 CITES, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, etc.
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international arena was the contribution of a wide range of NGOs to the 1972 UNCHE
and the 1992 UNCED.247
Activities of NGOs are not limited to the field of regime creation. They
participate in the functioning of international regimes.248 In particular, in the 1992
UNCED, NGOs have succeeded in formalizing their role in the implementation of the
agreements concluded in the UNCED. The 1992 UNCED Declaration lay down a
principle on public participation which relates mainly to the activities of NGOs.249
Agenda 21 recognizes NGOs as partners of States in the implementation,250 and calls for
States to promote communication and cooperation with NGOs.25lIn the Convention on
Climate Change, it is declared; "All Parties...shall...(i) promote and cooperate in
education, training and public awareness related to climate change and encourage the
widest participation in this process, including that of non-governmental organizations."252
In the regime under the Convention on Biological Diversity, NGOs can be admitted as
observers at meetings of the Conference of the Parties.253 In the Meeting of States Parties
to the 1982 UNCLOS also, an NGO is invited to participate as an observer.254
The most effective means to which NGOs may resort in their effort to promote
compliance with international environmental norms is their participation in the
compliance information system.255 Compared with government actors, NGOs may be
freer and more transparent, although their resources are more limited, in collecting,
disseminating relevant information and knowledge. NGOs may play an important role in
247 See Wolfgang E. Burhenne, The Role ofNGOs, in Winfried Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and
International Law, Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1995, Hilary French, The Role of non-State
Actors, in Jacob Werksman (ed.), Greening International Institutions, Earthscan, 1996
248 With respect of the role of non-State actors in the making of international regimes, see supra, chapter 2
249 Principle 10
250 Agenda, Chapter 27, para. 27.1 "Formal and informal organizations, as well as grassroots movements,
should be recognized as partners in the implementation of Agenda 21"
251 Agenda, Chapter 27, Para.27.4 states; "to ensure that the full potential contribution of non-governmental
organizations is realized, the fullest communication and cooperation between international organizations,
national and local governments and non-governmental organizations should be promoted."
252 Article 4, para 1. (i)
251 Article 23, para.5. Qualified NGOs can be admitted at the meetings of the Conference of the parties
unless at least one third of the Parties present object.
254 In accordance with the Rule 18, paragraph 4 of the Rules of procedure for Meetings of States Parties
(SPLOS/2/Rev.3/Add.l), the Seamen's Church Institute has reported to SPLOS on the problems
concerning seafarers.
255 See Celine Chamot, La participation des ONG au systeme de controle de la Convention de Berne, in
Sandrine Maljean-Dubois (dir.), I'effectivite du droit europeen de I'environnement: Controle de la mise en
oeuvre et sanction du non-respect. La documentation franijaise, 2000, pp. 67-83
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reinforcing non-compliance procedures by engaging in fact-finding, monitoring and
thereby providing information on suspected non-compliers.256 Some NGOs are officially
entrusted with the role of provisional secretariat of international conventions, or the role
of assisting the secretariat.257 NGOs may also contribute to the enhancement of
compliance by means of administrative and judicial proceedings in national courts.258
In spite of the important contribution made or expected to be made by NGOs in
the creation and functioning of international environmental regimes, many questions arise
in relation to the nature of their role. In legal aspect, the legal personality of NGOs and
the sources of the legitimacy of their role in intergovernmental regimes are ambiguous
and diverse.259 There is a large spectrum of the roles played by NGOs in and around
international regimes. In the issue-areas characterized by highly political sensitivity, such
as Nuclear Safety, etc, NGOs are excluded. In the context of the relationship with
ECOSOC, NGOs have consultative status.26" In other regimes, NGOs are accorded with
varying degrees of participation, ranging from observer or advisory status to the status of
provisional secretariat.261 In practical aspect, it would be difficult to decide what roles
will be given to which ones among the myriad ofNGOs.262
256 See Cyrill De Klemm, Les ONG et les Experts scientifiques, in Claude Imperiali (ed.), L'effectivite du
droit international de l'environnement, Economica, 1998
Greenpeace is active in monitoring compliance with international norms concerning ocean dumping,
whaling, etc. See www.greenpeace.org. TRAFFIC monitors wildlife trade in the context of the regime
under CITES. See wwvv.traffic.org.
257 In the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention), IUCN is
entrusted with the role of secretariat. Article 8 stipulates; "The International Union for the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources shall perform the continuing bureau duties under this Convention until such
time as another organization or government is appointed by a majority of two-thirds of all Contracting
Parties. In the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species ofWild Flora and Fauna
(CITES), the secretariat can be assisted by NGOs. Actually, TRAFFIC plays the role of surveillance of
trade of wild flora and fauna. TRAFFIC is the joint wildlife trade monitoring programme ofWWF and
IUCN. See www.traffic.org.
258 Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration provides; "...Effective access to judicial and administrative
proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided." See also James Cameron, Compliance,
Citizens and NGOs, in James Cameron, Jacob Werksman & Peter Roderick (ed.). Improving Compliance
with International Environmental Law, Earthscan, 1996
259 See Hilary French, The Role of non-State Actors, in Jacob Werksman (ed.), Greening International
Institutions, Earthscan, 1996
260 ECOSOC Resolution 1296, adopted to implement Article 71 of the UN Charter, establishes the
characteristics of the relationship between ECOSOC and NGOs, and the roles of three categories of NGOs.
261 See Stephen Hobe, Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of
Nongovernmental Organizations, Indiana Journal ofGlobal Legal Studies, vol. 5 Fall 1997
262 For the growth ofNGOs in number, size and scope, see Thomas Princen, Matthias Finger, and Jack
Manno, Nongovernmental Organizations in World Environmental Politics, International Environmental
Affairs, vol. 7 N°l, Winter 1995
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3.3.3 Development of financial mechanisms and resources
In many cases, States fail to comply with environmental obligations for lack of financial
resources, in spite of their animus obligandi and bona fide efforts. In such cases, the
effectiveness of regimes can be enhanced by providing some financial mechanisms
designed to assist regime members in complying with regime norms. Many trust funds
have been created to cover the costs of administering and implementing a specific regime,
including the costs of the maintenance of the secretariat, the meeting costs, the costs of
participation by developing States. Since the creation of the regime under the Montreal
Protocol, the problem of funding the "incremental costs incurred by developing States for
their compliance with their obligations under the regime" arises as a bigger issue in
building international environmental regimes.
Thousands of trust funds have been created for specified purposes, such as the
World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the World Heritage Fund (WHF), the Ozone Projects Trust
Fund (OTF), the Rain Forest Trust Fund (RFT), UNEP Convention Funds, and many
others.263 In parallel with these trust funds for specified purposes, the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF) has been developed with more general purposes.264 GEF
was first established in 1991 in the World Bank as a pilot programme in order to assist in
the protection of the global environment and promote thereby environmentally sound and
sustainable economic development.265 Reflecting the result of the debates in the 1992
UNCED, GEF was restructured on the basis of the Instrument Establishing the Global
Environmental Facility,266 adopted in 1994 in accordance with the principles of
universality,267 transparency and democracy. Composed of the Assembly, the Council, the
261 See Peter H. Sand, Trusts for the Earth: New International Financial Mechanisms for Sustainable
Development, in Winfried Lang (ed.), op. cit. pp. 167-188
264 See Helen Sjoberg, The Global Environmental Facility, in Jacob Werksman (ed.), Greening International
Institutions, Earthscan, 1996
265 Resolution N° 91-5 of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank
266 33 ILM (1994) 1273
267 Any State member of the United Nations or of any of its specialized agencies may become a Participant
on the GEF. Instrument Establishing the Global Environmental Facility, I. Basic Provisions, para. 7 The
decision-making procedures of the Assembly and the Council are hybrids of those of the Bretton Woods
System and the United Nations system. See Instrument Establishing the Global Environmental Facility, IV.
Principles of Decision-making
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Secretariat, the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel, and three Implementing
Agencies - UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank, GEF functions as a mechanism for
providing new and additional grant and concessional funding to meet the agreed
incremental costs ofmeasures to achieve agreed global environmental benefits in the four
focal areas - Climate change; Biological diversity; International waters; and Ozone layer
depletion. But the areas eligible for funding by GEF are expanding to the new fields, such
as Persistent Organic Pollutants.268 Under the operational program entitled "coastal,
marine and freshwater ecosystems", GEF has financed many regional and national
projects for the protection on the marine environment, in particular the protection of
marine biodiversity, the protection of marine and coastal ecosystems, the integrated
management of coastal zones, etc."269
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities underlies these
financial mechanisms. On the one hand, the protection of the global environment is the
responsibility to be shared by all States in the interest of the humanity as a whole. On the
other, these financial mechanisms constitute an embodiment of the principle of
differentiated responsibility in that they are designed to assist developing States to fulfil
this common responsibility by providing them with financial resources contributed
mainly by developed States.270 The additional burden to be borne for the protection of the
global environment is termed 'incremental costs'. When this burden is transferred from
developing countries to developed countries under the principle of differentiated
responsibility, it is termed 'new and additional financial resources271 or 'additionality'.272
268 The agreed incremental cost of activities concerning land degradation, primarily desertification and
deforestation, as they relate to the four focal areas, are also eligible for funding. In 2001, Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) agreed GEF as the interim financial mechanism for the
implementation of the POPs program. See www.worldbank.com
269 GEF has financed some regional projects, such as "Conservation and Sustainable Use of the
Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System Project, "Coral Reef Monitoring Network in member states of the
Indian Ocean Commission", "South Indian Ocean Fisheries". GEF has financed also many national projects
undertaken for the protection of marine biodiversity, marine and coastal ecosystems in developing
countries, such as, Benin, Colombia, Ecuador, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Mauritius, Moldova,
Mozambique, Namibia, Philippines, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, T&T, Tunisia, Ukraine, Viet Nam,
Yemen, among others. See World Bank GEF Database.
270 See David Freestone, The Challenge of Implementation: Some Concluding Notes, in Alan Boyle and
David Freestone (ed.), International Law and Sustainable development, Oxford University Press, 1999
271 See the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity Convention Article 20, para.2; "The developed
country Parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties to
meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing measures which fulfil the obligations of
this Convention..." See also similar provision in the Convention on Climate Change, Article 4, para.3.
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3.3.4 Development of capacity-building mechanisms
Technical resources may also become a limiting factor in complying with international
environmental norms. In order to enhance the effectiveness of a regime, it is necessary to
assist the States in need of technical resources in their effort to fulfil their obligations. To
this end, many international instruments lay down capacity-building clauses. The concept
and means of capacity-building differ from instrument to instrument, but their common
element is that they purport to enable developing countries to participate in the
implementation of a treaty, through technical assistance and transfer of technology and
other appropriate means.2" Agenda 21 lays much emphasis on capacity-building in its
broad sense; "The ability of a country to follow a sustainable development path is
determined to a large extent by the capacity of its people and its institutions, as well as its
ecological and geographical conditions. Specially, capacity-building encompasses the
country's human, scientific, technological, organizational, institutional and resource
capabilities...As a result, the need to strengthen national capacities is shared by all
countries."274 In the field of the marine environment. Agenda 21 underlines the capacity-
building for each programme area.275 Most international environmental instruments
contain such clauses which may serve as a legal basis for capacity-building mechanisms,
in content if not in name.276
272 See Andrew Jordan and Jacob Werksman, Financing Global Environmental Protection, in James
Cameron, Jacob Werksman & Peter Roderick (ed), Improving Compliance with International
Environmental Law, Earthscan, 1996, pp. 247-255
271 See Diana Ponce-Nava, Capacity-Building in Environmental Law and Sustainable Development, in
Winfried Lang (ed.) op.cit. pp. 131 -142
"In some cases, these types of clauses are in the form of 'provision of technical assistance', and in many
cases are associated with provisions related to the development and transfer of technology. The level of
specificity in what we could categorize as 'capacity-building clauses' depends on the nature of the treaty in
question. Thus, in some cases such provisions simply create basic obligations upon states to cooperate
directly, or through competent international obligations. In other cases, provisions have been included to
give details of the scope and nature of technical assistance and the component aspects of transfer of
technology, in order to attain the objectives of a particular international legal instrument." p. 133
274 Chapter 37
275 Chapter 17
276 The 1982 UNCLOS contains several provisions which can be interpreted as capacity-building clauses:
See Article 202 Scientific and technical assistance to developing States, Article 266 Promotion of the
development and transfer ofmarine technology.
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and many
other instruments, in particular those concluded since 1990s, contain detailed capacity-building clauses.
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3.3.5 Formation of the concept of dispute avoidance
In the course of the negotiations of the Convention in the UNCLOS III, the concept of
dispute avoidance was first proposed.277 Since then, some delegations have reiterated this
concept in the conferences of the UN General Assembly, the 1992 UNCED and the
UNEP.278 The basic elements of a dispute avoidance mechanism are: prior consultation;
reporting procedure; fact-finding; commission of inquiry.279 But these mechanisms have
already been set up in many international instruments, including the Convention. The
novelty of the concept of dispute avoidance resides in the fact that it is aimed at
preventing a dispute which is likely to occur, while traditional diplomatic means of
dispute settlement are formulated as means of settling disputes which have occurred. The
same methods can be regarded as dispute avoidance mechanisms when employed ex ante,
diplomatic means of dispute settlement when applied ex post.
The concept of dispute avoidance finds an echo in some international instruments.
For example, the 1995 Agreement lays down a provision on the prevention of disputes by
elaborating decision-making procedures.280 If non-compliance procedures are understood
as a form of 'dispute avoidance' or 'alternative dispute resolution' in the sense that resort
to binding third-party procedures is avoided, as Patricia Bimie and Alan Boyle
maintain,281 dispute avoidance systems have already been embedded in many regimes,
not in term but in content.
3.4 Conclusion
277 See A. O. Adede, The System for Settlement of Disputes under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987
278 A. O. Adede, Management of Environmental Disputes: Avoidance versus Settlement, in Winfried Lang
(ed.), op. cit.
279 Idem.
See also Zano O. Gresham and James M. Schurz, Dispute avoidance and dispute settlement in international
environmental agreements and multilateral trade agreements, UNEP, 1995
280 The 1995 Agreement, Article 28 Prevention of disputes.
281 Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment, Second edition, Oxford
University Press, 2001, p. 207
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Amidst the development of a range of means of enhancing compliance with international
environmental norms, the traditional dispute settlement system remains as a buttress of
compliance. The 1982 UNCLOS has made an important step forward in the evolution of
dispute settlement procedures, by introducing compulsory procedures and by providing a
variety of dispute settlement procedures. Some direct impact of the dispute settlement
procedures of the Convention can be found in some subsequent instruments. For example,
the 1995 Agreement incorporates the dispute settlement procedures of the
Convention,282and further extends the jurisdiction ratione personae to non-State
entities.282 The 1994 Agreement to promote Compliance with International Conservation
and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas relies on the dispute
settlement institutions of the Convention but such procedures can be used only with the
consent of all parties to a dispute.284 Indirect repercussions of the dispute settlement
system of the Convention can be found in many regimes, which, without providing such a
variety of procedures, set down a limited number of forums having compulsory
jurisdiction. Most common types of legal means of dispute settlement in post-UNCLOS
international environmental regimes are: (a) those providing the choice between two
compulsory procedures, ICJ and Arbitration, with conciliation as the default
procedure;285(b) those providing the choice between two compulsory procedures, ICJ and
Arbitration, without providing conciliation as the default procedure.28''
In the issue-areas dealing with global commons, where many norms are
formulated in the form of non-binding instruments and the causal relationship between a
282 Article 30
281 By virtue of Article I (3) which stipulates; "This Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing
entities whose vessels fish on the high seas", the dispute settlement system of the Agreement will apply to
other fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas.
284 Article IX
285 Examples of this type of instruments, i.a., are: The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, (Article 11), The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (Article 14), the 1992 UN
Convention on Biological Diversity (Article 27), the 1994 Convention to Combat Desertification on Those
Countries Experiencing Drought and/or Desertification (Article 28), the 1994 Protocol on Further
Reduction of Sulphur Emission to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(Article 9)
286 Examples of this type, i.a., are: The 1989 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention), Article 20, the 1992 Convention on the
Protection of and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Lakes (Article 22), the 1991 Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Article 15), the 1992 Convention on the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (Article 21), the 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a
Nuclear Accident (Article 11), the 1991 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection,
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particular action and its consequences is difficult to identify, the effectiveness of legal
means of dispute settlement may be limited.287 The limited utility of the legal means of
dispute settlement can be shown by the fact that few environmental disputes have been
settled through international adjudications. As a result, more and more international
regimes adopt a variety of complementary mechanisms, such as non-compliance systems,
information systems, financial mechanisms, capacity-building mechanisms, public
participation, etc.
The 1982 UNCLOS contains a range of provisions which may serve as the legal
foundation for the evolution of the regime toward these mechanisms. The Convention
sets up the Meeting of States Parties. Although the Convention does not lay down a
provision on the secretariat, the Secretary-General of the United Nations is playing the
role of the secretariat of the Convention. The Meeting of States Parties and the Secretary-
General of the United Nations may function as institutional mechanisms for a non¬
compliance system. In addition, the provisions of the Convention requiring States to
collect, exchange and disseminate information as well as monitor and assess risks and
effects of pollution of the marine environment constitute a legal foundation for a
compliance information system. The provisions on transfer of technology can develop
into a capacity-building mechanism,288 when backed by necessary financial resources.289
As its substantive norms are endowed with various evolutionary mechanisms,290
the Convention contains the procedural norms which are ready to evolve into a variety of
procedural components of an effective compliance system. This evolution can be realized
287 There are various reasons why legal process is not effective in such issue-areas: For Koskenniemi, In the
judicial or arbitral process, the parties may not agree on a procedure for determining what constitutes a
'refusal to fulfil a treaty obligation', i.e. a formal breach, or there may be no certainty that the losing party
will comply with an eventual judgment or award; or the alleged violation may concern a collective interest
(environmental or human rights treaties are obvious examples) but there is no state or body which could
claim to represent that interest. Also a formal dispute settlement system intervenes only after the breach.
See Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of the
Montreal Protocol, YIEL, vol. 3 (1992)
And dispute settlement through arbitration or judicial decision may seem simply too slow, too expensive,
too untried or too confrontational to deal with technically complex and politically sensitive questions
relative to a party's implementation. See Thomas Gehring, International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic
Sectoral Legal Systems, YIEL, vol. I (1990)
288 Art XIV^
289 Article 270 of the 1982 UNCLOS is a provision foreseeing the development of appropriate international
funding mechanisms for ocean research.
290 See supra. Chapter 3
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by way of reinterpretation of relevant provisions or adoption of subsequent agreements,
or other mechanisms of regime evolution.
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General Conclusion
The 1982 UNCLOS provides a legal basis for the comprehensive regime of the law of the
sea, covering all issue-areas of the law of the sea. This regime is composed of a variety of
sub-regimes, such as the regime of the territorial sea, the EEZ regime, the high seas
regime, the regime of islands, the regime of international straits, and so on. Since "the
problems of ocean space are closely interrelated", these sub-regimes are all
interconnected. The regime for the protection of the marine environment is also one of
these sub-regimes nested in the regime of the law of the sea. The 1982 UNCLOS contains
a set of elements sufficient to form a regime for the protection of the environment: an
issue-area; a set of substantive norms; a set of decision-making procedures; convergence
of expectations around the Convention; and a compliance system.
The issue-area of the regime for the protection of the marine environment under
the 1982 UNCLOS is composed of two categories of issues. The issues concerning
marine pollution are specific to the regime for the protection of the marine environment,
but the issues concerning the conservation of marine living resources constitute an
overlapping issue-area. In the light of the concept of ecosystem, it is evident that marine
living resources are components of the marine environment. In this sense, the issues
concerning the conservation of marine living resources constitute part of the issue-area of
the regime for the protection of the marine environment as well as the issue-areas of the
EEZ fishing regime and the high seas fishing regime. Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 has
further extended the issue-area of the regime for the protection of the marine environment
to the issues of the over-development of coastal areas.
Reflecting this complexity of its issue-area, the regime for the protection of the
marine environment is endowed with a complex set of substantive norms. The norms for
the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution laid down in Part XII of the
1982 UNCLOS are specific to the regime for the protection of the marine environment.
The norms concerning the conservation of marine living resources have a dual aspect.
They are components of either the EEZ fishing regime or the high seas fishing regime,
but they also belong to the category of the norms for the protection of the marine
environment.
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The 1982 UNCLOS provides for a set of procedural rules: 1) the decision-making
procedures for its routine functioning, as formulated in the Rules of Procedures for
Meetings of States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention; 2) the procedures for the
settlement of disputes; 3) the rules for amendment. These decision-making procedures are
applicable to the whole regime of the law of the sea and all of its sub-regimes, including
the regime for the protection of the marine environment.
Converging expectations around the 1982 UNCLOS have been manifested within
and beyond the context of the Convention. Within the context of the Convention,
converging expectations have crystallized in the ratification or accession by an absolute
majority of the States of the world. Beyond the context of the Convention, expectations
have converged in universal forums, in particular the General Assembly of the United
Nations and the UNCED, as expressed in declarations and resolutions in which
international society has reiterated the importance of the Convention as a legal
framework for the law of the sea. Converging expectations have also been shown in
many international treaties which declare their consistency with the 1982 UNCLOS as
well as many national laws and regulations adopted in conformity or compliance with the
Convention. The regime for the protection of the marine environment is also equipped
with a compliance system, composed of the information system and the dispute
settlement system.
The protection of the marine environment is an issue-area where new norms
emerge rapidly due to increasing human activities in marine and coastal areas, the
ensuing degradation of the marine environment, ever increasing scientific knowledge on
the marine realm and human awareness of the gravity of environmental problems. The
regime for the protection of the marine environment under the 1982 UNCLOS is
endowed with a variety of mechanisms for evolution, such as evolution by amendment,
evolution by additional agreements, evolution by re-interpretation, evolution by rules of
reference and evolution by the creation of sub-regimes. By virtue of these mechanisms,
the regime has evolved and is prepared to evolve adapting to the changing environment.
The amendment clauses of the 1982 UNCLOS, although rather rigid, allow the regime to
evolve by modifying its provisions. The two additional agreements, i.e., the 1994
Agreement and the 1995 Agreement, have introduced new elements into the sea-bed
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regime and the high seas fishing regime under the 1982 UNCLOS. Although the 1982
UNCLOS does not articulate some relatively new principles of international
environmental law, such as the ecosystem approach, the principle of sustainable
development and the precautionary principle, the Convention is well prepared to embrace
these principles utilizing its different evolutionary mechanisms. New technical rules
developed in other international or regional regimes with a specific issue-area can be
incorporated into the regime for the protection of the marine environment under the 1982
UNCLOS by means of the rules of reference. Many regional regimes are developing for
the protection of particular regional seas from pollution, over-exploitation of marine
living resources and over-development of coastal zones. Such regional regimes may be
regarded as sub-regimes to the umbrella regime established under the 1982 UNCLOS,
since their geographical scopes are limited to particular regional seas but their norms are
consistent with those under the Convention.
Agenda 21 adopted in 1992 UNCED has established, in Chapter 17, a
comprehensive set of objectives for the protection of the marine environment. Therefore,
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 has a special relationship with the 1982 UNCLOS: the former
sets down an action plan that international society should pursue; the latter serves as the
legal basis for the achievement of this international action plan. This relationship is
defined in Agenda 21 itself.291 In this regard, a question has been posed in Chapter 1: is
the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS adequate for the achievement of the objectives of
Agenda 21 ?292 To answer this question, the Convention can be evaluated in conceptual
terms and in real situations. Conceptually, the principles and rules set down in the
Convention are not sufficient for the achievement of the objectives of Agenda 21. It
would be difficult to expect that sovereign States be governed effectively by such abstract
or ambiguous principles and rules as provided in the Convention. In particular, the
insufficiency of legal norms is apparent in the issue-area of over-development of coastal
areas, which requires, La., effective norms for the prevention, reduction and control of
marine pollution from land-based sources. Whereas Agenda 21 pays particular attention
to the problems of over-development of coastal areas and the ecological relationship
2,1 Agenda 21, Chapter 17, para. 17.1
292 See supra, p. 51
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between marine areas and coastal areas, the 1982 UNCLOS, without providing any
particular rules, only provides a call for the establishment of national laws and
regulations and global or regional rules, standards, recommended practices and
procedures to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution from land-based sources.293
However, in an umbrella regime, the insufficiency of concrete norms is not
necessarily a critical deficiency, if the regime is endowed with efficient evolutionary
mechanisms. As a framework convention, the 1982 UNCLOS provides for norms of a
rather general nature. Insufficient and abstract norms may be supplemented through
different evolutionary mechanisms by filling its lacunae, concretizing ambiguous
provisions and incorporating new rules.
An evaluation of the real contribution by the regime under the 1982 UNCLOS to
the objective of the protection of the marine environment would require a counterfactual
argument. If the 1982 UNCLOS had not been concluded, would the marine environment
be more seriously deteriorated than it is now? The search for an answer to this question
requires not only scientific assessments of the state of the marine environment in
different times but also assessments of the hypothetical state of the marine environment
in the case that the Convention did not exist. Such a task belongs, beyond the scope of
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